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)THE EMERGENCE OF DE-FACTO STANDARDS
Increasingly, companies compete on technologies that bring together groups of users in
two-sided networks. Examples include smartphones and on-line search engines. Industries
governed by such platform technologies commonly show one emerging as the de-facto
standard. This is because these industries are prone to network externalities (i.e. when the
benefit that can be derived from a technology increases exponentially with the number of
users). Competitions for the de-facto standard are high-stakes games. These ‘winner-take-
all’ markets demonstrate very different competitive dynamics than markets in which many
competitors can coexist relatively peacefully, as they often have a single tipping point
which shifts market adoption to one particular technology. The academic field lacks a robust
clarification on how firms can shape the odds of their technology emerging as the de-facto
standard.
This study develops an integrative framework and corresponding methodology for
under standing the process by which a technology becomes the de-facto standard. By apply -
ing the framework to several technology competitions, insight is provided in how firm-,
technology- and market-related elements influence technology competitions. Results indi -
cate that the emergence of every de-facto standard displays a unique path. This path can
be divided into six phases, and can be influenced by 34 unique elements, of which 17 are
subject to strategic decision making. Patterns between technology competitions indicate a
common set of focal points per phase.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Examples of de-facto standards can be found in everyday technologies, for example the dial of a watch, 
the QWERTY keyboard, and the combustion engine powered automobile. The academic field studying 
de-facto standards is merely a few decades old, but its increasing relevance in the fields of technology and 
innovation management, and economics can be attributed to the advent of the industrial revolution and 
industrial capitalism.  
 
The industrial revolution marked a period of great technological progress, spawning many new 
complicated products such as the steam locomotive, the telephone, typewriters, electric lighting, and the 
automobile. Unlike conventional economic theory (centred around resource-based parts of the economy 
as agriculture, bulk-goods production and mining), consumers of these knowledge based products 
benefitted from being part of a group that used the same technology.1 Over time, knowledge based 
industries have become a substantial part of the economy and new economic theories complemented the 
old in order to provide insights in the dynamics of these new industries. The pioneer of these new 
economic theories, Joseph A. Schumpeter, attributed innovation as a central element in capitalism. In his 
view, capitalism is by nature an evolutionary process.2 The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the 
capitalist engine in motion comes from new consumers' goods, new methods of production or 
transportation, new markets, and new forms of industrial organization that enterprises create. This 
ongoing change is a process of ‗Creative Destruction‘, whereby the economic structure is revolutionized 
from within, incessantly destroying the old one and creating a new one. Other economists, building on 
Schumpeter, have noted that these industry revolutions are caused by shifts in context (e.g., consumer or 
industry needs)3 and in technological paradigms.4 When a paradigm shift occurs, several technological 
options compete for adoption. At some point during this competition a shake-out occurs, and one 
technology emerges as the de-facto standard.5 
 
An organization that is able to establish its technology6 as the de-facto standard can earn near-monopoly 
rents and may dominate a product category through several product generations. However, when an 
organization sponsors a technology that does not become the de-facto standard, it may be forced to 
forfeit the capital, learning, and brand equity invested in its technology. In addition, it may lose substantial 
market share to a new entrant or even find itself locked out of the market. Especially market leaders are 
prone to this. They are often among the first to identify a radical innovation but choose to bypass the 
opportunity because it cannibalizes its existing market. This ‗innovator‘s dilemma‘7 clears the way for new 
entrants to catch the next wave of industry growth, often leading to dramatic changes in industry 
leadership. Competitions for the de-facto standard are high-stakes games, and these ‗winner-take-all‘ 
markets demonstrate very different competitive dynamics than markets in which many competitors can 
coexist relatively peacefully, as they often have a single tipping point which shifts market adoption to one 
particular technology.8 
 
Increasingly, companies compete on platform technologies that bring together groups of users in two-
sided networks.9 In industries governed by platform technologies, it is common to see one emerging as 
the de-facto standard because they are especially prone to network externalities (i.e. the benefit that can be 
derived from the technology increase exponentially with the number of users). These network 
externalities can cause a market to tip towards one technology. 
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1.1 Standards, dominant designs and platforms 
In the management literature, scholars from different disciplines (e.g., evolutionary economics, industrial 
organization economics, institutional economics, and strategic management) have examined standards, as 
well as standards-based competitions, pursuing research into concepts such as ‗dominant designs‘ and 
‗platforms‘. 
 
The phenomenon captured by the concept of standards is complex, because it involves both macro 
(environmental) and micro (firm) level aspects, and standards both drive and are driven by the actions of 
firms and/or industry associations. The complexity is reflected in the significant volume of research in 
recent decades, in which scholars pursued this broad phenomenon from their own disciplinary 
perspectives. Thus the richness of the literature came at the cost of the fragmentation caused by the 
inconsistent use of terms and the lack of consensus (or standardization if you will) among scholars 
operating at different levels of analysis or treating standards sometimes as exogenous and sometimes as 
endogenous variables. 
1.1.1. What is a standard? 
A standard can broadly be defined as the consensus of different agents to do certain key activities 
according to agreed-upon rules.10 De Vries11 provides a more elaborate, complementary, definition; an 
approved specification of a limited set of solutions that determine features of different interrelated entities 
in a way that they harmonize with each other, prepared for the benefits of the parties involved, balancing 
their needs, and intended to be used repeatedly during a certain period. However, it is helpful to 
distinguish among several kinds of standards; compatibility standards, quality standards, safety standards, 
and measurement standards (i.e. the metric system).12 
 
This dissertation focuses on compatibility standards, which are a set of technical specifications that define the 
interface between two or more elements that are interoperable, e.g., a plug and a socket, or a transmitter and a 
receiver.13 A compatibility standard is often referred to as technology standard, which makes sense 
considering that technology can be defined as the specifications for a product or a process which when 
built will ‗work‘.14 These standards create value by either allowing interconnectivity directly between 
products or facilitating the provision of complementary assets.15 Compatibility standards assure the user 
that an intermediate product or component can be successfully incorporated in a larger system comprised 
of closely specified inputs and outputs. The benefits appear on both the demand- and supply side. On the 
demand side, consumers can benefit from direct network externalities, and complementary goods (e.g. 
software) become cheaper and more readily available.16 On the supply side, producers can harness 
economies of scale in manufacturing, and the cost of new product development can be reduced by 
utilizing a modular product architecture consisting of numerous components and subsystems that are 
provided by different suppliers that conform to the same compatibility standard. 
 
Another, much related concept, concerns the standard setting process; how does something become ‗a 
standard‘. While studying standards-setting processes, David and Greenstein17 differentiated between de-
facto and de-jure standards.18  
 
19_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
3 
 
De-jure standards refer to the acceptance of a set of specifications that has been developed through a 
formal process by standard development organizations,19 sometimes mandated by a governmental agency 
that has regulatory authority. De-facto standards are established by widespread acceptance through 
market competition involving 
products embodying unsponsored or 
sponsored standards. De-facto 
standards emerge spontaneously, 
through an undirected competitive 
process in which many consumers20 
exercise their choice among a 
potentially wide array of alternatives. 
Some academics21 also use the term 
‗de-facto industry standard‘. 
 
This dissertation focuses on de-facto 
standards. Over the last 30 years, de-
facto standards have emerged in 
many different industries (a non-
comprehensive overview is shown in 
Figure 1), often sponsored by 
individual firms or industry consortia. 
Figure 1: Overview of de-facto standards (adopted from Gallagher and West22) 
1.1.2. Dominant designs and standards wars 
When the concept of de-facto standards was introduced, it overlapped with the concept of ‗dominant 
designs‘ that was introduced a decade earlier by Abernathy and Utterback.23 While studying various 
industries with complex products,24 they found that the nature of technological innovation changes over 
time. In the early period of a new industry, companies focus on product innovation and implement 
different product architectures (reflecting choices from technological possibilities) that compete in the 
market. Over time, the market solidifies a preference of a design over its technological alternatives, 
marking the emergence of a dominant product design. The focus shifts to process innovations, and 
products become highly ‗standardized‘ in order to obtain production economies. Interestingly, this 
dominant design is often synthesized from individual 
technological innovations that have been introduced 
independently in prior products. When a paradigm shift 
occurs in an industry with complex products, 
innovations on different levels of a product design 
hierarchy (Figure 2) 25 compete for market adoption. 
After Abernathy and Utterback identified the 
phenomenon of dominant designs, others followed to 
refine its definition (e.g. Tushman and Anderson26, 
Utterback and Suarez27). Anderson et al.28 define a 
dominant design as a product or system is considered 
dominant if it acquires more than 50% market share of 
the product category and maintains it for four years in a 
Figure 2: Overview of product hierarchy (Source: Murmann and 
Frenken, 2006) 
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row. Srinivasan et al.29 provide an overview of definitions and adopt one that is in line with Christensen et 
al.;30 a dominant design emerges in a product category when one product‘s design specifications 
(consisting of a single or a complement of design features) define the product category‘s architecture. For 
this dissertation, the following definition is used: a product or system is considered dominant when its design 
specifications (consisting of a single or a complement of design features) define the product category‟s architecture (i.e. >50% 
market share). Similar to the concept of de-facto standards, the emergence of a dominant design is a market 
driven process whereby alternatives compete for adoption, and this eventually leads to  convergence in 
the industry whereby design specifications (consisting of a single or a complement of design features) start 
defining a product category‘s architecture.31  
 
Clymer and Asaba32, and Durand33 note that the work of Abernathy and Utterback may be the most 
seminal work on strategic management in technological innovation from that period, and the concept of a 
dominant design has become an essential building block in the innovation management literature. Due to 
the significant overlap, many researchers have used the terms ―industry standard‖ and ―dominant design‖ 
interchangeably.34 In addition, some have used alternate terms for the same concept. Cusumano et al.35 
introduced the term ‗dominant standard‘ and Schilling36 and Hill37 used this interchangeably with the term 
‗industry standard‘. In a similar avenue, Shapiro and Varian,38 and Besen and Farrell39 focus on ‗standard 
wars‘; the competition between incompatible technologies for market dominance, and between companies 
to establish their technology as the industry standard. Finally, Christensen et al.40 use the term 
‗architectural standardization‘ and use this interchangeably with ‗dominant architectural characteristics‘. 
 
The overlapping use of the terms in literature has disguised the heterogeneity of the phenomena; while a 
dominant design is the ‗industry‘ or ‗de-facto‘ standard, an industry standard is not always a dominant 
design, but can also be a compatibility or safety standard. Some academics have made efforts to 
distinguish the phenomena (Funk41, Srinivasan et al.42, and Gallagher43). Although Funk and Srinivasan et 
al. agree that the concepts of industry standards and dominant designs are very similar, they emphasize 
that compatibility standards are often elements of dominant designs. This is illustrated by referring to 
mobile phone telephony (whereby phones and base stations can have dominant designs, but must work 
with the same air-interface standard) and computers (which can have a dominant design, but require 
standards that define the interface between hardware and software). In addition, Srinivasan et al. note that 
compatibility standards serve a functional purpose, separate from market acceptance, whereas market 
acceptance is an integral aspect of a dominant design. Gallagher complements this by stating that firms 
frequently engage in discussions over standards before products are introduced because of their 
importance in facilitating consumer adoption of products, while the architecture of a dominant design can 
only be known after it has been adopted and it is rarely the subject of supra-firm deliberations. Since a 
compatibility standard can be identified before it is established, this enables managers to act strategically 
to benefit from the standard. Gallagher supports Funk and Srinivasan et al. that one or more 
compatibility standards can be encompassed in a dominant design, however he uses the concepts of 
compatibility standard and industry standard interchangeably.  He makes the point that de-facto standards 
arise as a result of market competition between compatibility standards. However, the winner of this 
competition rarely reflects the synthesis of attributes seen in dominant designs. 
 
In this dissertation, we define the relationship between the concept of standards and dominant designs as 
follows: products or systems that achieve a dominant position can 1) adhere to standards regarding safety, 
quality, etc., 2) use components or interfaces that are regarded as de-facto standard (such as the 
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QWERTY keyboard), 3) play an important role in establishing new standards (as happened in the case of 
electricity supply44), and 4) itself become an industry standard (as with the IBM personal computer 
architecture). 
1.1.3. Platforms 
With the trend of modular product architectures, the concept of ‗platforms‘ (often used interchangeably 
with ‗industry platform‘ and ‗technology platform‘) has recently become popular. When Wheelwright and 
Clark45 introduced the term ‗platform product‘ (i.e. products that meet the needs of a core group of 
customers but designed for easy modification into derivatives) in their seminal work on product 
development, there was little overlap with the concepts of ‗de-facto standards‘ or ‗dominant designs‘. 
However, the concepts became intertwined as research continued towards ‗platform technologies‘46 and 
‗platform leadership‘.47 Industrial economists adopted the term ‗platform‘ to characterize products, 
services, firms or institutions that mediate transactions between two or more groups or agents.48 Their 
work broadened the empirical scope to include on-line recruitment and realtors (an overview of ‗platform 
technologies‘ is provided by Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: Overview of platform technologies (adopted from Eisenmann et. al, 2006)49 
 
Recent work by Gawer50 aims to clarify the different facets of platforms. In this work, a platform is 
defined as a product, technology or service that consists of core components and interfaces (often 
codified into technical specifications or compatibility standards to facilitate interoperability) which allow 
the core components to operate with complements as one system.51 These complements often exhibit 
high variety and may change over time. Gawer notes that platforms are designed and used inside firms, 
across supply chains, or as industry platforms.52 For this dissertation, the focus is on industry platforms, 
which serve as foundations upon which other firms can build differentiating and complementary 
products. Examples include the Compact Disc, VHS and DVD. Industry platforms bring together groups 
of users in two-sided networks; the supply network (which provides complementary products) and the 
demand network.53 The platform‘s value to a user depends on the size of the network on the other side,54 
and jump-starting the network externalities requires solving a ‗chicken-and-egg problem‘.55 For this 
dissertation, platforms are defined as technological systems that facilitate the interaction between a demand and supply 
network. 
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Although a platform does not necessarily represent technological dominance, its modularity in design 
increases customers‘ expectation for interchangeability of components across compatible platforms.56 
Similar to dominant designs, platforms may occur on multiple levels of a product‘s architecture: a per-
sonal computer is a platform, just as its operating system. 
1.1.4. Integral view on the different facets 
The previous sections have shown that the field of de-facto standards is marked by overlapping concepts 
that highlight different facets of the phenomenon. I define a de-facto standard as a compatibility standard, 
platform, or product design specification that has obtained widespread acceptance (>50% market share in terms of worldwide 
yearly unit sales) through market competition. Figure 4 shows the three concepts, notes their main characteristic, 
and illustrates the overlap of the concepts based on several well known de-facto standards. 
 
Figure 4: Overlap between concepts of compatibility standards, dominant designs and platforms 
 
As the de-facto standard examples show, some incorporate all three facets while others incorporate only 
one or two. For example, during a particular period the Compact Disc was the dominant design for audio 
storage and distribution, but it could also be characterized as a compatibility standard and a platform 
technology. Previous studies have found that the market adoption of compatibility standards, platforms 
and product design specifications is governed by concept-specific dynamics. For example the two-sided 
network externalities which are experienced in industries with platform technologies. Therefore, lessons 
from the market adoption of MP3 cannot simply be applied to for example the case of the Ford Model-T. 
 
The three concepts can also be simultaneously applicable to different levels of a product‘s architecture; in 
the case of automobiles, at some point the Ford Model-T became the dominant design, gasoline powered 
engines are platforms that facilitate the interaction between fuel stations and car owners, and the opening 
of the gas filler hose adheres to physical requirements described in a compatibility standard. 
 
The focus of this dissertation is on de-facto standards which can be characterized by two or three of the 
definitions for dominant design, compatibility standard or platform (i.e. the four middle sections of Figure 
4). Considering that a compatibility standard, platform or a products‘ design specifications can only be 
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referred to as de-facto standard after it has gained widespread acceptance, in the remainder of this 
dissertation I will refer to these simply as ‗technology‘ when widespread acceptance has not occurred yet. 
1.2 The emergence of de-facto standards 
As has become apparent in the previous section, a de-facto standard emerges as outcome of a 
competition between technologies, whereby the winner is selected by the market. This section provides an 
overview of the research on the emergence of de-facto standards. Recently, Narayanan & Chen57 and Van 
de Kaa et al.58 have provided a comprehensive overview of the literature regarding the emergence of de-
facto standards. As the approaches in both studies overlap, I merged their frameworks to structure my 
overview. 
 
The emergence of de-facto standards (albeit compatibility standards, platforms, or dominant designs) has 
been studied from multiple perspectives and disciplines. In order to structure these perspectives, we adopt 
the organizing framework of Astley and Van de Ven,59 as suggested by Narayanan & Chen. Astley and 
Van de Ven developed a two-dimensional framework to integrate the fundamental approaches of 
organizational theorists. This framework is based on two dimensions, 1) the level of analysis (macro 
versus micro) and 2) the deterministic versus voluntaristic nature of firms. The level of analysis 
differentiates between theories on an industry level (macro) and on a single firm level (micro). The second 
dimension differentiates theories that propose that phenomena are determined by exogenous forces and 
those that propose that phenomena are created and driven by endogenous forces. Crossing these two 
dimensions leads to four ―central perspectives‖: 1) natural selection, 2) system structural, 3) strategic 
choice, and 4) collective action. These central perspectives match with the academic disciplines identified 
by Van de Kaa et al. The natural selection view has been advocated by evolutionary economists, which 
regard the survival of a firm as the result of a process of natural selection. The system-structural and 
collective-action views have been advocated by scholars in the field of industrial economics, which have 
studied the dynamics of the emergence of de-facto standards and the ability of firms to adapt to 
technological changes. The strategic-choice view has been advocated by institutional economists, which 
have focused on strategic behaviors of firms to establish their technology as the de-facto standard. Figure 
5 shows the framework of Astley and Van de Ven, and the allocation of the academic disciplines. 
 
Figure 5: Organizing framework of Astley and Van de Ven, and allocation of academic disciplines 
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In the upcoming sections, we first describe the natural-selection view, which views the emergence of a de-
facto standard as an exogenous process along the line of thinking of the punctuated equilibrium model. 
Subsequently, we take the system-structural perspective to show the influence of market mechanisms (e.g. 
network externalities) and the ability of firms to adapt to technological change. Then we move over to the 
collective action view, to show how firms can collaborate (e.g. game theory) and how groups of firms 
compete to establish a de-facto standard. Lastly, we discuss the strategic-choice view, that takes a resource 
and capability perspective and argues that innovation is an endogenous process whereby firms can shape 
opportunities. 
1.2.1. Evolutionary economics and the natural-selection view 
Evolutionary economists have provided several models of technological change. In these models, two 
concepts from evolutionary theory appear to be particularly relevant: 1) the punctuated equilibrium 
model, and 2) the variation-selection-retention structure.60 Punctuated equilibrium characterizes biological 
evolution as extended periods of stasis, followed by periods of short, feverish evolutionary change.61 
Mokyr62 noted the similarity, pointing out that technological progress can be characterized by long periods 
of incremental improvement, interrupted by an event of radical innovation. Concerning the second 
concept, Dosi63 notes that an industry‘s economic and social environment first selects the ‗direction of the 
mutation‘ (i.e. the technological paradigm) and then selects among mutations within that paradigm in a 
‗Darwinian manner‘ (i.e. the market functions as a system of rewards and penalizations, leading to 
selection amongst technological innovations). 
 
One of the models supporting the punctuated equilibrium 
model, is the classic ‗S‘ curve of technology development 
(Jantsch64 and Foster65). As illustrated by Figure 6, this 
model proposes that technology adoption typically follows 
a business cycle represented by an S-curve.66 During the 
early phase a new technology is introduced into the market 
but its adoption is limited to a small group of early 
adopters and small niche markets. As the product gains 
ascendancy, new capabilities are introduced and refined 
with the goal of meeting the needs of the broadest 
possible segment of mainstream users. During this middle 
phase a de-facto standard begins to emerge, winning the 
allegiance of the market place. The de-facto standard in 
turn allows heightened competition as new entrants realize 
opportunities for further innovation based on cost and scale as well as product performance. This is the 
period of rapid and greatest growth as a technology matures and reaches the mainstream.  During the 
final phase the product reaches market saturation and hits a plateau. As the market plateaus incumbent 
firms are increasingly challenged to realize incremental innovation while maintaining market advantage 
through a variety of management strategies. At one time, a new technology is introduced, which replaces 
the old technology. At a point in time, the new technology also reaches maturity, and inevitably faces 
extinction when replaced by another technology.  
 
Figure 6: S-curve of technology adoption (Source: 
Foster, 1986)  
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The S-curve model is complemented by the 
model of product and process innovation of 
Utterback and Abernathy.67 Their model68 
(Figure 7) shows how the character of 
technological innovation changes over time. 
Utterback and Abernathy argue that in the 
formative years of a technological 
innovation (the fluid phase), there is 
considerable experimentation with product 
design and operational characteristics. The 
phase is characterized by high product 
innovation, with much less attention given 
to the processes by which products are 
made. New product technology is often crude, expensive and unreliable, but it is able to fill a function in a 
way that is highly desirable in some niche markets. The period of fluidity typically gives way to a 
transitional phase in which the rate of major product innovation slows down and the rate of major 
process innovations speeds up. The basis of competition shifts from performance and technological 
characteristics to price and cost considerations. At this point, product variety is superseded by standard 
designs (i.e. dominant design or de-facto standard) that have proven themselves in the market as best 
satisfying user needs. 
 
Building on Abernathy and Utterback‘s 
dominant design concept, and the 
related model of product and process 
innovation, Teece69 and Tushman and 
Anderson70 define two phases in a 
product/industry life cycle. The first is 
the phase before the dominant design, 
which Teece refers to as the 
‗preparadigmatic design phase‘ and 
Tushman and Anderson refer to as the 
‗era of ferment‘. According to 
Anderson and Tushman,71 this phase is 
characterized by two distinct selection 
processes: competition between 
technological regimes and competition 
within the new technical regime. The 
second is the phase after the dominant 
design, which Teece refers to as the ‗paradigmatic design phase‘, and Tushman and Anderson refer to as 
the ‗era of incremental change‘. Anderson and Tushman state that during this phase the selected technical 
regime evolves through relatively long retention periods marked by incremental technical change, which 
may be disrupted by technological breakthroughs. Complementing these views, Tushman and 
Rosenkopf72 define technology cycles comprised of four components; technological discontinuities, eras 
of ferment, dominant designs, and eras of incremental change (Figure 9). In addition, they argue that the 
organizational and inter-organizational impact of technology cycles differs with the complexity of the 
Figure 7: Model of product and process innovation (Source: Utterback, 1994) 
Figure 8: Level of organization and inter-organizational impact of technology cycles 
(Source: Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992) 
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product, whereby they differentiate between non-assembled products, simple assembled products, and 
complex products which can either be a closed or an open system (illustrated by Figure 8). 
 
But when is an innovation 
considered a technological 
breakthrough? Abernathy and Clark73 
propose that the competitive 
significance of an innovation 
depends on what it does to 1) the 
value and applicability of established 
competence (competence destroying 
innovations render obsolete the 
expertise required to master the 
technology that it replaces), and 2) 
the linkage to the market/customer. 
By combining these two aspects into 
a two-dimensional diagram called the 
‗transilience map‘ (Figure 10), they derive four different categories of innovations; architectural 
innovations, revolutionary innovations, niche creation innovations, and regular innovations. An 
architectural innovation departs from established systems of production, and in turn opens up new 
linkages to markets and users. These innovations lead to the creation of new industries (e.g. xerography or 
radio) as well as the reformation of old ones by re-defining the basic configuration of a product or 
process. Revolutionary innovation is innovation that disrupts and renders established technical and 
production competence obsolete, yet is applied to existing markets and customers. An example is the 
closed steel body that came to dominate the car industry in the 1920-1930s. A ‗niche creation‘ innovation 
concerns opening new market opportunities through the use of existing technology, while conserving and 
strengthening established designs of technical systems. For example, the combination of light weight 
earphones and a portable cassette player in Sony‘s Walkman used established technologies to create a new 
niche in personal audio products. Regular innovations involve change that builds on established technical 
and production competence and is applied to existing markets and customers. Although the changes 
involved in these innovations may 
be minor when examined 
individually, they cumulatively have 
a great effect on lowering product 
cost, and increasing reliability and 
performance. Clark74 adds that a 
dominant design marks the 
transition from an ―architectural 
phase‖ wherein fundamental 
characteristics are defined, to a 
―regular phase‖ where the 
established technical and market 
linkages are strengthened. We find 
that, given the broader notion of 
de-facto standards, architectural, 
Figure 9: Technology cycles (Source: Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992) 
Figure 10: Transilience map (Source: Abernathy and Clark, 1985) 
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revolutionary and niche-creation innovations are all capable of disrupting equilibrium and can lead to the 
emergence of a new de-facto standard. 
 
The evolutionary ‗variation-selection-retention‘ structure is reflected in the theory of path dependency. 
Sydow et al.75 distinguish three phases in the process of creating path dependencies (Figure 11): 
1) The pre-formation phase wherein the range of options in the choice of a solution is broad; 
2) The formation phase wherein self-reinforcing processes narrow the range of options, and the process 
becomes partly irreversible – a path is evolving; 
3) The lock-in phase. The dominant decision pattern only leaves room for very limited change, this 
pattern becomes deeply embedded in organizational practice and is replicated. 
 
 
Figure 11: Three phases of path dependency (Source: Sydow et al., 2009) 
The most prominent example of technological path dependence is the QWERTY keyboard. The 
QWERTY keyboard has retained its position as de-facto standard for over 100 years, while the technical 
rationale of the QWERTY lay-out (mitigating typebar clashes) has long been gone and more efficient 
alternatives are available. David76 explains this as the result of a path-dependent process which has been 
subject to network externalities and technological lock-in. In the following sections, we will go into more 
detail about these concepts. 
 
We finalize the natural selection view by noting that the selection mechanism itself not necessarily 
converges an industry to a single solution, but rather towards a duopoly or oligopoly. Examples include 
the personal computer and video game console industry.77 According to Shapiro and Varian78 
technological competitions can end in a truce (whereby two technologies coexist peacefully together), a 
duopoly/oligopoly (whereby two or multiple technologies battle toe-by-toe), or a fight to the death. The 
coexistence of competitive technological systems is influenced by regulatory regimes, strong divergence of 
customer need or technological functionality, lack of technological selection criteria79, weak network 
externalities, and the industries‘ appropriability regime.80 In a study on 63 office products and consumer 
durables, Srinivasan et al.81 found that no de-facto standard had emerged in 52% of the product 
categories. 
1.2.2. System-structural view 
Research on the system-structural perspective has focused on market mechanisms and firm adaptation to 
technological change. We start by discussing the market mechanisms. 
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Conventional economic theory is built on the assumption of diminishing returns.82 Economic actions 
engender a negative feedback that leads to a predictable equilibrium for prices and market shares. An 
example is the competition between water and coal to generate electricity. As hydroelectric plants take 
more of the market, engineers must exploit more costly dam sites, thereby increasing the chance that a 
coal-fired plant will be cheaper. As coal plants take more of the market, they bid up the price of coal. The 
two technologies end up sharing the market in a predictable proportion that best exploits the potentials of 
each. The parts of the economy that are resource-based (e.g. agriculture and mining) are subject to 
diminishing returns. However, parts of the economy that are knowledge-based (e.g. computers, 
automobiles, and telecommunications equipment) are subject to increasing returns. Increasing returns are 
mechanisms of positive feedback that reinforce that which gains success or aggravate that which suffers 
loss.83 Products in these industries are complicated to design and to manufacture. They require large initial 
investments in research, development and tooling, but once sales begin the incremental production is 
relatively cheap. 
 
The phenomenon of increasing returns in the context of standards was first described by David in his 
seminal paper on the rise of the QWERTY keyboard as the de-facto standard.84 He found that the advent 
of ‗touch typing‘ enhanced the need for ‗system compatibility‘ between keyboard hardware and the 
‗software‘ represented by the touch typist‘s memory of a particular arrangement of the keys. As a result, 
the value of a typewriter as an instrument of production became dependent on the availability of 
compatible software created by typists‘ decisions regarding the kind of keyboard they should learn. The 
purchase of a potential employer of a QWERTY keyboard conveyed a positive pecuniary externality to 
compatibly trained touch typists, to the degree to which this increased the likelihood that subsequent 
typists would choose to learn QWERTY. The overall user costs of the QWERTY typewriter system 
decreased as it gained in acceptance relative to other systems. These decreasing cost conditions led to 
QWERTY becoming the de-facto standard in keyboard design. David also notes that the cost of 
acquiring specific touch typing skills were high and therefore ‗quasi-irreversible‘, whereas the cost of 
typewriter hardware rapidly decreased with volume production. In addition, with the introduction of 
novel non-typebar technologies, typewriter manufacturers were freed from fixed-cost bondage to any 
particular keyboard arrangement and could cheaply switch to QWERTY to achieve compatibility with the 
existing stock of QWERTY programmed typists. The costs incurred by technology users to move from 
one technology to another are referred to as ‗switching cost‘.85 High switching cost may lead to ‗excess 
inertia‘, 86 impeding the collective switch from a de-facto standard to a possibly superior new technology.87 
 
In addition to David, Katz and Shapiro88 found that there are many products for which the utility that a 
user derives from consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents consuming the 
good. They differentiate between two types of increasing returns: direct- and indirect network 
externalities.89 The direct externalities relate to a physical effect of the number of purchasers, whereby the 
utility that a customer derives from purchasing a product (for example a telephone) depends on the 
number of others that have joined the (telephone) network. Indirect externalities relate to the ‗hardware-
software paradigm‘ whereby someone purchasing hardware will be concerned with the number of others 
purchasing similar hardware because this has a positive influence on the amount and variety of software 
that will be supplied for use with this hardware, thereby increasing its utility. Indirect externalities can also 
refer to the quality and availability of a service network. The scope of the network that gives rise to the 
consumption externalities varies across industries. The consumption externalities give rise to demand-side 
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economies of scale, which are influenced by consumer expectations. Later, Liebowitz and Margolis 
differentiate between ‗network effects‘, referring to the circumstance in which the net value of an action is 
affected by the number of agents taking equivalent actions, and ‗network externalities‘ which refers to 
‗network effects‘ in which the equilibrium exhibits unexploited gains from trade regarding network 
participation.90 
 
The value of direct network externalities can be explained according to Metcalfe‘s law91 which states that 
if   people are in a network, and the value of the network to each of them is proportional to the number 
of other users, the total value of the network to all the users is proportional to            . So if 
the value of a network to a single user is €1 for each other user in the network, then a network size of 10 
has a total value of €90. A tenfold increase in the size of the network leads to roughly a hundredfold 
increase in its value. Metcalfe's Law is related 
to the fact that the number of unique 
connections in a network of a number of 
nodes ( ) can be expressed mathematically as 
the triangular number         , which is 
proportional to    asymptotically. In more 
simple terms, if there are 5 telephones, 
these can be linked using 10 unique 
connections (illustrated by Figure 12). 
    
Arthur92 found that complex technologies often display increasing returns to adoption in that the more 
they are adopted, the more experience is gained with them and the more they are improved. In addition, 
he finds that in insignificant ‗chance‘ or ‗essentially random‘ events in the beginning of the competitive 
process can provide one technology with an initial market adoption advantage. The increasing returns to 
adoption magnify the initial advantage in market adoption by positive feedback loops and ‗tip‘ the market 
towards one technology. Increasing returns reinforce the evolutionary character of technology 
competition, whereby random events can set a sequence of events in motion that will lead to one 
technology emerging as the de-facto standard. As a consequence, industries can get locked into an inferior 
path of technological development, because network externalities have a greater impact on market 
adoption than technological superiority.93 
 
Following a study of the personal computer industry, Hill94 introduced a model that depicts increasing 
returns as a positive feedback loop whereby a technology‘s increase in installed base (number of users) 
leads to a greater availability of software applications (complementary assets). This has a positive impact 
on the value of a particular machine to consumers and leads to greater demand for those machines, which 
translates into a greater installed base. Gallagher and West95 extend this model into a more comprehensive 
version (Figure 13) that includes moderators of the positive feedback loop and several actionable steps 
available to a technology‘s sponsor to increase market adoption. As we describe the steps that a 
technology sponsor can take to increase market adoption in another section, we limit the model‘s 
explanation to a few of the additions. Gallagher and West argue that although the supply of software is 
positively influenced by the number of users, when competing technologies are incompatible the 
complementary assets are sometimes specifically developed for one or the other technology. Before 
market share trends become clear, technology sponsors can provide incentives to software producers to 
Figure 12: Number of unique connections as a function of the number of nodes in a 
network (Source: www.wikipedia.org, network effect) 
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invest in ‗co-specialization‘.96 These costs can be reduced by converters (allowing software to be used on 
the competing technology) or when a technology sponsor vertically integrates its business in order to 
provide software itself. While the product utility increases with the increase of the software supply, 
Gallagher and West note that the utility creation of indirect network effects can display three patterns; 
monotonic (each new complement increases the consumers‘ utility), declining returns (the value for each 
additional complement is slightly less) and critical value (at some point additional complements no longer 
provide additional utility for consumers). The ‗usage pattern‘ of the complementary assets determines a 
technology‘s pattern for indirect network effects. For example, the video recorder and game console 
industry are centered on variety seeking buyers and therefore the indirect network effects display a 
monotonic pattern. 
 
Figure 13: Technology adoption model incorporating positive feedback (Source: Gallagher and West, 2009) 
 
Besides the concepts of network externalities and switching cost, the concept of technological lock-out 
affects firm adaptation to technological change. As described in the section on the natural-selection view, 
a de-facto standard reflects the selection of a technology over a variety of alternatives. These alternatives 
are sponsored by a variety of firms, and several scholars have noted that the ‗technological shake-out‘ 
coincides with an ‗industry shake-out‘. 97 In a study on the impact of architectural innovation (and thereby 
dominant designs) on established firms, Henderson and Clark98 find two reasons why such innovations 
create problems for established firms: 
- Radical innovations requires new modes of learning and new skills, but information that might 
warn the organization may be screened out by the information filters and communication 
channels that embody old architectural knowledge. They misunderstand the nature of the threat, 
shoehorn the unexpected new information, and fall back into the patterns with which they are 
familiar. 
- Once an organization has recognized the nature of an architectural innovation, it faces the 
challenge to build and apply new architectural knowledge effectively. 
 
This problem was popularized by Christensen,99 who coined it as ‗the innovators dilemma‘. Bower and 
Christensen100 argue that a company‘s information filters are based on the feedback that these firms 
receive from their existing customers. This leads to investments in incremental innovations, aimed at 
improving the existing technology.  Therefore, an excessive customer focus prevents firms from creating 
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new markets and finding new customers for the products of the future. They unwittingly bypass 
opportunities and clear the way for entrepreneurial companies to catch the next wave of industry growth. 
In their study of the disc drive industry, Bower and Christensen found that many of the disruptive 
technologies never surpassed the capability of the old technology, instead companies would have been 
more successful had they focused on the trajectory of a new technology compared with that of the 
existing market. For example, the reason why the personal computer took over from the mainframe 
computer was not because personal computers outperformed mainframe computers, it was because 
personal computers networked with a file server met the computing and data-storage needs of many 
organizations more effectively. In later research, Christensen et al.101 provide three lessons for market 
entry and probability of survival: 
1) When entering an industry, managers should define if a de-facto standard has emerged. If this is 
not the case, they should specifically monitor any convergence toward a de-facto standard. 
2) Firms conforming to the de-facto standard have an increased probability of survival, regardless of 
whether the firm has entered its industry before or after the de-facto standard has emerged. 
3) Firms that have entered the industry at a very early stage have a low probability of survival. The 
capabilities that such firms develop in the early, fluid, low-volume phase of the industry may 
render them uncompetitive in a post de-facto standard environment characterized by faster design 
cycle times, steeper ramps to volume production, and low cost manufacturing. 
 
The second lesson is also supported by the findings of Tegarden et al.102 In their case study regarding the 
personal computer industry, they found that firms were not doomed when their entry design choices were 
not reflected in the de-facto standard; the firms that had made the ‗wrong‘ choices were able to switch to 
the de-facto standard and this improved their probability of survival. Suarez and Utterback103 and Baum et 
al.104 complement this by showing that firms that enter an industry before the emergence of a de-facto 
standard have a greater probability of survival than firms that enter after a de-facto standard has emerged. 
Once a de-facto standard has emerged, early entrants have an advantage over new entrants in terms of 
market knowledge, distribution networks, reputation, experience effects, specialized processes and 
economies of scale. 
 
In her research on technological lock-out, Schilling105 notes that when an industry is in the process of 
selecting a de-facto standard, firms may be technologically locked out when their technology is rejected in 
favour of a competing technology. Alternatively, in markets where a de-facto standard exists, a firm may 
be technologically locked out if it is unable to produce products according to the de-facto standard. 
Schilling provides a model of the elements influencing the likelihood of technological lockout (Figure 14). 
She identifies four elements (failure to invest in learning, lack of complementary goods, insufficient 
installed base, and timing of entry) that have a direct influence, and three elements (margin of 
technological improvement, entry barriers and network externalities) that have an indirect influence. 
Schilling argues that firms can influence these elements and use them strategically to reduce the likelihood 
of technological lock-out. 
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Figure 14: Framework of elements influencing likelihood of technological lock-out (Source: Schilling, 1998) 
1.2.3. Collective-action view 
According to the collective action view, technological change can be driven by a process in which a 
coalition of firms with conflicting views confront each other and engage in political behaviors to co-create 
new technologies and aim to establish these as de-facto standard.106 In this section, we first focus on the 
drivers for collaboration or competition between firms, and subsequently we discuss the forms of 
collaboration. 
 
As described above, markets that are subject to network externalities tend to converge to a de-facto 
standard and become locked into this technological path. Besen and Farrell107 note that a firm that 
controls a technology that becomes established as a standard can have an extremely profitable market 
position. Examples include IBM‘s historical dominance of the mainframe computer industry and the 
dominance by Microsoft operating systems and Intel microprocessors in the personal computer industry. 
When one technology can provide network benefits that another cannot provide, there is a discrepancy in 
value which a fortunate firm may be able to extract as profit. Because the prize is so tempting, firms may 
compete fiercely and increase their chances of winning by investing more on product enhancements, 
advertising, or price reductions. This competition may result in a ‗spending war‘ that dissipates (part of) 
the potential gains. Besen and Farrell substantiate this by modeling a situation whereby two firms 
compete by investing resources in e.g. advertising or price reductions. Firm 1 spends  , and Firm 2 
spends  . Whichever firm ―wins‖ gets  , and the one that loses gets the smaller amount  . Firm 1‘s 
chance of winning is             , with    . Likewise, Firm 2‘s chance of winning is given by 
            . Note that if    , the probability that each firm will win is 1/2, independent of how 
much the firms spend. However, as   gets larger, small differences between   and   result in larger 
differences in the probability of winning. Thus a large value of   implies that extra effort can have a large 
expected payoff. The Nash equilibrium can be used to determine the optimal amount that each firm 
should invest in its attempt to win. Firm 1 takes   as given, and chooses   to maximize its expected net 
gain: 
 
33_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
17 
 
          
  
        
      
  
      
      
 
Taking   as given, Firm 2 chooses   in the same way. Hence Firm 1‘s reaction function is given by: 
 
        
         
            
 
and Firm 2‘s reaction function is given by: 
 
        
         
            
 
Combining these two reaction functions, we get the following symmetric Nash equilibrium: 
 
        
 
 
       
 
Thus, the total net profit for the two firms is:     
 
 
       . 
 
Now, suppose that  = €1000,   = 0, and   = 1. Then each firm will spend €250 trying to win, and total 
net profits will be €500. If   = 2, each firm will spend €500 trying to win, and total profits will be 0. 
Finally, if   = 3, each firm will spend €750, and total profits will be -€500, i.e., one firm will win and have 
a net gain of 1000-750 = €250, and the less fortunate firm will simply lose €750.108 Although the total net 
profit is positive at the beginning of the competition, the outcome can be worse than dissipating potential 
gains when sponsors alternate in making investments. In such cases, the competition takes on 
characteristics of what is known in game theory as a ‗War of Attrition‘ or ‗auctioning the dollar‘ game 
where there is no limit to the amount that a firm will spend to win once it has chosen to play.  
 
Competition to become the de-facto standard may also delay market growth because buyers are hesitant 
to take risk and invest in a technology that may become obsolete, instead they will postpone technology 
adoption until the technology competition has generated a result. The alternative is that firms agree to 
support the same technology and to make their product compatible. This channels competition into 
different, more conventional, dimensions such as price, service, and product features. This leads firms to 
face the question whether inter-technology competition (‗for the market‘) will be more or less profitable 
than intra-technology competition (‗within the market‘). Besen and Farrell, and Grindley109 define two 
models (strategic games) that mark the form of the competition. These models are based on two 
competing firms, but Besen and Farrell note that with more than two firms, competition will involve 
elements of these models. 
 
The first model is known in game theory as the ‗Battle of the sexes‘. If technological compatibility is 
overwhelmingly important in an industry, then firms will prefer intra- to inter-technology competition. 
This game results in a bargaining problem, whereby the firms will need to agree which technology is 
preferable. Both firms want compatibility but each prefers their own technology, for example because the 
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thorough understanding of the technology provides the firm with advantages over its rivals in using it. 
The ‗Battle of the sexes‘ game is shown in Figure 15, which lists the pay-offs to two competitors 
according to whether they lead or follow (Grindley differentiates a firm‘s position as ‗lead‘, referring to 
the role of technology sponsor, or ‗follow‘ which refers to a 
adopting another firms‘ technology). When both firms set out 
to lead, there is a technology competition and the expected 
payoff to each firm is 3 (e.g. due to duplicated R&D 
investments). If A leads and B follows, then A receives 6 and 
B receives 4. The pay-offs are reversed when B leads and A 
follows. Thus both firms do better by agreeing to a single 
technology than by entering into a technology competition, 
but the firm which follows reaps less pay-offs than the leader. 
Figure 15: 'Battle of the sexes' game (Source: Besen and Farrell, 1994) 
In the second model, the distribution of gains in favor of the leader is so great that the follower prefers 
risking technology competition and fragmenting the market to an inferior position adopting an outside 
technology. This is a form of the ‗prisoners‘ dilemma‘ game, in which all players would be better off 
agreeing, but by each trying to gain an advantage at the expense of the others they end up disagreeing, to 
their mutual loss. This ‗rather fight than switch‘ game is shown in Figure 16. Compared to the ‗battle of 
the sexes‘ game, the distribution of the payoffs is more in favor of the leader. The firm taking the lead 
could aim to convince the other firm to follow by changing 
the game and share the gains more evenly, for example by 
making a side payment of 2 to the other party if it follows 
(resulting in a payoff distribution similar to the ‗battle of the 
sexes‘ game). In practice, this side payment could be a 
reduction in the license fees or technical support in adopting 
the other firms‘ technology. This is an essential part of the 
logic of open standards, which modify the players payoffs and 
hence change the combined leadership and access decisions.  
Figure 16: 'Rather fight than switch' game (Source: Besen and Farrell, 1994) 
 
Whereas the previous sections show a very theoretical approach, a large body of the academic literature 
has taken a case study approach, providing a descriptive in-depth historic overview of technology 
competition, market adoption and the selection of one technology as the de-facto standard. These studies 
describe the following technologies / industries: typewriter keyboard (QWERTY),110 videocassette 
recorders,111 electricity supply system,112 microcomputers,113 disc drives,114 video game consoles,115 
television receivers,116 typesetters,117 electronic initiation systems,118 ink-jet printers,119 web browsers,120 
cellular phones,121 close range wireless connectivity (Bluetooth),122 personal digital assistants (PDAs),123 
electronic calculators,124 minicomputers,125 programming languages (Java),126 and microprocessors 
(RISC).127 These case studies provide valuable insights in the complexity and dynamics of technology 
competitions and the emergence of de-facto standards. They show that in the competition between 
multiple incompatible technologies, each technology can be thought of as being supported by a 
community of organizations that have a stake in the technology. Several cases, e.g. videocassette 
recorders, have shown that technology sponsors can establish a de-facto standard by actively building an 
ecosystem of followers that support the technology.128 A large number of firms supporting a technology 
may encourage customers to adopt it due to enhanced product availability or confidence regarding the 
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future prospects of the technology which, in turn, leads to more firms joining the community. This results 
in a positive feedback loop, also known as a ‗technological bandwagon‘.129 
 
Research in the field of platforms has generated useful insights regarding the possible modes of 
collaboration. Before discussing the modes, we first need to clarify the different elements that can be 
found in the network. Research on ‗platform-mediated networks‘ has identified four different elements:130 
- Platform sponsors: these firms own or control the technology and determine if and which 
companies are allowed access to the technology 
- Platform providers: those firms that offer the technology to the end-users 
- Supply-side users: parties that provide goods that are complementary with the technology (e.g. 
software) 
- Demand-side users: the end users of the technology. If we take the example of consumer 
electronics, this group is represented by consumers. 
 
Each of these roles can be open or closed to participation by third parties. Figure 17 illustrates this by 
several examples of platforms. In the case of the Linux operating system, any party can contribute 
improvements subject to the rules of the open source community that maintains the operating system 
kernel, any party can bundle Linux with server or personal computer hardware, any party can offer Linux-
compatible software applications, and any organization or individual can use Linux. By contrast, in 2008 
Apple‘s iPhone was closed with respect to three of the four roles, and only open for some prospective 
demand-side users; in the USA, only AT&T Wireless subscribers were able to use an iPhone. Apple is 
solely responsible for the iPhone‘s technology, manufacturing and distribution. Although third parties are 
able to provide software applications for the iPhone, these are only available through Apple‘s iTunes or 
App Store and Apple reserves the right to reject third-party applications due to quality or strategic 
concerns.  
 
Figure 17: Comparison of openness by role in platform-mediated networks (Source: Eisenmann et al, 2009) 
 
When focusing on platform sponsors and platform providers, there are four models to organize 
platforms: proprietary, licensing, joint venture, and shared (illustrated by Figure 18).131 A proprietary 
platform has a single sponsor who serves as its single provider, for example the Macintosh and the 
iPhone. With a joint venture model, several firms cooperate in developing the technology, but a single 
entity serves as the technology provider. With a licensing model, a single company develops a platform‘s 
technology and aims to build an ecosystem of followers by providing licenses to other firms. The VHS 
video recorder is an example of this model. With the model of a shared platform, multiple firms 
collaborate in developing the technology and then compete with each other in providing differentiated 
but compatible versions. Examples include DVD and Blu-ray. The development of a shared technology 
typically occurs in Standard Development Organizations (SDOs) or ad-hoc industry consortia. 
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There are four scenarios under which parties are allowed to participate in the technology development:132 
- Fixed group (no new members) 
- Members with qualifications (country club): this model is sometimes applied in industry consortia, 
whereby the existing members decide which firms can become new members, typically using 
some combination of objective and subjective 
criteria 
- Nondiscretionary membership (fitness club): 
nearly all firms can become a member upon 
filing a form and paying membership dues. 
Many trade associations and industry consortia 
use this model. 
- Nonmember organizations (town meeting): 
there is no membership required to participate, 
such as the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), which prides itself on its openness to 
participation        Figure 18: Models for organizing platforms (Source: Eisenmann, 2008) 
 
In a technology competition, the different sponsors may select different modes for collaboration as 
described above, which influences the extent to which they are able to build-up an ecosystem of 
followers.  
1.2.4. Strategic choice view 
Contrary to the natural-selection view, which states that a de-facto standard can only be identified ex-post 
at an industry level, company strategists face the issue of how their firm can deliberately shape the odds of 
their technology emerging as the de-facto standard. This issue has been addressed by scholars advocating 
the strategic choice view, and their contributions have focused on two aspects: 1) strategic elements and 
firm resources that can be applied to influence the market adoption of a technology, 2) models combining 
several elements. 
 
Research on the ability of firms to establish its technology as the de-facto standard started with the 
identification of a range of elements that firms can use strategically. Over time, many researchers have 
provided contributions, of which those from Teece,133 Hill,134 Shapiro and Varian,135 Grindley,136 
Schilling,137 and Eisenmann138 are most notable. Together, these have identified and thoroughly studied a 
wide range of strategic elements, including: timing of market entry (first mover advantage), (penetration) 
pricing, marketing and pre-announcements to create awareness and manage expectations, applying lessons 
from pattern of adoption of previous technology generations, vertical integration to provide 
complementary assets, the level to which firms accommodate to the needs / requirements of licensees, 
efforts to build-up an ecosystem of supporters, level of collaborative platform development, and strategic 
alliances with complementors. They also identified elements that can be considered inherent to the firm, 
which include: core capabilities, absorptive capacity (ability to learn and adapt), pre-entry experience, size 
(market share, turnover), and installed base. Appendix 1 provides an in-depth description of these 
elements and the contributions from various researchers. 
 
In parallel to the identification of elements, researchers have started to combine these into models in 
order to obtain a deeper understanding of how firms can influence the emergence of a de-facto standard. 
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We have identified four models, provided by McGrath et al.,139 Lee et al.,140 Gallagher and Park,141 and 
Suarez.142  
 
McGrath et al. developed a framework showing how corporate executive teams can influence strategic 
decision making regarding de-facto standards. They draw upon the natural selection view to differentiate 
three phases of the emergence process of a de-facto standard; variation, selection, and retention. 
Subsequently, they identify the choices that executive teams need to make regarding their firm‘s 
technological trajectory (Figure 19). During the ‗variation‘ phase, the executive team needs to manage the 
scope and intensity of exploring technological variations. They need to select among competing 
technology project opportunities, consider if these should be based on technology ‗push‘ or market ‗pull‘, 
and decide upon the extent to which resources are allocated to the project. During the ‗selection‘ phase, 
the team can utilize an evolutionary- or a revolutionary strategy. The same holds for the ‗retention‘ phase. 
Following the variation phase, a firm needs to help its technology overcome the market selection process. 
They identify several forces that need to be taken into account for technology selection: switching cost for 
an installed base to move to the new technology, superior technological performance is important but 
often insufficient in itself, power and influence of the innovator and its competitors over key 
stakeholders, installed base, marketing capability, reputation, governmental agencies and industry 
associations, complementary assets, and entry timing. After a firm‘s technology has been selected it needs 
to reap the rewards of its investments, which may require the ability to prevent others from copying the 
technology. If a firm is able to anticipate co-evolutionary requirements, it can appropriate specialized 
resources. In addition, if an industry has a strong appropriability regime, a firm can protect its intellectual 
property and prevent others from copying the technology. The strength of the model provided by 
McGrath et al. is that they identify several phases and list a significant amount of elements that influence 
the selection of a de-facto standard. However, they provide insufficient guidance on how a firm can 
utilize these elements strategically to shape the technology selection process. 
 
 
Figure 19: Executive team influences on the emergence of de-facto standards (Source: McGrath et al., 1992) 
 
Lee et al.143 note that according to previous research, the emergence of a de-facto standard can be 
regarded as the ‗black box‘ between an innovation and ‗economic success‘. They present a framework of 
underlying elements and forces that influence a technologically feasible innovation144 to move on to 
emerge as de-facto standard (Figure 20). The framework is comprised of ‗external conditions‘ such as an 
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industry‘s appropriability regime and network effects, a set of technological and non-technological 
‗driving forces‘, and complementary assets (distribution channels, service network, etc.) which contribute 
to successful adoption of a technology. While the framework outlines elements that drive the emergence 
process, it does not suggest that the process is necessarily linear or sequential; it is a parsimonious 
description. The variety of elements that may influence the emergence of a de-facto standard precludes 
the use of simple heuristics for predictive purposes. Lee et al. consider each situation unique, and note 
that technologies that appear to have similar characteristics may be dissimilar in the manner and forces by 
which they emerge. They propose that firms can frame the emergence process and systematically manage 
the elements in the pursuit of competitive advantage from innovation. This framework marks the first 
attempt to categorize elements that drive the emergence of a de-facto standard, and to note the preclusion 
of simple heuristics for predictive purposes. However, the framework consists of a limited number of 
elements, of which several (e.g. organizational and socio-political forces) are abstract and therefore 
difficult to use strategically by a firm. 
 
Figure 20: Framework of de-facto standard emergence process (Source: Lee et al., 1995) 
 
Gallagher and Park145 developed a framework to provide insights in the elements influencing a firm‘s 
competitive success in markets with network effects (Figure 21). Based on their study on the history of 
the video game industry, they emphasize the importance of building a network of complementary 
products and an installed base. They argue that traditional competitive strategies, such as superior 
technology, early market entry, penetration pricing, brand awareness, channel management and entry 
barriers, are important to attract independent software vendors into the network of a platform. These 
competitive strategies lead to higher switching costs and a broader network of complementary products, 
which increases the installed base. A firm‘s capabilities and absorptive capacity allows early adoption of a 
new technology and effective implementation of competitive strategies, leading to higher switching cost. 
While Gallagher and Park present several elements that influence competitive success and make a 
suggestion on how these are interrelated, the framework has been deduced from a single case study and 
further research has not tested its application on other cases. 
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Figure 21: Integrative framework for success in network based industries (Source: Gallagher and Park, 2002) 
 
Suarez146 developed a framework providing insight in the process by which a technology emerges as de-
facto standard. First, he identifies elements associated with technological dominance, and proposes two 
broad groups: firm level elements and environmental elements (shown in Figure 22). 
 
 
Figure 22: Framework of elements influencing the dominance process (Source: Suarez, 2004) 
 
Secondly, Suarez describes the emergence of a de-facto standard in a few key milestones as shown in 
Figure 23. The beginning of the technological field (T0) can be traced back to the moment when a pioneer 
firm or research group starts performing applied R&D aimed at the technological innovation. A second 
milestone (TP) is marked by the appearance of the first working prototype based on the technological 
innovation. The first working prototype sends a powerful signal to all firms in the race that at least one of 
the technological trajectories is feasible and has been developed to such a level that there will soon be a 
product in the market. The third milestone (TL) in the process is the launching of the first commercial 
product, which for the first time, directly connects a technology coming out of the lab to customers. The 
first product in the market is often too expensive for the mass market and therefore aimed at the high end 
of the market. The early market, typically a relatively small one when compared to the mass market, helps 
a particular design become an early ―forerunner‖. The presence of a clear front runner marks the fourth 
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milestone (TF) in the dominance battle. This front runner has a chance of winning the battle, as its larger 
installed base tends to create a bias towards the technology with the largest market share. The final 
outcome will depend on how fast competitors improve on their own designs and how fast the market 
grows. Finally a specific technological design achieves dominance and marks the last milestone (TD) of the 
dominance process. 
 
 
Figure 23: Milestones in the process of technological dominance (Source: Suarez, 2004) 
 
Lastly, Suarez combines the milestones and elements into a single model representing the key elements of 
success at each stage of the dominance process (Figure 24). This model combines a different mix of firm 
and environmental level elements which according to Suarez have the strongest effect on success in the 
respective phases of the dominance process. While Suarez‘s model constitutes a major contribution to the 
‗strategic choice view‘, the limitations of this framework are 1) the limited amount of elements, and 2) the 
abstract description of factor interrelatedness.  
 
 
Figure 24: Key elements of success at each stage of the dominance process (Source: Suarez, 2004) 
1.3 Problem description 
As the previous sections show, the body of literature on the emergence of de-facto standards covers many 
aspects. Scholars have found that the emergence can be expressed in patterns representing market 
adoption or the rate of process and product innovations, they have studied specific market dynamics such 
as the effects of network externalities and innovators‘ dilemma, performed in-depth case studies on 
technology competitions and the drivers for firms to either collaborate or compete, and they identified 
how firms can utilize specific strategies and resources to influence the technology competition. 
 
However, advocates of the strategic-choice view are still far from a robust clarification on how firms can 
deliberately shape the odds of their technology emerging as the de-facto standard. We note several 
limitations regarding the body of literature in this field: 
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- First, the models take a static approach,147 providing a single set of measures (a ‗recipe‘ or 
‗formula‘) that should lead to success in a technology competition. During my review of extant in-
depth case studies on technology competitions, I noticed that the emergence of the de-facto 
standards displayed case-specific paths, due to the differing constellation of technologies (each 
technology often has its own characteristics), the firms supporting these technologies, and the 
environment in which the firms and technologies competed. In addition, technology sponsors 
applied different strategies, and their competitors responded with their own strategic actions. I 
therefore believe this field requires a framework that can support the variety and dynamics of 
technology competitions. This point is confirmed in a recent publication by Narayanan and 
Chen,148 which recommends future research on the strategic-choice view to incorporate the 
action-response perspective from the field of competitive dynamics research. Although no easy 
answers result from using a framework rather than a ‗recipe‘, it assures that one considers the right 
questions and criteria; 
- Secondly, the various elements of the emergence of a de-facto standard (e.g. market mechanisms, 
models for creating a technology bandwagon, elements that can be used strategically, and models 
showing the interrelatedness of several elements) are fragmented over many different publications. 
Although there are some papers on de-facto standards that provide a synthesis of prior research 
(i.e. Narayanan & Chen,149 Van de Kaa et al.150, Gallagher and West151), their contributions do not 
address the strategic-choice view. The one paper providing a synthesis of prior research whilst 
addressing the strategic-choice view is from Suarez.152 Suarez‘ framework, however, dates from 
2004, and therefore lacks insights gained in the past decade (e.g. the more extensive number of 
elements which were later found by Narayanan & Chen or Van de Kaa et al., and new insights 
regarding platform technologies). I believe an up-to-date synthesis of prior research, addressing 
the strategic-choice view, is required to enhance our understanding of the emergence of de-facto 
standards, leading to better theoretical insights; 
- Lastly, the available models have been derived from a very narrow set of cases (often only one). It 
is therefore unknown if they are robust when applied to other technology competitions. 
 
Strategic decision making to shape the odds of a technology emerging as the de-facto standard is a 
difficult task, because many different aspects have to be taken into account: 
- Opportunity recognition; e.g. innovator‘s dilemma; 
- Development of a technological bandwagon; e.g. open or closed approach to the elements of the 
technology; 
- Strategic and resource related elements; e.g. timing of market entry, pricing; 
- Phases and milestones in the emergence of a de-facto standard; 
- Interrelatedness of the elements; how does a change in one factor influence other elements of the 
competition; 
- Anticipating and responding to moves of the competing technology sponsors. 
 
This problem is complex from both a practical and a theoretical perspective, but renders opportunities for 
theoretical advancement. 
 
In addition, advancing the strategic-choice view is becoming increasingly relevant. As described before, 
many industries display high-stakes ‗winner-take-all‘ games, and the ‗rent-seeking‘ firms in these industries 
would like to obtain a (near) monopoly position, whereas losing the competition comes at a high cost.153 I 
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note two trends that will lead to more ‗winner-take-all‘ games, even in industries that have previously not 
displayed these: 
- Due to the increasing use of IT and telecommunications technologies in larger systems, many of 
tomorrow‘s products are becoming connected, resulting in stronger network effects. Examples 
include intelligent lighting, smart grids, personal health, and the ―internet-of-things‖. 
- Companies increasingly compete on platform technologies that bring together groups of users in 
two-sided networks. Examples include smartphones, social networks and internet search engines. 
1.4 Research objective and research questions 
The objective of this study is to contribute to the strategic-choice view by developing a framework that 
can be used to support strategic decision making to shape the odds of a technology emerging as the de-
facto standard. The framework should provide an integrative approach, covering the various aspects 
identified in the previous sections as relevant for strategic decision making. In addition, it should be able 
to cater to the variety and dynamics of technology competitions. 
 
In order to develop this framework, I aim to answer the following research questions: 
1. What are the various elements of the emergence of a de-facto standard that we would need to 
incorporate in the framework (e.g. market mechanisms, models for creating a technology 
bandwagon, elements for shaping the odds of technology selection)? 
2. How to integrate these elements in a framework? 
a. Can we differentiate between types of elements (e.g. those that are within or outside a 
firm‘s span of control)? 
b. Are some elements more important than others in the decision of an agent to adopt a 
technology (do they have a direct or indirect influence on the emergence)? 
c. Do the elements affect each other, and how are they interrelated? 
3. Which phases and milestones can we identify in the emergence of a de-facto standard? 
4. How can the framework be applied to technology competitions 
a. Can the framework really be applied to technology competitions and, when doing so, 
how robust (scalable) is the framework? 
b. What can we learn from applying it: does it provide comprehensive insight in the 
dynamics of technology competitions, can it clarify the outcome, can it support 
strategic decision making to shape the odds of a technology to emerge as de-facto 
standard? 
1.5 Methodology and research approach 
In order to address my research questions, I adopted a directed content analysis combined with a multiple 
case study approach.  
 
The objective in research question 1 and 2 is to construct a framework. As this can be considered theory 
building, rather than theory testing, a qualitative approach was adopted. Section 1.2 has shown the 
available body of literature consists of a large number of independent studies adopting different 
perspectives and different concepts of de-facto standards. I decided to use the literature to develop an 
‗integrative framework‘ that combines the constructs and variables. The development of an integrative 
framework is a commonly-used approach when there is a wide, fragmented body of literature. Examples 
of integrative frameworks can be found in a variety of fields, examples include ‗organizational buying 
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behavior‘154, ‗collaborative partnerships‘155, and ‗persuasive advertisements‘156. In constructing the 
integrative framework, I used literature regarding dominant designs, compatibility standards, and 
platforms, related to the strategic-choice view. In addition, literature from the other three quadrants was 
reviewed. During this review, I identified literature regarding specific elements from the system-structural 
view (i.e. regarding market mechanisms such as network externalities), collective-action view (i.e. case 
studies of technology competitions), and natural-selection view (i.e. regarding types of innovations), which 
were relevant to complement the literature on the strategic-choice view. 
 
In order to determine the population of literature for my analysis, I started with an initial literature review 
to contextualize the research within the field of de-facto standards and build an understanding of the key 
terminology. I searched for publications from different sets of academic journals and scholarly books by 
searching journal databases on key terminology (e.g. compatibility standards, technology platforms, 
dominant designs), reviewing the citations of articles and books (backward search), and a forward search 
using the Web of Science to identify articles citing the key articles and books (indicated by Neuman157, 
Rowley et al.158, and Webster et al.159, as elements for conducting a comprehensive literature review). I 
limited my search to English-written sources only. This resulted in a variety of publications and books 
from different geographic regions (North America, Europe and Asia). Only those of which the object of 
analysis was in accordance with the emergence of de-facto standards were included. In total 75 sources 
were found (68 publications, 7 books). Of these, I selected 47 sources based on a combination of their 
amount of citations, and the number of elements in the publication. The number was determined by 
diminishing returns of the content analysis. Of the 47 sources, 27 were theoretically oriented and 20 were 
historical case studies. The theoretical publications study one or more elements that shape (facilitate or 
delay) the process of de-facto standard emergence, whereas the historical case studies describe technology 
competitions leading towards de-facto standards. 
 
The constructs and variables for the framework were fragmented over the body of literature, and authors 
used different labels or narrative descriptions when addressing these. I applied directed content analysis to 
unify the different elements in a single comprehensive set. Content analysis is a qualitative research 
technique to interpret meaning from the content of text data. A directed approach to content analysis is 
aimed at validating or extending a framework or theory.160 The main strength of a directed approach to 
content analysis is that it allows to support and extend existing theory. Using prior research, researchers 
typically begin by identifying concepts or variables as initial coding categories.161 Next, operational 
definitions for each category are determined. Lastly, existing research can provide predictions about the 
variables of interest or about the relationships among variables. 
 
The content analysis was initiated using a process of inductive coding;162 I performed close readings of the 
47 publications and highlighted all text that on first impression appeared to relate to an influence on the 
emergence of a de-facto standard. As next step, I considered the multiple meanings that were inherent in 
the texts and created an initial set of labels whereto I could allocate highlighted text segments. Any text 
that could not be categorized with the initial coding scheme would be given a new label. Subsequently, the 
highlighted texts were used to develop a description of the elements. As the intended outcome of the 
process is to create a small number of summary categories that in the researcher‘s view capture the key 
aspects of the identified themes, I aimed to group elements together in categories. Lastly, I reviewed the 
same publications again and identified links between elements, in order to show their relationship in a 
network and their hierarchy. 
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In order to address my last research question (i.e. applying the framework to technology competitions in 
order to explain how a technology became the de-facto standard), I adopted a multiple case study 
approach. An in-depth case study is a very suitable research method to explore competitive dynamics in 
the emergence of de-facto standards, because it enables the researcher to capture the details of this 
complex process. By investigating multiple it is possible to evaluate the merits of the integrative 
framework in several situations. Regarding the case studies themselves, an explanatory approach was 
adopted, considering that the goal was to explain the emergence of a de-facto standard. An explanatory 
case study approach consists of three elements; 1) an accurate rendition of the facts of the case, 2) 
consideration of alternative explanations of the facts, and 3) a conclusion based on the single explanation 
that appears most congruent with the facts.163  
 
This brings us to the matter of case selection. In total three cases were selected, as this would allow for 
some measure of generalization through a cross-case analysis. The cases were selected via theoretical 
sampling, as the aim was to replicate the approach.164 In selecting the cases, I used the following criteria: 
- Cases needed to be technology competitions with a known outcome (either a de-facto standard 
had emerged or the competing technologies did not manage to displace the extant de-facto 
standard). In order to understand if the integrative framework can be used to support strategic 
decision making to shape the odds of a technology emerging as the de-facto standard, ongoing 
technology competitions would have been ideal. However, this is not feasible since it would 
require that the researcher would have to be involved in several technology competitions 
simultaneously and be in a position to influence the technology sponsors to base their strategic 
actions on a integrative framework. 
- Technology competitions from the same industry in order to test the repetitiveness of the 
constructs, and technologies with similar characteristics (i.e. can be attributed to the four middle 
sections of Figure 4) in order to test the extent to which the framework can provide insight in the 
outcomes and to support analytic generalization.165 The contexts of such cases will have a ‗high 
degree of similarity‘, and therefore high transferability of the findings of one case to another.166  
- The market in which the technology competition takes place needs to exhibit strong network 
externalities 
- The competition for market adoption occurred after 1990. The reason for adopting this restriction 
is because I wanted to perform interviews with key persons from companies involved in the 
technology competition, and this restriction was necessary to select cases whereby I would be able 
to find 1) a sufficient number of respondents, and 2) the respondents would still have a 
reasonably accurate recollection of the events.  
 
After investigating several industries, I focused on the consumer electronics industry because it has many 
markets that display strong network externalities, market selection is driven by a mass-market of 
consumers, and the potential cases are often well documented by public announcements. Considering that 
many existing case studies are based on cases older than 1990 (e.g. video recorders, personal computers, 
colour television), I selected three new cases: Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD, MP3 vs. WMA, and SuperAudio CD 
vs. DVD Audio (presented in the order in which they were studied). 
 
Each of these cases was studied in three phases: data gathering, case analysis and case report. Upholding 
the replication logic167 in the three cases posed a methodological challenge; how to systematically collect 
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all the relevant details, and obtain the required in-depth insights. In order to tackle this, I developed a data 
matrix based on the results of the inductive coding of the 47 sources. This data matrix allowed for a 
structured historic analysis of each case, and enabled me to focus on obtaining the relevant details. 
Secondly, I collected data by first searching for relevant documents and public announcements and 
performed content analysis on these. This was complemented by focused interviews with key persons 
from companies involved in the technology competitions to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
emergence process. Following completion of the data gathering, the interviewees were asked to verify and 
moderate the preliminary analysis. Lastly, by aligning the integrative framework with the data matrix, the 
information collected in the data matrix allows for consistently application of the constructs across the 
case studies.  
 
Following each case study, the case analysis was used to review the integrative framework and make 
revisions based on new insights. 
 
Before moving to the cross-case analysis, the limitations and comprehensiveness of the integrative 
framework were further investigated by ‗zooming in‘ on specific parts. This was done on two different 
levels; first the relationship between two elements, subsequently one specific (new) element and its 
position in the framework. When selecting the particular relationship and specific element, I took into 
account the relevant themes in academia regarding de-facto standards in respectively 2010 and 2012. This 
resulted in aligning the selection with the topics of special issues of two prominent academic journals, 
respectively Organization Studies and California Management Review. For the Organization Studies 
special issue on ‗the dynamics of standardization‘, the relationship between the elements ‗collaborative 
technology development‘ and ‗organizational community of supporters‘ was investigated. For the special 
issue of California Management Review on ‗Intellectual Property Management‘, I focused on the element 
of ‗accessibility of intellectual property rights‘ and its position in the framework. 
 
In the cross-case analysis, the insights from the case studies regarding the emergence of de-facto 
standards were combined and compared. The transferability of the case findings was investigated through 
analytic generalization. In analytic generalization the investigator strives to generalize a particular set of 
results to some broader theory. According to Yin,168 if two or more cases are shown to support the same 
theory, replication may be claimed. Analytic generalization may be defined as a two-step process.169 The 
first involves a conceptual claim whereby investigators show how their study‘s findings are likely to form a 
particular set of concepts, theoretical constructs, or hypothesized sequence of events. The second 
involves applying the same theory to implicate other similar situations where similar concepts might be 
relevant. The findings from the analytic generalizations were subsequently used as input for the final 
framework. 
 
By applying different research methods and information sources I aimed to achieve method and 
information source triangulation, improving the reliability of the results and a strong theoretical basis. 
 
Figure 25 provides an overview of the research approach, and the corresponding chapters in this 
dissertation. 
 
46_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
30 
 
 
 
 
1.6 Outline of the dissertation 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter starts with a synthesis of several concepts (i.e. compatibility standards, dominant designs and 
platforms) that represent different facets of the phenomenon of de-facto standards. Subsequently, an 
overview of the literature on de-facto standards is provided. From this overview, a problem description 
and research objective are derived. The chapter ends with a clarification of the methodology and research 
approach.  
 
Chapter 2 – Integrative framework 
In Chapter 2, the first three research questions are addressed by constructing an integrative framework 
from the existing body of literature on de-facto standards.  
 
Chapter 3 – The triumph of Blu-ray over HD-DVD (published in Business History) 
In order to address the last research question, the integrative framework is applied to three cases, of 
which the competition between Blu-ray and HD-DVD in the high definition optical disc industry is the 
first. This chapter starts with an in-depth study of the case, and subsequently the integrative framework is 
applied for further analysis. 
 
Chapter 4 – The rise of MP3 as the market standard (published in Journal of IT Standards and Standardization 
Research) 
This chapter starts with an in-depth study of the emergence of MP3 as the de-facto standard in music 
formats. Subsequently, the integrative framework is applied to the case. 
 
Chapter 5 – The competition between SA-CD and DVD-A 
This chapter starts with an in-depth study of the technology competition between SuperAudio-CD and 
DVD-Audio in high definition audio storage. Subsequently, the integrative framework is applied to the 
case. 
 
Chapter 6 – The paradox of standard flexibility (published in Organization Studies) 
This chapter delves deeper into the effect of two elements that influence the emergence of a de-facto 
standard: ‗collaborative technology development‘ and ‗building an organizational community that 
supports the technology‗. 
 
Figure 25: Overview of research approach and corresponding chapters in dissertation 
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Chapter 7 – Managing intellectual property using patent pools (published in California Management Review) 
This chapter focuses on one specific element of the framework: ‗accessibility to intellectual property 
rights‘. 
 
Chapter 8 – Cross case analysis 
In this chapter the results of the three case studies are compared to investigate if the findings can be 
generalized, and if generic patterns can be identified. Where applicable, specific insights from the two 
other papers are included in the analysis. 
 
Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
This chapter summarizes the main findings, limitations and suggestions for future research.  
 
Multiple chapters of this dissertation have been published in academic journals, and these were written as 
‗stand-alone‘ papers. Where needed, a prologue or epilogue was added to provide context or to add 
information which was omitted from the paper to adhere to the requirements of the journal (e.g. an 
overview of the respondents) or relevant for the cross-case analysis.  
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Chapter 2 - Integrative framework for the emergence of  de-facto 
standards 
 
In this Chapter, an integrative framework will be developed by first identifying the various elements that 
shape the odds of a technology emerging as the de-facto standard. Secondly, we will attempt to categorize 
the elements (e.g. those that can be utilized strategically vs. those that are outside a firm‘s span of control). 
Thirdly, we attempt to differentiate them by level of importance in the decision of an agent to adopt a 
technology, and investigate the known relationships between the elements. Finally, we will identify the 
phases and milestones in the emergence of a de-facto standard. Section 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 were presented at 
a conference and published in its proceedings,170 the version in this dissertation was updated by including 
recent literature. 
 
The following starting points were used in devising the framework: 
- Considering that the aim is to add to the strategic-choice perspective, the framework is devised 
from the perspective of a technology sponsor (i.e. an entity that has property rights to the 
technology and hence is willing to invest in its adoption)171 
- As the emergence of de-facto standard is represented by rival incompatible technologies within a 
single product category competing for market adoption, and the de-facto standard is determined 
by customers adopting a technology,172 the customer (and its tendency to adopt a particular 
technology) is at the center of the framework 
- It should encompass de-facto standards in all its facets (platforms, dominant designs, interface 
standards), on any level in a product hierarchy (complete system, sub-system), and irrespective of 
a particular market. 
- In accordance with Suarez (2004), I presume that no single factor is strong enough to tilt the 
balance in favour of a particular technology; the final outcome is the result of the interplay of 
multiple firm-, technology- and environment-level variables 
- Elements that are known to facilitate or frustrate the emergence of a de-facto standard will both 
be included. Technological competitions can have several outcomes (i.e. winner-take-all, market 
dominance, oligopoly, and failure to replace the old de-facto standard), and the framework should 
be able to provide insights in such outcomes as well. 
2.1 Elements influencing odds of technology selection 
As described in Section 1.5, 47 sources where analyzed, of which 27 theoretical and 20 empirical. In total, 
36 elements were labelled. An overview of these and a short description is presented in Table 1. The 
elements in the table are ranked on the basis of the frequency of the codes. Appendix 1 presents a more 
detailed description of the elements. Table 2 shows the elements that were identified per theoretical 
publication, and Table 3 shows the elements that were identified per empirical publication. Of the 47 
sources, I identified the most elements in Cusumano et al (1992) and Shapiro & Varian (1999), which each 
contained 22 elements. Compared to these two sources combined (which renders 29 individual elements), 
my analysis provides an additional 7 elements. 
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Table 1: Overview of elements influencing odds of technology selection 
Element # of 
results 
Short description 
Technological superiority 39 
A technology is superior when it has features that allow it to outperform competing 
alternatives. These features comprise of the pure effect of technology (e.g. picture 
quality of video storage media), and differentiating features (e.g. amount of video that 
can be recorded on a video tape) 
Entry timing 36 
Point in time when the first product based on a particular technology enters the 
market. The technology that is first to market can benefit from increasing returns to 
adoption and a head start in establishing an installed base. 
Network effects 33 
The utility of a technology to a customer increases with the number of customers that 
use the technology 
Availability of 
complementary goods 
31 
Products or services that increase the utility of a technology. Goods are 
complementary to a technology when they adhere to a common compatibility 
standard. Generally dubbed ‗software‘. 
Appropriability 28 
Ability to protect the innovation from imitation by competitors and capture the 
profits generated by it. Dependent on solid intellectual property rights, a secure R&D 
and manufacturing environment, and the efficacy of legal mechanisms 
Pricing 27 Use of a pricing strategy (e.g. penetration pricing) to stimulate market adoption 
Organizational community 
of supporters 
27 
Community comprised of competitors and/or complementors that has some degree 
of hard- and/or software compatibility. Often requires active development by a 
technology sponsor. Its success is defined by the amount of parties, diversity, and 
market shares. 
Government intervention 
and industry regulation 
27 
The government may act as an early adopter of a particular technology, provide 
subsidies to promote adoption or erect trade barriers, subject a technology sponsor to 
antitrust scrutiny, and it may mandate the use of a particular technology. 
Marketing and pre-
announcements 
25 
Creating market awareness regarding the availability of a technology,   informing the 
customer of its strengths, and influencing customer and industry perception regarding 
its potential success 
Installed base 24 
The number of users applying a particular technology at a certain moment in time, 
the number of users of products of a particular firm, or the number of products in 
use 
Firm‘s complementary 
assets 
21 
Particular capabilities or resources which support the commercial success of a 
technology. This relates to the extent to which a firm is vertically or horizontally 
integrated. 
Switching and homing cost 19 
Switching costs are costs that customers incur to move from one technology to 
another. Homing costs include all the expenses incurred by technology users. If 
homing costs are low, customers may adopt multiple technologies 
Reputation and credibility 19 
A recognized brand name and sponsorship of de-facto standards creates expectations 
for the potential success of a new technology 
Strategic partnerships 18 
Contractual relationship with providers of complementary goods and distributors to 
more rapidly deploy the technology, or gain access to new technologies 
Level of competition 18 
Number of incompatible technological alternatives that are competing in the market 
for adoption and the strength (financially and in terms of market share) of their 
supporters 
Technological knowledge 
and skill base 
17 
A firm‘s amount and type of technological skills (e.g. know-how in magnetic 
recording equipment) 
Level of collaborative 
development 
15 
Extent to which a technology sponsor engages into a collaboration with its 
competitors to develop a shared technology 
Availability of products 13 
The extent to which products based on a particular technology are available to the 
customer 
Absorptive capacity 13 
A firm‘s ability to recognize the value of new information, to assimilate it, and to 
apply it to commercial ends 
Increasing returns to 
adoption 
12 
As a technology is adopted, greater knowledge and understanding accrues as a by-
product and enables improvements. Revenues generated by the adoption can be used 
to further develop and refine the technology 
Chance 12 
In technological trajectories with network externalities, random (insignificant) events 
may become magnified by positive feedback loops and ‗tip‘ the market towards a 
particular outcome 
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Table 2: Elements identified per theoretical publication 
Market and industry 
characteristics 
12 
Structure and dynamics of the market and technological field, e.g. excess inertia vs. 
insufficient friction, rules of engagement and information sharing practices 
Rate and type of 
technological change 
12 
The pace of technological change in an industry affects the willingness of suppliers 
and buyers to invest in a technology and influences the desirability of committing to a 
specific technology 
Firm size 11 
Financial resources, number of industries and geographical markets in which the 
technology sponsor has a presence and its market share in these 
Backward compatibility 10 
A technology is backwards compatible when it is designed to be interoperable with, 
or accommodate products from, the previous technology generation 
Powerful rival technology 
sponsors 
9 
Competing technology sponsors that have the resources required either to imitate a 
technology, even in the face of high barriers to imitation, or to develop their own, 
possibly superior, technology 
Type of technological 
innovation 
9 
A sponsor can set out to develop an innovation that is either incremental, modular, 
architectural, or radical. This choice impacts the superiority of the technology, its 
backward compatibility, appropriability, ability to engage in collaborative 
development, and ability to build-up an organizational community to support it 
Adapters and gateways 8 
Establishes compatibility between non-compatible systems by enabling conversion 
from one side to the other 
Availability of imitators  8 
Companies imitating a technology or its complementary goods. Imitators can increase 
the amount of products or complements on the market 
Pre-empting scarce assets 8 
Anticipating on the path of technological development and preserving future rights to 
scarce assets (e.g. materials, specific distribution channels or complementary 
products) and intellectual property 
Unclear assessment criteria 8 
Customer ambiguity regarding the features that they value and require in a new 
technology 
Technological 
breakthroughs in 
subsystems 
7 
Advances and breakthroughs in subsystems that enable a technology to move from 
prototype to commercially feasible product 
Technological performance 
trajectories 
7 
Disruptive technologies, often inferior to existing technologies, open up new (niche) 
markets. Subsequent sustaining radical and incremental innovations can raise the 
technology‘s performance along steep trajectories and enable it to migrate to 
established (mass) markets 
Killer application 7 
Application of the technology that possesses a set of attributes meeting customer 
demands and stimulates market adoption 
Hetero- or homogeneity of 
customer needs 
7 
Markets with homogenic customer needs are prone to ‗tipping‘ under network 
externalities, whereas markets with heterogenic customer needs are more likely to 
sustain multiple technologies 
Product proliferation 4 
Serving as many niches as feasible by customizing the product offering to appeal to 
different users 
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Technological 
superiority 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1  1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Entry timing 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1    1 1 1  1 1 1  1 1 1 1 
Network effects   1 1 1    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
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Availability of 
complementary goods 
1  1 1 1    1 1 1 1 1  1 1  1  1 1 1 1   1 1 
Appropriability 1    1    1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1  1 1  1 1 1 
Pricing 1 1  1 1    1 1 1 1  1 1  1   1  1   1 1 1 
Organizational 
community of 
supporters 
1   1 1    1  1 1 1  1 1  1  1 1 1 1 1 1   
Government 
intervention and 
industry regulation 
1 1 1     1 1  1  1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 
Marketing and pre-
announcements  
   1 1     1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1  1  1   1  1 
Installed base   1 1 1     1 1 1 1 1 1   1  1 1 1   1  1 
Firm's complementary 
assets 
   1 1     1 1 1    1  1    1  1 1 1 1 
Switching and homing 
cost 
1   1 1    1 1     1 1  1 1   1   1  1 
Reputation and 
credibility 
    1     1 1 1 1  1   1    1  1 1 1 1 
Strategic partnerships     1      1 1   1 1    1 1     1 1 
Level of competition     1  1  1  1 1             1   
Technological 
knowledge and skill 
base 
   1    1    1    1   1 1 1     1  
Level of collaborative 
development  
1    1    1  1 1    1    1  1      
Availability of products     1     1 1 1 1             1  
Absorptive capacity                1   1 1 1 1     1 
Increasing returns to 
adoption 
1 1 1   1 1           1  1 1       
Chance  1 1 1        1     1  1  1 1      
Market and industry 
characteristics 
             1 1   1 1      1   
Rate and type of 
technological change 
1               1   1        1 
Firm size    1     1 1          1    1  1 1 
Backward compatability          1 1 1    1 1     1   1  1 
Powerful rival 
technology sponsors 
        1   1                
Type of technological 
innovation 
1     1            1    1 1   1  
Adapters and gateways     1     1 1  1  1       1      
Availability of imitators     1                 1 1 1  1  
Pre-empting scarce 
assets 
        1         1    1    1 1 
Unclear assessment 
criteria 
     1 1            1 1 1      1 
Technological 
breakthroughs in 
subsystems 
                  1         
Technological 
performance trajectories 
     1  1           1         
Killer application          1            1      
Hetero- or homogeneity 
of customer needs 
     1    1     1  1 1        1  
Product proliferation         1  1 1                
                            
Number of elements 
found per publication 
12 6 8 13 18 7 4 3 16 17 19 21 10 7 15 14 10 16 12 17 13 22 7 9 15 16 19 
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Table 3: Elements identified per empirical publication 
 Empirical research 
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Technological superiority 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1  1   1  1 1 1 1 
Entry timing 1  1 1 1 1   1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 
Network effects   1 1 1 1  1 1 1  1 1  1 1 1  1  
Availability of complementary goods  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1    1  
Appropriability  1 1  1 1    1  1   1  1 1 1  
Pricing  1 1 1       1 1  1 1 1  1  1 
Organizational community of 
supporters 
 1 1    
 
1 1 1 1  
 
1 1    1  
Government intervention and 
industry regulation 
  1  1 1 
1 
 1 1 1  
1 
   1    
Marketing and pre-announcements    1  1  1  1 1 1   1 1 1 1   1 
Installed base    1  1 1   1   1 1 1 1   1 1 
Firm's complementary assets   1    1   1    1 1  1 1  1 
Switching and homing cost    1 1  1 1       1  1  1  
Reputation and credibility   1    1  1   1 1  1  1 1  1 
Strategic partnerships  1 1 1      1 1  1  1   1  1 
Level of competition   1 1 1   1 1 1  1  1   1   1 
Technological knowledge and skill 
base 
 1 1    
1 
1  1 1 1 
 
    1  1 
Level of collaborative development    1     1 1 1    1 1      
Availability of products   1    1     1     1  1 1 
Absorptive capacity   1    1 1         1 1  1 
Increasing returns to adoption       1      1 1   1 1   
Chance  1  1 1        1      1  
Market and industry characteristics   1    1  1   1  1   1  1  
Rate and type of technological 
change 
1      
1 
1   1 1 
 
   1 1 1  
Firm size   1    1    1    1     1 
Backward compatability        1       1      
Powerful rival technology sponsors   1    1 1 1 1  1  1 1      
Type of technological innovation 1      1   1   1      1  
Adapters and gateways     1                
Availability of imitators        1    1       1  
Pre-empting scarce assets   1   1 1              
Unclear assessment criteria       1      1 1   1    
Technological breakthroughs in 
subsystems 
    1  
 
    1 
1 
1 1      
Technological performance 
trajectories 
1 1     
1 
     
 
   1    
Killer application     1  1     1  1 1      
Hetero- or homogeneity of customer 
needs 
      
 
     
 
 1      
Product proliferation  1                   
                     
Number of elements found per 
publication 
5 10 22 9 13 8 21 13 14 16 9 16 
1
2 
1
5 
2
0 
4 
1
7 
1
1 
1
4 
1
3 
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2.2 Categorizing the elements 
In order to gain a better understanding which elements are within or outside of a firm‘s scope of 
influence, and to further pursue the inductive coding process, my next step was to group elements in 
clusters. 
 
The academic literature on de-facto standards (i.e. Suarez and Utterback173; Tushman and Rosenkopf174; 
Lee et al.175; Smit and Pistorius176; Suarez177; Van de Kaa et al.178) provides several propositions for 
grouping elements, however there is no consensus on the best approach. Suarez and Utterback state that 
the emergence of a de-facto standard is the result of a fortunate combination of technological, economic, 
and organizational elements. Tushman and Rosenkopf claim that de-facto standards emerge from 
selection through technological logic, social and organizational dynamics. Lee et al. suggest that the 
underlying elements and forces influencing the emergence of a de-facto standards consist of certain 
external conditions, a set of technological and non-technological (amongst which organizational) driving 
forces, and the concept of assets which are complementary to the commercial viability of a design. 
Building on the framework of Lee et al., Smit and Pistorius propose a more extensive framework and 
group the elements in eight categories: technological, market, economic, social and behavioral elements, 
standards and regulations, political elements, organizational elements and strategic elements. Suarez states 
that different technological trajectories compete for market dominance through a process where 
economic, technological and socio-political elements are intertwined, and proposes to cluster these 
elements in firm-level and environmental elements. He further notes that this broad distinction is 
consistent with the existing school of thought in management that stresses the importance of firm level 
capabilities and resources and environmental elements on the performance of different firms in an 
industry. Finally, Van de Kaa et al. propose an extensive overview of elements for interface format 
dominance, and divide these over five groups: characteristics of the format supporter, characteristics of 
the format, format support strategy, other stakeholders, and market characteristics. 
 
As the categories proposed by Suarez are supported by the existing school of thought in management, 
this distinction was initially followed and the elements were roughly divided into firm and environmental 
elements. However, while categorizing these elements I encountered some difficulties; following the 
content analysis I initially grouped the factor of installed base within the category of firm level elements, 
however I found that several sources instead referred to the installed base of the technology itself as 
influencing the emergence of the technology as de-facto standard. This occurred for multiple elements. 
 
I also noticed that when the elements were grouped within the firm and environmental level, both levels 
contained a cluster of technology related elements. These findings, supported by the findings of Lee et al., 
Smit and Pistorius, and Van de Kaa et al., which all indicate to have found elements related to the specific 
technology, made me decide to follow the original proposition of Suarez and Utterback that the 
emergence of a dominant design is a result of technological, economic (environment) and organizational 
elements. As such I set-out to categorize the overview of elements as listed in the previous section into 
three categories: firm, technology and market/industry. 
2.2.1 Allocating elements to categories 
In order to allocate the 36 elements to the three categories, I reviewed the same set of 47 sources again 
and performed content analysis. For each source, the identified elements were reviewed and the 
highlighted texts were used to deduct if a source linked an element to a particular category. Before 
59_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
43 
 
commencing the analysis it was imperative to define the categories, the basis for allocating an element to a 
category, and to modify the coding process. 
 
The following definitions were used to set the boundaries of the three 
categories: 
- Firm: the technology sponsor, with its assets, resources, customer 
base, and product range 
- Technology: a technology or productized implementation of the 
technology, as developed by the sponsor and influenced by the 
market or industry. It can be a system or sub-system, and it can be 
hardware or software. 
- Market / industry: the market or industry in which the technologies 
compete for adoption. It comprises of customers, competitors, 
complementors, (potential) collaborators, the existing de-facto 
standard, rival technologies, and potential substitutes 
 
While reviewing the texts, two points were taken into consideration for 
allocating the elements to categories; 1) if the element would influence the 
customer decision to adopt a particular technology from a particular 
category, and 2) if the customer would consider a particular element 
inherent to the firm, the technology, market or environment when it is 
presented with the decision to adopt a technology. As such, the element of 
‗rate and type of technological change‘ was categorized under ‗market / 
industry‘, because it concerns the ‗pace of the industry‘. Another example is 
the element of ‗backward compatibility‘. While the ability of a technology to 
be backwards compatible depends heavily on choices made by the 
technology sponsor, it is an element that is inherent to the technology when 
it is presented to the customer. It requires mentioning that all technology 
related elements (e.g. technological superiority, adapters and gateways) are 
heavily influenced by the technology sponsor or the environment. 
 
Lastly, the coding process required a minor modification as this analysis 
required tracking which elements from which source could be allocated to a 
particular category. First, the 47 sources were provided with a code (i.e. a 
number, shown by Table 4). Subsequently a matrix was constructed with 
the three categories on the horizontal axis, and the 36 elements on the 
vertical axis. During the content analysis, when an element could be linked 
to a category, the number of the source was noted in the matrix. The result 
is shown by Table 5. While categorizing the elements, only a sub-set of the 
total amount of elements identified per source in the previous section could 
be allocated, because it was not always possible to deduce from the source 
to which category an element could be linked. 
 
 
 
Source Nr. 
Anderson et. al (1990) 1 
Arthur (1989) 2 
Arthur (1994) 3 
Arthur (1996) 4 
Besen (1994) 5 
Bower et.al (1995) 6 
Christensen et. al (1998) 7 
Clark (1985) 8 
Clymer & Asaba (2008) 9 
Cusumano et. al (1992) 10 
David (1985) 11 
David et. al (1988) 12 
Dosi (1982) 13 
Eisenmann, 2008 14 
Funk (2003) 15 
Gallagher & Park (2002) 16 
Gallagher & West (2009) 17 
Garud et. al (1993) 18 
Garud et. al (2002) 19 
Grindley (2002) 20 
Hill (1997) 21 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) 22 
Katz et. al (1986) 23 
Katz et. al, 1994 24 
Khazam et. al (1994) 25 
Klepper et.al (2000) 26 
Langlois (1992) 27 
Lee et. al (1995) 28 
Liebowitz et. al, 1996 29 
McGrath et. al (1992) 30 
Nair and Ahlstrom (2003) 31 
Rosenbloom et. al (1987) 32 
Schilling (1998) 33 
Schilling (2000) 34 
Schilling (2002) 35 
Schilling (2003) 36 
Shankar et al. (2002) 37 
Shapiro et. al (1999) 38 
Smit et. al (1998) 39 
Srinivasan et. al (2004) 40 
Suarez et. al (1995) 41 
Suarez (2004) 42 
Teece (1986) 43 
Tripsas (1997) 44 
Van de Kaa et. al (2011) 45 
Wade (1995) 46 
Willard et. al (1985) 47 
Table 4: Coding of the sources 
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Table 5: Elements allocated to type of influence 
 Category 
 Firm Technology Market / industry 
Technological 
superiority 
  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 
35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 
44, 45, 46, 47 
 
Entry timing 
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 
15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 
28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 
38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 
  
Network effects 
 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 
42, 46 
5, 10, 11, 18, 22, 23, 25, 28, 
29, 33, 34, 39, 40, 42, 45, 46 
Availability of 
complementary goods 
4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 
21, 25, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 
45, 46 
 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 
16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 
33, 34, 36, 38, 40, 43 
Appropriability 
5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 21, 23, 24, 25, 
28, 29, 30, 33, 36, 38, 39, 43, 45 
 1, 5, 10, 12, 14, 17, 22, 27, 33, 
40, 42, 43, 46 
Pricing 
1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 
20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 29, 33, 34, 
36, 37, 38, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47 
  
Organizational 
community of 
supporters 
1, 4, 5, 9, 10, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 
33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 46 
  
Government 
intervention and 
industry regulation 
  1, 2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 
22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 
32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 
45 
Marketing and pre-
announcements  
4, 5, 10, 12, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 
22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 33, 34, 
36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 45, 47 
   
Installed base 
5, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 25, 30, 36, 
37, 38, 42, 45, 47 
3, 4, 5, 11, 15, 17, 20, 23, 24, 
33, 34, 35, 46 
 
Firm's 
complementary assets 
4, 5, 10, 16, 17, 20, 21, 25, 28, 
30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 
43, 44, 45, 47 
  
Switching and homing 
cost 
 1, 4, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 24, 
28, 30, 31, 36, 38, 39, 42, 45, 46 
 
Reputation and 
credibility 
5, 10, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 27, 30, 
36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47 
  
Strategic partnerships 
5, 9, 10, 11, 16, 20, 21, 24, 25, 
28, 33, 35, 36, 43, 44, 45, 47 
  
Level of competition 
  5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 
20, 21, 25, 27, 32, 34, 39, 42, 
45, 47 
Technological 
knowledge and skill 
base 
4, 9, 10, 13, 18, 21, 25, 26, 27, 
28, 31, 32, 33, 35, 43, 44, 47 
  
Level of collaborative 
development  
1, 5, 10, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 
28, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38 
  
Availability of 
products 
10, 16, 17, 20, 22, 32, 39, 46, 47  5, 10, 17, 21, 22, 27, 32, 43, 
46 
Absorptive capacity 
10, 16, 17, 18, 28, 31, 32, 33, 
35, 38, 39, 44, 45, 47 
  
Increasing returns to 
adoption 
 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 
39, 44 
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Chance 2, 3, 11 2, 3, 10, 29, 35 2, 3, 35, 38, 46 
Market and industry 
characteristics 
  10, 16, 24, 27, 30, 31, 34, 39, 
42, 46 
Rate and type of 
technological change 
  1, 7, 16, 18, 26, 27, 28, 31, 39, 
44, 45, 46 
Market share and 
financial resources 
4, 10, 14, 17, 26, 33, 36, 41, 43, 
45, 47 
  
Backward 
compatability 
 17, 18, 20, 21, 28, 29, 36, 38, 
42, 45 
 
Powerful rival 
technology sponsors 
  10, 14, 18, 19, 21, 25, 27, 34, 
36 
Type of technological 
innovation 
  1, 6, 7, 25, 30, 35, 38, 
40, 43, 46 
 
Adapters and 
gateways 
  5, 12, 16, 17, 20, 22, 24, 38  
Availability of 
imitators 
  5, 18, 27, 38, 40, 41, 43, 46 
Pre-empting scarce 
assets 
10, 14, 15, 16, 30, 38, 43, 45   
Unclear assessment 
criteria 
   6, 8, 31, 33, 34, 35, 
39, 45 
Technological 
breakthroughs in 
subsystems 
 12, 16, 27, 31, 32, 34, 36  
Technological 
performance 
trajectories 
 6, 7, 9, 13, 31, 32  
Killer application 16, 17, 34, 36, 38  12, 16, 17, 27, 36 
Hetero- or 
homogeneity of 
customer needs 
  6, 17, 24, 29, 30, 36, 43 
Product proliferation 14, 20, 21  9 
 
2.2.2 Elements allocated to multiple categories 
As Table 5 shows, eight elements were allocated to multiple categories: network effects, availability of 
complementary goods, appropriability, installed base, availability of products, chance, killer application 
and product proliferation. The multiple allocation of these elements means that they are able to influence 
a customer in distinctly different ways, and therefore should be considered as separate elements in the 
development of the integrative framework. For example, by taking into account that there are two aspects 
of network effects and two aspects to an installed base which don‘t necessarily both apply to a situation. 
In order to indicate the difference between the allocation to one category or another, Table 6 shows the 
eight elements, their allocation, and a short description of the element per category based on the 
respective source texts. 
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Table 6: Allocation of the eight elements to multiple categories including short description 
 Firm Technology Market/Environment 
Network effects  Direct network effects; utility of a 
technology to a customer is 
dependent on the number of 
users connected to the same 
network (e.g. fax machines) 
Indirect network effects; 
utility of a technology to a 
customer increases with the 
availability of complementary 
goods  in the market 
Availability of 
complementary 
goods 
Complementary goods 
marketed by the technology 
sponsor 
 Complementary goods 
marketed by other companies 
in the industry 
Appropriability Firm‘s intellectual property 
rights 
 Efficacy of legal mechanisms 
to enforce the property rights 
Installed base Installed base of the firm Installed base of the technology  
Availability of 
products 
Products marketed by the 
technology sponsor 
 Products marketed by other 
companies in the industry 
Chance Whim of early developers Unexpected performance of a 
prototype 
Political circumstances 
Killer application Application of the technology 
that possesses a set of attributes 
meeting customer demands, 
marketed by the technology 
sponsor 
 Application of the technology 
that possesses a set of 
attributes meeting customer 
demands, marketed by 
another company in the 
industry 
Product 
proliferation 
Range of products adhering to 
the needs of a variety of market 
niches, marketed by the 
technology sponsor 
 Range of products adhering 
to the needs of a variety of 
market niches, marketed by 
other companies in the 
industry 
2.2.3 Elements for strategic decision making 
The elements which are in- or outside the scope of a technology sponsor have now been identified. 
However, not all elements in the scope of a technology sponsor are subject to strategic decision making, 
and considering our strategic-choice perspective it is imperative to understand which elements can be 
influenced by a technology sponsor as part of its strategy. Before commencing the analysis, it was 
important to define under what conditions an element would be considered to be subject to strategic 
decision making, and to establish the set of elements that would be reviewed. 
 
The following criteria were used to define which elements were subject to strategic decision making: 
- Should be subject to influence by a technology sponsor‘s executive team during the technological 
development, market launch and technology competition. In accordance with McGrath et al 
(1992), I adopt the view that strategic decision making is performed by an executive team that has 
been tasked by the technology sponsor to optimize its rents on the innovation 
- Short time to implementation; upon decision making it should be possible to initiate the change 
within a short timeframe (although actual results may become apparent as late as a few years 
thereafter) 
- In the view of the customer, the element would not qualify as inherent to the firm 
 
In the analysis, I limited the set of elements to those of Subsection 2.2.1 that were allocated to the ‗firm‘ 
and ‗technology‘ category, because these are within a firm‘s scope of influence. I subsequently reviewed 
each element, and performed content analysis on the respective sources to deduct if the element could be 
considered as inherent to the technology sponsor or subject to strategic decision making. Table 7 provides 
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an overview of the allocation of the elements; 6 elements were considered to be inherent to the 
technology sponsor, and 16 elements were considered to be subject to strategic decision making. The 
technological elements ‗switching and homing cost‘, ‗increasing returns to adoption‘, ‗technological 
performance trajectories‘ and ‗technological breakthroughs in subsystems‘ were not included in Table 7 
since they were not found to be ‗inherent to the technology sponsor‘ or ‗subject to strategic decision 
making‘. 
 
Table 7: Overview of elements for strategic decision making 
 Inherent to the technology sponsor Subject to strategic decision making 
F
ir
m
 
Reputation and credibility Pricing 
Installed base Marketing and pre-announcements 
Complementary assets Entry timing 
Firm size Availability of complementary goods 
Absorptive capacity Availability of products 
Technological knowledge and skill base Killer application 
 Appropriability 
 Product proliferation 
 Strategic partnerships 
 Organizational community of supporters 
 Level of collaborative development 
 Pre-empting scarce assets 
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
gy
   
 Technological superiority 
 Backward compatibility 
 Type of technological innovation 
 Adapters and gateways 
 
2.3 Direct or indirect influence 
In the previous section, 36 elements were found to influence the emergence of a de-facto standard, but 
this makes one wonder if all these elements influence a customer‘s decision to the same extent. As next 
step, I set out to learn if some elements could be considered to be more important than others in the 
decision of a customer to adopt a particular technology. 
 
Rather than trying to quantify the measure of influence of each element, I chose to differentiate them on 
the basis of their direct or indirect influence on the customer‘s decision. In other words, to determine the 
first and second order effects on a customer‘s decision to adopt a technology. My motivation to prefer 
this approach over a quantifying the influence is twofold: 1) while studying the empirical research on the 
emergence of de-facto standards it became apparent that the influence of an element differed per 
technology competition, so a quantifiable approach did not appear promising, and 2) it seemed unlikely 
that all 36 elements would have a direct influence on the customer‘s decision and this required further 
study. 
 
In order to determine which elements have a direct or indirect influence, I took a two stage approach. 
First, I set-out to identify the elements that have a direct influence (the first order elements). Subsequently 
I aimed to uncover the inter-element relationships. This second step provided insights which second 
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order elements influenced a particular first order element. In addition, it helped to identify any third order 
elements (those influencing only second order elements).  
2.3.1 First order elements 
The first stage was performed by investigating the 36 elements, and a content analysis of the 47 sources to 
identify which elements directly influenced a customer‘s decision. One of the leading indicators was for a 
source to mention that a particular element would stimulate a technology‘s installed base (i.e. amount of 
users). The results of the analysis can be found in Table 8. The left side of Table 8 presents the 15 first 
order elements that were identified, and the right side lists the corresponding sources (using the number 
coding of Table 4).  
 
Table 8: Overview of the 15 elements with first order influence on a customer‘s decision 
Direct influence on customer’s decision Sources 
Technological superiority 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 25, 28, 29, 30, 36, 46 
Entry timing 3, 5, 12, 16, 17, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36, 38, 42 
Network effects 17, 18, 22, 29 
Availability of complementary goods 3, 10, 11, 14, 19, 20, 21, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 42 
Pricing 4, 5, 10, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 26, 29, 33, 36, 38, 42, 44 
Marketing and pre-announcements 5, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 29, 33, 34, 36, 38, 42 
Installed base 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 33, 35, 36, 37, 42 
Switching and homing cost 1, 12, 16, 17, 24, 42 
Reputation and credibility 20, 22, 24, 36, 42, 44, 46 
Level of competition 5, 12, 16, 21, 39, 46 
Availability of products 10, 16, 21, 22, 36, 40, 46 
Market and industry characteristics 16, 24, 39, 42 
Rate and type of technology change 1, 28, 39 
Backward compatibility 20, 21, 36, 38, 42 
Killer application 12, 16, 36, 38 
2.3.2. Inter-element relationships and second order elements 
In order to gain an overview of the inter-element relationships, a matrix was constructed with the 36 
elements on both the horizontal and vertical axis. The elements on the vertical axis were labelled as 
‗influencing elements‘ and the ones on the horizontal axis were labelled as ‗influenced elements‘. The 
relationships between elements were derived by performing another content analysis of the 47 sources. 
When a relationship could be deduced from a source, this was noted in the matrix using the code of the 
source in accordance with Table 4. The element of ‗installed base‘ was omitted as influenced element, 
because this reflects the elements that directly influence a customer‘s decision to adopt a technology and 
therefore has already been addressed in the previous section. 
 
In total, 122 relationships were found. Appendix 2 provides an overview of the results (the overview was 
divided over two pages due to the size of the 36x36 matrix). The results show that nearly each first order 
element is influenced by one or more second order elements. Each non-first order element was found to 
influence a first order element, and therefore I regard all of these as second order elements. 
 
While determining the relationships, the elements ‗increasing returns to adoption‘ and ‗network effects‘ 
caused some difficulty, because these represent positive feedback mechanisms; increasing returns to 
adoption refers to the positive feedback loop between an increase in installed base and improving the 
technology, and network effects refer to the positive feedback loop between an increase in the installed 
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base and the availability of complementary goods. The different nature of these two elements will be 
taken into account when constructing the integrative framework. 
2.4 Phases and milestones in the emergence of a de-facto standard 
A de-facto standard does not emerge overnight. Technology competitions often go through several 
phases and span multiple years. It is therefore important to define the phases and milestones in the 
emergence of a de-facto standard. This area of academic research is, however, relatively underdeveloped. 
Several scholars have proposed phases and milestones. Utterback and Abernathy (1975) propose that the 
emergence progresses through three phases: fluid phase, transitional phase, and a mature phase. Tushman 
and Anderson (1986) propose two phases: era of ferment and an era of incremental changes. The era of 
ferment is triggered by a technical discontinuity, and selection of a dominant design marks the transition 
to the era of incremental changes. 
 
Of all frameworks, the phases and milestones as proposed by Suarez (2004) is best suited for studying the 
emergence of de-facto standards as it is well grounded in academic literature and developed specifically 
for understanding the process by which a technology emerges as de-facto standard. Suarez states that the 
emergence of a de-facto standard can be described in terms of a few key milestones as shown by Figure 
26. Each milestone marks the start of a new phase in the technology competition. The beginning of the 
technological field (T0) can be traced back to the moment when a pioneer firm or research group starts 
doing applied R&D aimed at the technological innovation. A second milestone (TP) is marked by the 
appearance of the first working prototype based on the technological innovation. The first working 
prototype sends a powerful signal to all firms in the race that at least one of the technological trajectories 
is feasible and has been developed to such a level that there will soon be a product in the market. Third 
milestone (TL) in the process is the launching of the first commercial product, which for the first time, 
directly connects a technology coming out of the lab to customers. The first product in the market is 
often too expensive for the mass market and therefore aimed at the high end of the market. The early 
market, typically a relatively small one when compared to the mass market, helps a particular technology 
become an early ―forerunner‖. The presence of a clear front runner marks the fourth milestone (TF) in the 
technology competition. This front runner has a chance of winning the competition, as its larger installed 
base tends to create a bias towards the technology with the largest market share. The final outcome will 
depend on how fast competitors improve on their own technologies and how fast the market grows. 
Finally a specific technology emerges as the de-facto standard and marks the last milestone (TD) of the 
competition. 
 
 
Figure 26: Milestones in the process of technological dominance (Source: Suarez, 2004) 
 
The amount of time needed for a technology to go from the beginning of the technological field (T0) to 
becoming the de-facto standard (TD) depends on the type of technological discontinuity (Anderson et. al, 
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1990). When a technology builds on a completely new knowledge base, many rival designs appear, and it 
will take longer for market forces to sort out these variants. 
2.5 The integrative framework 
The previous sections were required to generate the insights necessary for developing a framework that 
can be used to support strategic decision making to shape the odds of a technology emerging as the de-
facto standard. But before progressing to the integrative framework, a data matrix for the structured case 
study analysis will be presented. 
2.5.1 Data matrix as case analysis tool 
The concept behind the data matrix is to have a tool which will allow for a structured historic analysis of 
each case, and enables me to focus on obtaining the relevant details. The matrix was constructed by 
adopting the phases of Suarez (2004) on the horizontal axis, and combined these with a set of elements 
on the vertical axis. As elements, I took the 36 as shown in Table 1, divided these into their respective 
categories in accordance with Table 5. When an element was allocated to multiple categories, these were 
treated as separate elements and included on the vertical axis in their respective categories. Lastly, per 
category the elements were ranked on their type of influence on the customer‘s decision; first order 
elements were ranked first and the second order elements were placed thereafter. The resulting data 
matrix is shown by Table 9. 
. 
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Table 9: Case analysis tool 
  R&D 
Build-up 
Preparing for 
market entry 
Creating 
the market 
Decisive 
battle 
Post-
dominance 
F
ir
m
 
Reputation and credibility      
Installed base      
Pricing      
Entry timing      
Marketing and pre-announcements      
Availability of products      
Availability of complementary goods      
Killer application      
Size      
Complementary assets      
Technological knowledge and skill base      
Absorptive capacity      
Pre-empting scarce assets      
Level of collaborative development      
Organizational community of supporters      
Strategic partnerships      
Product proliferation      
Appropriability      
Chance      
       
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
Technological superiority      
Installed base      
Network effects      
Switching and homing cost      
Backward compatibility      
Increasing returns to adoption      
Technological breakthroughs in 
subsystems 
     
Type of technological innovation      
Adapters and gateways      
Technological performance trajectories      
Chance      
       
M
a
rk
e
t 
/
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 
Market and industry characteristics      
Level of competition      
Rate and type of technological change      
Network effects      
Availability of products      
Availability of complementary goods      
Killer application      
Availability of imitators      
Hetero- or homogeneity of customer 
needs 
     
Unclear assessment criteria      
Powerful rival technology sponsors      
Government intervention and industry 
regulation 
     
Product proliferation      
Appropriability      
Chance      
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As Table 9 shows, the data matrix can function as a checklist for the researcher to investigate per phase 
which elements influenced the emergence of the de-facto standard. 
2.5.2 Integrative framework of elements that shape the emergence of a de-facto standard 
This chapter began with the goal to devise a integrative framework that integrated the various elements of 
the emergence of a de-facto standard (e.g. market mechanisms, models for creating a technology 
bandwagon, elements for shaping the odds of technology selection), differentiated between types of 
elements (i.e. firm, technology, and market/industry related), their influence on a customer‘s decision to 
adopt a technology, influences between elements, and the phases and milestones in the emergence of a 
de-facto standard. 
 
In accordance with previous frameworks as described in Subsection 1.2.4, I devised a graphic 
representation of the results of the previous sections. As a starting point, I took the 36 elements that were 
identified in Section 2.1, and colour coded them based on their allocation to the firm, technology or 
market/industry category as defined in Section 2.2. The elements that can be utilized for strategic decision 
making were accentuated by a dotted line. Subsequently the results of Section 2.3 were used to 
differentiate the first- and second order elements. A circle was used to denote a barrier between the first- 
and second order elements, and the first order elements were placed inside the circle, whereas the second 
order elements were placed outside of the circle. Then I moved to draw arrows between the elements, 
indicating the influences between them. However, the graphic representation could not facilitate the great 
number of relationships without becoming undecipherable. So for the graphic representation, I decided to 
prioritize practicality over completeness and included only a few (often one or two) influences per 
element. The relationships included in the graphic representation were based on a review of Appendix 2, 
whereby I selected the one or two influences per element that had the highest concentration. I hereby 
took the assumption that there is a correlation between the number of sources that described a 
relationship between two elements, and its importance in shaping the odds of the emergence of a de-facto 
standard. Lastly, I reviewed the integrative framework. A major modification was the decision to omit the 
element ‗chance‘. During the analysis on the relationships between elements, it became apparent that the 
element can randomly influence any particular element. Therefore, one could say that chance is an ever 
present and uncontrollable event, which makes technology competitions to some extent unpredictable. 
For this reason it has no place in the framework. 
 
The phases in the emergence of a de-facto standard, as identified in Section 2.4, were not included in the 
framework to not further complicate it. Instead, I propose to utilize the integrative framework as a 
summary / snapshot of a phase, whereby the dynamics of a technology competition are captured in five 
summaries / snapshots wherein multiple firm, technology and market/industry related elements shape the 
odds of the emergence of a de-facto standard. Applying the integrative framework in the case studies shall 
have to point out if this allows to adequately capture the process. Figure 27 shows the integrative 
framework. 
 
69_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
53 
 
 
Figure 27: Integrative framework of elements that shape the odds for the emergence of a de-facto standard 
 
As can be seen from Figure 27, the elements of ‗increasing returns to adoption‘ and ‗network effects‘ were 
placed on an arrow between two other elements (as a result the element of ‗increasing returns to adoption‘ 
has been depicted between the first order elements). This was done to account for their nature as positive 
feedback mechanism, which is different from the other elements; as mentioned in Subsection 2.3.2., 
increasing returns to adoption refers to the positive feedback loop between an increase in installed base 
and improving the technology, and network effects refer to the positive feedback loop between an 
increase in the installed base and the availability of complementary goods. In Figure 27, we can see  that 
the element of ‗installed base‘ and ‗availability of complementary goods‘ influence each other is moderated 
by ‗network effects‘. The same holds for the element of ‗installed base‘ and ‗technological superiority‘ 
which is moderated by ‗increasing returns to adoption‘. 
2.5.3. Assessing the position of the technology sponsor versus its rivals 
While the integrative framework shown by Figure 27 provides insight in the actions that a technology 
sponsor can take, it does not offer a mechanism to evaluate the position of the technology sponsor versus 
its rivals during the technology competition. As mentioned in Section 1.3, it is important to include this 
perspective in order to gain a more thorough understanding of a technology sponsor‘s ability to shape the 
odds at a given moment during the technology competition. 
 
Hence, I propose a simple assessment method which can be used in combination with the case analysis 
tool (Table 9) or the integrative framework (Figure 27) so they can function a as ‗dashboard‘. First, one 
needs to identify the elements at play during the respective phase of the technology competition. Then, a 
Technology
Firm
Market / Industry
Installed base
Reputation and 
credibility
Technological 
superiority
Backward 
compatibility
Switching and 
homing cost
Rate and type of 
technological change
Network effects
Level of 
competition
Availability of 
complementary goods
Entry timing
Pricing
Marketing and pre-
announcements
Killer application
Availability of products
Market and industry 
characteristics
Firm size
Appropriability
Availability of imitators
Increasing returns 
to adoption
Product proliferation
Organizational 
community of supporters
Technological breakthroughs 
in subsystems
Government intervention 
and industry regulation
Adapters and gateways
Powerful rival 
technology sponsors
Level of collaborative  
development 
Absorptive capacity
Technological knowledge 
and skill base
Complementary 
assets
Pre-empting scarce 
assets
Strategic partnerships
1st order
2nd order
Technological 
performance trajectories
Unclear assessment 
criteria
Hetero- or homogeneity 
of customer needs
Type of technological innovation
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score can be attributed on how the technology sponsor‘s (A) situation compares to that of its rival (B). To 
this end I propose a simple scoring method whereby the options are shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Scoring options 
 
A has a distinct advantage over B 
 A has the advantage over B 
 
There is no apparent advantage for either A or B 
 
B has the advantage over A 
 
B has a distinct advantage over A 
Blank Element is not utilized or not applicable 
 
Following this, one has an overview of the elements at play and how the technology sponsor scores on 
these versus its competitor. The resulting overview has the potential to be used as a diagnostic tool, 
showing where the firm is outperforming its competitor or vice-versa, and which elements are 
underutilized. In combination with the integrative framework or the tables in Appendix 2, one could even 
go as far as to determine which second order elements it needs to shape in order to influence a particular 
first order element. 
 
Besides the case analysis tool and the integrative framework, I will apply the scoring method to the three 
cases to gain insight if (in retrospect) a technology sponsor could indeed evaluate the situation and 
identify the relevant elements to shape the odds in its favor. 
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Chapter 3 - Pushing technological progress by strategic manoeuvring: 
The triumph of  Blu-ray over HD-DVD 
 
Published in Business History, 55 (8), 2013, pp.1361-1384 
 
Simon den Uijl, Henk J. de Vries 
 
Abstract 
After the Digital Versatile Disc became the consumer‘s technology of choice for playing video content in 
1996, several consumer electronics companies in parallel initiated the development of the next generation 
optical discs. This eventually led to a format war between two similar but incompatible high definition 
optical disc formats: Blu-ray and HD-DVD. The companies behind these formats could not reach 
consensus on a combined format and either side was unable to impose a dominant technology, therefore 
they needed to compete for dominance in the marketplace. HD-DVD was first to enter the market with a 
high definition optical disc player in 2006. In addition, HD-DVD players were significantly cheaper than 
Blu-ray players. Nevertheless, it did not win the format war due to the strategic manoeuvring of the 
companies in the Blu-ray Disc Association. Differently from what was experienced in previous format 
wars, consumers did not determine the outcome. The format war was ultimately decided by tipping the 
amount of company support for Blu-ray throughout the supply chain and using the technology adoption 
characteristics of the video game console industry.  
 
Keywords: Format wars; Blu-ray, HD-DVD; dominant design,  innovation management 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, the 4.7-inch optical disc has been a successful technological 
format for digital data storage. The success of the 4.7-inch optical disc started in the late 1970s, when 
Philips and Sony combined their respective technologies to develop the first mass market optical disc for 
data storage: the audio Compact Disc. The result marked a huge leap in consumer audio by delivering 
high quality sound on a durable medium with instant playback. In 1991, nine years after introducing the 
technology to the market, the audio CD had become the dominant format for audio storage, thereby 
replacing the compact cassette tape. In order to leverage the format to other markets, in June 1985 Sony 
and Philips introduced the computer-readable CD-ROM, which became a widely applied data storage 
medium in the computer industry.  
 
Several years before market introduction of the CD, a mass market for video storage was created by the 
videocassette recorder format war between VHS and Betamax. Sony launched Betamax in 1975, and 
found support from companies such as Toshiba and Sanyo.179 VHS was launched by JVC in 1976, and 
soon thereafter other companies that supported VHS (the most important being Panasonic, then known 
as Matsushita) also launched products on the market. After VHS had won the format war in the 1980s, 
Sony managed to recoup some of its losses by receiving license fees from patents that were required for 
both VHS and Betamax. Although Toshiba also had some patents on a key technology used in both 
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formats, the patents on this invention were close to expiration and it could therefore not recoup the loss 
by Betamax‘s failure. This caused Toshiba to hold a grudge against Sony. 
 
Aiming to repeat the success of the CD format, in December 1994 Sony and Philips announced the 
development of a new optical disc format for digital video storage, called the MultiMedia Compact Disc 
(MMCD). However, one month later a consortium of several companies including Panasonic (wanting to 
uphold its position in video storage), Toshiba and Warner announced that they were developing an 
alternative format: the SuperDensity (SD) disc. In September 1995, pressured by the computer industry, 
the two factions agreed to combine their technologies into a new format: the Digital Versatile Disc 
(DVD). The DVD format was much closer to the SD disc format than the MMCD format. Little of 
MMCD's fundamental technology was transferred into the DVD format. The groups united to form the 
DVD Consortium (which was renamed ‗DVD-Forum‘ in 1997), to help the DVD format to rapidly gain 
adoption. The market transition from video cassettes to optical discs took six years (from 1997 to 2003), 
faster than any other technology transition in consumer electronics (Peek et al., 2009). Following the 
outcome, Sony and Philips wanted a more equal distribution of the license income, but this was not 
accepted by the other members of the DVD Consortium. Sony and Philips subsequently left the DVD 
Consortium patent pool (DVD6C) and established a separate patent pool (DVD3C). In effect, companies 
that wanted to manufacture DVDs required a license from both patent pools. This move by Sony and 
Philips worsened the relationship with Toshiba. After becoming the dominant format in the video 
recording industry, the DVD format also became dominant in the video game console industry and a 
widely applied data storage medium in the computer industry. Due to the success of CD and DVD, the 
optical disc has become a widely applied digital data storage format with a dominant market share in 
several large markets, some of which are listed in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Market penetration of the 4.7-inch optical disc format 
 1980 1991 1998 2003 
Music players Compact Cassette tapes CD CD CD 
Computer software Floppy discs Floppy discs CD DVD 
Video players VHS VHS VHS DVD 
Video game consoles Tapes Cartridges Cartridges DVD 
 
While the DVD was becoming the consumer‘s technology of choice for playing video content at the end 
of the 1990s, several companies in parallel started developing the next generation optical discs. By 2007, 
seven high-definition optical disc formats competed for consumer adoption; Blu-ray, HD-DVD, Versatile 
Multilayer Disc, CH-DVD, EVD, AOSRA, and Forward Versatile Disc. 180 The two most serious 
competitors were Blu-ray and HD-DVD, which attracted the most industry support and the largest 
consumer base. In their struggle for market dominance, the two formats faced a more complex 
environment than their predecessors. As shown in Table 1, the four product categories using the 4.7-inch 
optical disc format in 2003 all used different storage media in 1980. Whereas these products each had a 
single function in 1980, in 2003 a video player could be used both for playing video and audio, and video 
game consoles could be used for playing video games, videos and audio. With the success of the optical 
disc format in these product categories and the convergence of product functionalities, it had become 
more difficult to introduce a new optical disc format due to the necessity for building larger and more 
diverse networks of companies supporting the innovation. 
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From the early years of the optical disc industry, innovation was always led by a group of large-scale, 
integrated firms of the sort that Alfred D. Chandler Jr. observed in his studies of several of the world‘s 
largest industries.181 The increasing convergence of product functionalities and the increased difficulty to 
introduce a new optical disc format retained the necessity of large-scale, integrated firms as an engine of 
progress in this industry. The optical disc industry also illustrates Schumpeter‘s notion of ‗creative 
destruction‘182; CD, DVD and Blu-ray were all based on new intellectual property portfolios because these 
formats were radical rather than incremental innovations. Format wars, such as the competition between 
the high-definition optical disc formats, demonstrate different competitive dynamics than markets in 
which competitors can coexist relatively peacefully, as they often have a single tipping point which shifts 
the balance to one side.183 Tipping of the market towards one technology is often driven by network 
effects184; the phenomenon that the value of a product to an individual customer depends on the number 
of other users of that product.185 Different from previous format wars in videocassette recorders186, 
microcomputers and operating systems187 and internet browsers188 which suggest that ‗the market decides‘, 
in the format war of Blu-ray versus HD-DVD, consumers did not play a decisive role. The outcome of 
this format war was determined by the amount of company support for the formats, which was 
influenced by strategic manoeuvring. Therefore, the events in the high definition optical disc format war 
add new insights to what is currently known on strategies and tactics in format wars189 which focus on 
customer adoption of new technologies. With the technology being a platform used in multiple product 
categories, it connects different supplier and distribution networks. Therefore, the more parties an alliance 
manages to attract, the stronger its position in the format war. Due to the on-going integration of 
technologies and markets, we expect to see such format wars unfold more often.  
3.2 Initial development of Blu-ray and HD-DVD: the R&D build-up (1986-2000) 
3.2.1 Enabling the technological development with blue laser diodes 
In 1998, commercial high definition television (HDTV) sets began to appear in the US and Japanese 
consumer market. But there was no commonly accepted, inexpensive way to record or play high 
definition content. The CD and DVD format were based on red laser diodes, and due to their wavelength 
these optical disc systems were not able to store the amount of data required for HDTV recording. A new 
format had to be developed, using shorter-wavelength lasers. 
 
In 1986, the Japanese company Toyoda Gosei started developing blue laser diodes under the guidance of 
Professor Isamu Akasaki.190 However, the required technological breakthrough was achieved by a team of 
scientists led by Shuji Nakamura at Nichia Corporation that produced the first commercial blue laser 
diodes in 1993.191 Blue light has the shortest wavelength of visible light. With a blue laser diode the 
amount of data that could be read and stored on a 4.7 inch optical storage disc could be quadrupled, 
enabling high density optical media capable of recording HDTV. Although the blue lasers became 
commercially available in 2001, it took another two to three years192 before the price was low enough for 
mass market consumer products. A legal battle between several companies (e.g. Nichia, Toyoda Gosei 
and Cree193) from 1996 to 2002194 led to limited availability and high prices for the blue laser diodes ($5000 
for a sample), and made companies reluctant to license technology from either company. 
 
The invention of blue-laser diodes was a first step in creating a high definition optical disc format. To 
create a disc that could store the required amount of data, one had to choose between two technical 
approaches: 
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 Compressing the digital information to a lower data rate (use less digital data) to data capacity 
levels supported by DVD based technology. This lower bit rate would, however, degrade the high 
definition picture quality. 
 Recording the data at the higher data rate required by HDTV, but use new technology that would 
support the higher data rate and higher data capacity. This approach allowed the high definition 
signal to pass without excessive compression, preserving the detail of the original high definition 
picture. 
3.2.2 Developing the DVR-Blue format 
Due to their long relationship, at the end of 1997, Sony and Philips decided to collaborate on a high 
definition optical disc format. Concerning the technological approach, an executive at one of these 
consumer electronics companies stated: ―It was a strategic choice to work on a technology with five times 
more storage capacity than DVD because we believed that in the future, motion picture studios would 
have the need for more disc capacity (to include more interactivity features, etc.) and because consumers 
require a substantial improvement in order to switch to a new system‖. As such, Sony and Philips chose 
to support the higher data rate and data capacity required to record HDTV. This required new 
technologies, leading to a new intellectual property base. They combined their new high-numerical 
aperture lens, advanced tilt servo system and phase change material195 and started developing DVR-Blue, 
the technology which would eventually become Blu-ray.196 With a data storage capacity of 25GB 
(gigabytes), about four hours of HD video, on a single layer disc the technology was far more advanced 
than DVD technology (4.7GB for single layer disc).197 Due to the importance of video recorders in Japan 
(which accounted for 60% of DVD player/recorder shipments in 2005), the DVR-Blue format was set-up 
as a video recorder and the development started with a rewritable disc.  
 
The most important technological difference between DVR-Blue and its predecessors was its disc 
structure. As Figure 28 shows, the data layer of the CD was located at the bottom of a substrate and the 
data area of the DVD was placed in the middle of a disc. To create room for extra data layers, and as such 
the potential to store more data, the DVR-Blue discs were designed to keep the data layer close to the 
surface; they were composed of a single substrate instead of two halves,198 placing the data layer 0.1mm 
from the surface. Because the data layer was so close to the laser, the design had little allowance to 
scratches and the discs required a caddy. The design called for a more complex lens, which had to be 
made of glass rather than the less expensive plastic used for other types of optical players. 
 
 
Figure 28: Optical disc technology roadmap199 
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The technology base of DVR-Blue was also used to target other markets. In November 2000, Plasmon 
and Sony jointly announced the development of the Ultra Density Optical technology as a high capacity 
storage solution for data servers.200 
3.3 Preparing for market entry: Building business networks, shifting allegiances 
and efforts to merge the formats (2000-2006) 
In October 2000, Sony and Philips presented the first DVR-Blue prototype.201 It was based on an 
intermediate version of the format (version 0.5), leaving sufficient room for other parties to provide 
suggestions for modifications. Half a year later, Matsushita (Panasonic) presented a prototype of their 
high definition optical disc format.202 Sony and Philips, having learnt the importance of building a 
network of consumer electronics companies supporting a technology from the format war between VHS 
and Betamax203 and wanting to prevent another costly format war, invited Panasonic to join their 
partnership. Panasonic evaluated both formats and decided to support DVR-Blue because of its superior 
storage capacity. Panasonic contributed valuable aspects of their own format, including its dual layer 
technology which enabled the discs to double their storage capacity to 50GB. Involving Panasonic was a 
very important move for Sony and Philips due to Panasonic‘s abilities and reputation. An executive at one 
of the consumer electronics companies stated: “Throughout history, when Panasonic supported a technology, that 
technology won the format war. Therefore Panasonic was an obvious key player that we wanted to attract in the development 
of DVR-Blue”. Together, the three companies developed the standard to version 0.9. 
 
In order to fully prevent a format war and increase the support behind DVR-Blue, the three parties aimed 
at involving eight other large consumer electronics manufacturers. Each contacted those companies they 
had the closest relationship with. Toshiba and Mitsubishi Electric declined the offer. Due to their stake in 
the intellectual property of DVD, Toshiba decided to pursue its own technological development, thereby 
moving towards a format war. A former Japanese government official stated: ―Toshiba‟s decision to develop 
their own format was also motivated by their grudge towards Sony from previous format wars‖. Mitsubishi Electric did 
not want to adhere to the stringent non-disclosure demands for evaluating DVR-Blue. A few years later, 
in 2003, Mitsubishi Electric reconsidered and decided to support the format; the arguments from a 
business perspective prevailed over those from the intellectual property perspective. Mitsubishi‘s decision 
to choose DVR-Blue over Toshiba‘s format was based on the larger alliance size and larger disc capacity. 
 
On 19 February 2002, nine large consumer electronics companies (Sony, Philips, Hitachi, LG, Panasonic, 
Pioneer, Samsung, Sharp and Thomson) formed the Blu-ray Disc Founders (BDF) and DVR-Blue was 
renamed to Blu-ray. These nine companies developed the format to version 1.0, which was completed in 
June 2002. Licensing of version 1.0 started in February 2003.  
 
In August 2002, Toshiba and NEC publicly announced their competing format Advanced Optical Disc 
(AOD was later renamed to HD-DVD).204 AOD was built upon the intellectual property of the DVD 
format, while adding new intellectual property for the HD application. In developing AOD, Toshiba and 
NEC chose to reduce the data rate in order to record HDTV. The surface layer of AOD discs was similar 
to DVD (0.6mm). This technology was more evolutionary than revolutionary, with a data storage capacity 
of 15 GB of data, or about 2.5 hours of HD video, on a single layer disc. In October 2002, Toshiba gave 
the first public demonstration of an AOD prototype.205 
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The different disc designs influenced the lens pickup apertures (0.65 for AOD vs. 0.85 for Blu-ray), which 
made the two formats technically incompatible despite using the same type of blue laser diodes. The 
companies behind both formats understood the importance of low switching cost to enable consumers to 
migrate to the new format. To achieve this, both groups made their formats backwards compatible, 
enabling them to play CD and DVD discs. AOD used a single plastic lens that could operate with both 
blue and red lasers, but the Blu-ray systems required a separate lens for a red laser besides the glass lens 
for the blue laser,206 increasing its manufacturing cost. Due to the different technological choices in 
developing the formats, Blu-ray and AOD were positioned differently. AOD discs were cheaper to 
manufacture, because they used the same manufacturing equipment as DVDs (existing DVD-Video 
fabrication plants could be retrofitted to produce AOD discs and the projected cost for retooling a plant 
for AOD was $150,000, versus $3,000,000 for Blu-ray). Blu-ray had a higher data capacity of 25GB versus 
15GB for AOD on a single layer disc, and a theoretical limit of 200GB versus 60GB. 
 
Shortly after founding the BDF, the focus of the Blu-ray development changed. Several of the new 
network members made clear that pre-recorded discs and content were required to make the technology 
successful. Their experience with DVD had taught them that consumers were not really interested in a 
new format for recording, but adopted the new format for playing pre-recorded discs. Therefore, the 
companies started to work on a read-only disc for motion pictures. With this change in course, they saw 
the importance of gaining commitment from content providers (the major film studios) and the IT 
industry. In order to obtain support from the major film studios, in 2002-2003 Sony, Philips and 
Panasonic organized a series of meetings between their engineers and the major film studios. This led to a 
decision by 20th Century Fox and the Walt Disney Company in the autumn of 2004 to pledge support for 
Blu-ray. To obtain support from these film studios, the BDF agreed to include a three layer content 
protection (AACS, ROM mark and BD+207), region coding, additional video codecs (providing content 
providers more flexibility to pack more content on a disc)208 and a new video application format. 
According to an executive at a consumer electronics company ―20th Century Fox and Walt Disney have fewer, 
but very strong titles in comparison to other major film studios, and due to their size it is more difficult to launch movies 
world-wide on the same date. Therefore, content protection and region coding are especially important to these two studios‖.  
The importance of the copy protection is also reflected in its ownership; BD+ was developed and 
licensed in a collaborative effort by Sony, Panasonic and 20th Century Fox. AOD also used AACS content 
protection, but that was its single form of content protection. Region codes denote the areas of the world 
in which distribution and playback of the discs are intended, and allow studios to control various aspects 
of a release, such as date and price, per region. AOD did not have region codes in their technical 
specifications. The companies in the BDF were initially divided over the issue of including region coding. 
Around 2003-2004 the European Commission was investigating the region coding of DVD due to an 
anti-trust issue (Neuwirth, 2009) but because 20th Century Fox and Walt Disney required region coding, 
the BDF decided in 2004 to include it in the format. They limited the amount of regions to three, half the 
number used for DVD. A key requirement for the new video application format was advanced 
interactivity and web connectivity, for which a new programmable environment needed to be created. 
After long consideration, in September 2003 the BDF agreed to proceed with the development of a Java-
based programmable platform.  
 
With Blu-ray gaining momentum, the DVD-Forum (initially known as the DVD Consortium), chaired by 
Toshiba, was divided on whether to support the blue lasers (9 of the 17 members of the DVD-Forum 
Steering Committee were also the founders of the BDF, thereby uniting outside the Forum). The 
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technical decisions made during the development of Blu-ray resulted in a more expensive medium and 
physically different from DVDs. In order to avoid what would be a costly shift to blue-laser technology, 
only a week after the creation of the BDF, the DVD-Forum approved a proposal endorsed by Warner 
Bros. and other major film studios that involved compressing HD content onto dual-layer DVD-9 discs. 
Six of the 17 companies in the Steering Committee, including Panasonic, Sony and Philips, abstained. In 
spite of this decision, in June 2002 the DVD-Forum's Steering Committee decided to form two 
subgroups to study the best technical approach based on blue laser optical disc applications,209 in order to 
adopt a successor for the DVD format. The first of the two subgroups was formed in the same month 
and immediately started studying a disc format with a 0.6mm surface layer. The Blu-ray format was never 
formally proposed to the DVD-Forum, although some of the parties in the BDF lobbied in the Steering 
Committee for acceptance. On 29 August 2002, Toshiba and NEC proposed the AOD format to the 
DVD-Forum,210 but were thwarted twice when Blu-ray members of the Steering Committee either 
abstained or voted against.211 Political tactics and rhetoric from both sides were in play. Toshiba pointed 
at the immaturity of Blu-ray; the discs used a caddy, along with the higher cost required for retooling by 
disc manufacturers. The Blu-ray camp countered with continuing efforts and historical precedence to 
placate those concerns along with their future capacity and higher bit stream rates. But the biggest issue 
was the future revenue from licensing and royalties. Blu-ray was based on new intellectual property, 
whereas AOD was based on the intellectual property base of DVD. By accepting AOD, the intellectual 
property base of DVD would still generate revenues. In order to break the stand still, Toshiba managed to 
get the Steering Committee to accept a proposal changing the voting rules to allow absentee votes not to 
count in the final tally while also accepting the addition of three new members to the Steering Committee. 
This resulted in AOD winning final approval in November 2003 without a majority. Subsequently the 
AOD format was renamed to HD-DVD.  
 
DVD-Forum‘s support for HD-DVD provided additional momentum. Many disc replicators and smaller 
companies relied on the DVD-Forum to indicate where the industry would be headed and decided to 
support the HD-DVD format. However, with the DVD-Forum being a mere means of collaboration, it 
could not impose industry regulation. As Blu-ray was based on new intellectual property, the BDF could 
continue the development of the format without requiring licenses from the DVD-Forum. 
 
An important aspect in a format war is to be first to launch a product on the market; whoever is first to 
market can build-up an installed base of users. On 10 April 2003, Sony introduced the first commercially 
available high definition disc recorder, the BDZ-S77.212 This product targeted the niche market of 
recording the HD image of the digital satellite broadcasting (launched in Japan in December 2000) and 
the terrestrial digital broadcasting (launched in Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka in December 2003). Due to the 
importance of recorders in Japan and the shift of focus in the technological development, the BDZ-S77 
was only made available in Japan and the recommended price was ¥450,000 (US$3,815). The Sony BDZ-
S77 was based on version 1.0 Blu-ray Disc Rewritable format, using Sony proprietary BDFS as logical 
format and 23GB discs with a caddy. Sony wanted to be the first to market a Blu-ray device to show that 
they were the main party behind Blu-ray. However, the timing of market entry was too early. Consumer 
adoption of the BDZ-77 and a later model from Panasonic was not very successful due to the price 
(which was much higher compared to the hard disc drive recorders which had entered the market at the 
end of 2001 and satisfied the same consumer need) and because the products experienced technical 
problems. Nevertheless, the device did enable the companies in the BDF to learn about the consumer 
requirements for the new format. 
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In order to gain commitment from the IT industry, in 2003 the BDF decided to modify version 1.0 to 
their requirements by replacing Sony‘s logical format with the non-proprietary logical format UDF. They 
also committed to find an alternative solution for the caddy. As a result, in January 2004 the world's two 
largest PC manufacturers, Hewlett Packard and Dell, joined the BDF. Two months later the BDF 
announced the addition of TDK, a leading manufacturer of optical discs, which had developed a new 
hard-coat polymer. The hard-coating enabled the cost-efficient production of robust, bare Blu-ray discs. 
By eliminating the caddy, the cost of the discs was reduced. 
 
Following its collaboration with Sony in 2000, Plasmon announced the global debut of their UDO drive 
for data archival storage based on DVR-Blue in March 2003. Later that year, the first products entered the 
market. On 7 April 2003, Sony announced its own format for data archiving applications,213 ProData, 
which was based on Blu-ray. Sony‘s first products based on the ProData format were shipped in June 
2004. Next to ProData, Sony also developed XDCAM HD which targeted yet another market; 
broadcasters and AV studios.214 The first XDCAM HD entered the market in April 2006. This prolific 
approach in leveraging the DVR-Blue and Blu-ray technology to other markets increased market demand 
for e.g. Blu-ray discs. 
 
By 2004 the market for DVD began to saturate, creating a sense of urgency with the major film studios to 
cooperate in developing a new format. Because of the success of the optical disc format in multiple 
product categories, the supporters of both formats vied for support from companies in various industries 
(e.g. major film studios, video game studios, optical disc manufacturers, disc replicator and authoring 
companies, providers of disc production, replication and authoring equipment, consumer electronics 
manufacturers, computer manufacturers, game console manufacturers, and retailers). Although the 
process to diversify the business network supporting the formats started in 2003, this got a significant 
boost in 2004. Appendix 1 provides a timeline containing the major events in the development of the 
respective business networks. 
 
On 18 May 2004, the 13 members of the BDF announced to be re-incorporated into the Blu-ray Disc 
Association (BDA). Companies wishing to participate in the future development of Blu-ray and support 
the format were welcomed into the BDA. Three months later, more than 70 companies from the 
consumer electronics, information technology, media and software industry had joined.  
 
In September 2004 Sony, owner of the film studios Sony and Columbia Pictures, acquired Metro 
Goldwyn Mayer (MGM), expanding its complementary assets and enlisting its support for Blu-ray. In the 
same month, Sony announced that their game console PlayStation 3 (PS3) would use Blu-ray discs.215 The 
practical reason for integrating a Blu-ray player in the PS3 was that Blu-ray could support the increasing 
amount of data required for the graphics of its games. A strategic reason was that Sony realized the PS3 
could function as a ‗killer app‘, just as their PlayStation2 had been for the DVD format. Several studies 
have shown the importance of a ‗killer app‘. Shapiro & Varian (1999) note that Walt Disney‘s Wonderful 
World of Color was the ‗killer app‘ for colour television sets, and Oshri, De Vries & De Vries (2010) 
report the Mosaic browser was the ‗killer application‘ for the Internet. Another strategic reason was to 
show the industry, and primarily the major film studios, that Sony was fully committed to making Blu-ray 
a success. 
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In addition of the DVD-Forum‘s support, Toshiba, Sanyo, NEC and Memory-Tech established the HD-
DVD Promotion Group in December 2004. This entity was created to provide additional momentum 
behind promoting the HD-DVD format and to enhance the development of content and hardware made 
in compliance with the format. 
 
Back in 2002, Microsoft had announced plans to deliver HD-enhanced new DVD content using an 
interactive menu system called HDi (initially known as iHD). In order to run HDi, new players would 
need to incorporate a small computer. Intel supported Microsoft‘s plans, having an interest that such a 
small computer would be based on its microprocessors. Microsoft hoped to get both Blu-ray and HD-
DVD to adopt HDi.  Hewlett Packard in turn invited Microsoft to support Blu-ray for playback under 
Windows, which HP would need for its Blu-ray-equipped PCs. Microsoft demanded that the Blu-ray 
group would adopt HDi in order for its support. In 2005, the BDA performed a three-month evaluation 
of BD-J and HDi. By the end of June 2005, Sun announced that the BDA had chosen the Java-based BD-
J interactivity layer instead of Microsoft's HDi. The BDA Board of Directors voted 10 to 4 in favour of 
BD-J, despite an earlier 7 to 5 vote by the technical committee in favour of HDi. The choice for BD-J 
instead of HDi was one of the most difficult and important decisions in the development of the Blu-ray 
format because it concerned the intelligence of the player. Several of the IT companies and major film 
studios had a strategic alliance with Microsoft and therefore had a preference for HDi. However, some 
BDA members strongly preferred BD-J because of its interoperability with other products, and the 
interactivity and broadband-ready new functions. Adopting HDi would also allow Microsoft to enter the 
consumer electronics market and gain an influential role in the Blu-ray disc format. In addition, the 
manufacturers of Blu-ray players would need to integrate Intel products. Both were not in the interest of 
the consumer electronics companies supporting Blu-ray.  
 
The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) wanted to avoid the impeding format 
war. In April 2005, METI urged Toshiba, Sony and Panasonic to initiate negotiations for unifying their 
formats. Panasonic and Sony proposed the combination of the Blu-ray disc physical format and HD-
DVD application (video) format, however Toshiba insisted on the HD-DVD physical format because it 
believed low cost was very important. For all companies it was important to come to a consensus 
whereby none would lose face. Both sides regarded that the ‗winner‘ of the negotiations would be the one 
that had its optical disc substrate thickness selected. Both sides could not find a resolution for this, and on 
22 August 2005, the BDA and DVD-Forum announced that the negotiations to unify their formats had 
failed. 
 
As a result of the BDA‘s decision to select BD-J and the negotiations not altering this, in September 2005 
Microsoft and Intel announced their exclusive support for HD-DVD (which had already included HDi as 
a mandatory part of the specification). HP made a last attempt to broker an agreement between the BDA 
and Microsoft. It demanded that the BDA would adopt Microsoft's HDi and a mandatory managed copy 
feature, otherwise it would support HD-DVD. Eventually, the BDA did not comply with HP‘s requests 
and in December 2005, HP announced it would support both formats. 
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Figure 29: Major film studios committed to Blu-ray (black), HD-DVD (grey), and not committed (white) end of 2004 and 2005, including studio 
market shares.216 
 
Figure 29 shows that at the end of 2004 each format had the exclusive support of three of the big six film 
studios. But in October 2005, Warner Bros. and Paramount decided to also support Blu-ray. Warner‘s 
decision to withdraw its exclusive support for HD-DVD was the first time it diverged from its 
commitment to Toshiba and put a strain on their long relationship. The reason behind Warner‘s decision 
was that they wanted to sell their products regardless of the format, and at that point it was clear that Blu-
ray would be launched. Moreover, Panasonic had established a pilot production line of Blu-ray discs 
earlier that year217 with new (inexpensive) manufacturing technology that reduced the price of the Blu-ray 
discs.218  
 
In November 2005 Sony and NEC agreed to merge their optical disc storage groups,219 which was later 
fully acquired by Sony. This weakened NEC‘s support for the HD-DVD format. 
 
 
Figure 30: Number of companies in the alliances of Blu-ray and HD-DVD 
  
Figure 30 shows that by the end of 2005 the Blu-ray format had gathered a greater number of companies 
that supported the format. Table 12 shows that the Blu-ray format managed to achieve a large 
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accumulated market share through its supporters in consumer electronics, personal computer, game 
console and film studio industry. 
 
Table 12: Accumulated market share (% of total market) of the companies supporting Blu-ray and/or HD-DVD in their 
respective industries, through the years220 
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Consumer electronics manufacturers (in US DVD hardware) 50 10 47 11 51 10 43 9 
PC manufacturers (based on worldwide shipments)      27  27 16 
128-bit video game console manufacturers (installed base, 
worldwide) 
    62  63 17 
Top 12 major film studios (worldwide)     43 34 66221 41 
 
Because the film studios required copy protection to securely distribute movies to consumers, an 
agreement on a new copy protection standard, AACS, was required before movies in either format could 
be released. AACS LA, a consortium founded in 2004 by e.g. Toshiba, Microsoft, Sony and Panasonic, 
had been developing the AACS copy protection. However, the final AACS standard was delayed several 
times. At the request of the consumer electronics manufacturers, an incomplete interim standard was 
published early 2006. At the same time, DVD sales started to decrease. With the last technical details 
solved, both formats were on the brink of market entry. 
3.4 Creating the market (2006-2007) 
In the race to have the first high-definition optical disc player on the market, the HD-DVD format won. 
On 31 March 2006, Toshiba released their first HD-DVD player in Japan, the HD-A1, at ¥110,000 
($934).222 HD-DVD was subsequently released in United States on 18 April 2006, with players priced at 
$499 and $799. The first HD-DVD titles were released on the same date by Warner and Universal.  
 
Only three months after the launch of the first HD-DVD player, Samsung launched the first Blu-ray disc 
player, the BD-P1000, based on version 2.0 of the Blu-ray format at a suggested retail price of $999. 
Because the time window between the market entry of the two formats was small and both formats were 
launched in the US before Black Friday (the first Friday after Thanksgiving which marks the beginning of 
the Christmas shopping season in the US), being first to market did not give HD-DVD a strong 
advantage. However, with HD-DVD players on the market it was difficult for Blu-ray disc players to 
build-up an initial installed base. The original proposition of offering a technology that was four to five 
times better than any other commercially available product was cancelled out. In addition, the first Blu-ray 
disc players were perceived as expensive and buggy, and only few titles were available. 
 
The market for both high definition optical disc formats was limited, as their adoption was dependent on 
the sales of HDTV sets. Worldwide an estimated 48 million households had a HD television at the end of 
2006.223 The United States accounted for 58% of HD homes, Japan for 20%, with Britain, Canada and 
China also high on the list. 
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On 11 November 2006, Sony launched its PS3 game console with integrated Blu-ray disc player in Japan 
and the week thereafter in the United States. The video game console market has a tradition of switching 
to a new console every few years and its users are very willing to adopt the latest technology, whereas 
users in the movie player and recorder industry are more conservative. The characteristics of the video 
game console industry were therefore very suited for building-up an installed base for a high definition 
optical disc format.  
 
A few weeks after Sony launched its PS3, Microsoft began offering an optional HD-DVD player designed 
for its Xbox360 game console for $200. The Xbox360 itself had been launched in November 2005 and 
contained a DVD drive. The external HD-DVD drive was restricted to HD-DVD playback to prevent 
fragmentation of the installed base for Xbox games publishers and to ensure that all Xbox games were 
playable on all machines. For this reason, it was clear that Microsoft would not launch a second 
generation Xbox360 with a built-in HD-DVD drive. Microsoft wanted to leave its options open and not 
get locked into a particular information storage technology. 
 
At the end of 2006, both formats competed for consumer adoption through multiple stand alone high 
definition players and video game consoles. Figure 31 shows that in the first year after both formats were 
on the market, consumer adoption of the stand alone players was only marginal, and the PS3 primarily 
fuelled the installed base of the Blu-ray format. Fewer than 2% of the Xbox users opted to buy the 
optional HD-DVD drive, but those that did would subsequently also purchase HD-DVD discs. Only a 
small percentage of the consumers purchasing a PS3 actually purchased Blu-ray movies. 
 
Figure 31: Worldwide Blu-ray and HD-DVD hardware sold to consumers, 4th quarter 2006 – 3rd quarter 2007.224 
 
A known strategy in format wars is the use of marketing to manage expectations.225 In February 2007, the 
BDA launched their ―The War is over‖ marketing campaign, already pronouncing Blu-ray as the 
winner.226 The BDA emphasized that many more consumers had a Blu-ray player than a HD-DVD player. 
The goal of the campaign was to increase consumer trust that Blu-ray would become the next standard 
and in effect boost confidence to invest in a Blu-ray player. On the other hand, the HD-DVD Promotion 
Group emphasized that the HD-DVD format sold more dedicated HD-DVD players; consumers 
purchasing a HD-DVD add-on for the Xbox360 did so solely for watching HD-DVD movies and 
therefore those sales numbers could be added up to the stand alone HD-DVD players. They used a 
marketing campaign pushing the slogan ―The Look and Sound of Perfect‖ in efforts to raise awareness of 
their format.227 
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The leading companies behind the formats used different pricing tactics.228 Sony initially sold its PS3 at an 
estimated loss of more than $200 per unit, so that it cost less than an Xbox 360 with the optional HD-
DVD player ($499 vs. $599). Toshiba sold its HD-DVD players for around $500, whereas a parts 
breakdown revealed that the components alone cost around $674 (in order to run Microsoft‘s HDi menus 
and render HD video, the players incorporated several sophisticated components), even without 
manufacturing costs, packaging, and other expenses. Toshiba sold the players at a loss to encourage 
uptake of HD-DVD prior to the release of the first Blu-ray players. Because Sony earned a license fee per 
game title sold for the PS3, it could recoup most of the discount, whereas Toshiba could not recoup its 
discount on the players. 
 
On 10 March 2006, Blu-ray supporter LG Electronics surprised the industry with news that it was 
developing a dual HD-DVD/Blu-ray player. Nearly a year later, in January 2007, they released their dual 
format player, the LG BH100 ―Super Multi Blue Player‖.229 In the same month, Warner Bros. showed a 
prototype disc with both an HD-DVD and Blu-ray disc layer, and announced that their Total HD disc 
would become available later that year. In previous format wars230 such ‗gateway technologies‘, were 
applied to resolve the incompatibility of two formats. However, in this case the adoption of the LG 
BH100 player was limited due to its price (which was higher than the price of a player of either of the 
formats) and on 13 November 2007, Warner announced to delay the introduction of the Total HD disc 
(during 2007, Warner had tried to gain support from other film studios, however this had failed because 
the other film studios were too entrenched in their support for either Blu-ray or HD-DVD). As such, 
these technologies did not resolve the format war.  
 
Although a significant amount of time and effort had been spent to create adequate copy protection for 
both formats, on 26 December 2006 a hacker managed to break part of the AACS copy protection. In the 
following months, more such cases occurred, cracking additional parts of the AACS copy protection. 
With AACS being the only copy protection on HD-DVD,231 this could impact the adoption of the HD-
DVD format. However, implementing these hacks required some degree of technical savvy and due to 
adequate actions of AACS LA to restrict and prohibit the availability of the hacks through the Internet, 
the impact of cracking AACS on the adoption of the HD-DVD was very limited. 
 
In June 2007, Blockbuster, the largest U.S. movie rental company, moved to Blu-ray exclusively in 1450 
stores after test-marketing both formats at 250 stores and finding that more than 70% of high definition 
rentals were Blu-ray discs. A month later, in July 2007, Target Corporation began carrying only Blu-ray 
players in its stores. 
3.5 The decisive battle (2007-2008) 
At the end of July 2007, the two formats had been competing for consumer adoption for a year. Blu-ray 
had an advantage in installed base, amount of companies providing players and amount of support from 
content providers (as shown by Figure 32, the film studios supporting Blu-ray had 78% market share, 
while those supporting HD-DVD had 47% market share), but because of the reluctance of the market to 
adopt high definition players, the balance in the format war was only slowly tipping towards Blu-ray. Both 
formats were in a virtual stalemate. Blu-ray players were technologically superior but more expensive. 
HD-DVD had sold more players on the high definition player market, but this was overshadowed by the 
84_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
68 
 
number of sales of PS3s with the integrated Blu-ray player. Meanwhile, the market was speculating that 
the platform war might be futile as technological alternatives such as internet downloads were advancing. 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Major film studios committed to Blu-ray (black), HD-DVD (grey), and not committed (white) end of 2006 and 2007, including studio 
market shares.232 
 
In order to counteract the momentum behind Blu-ray and try to tip the market in its favour, the HD-
DVD camp increased its efforts to win exclusive support from major film studios; the format with most 
complementary goods is the most attractive to customers. In August 2007, after having supported both 
HD-DVD and Blu-ray for over a year, Paramount announced it would release all high-definition content 
(except titles directed by Steven Spielberg) exclusively on HD-DVD.233 At the same time, DreamWorks 
Animation SKG, which had not released any high-definition discs, announced it would release exclusively 
on HD-DVD. The companies cited perceived advantages of HD-DVD's technology and lower 
manufacturing costs. However, rumours suggest the companies together received about $150 million in 
cash and promotional guarantees. Viacom (owner of Paramount) reported receipt of $29 million in cash234 
for Paramount‘s exclusive support for HD-DVD. By providing financial incentives to increase support 
for a format and improve its position regarding the availability of complementary goods, Toshiba used a 
tactic never seen before in a platform war. With two of the big six film studios exclusively supporting 
HD-DVD, the HD-DVD camp still needed to convince Warner (the movie studio with the largest market 
share of DVDs and the only major studio still releasing movies in both HD-DVD and Blu-ray), to get on 
even ground with Blu-ray.235 
 
By the end of 2007, as the holiday shopping season began, supporters of HD-DVD initiated a price war 
including $100 Toshiba HD-DVD players, discounted movies and increased player features. Microsoft cut 
the price of its HD-DVD player for the Xbox360 from $199 to $179 and offered five free movies. 
 
The tipping point came on 4 January 2008, a day before the Consumer Electronics Show (CES) 2008 in 
Las Vegas, when Warner Brothers announced it would release only in Blu-ray after May 2008. This 
effectively included other studios under the Warner umbrella, such as New Line Cinema and HBO. At the 
CES 2008, some HD-DVD-related events and private meetings with analysts and retailers were cancelled. 
Toshiba management expressed disappointment over Warner's decision, but said it would continue to 
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promote its format. The following Monday, Toshiba reduced the price of its HD-DVD players by 40%-
50%, with the HD-A3 selling at a retail price of $150.   
 
Towards the end of 2007, Warner realized the market was not tipping towards a single format and its 
Total HD format would not be a means to resolve it. With the DVD market becoming saturated and 
retailers becoming concerned about the cost of their shelf space (including Wall-Mart which was 
responsible for 40% of the optical disc sales in the USA, and other retailers with whom Warner had a 
vendor managed inventory relationship236), Warner wanted to speed up the emergence of a dominant high 
definition optical disc format. This implied choosing between the two formats. In the second half of 
2007, Warner closely monitored the consumer disc sales of both formats. By the end of 2007, Blu-ray 
discs were outselling HD-DVD discs by about three to one, and Blu-ray had a larger installed base of disc 
players due to the PS3. Warner concluded that consumer adoption of Blu-ray discs was more successful 
and decided to exclusively support Blu-ray. As the decision for Blu-ray implied sourcing the disc 
replication in a single format, Warner negotiated a business arrangement237 with Sony which included a 
discount on fees for patent rights, reproduction rights, etc. totaling a rumored amount of between $400 
and $500 million.238  
 
Warner‘s move caused a chain reaction in the industry. Wal-Mart and other major US retailers dropped 
HD-DVD from their stores. A major European retailer, Woolworths, dropped HD-DVD from its 
inventory. Netflix, the major online DVD rental site, would no longer stock new HD-DVDs. Best Buy 
decided to recommend Blu-ray over HD-DVD in its retail locations and removed all HD-DVD players.  
 
Following these developments, on 19 February 2008, Toshiba announced plans to cease the development, 
marketing and manufacturing of HD-DVD players and recorders. The company cited "recent major 
changes in the market".239 On that same day, Universal Studios announced it would release its titles in Blu-
ray, following two years of exclusive HD-DVD support. On 20 February 2008, Paramount Pictures 
announced it would back Blu-ray, becoming the last of the big six film studios to do so. Paramount 
Picture‘s sister DreamWorks Animation followed suit by cancelling its only remaining HD-DVD release. 
The HD-DVD Promotion Group was dissolved on 28 March 2008. 
 
Sony's decision to integrate a Blu-ray Disc player in the PlayStation 3 video game console helped the 
format's triumph. As Figure 33 shows, by the time Toshiba ceded the market, about 800,000 standalone 
Blu-ray players and 10.5 million PS3s had been sold versus almost 500,000 stand alone HD-DVD players 
and almost 400,000 add-on players for Microsoft's Xbox 360 console. Sony's strategy came at a cost: their 
decision to sell the PS3 at a loss resulted in a total estimated loss of more than $3 billion.240 
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Figure 33: Worldwide Blu-ray and HD-DVD hardware sold to consumers, 4th quarter 2007 – 1st quarter 2008.241 
3.6 The format war aftermath: Post-dominance (2008-onward) 
Although the format war in high density optical discs had been won by Blu-ray, it still needed to replace 
DVD as the dominant format for optical discs. Figure 34 shows that from 2008 to 2011, the sales of Blu-
ray discs were only a fraction of DVD sales. It took the CD nine years to replace the compact cassette 
tape, and DVD only needed six years to replace VHS video tapes, but it remains to be seen whether Blu-
ray can break this record. Figure 7 indicates this will be challenging. Since 2007, the overall sales of optical 
discs have declined due to the impact of the 2007 credit crunch and the increasing popularity of 
substitutes such as Video on Demand services and illegal film downloads. The overall reduction in optical 
disc sales has affected the adoption of Blu-ray, being a new and more expensive technology. It remains to 
be seen how the adoption of Blu-ray will actually develop over the upcoming years, but with a clear 
winner in the format war, there is less uncertainty for the consumer. This might increase Blu-ray‘s market 
share faster than projected. 
 
After its victory, the BDA continued its campaign to support Blu-ray. Prices of Blu-ray players and discs 
were further reduced and more companies joined the BDA, thereby increasing the momentum behind the 
technology. Meanwhile, in August 2008, Toshiba tried to extend the lifetime of the DVD format by 
introducing a device that upscaled the output of a DVD player to more closely match the resolution of an 
HDTV screen.242 Despite this last effort, market adoption of Blu-ray quickly progressed and in August 
2009 Toshiba applied for membership of the BDA.243 With even its main adversary on board, little stands 
in the way for Blu-ray to become the dominant technology for optical discs. It remains to be seen how 
long Blu-ray can sustain its position of up and coming technology. The fast progress of alternate 
technologies is imposing a threat; downloading digital content from the Internet is becoming increasingly 
popular and can become a serious contender in the near future. 
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Figure 34: Worldwide recorded and estimated sales of CD, DVD and Blu-ray discs.244 
3.7 Conclusions 
The description of the format war between Blu-ray and HD-DVD shows the strategic measures a 
company can take to push the adoption of its superior technology when facing a limited market and a 
cheaper alternative that entered the market earlier. The story of Blu-ray versus HD-DVD shows the 
importance of building alliances and using the technology adoption characteristics of a particular industry 
to gain worldwide technological market dominance. 
 
Two elements proved decisive for Blu-ray‘s victory: the ‗killer app‘ PS3 and the exclusive support from 
Warner Bros. However, other elements such as the short time window between the market entries of the 
two formats were important as well. The development of HD-DVD proceeded significantly faster than 
the development of Blu-ray because the group of companies sponsoring HD-DVD was considerably 
smaller. When HD-DVD entered the market, it started to build-up an installed base. The installed base 
did not grow fast due to the limited number of HD television sets in households. However, the initial 
installed base combined with the low pricing and a technological superiority which was ‗good enough‘ for 
consumers provided HD-DVD with an advantage over Blu-ray. Previous format wars have shown that 
network effects can reinforce such a slight advantage to the point that a market will tip towards one 
technology.245 When Blu-ray entered the market, it was difficult to create a beachhead. This brings us to 
the PS3 which proved to be the ‗killer app‘ for Blu-ray. The PS3 quickly increased Blu-ray‘s installed base, 
which became an important advantage. If the PS3 had only offered an optional Blu-ray player, just as 
Xbox360 for HD-DVD, it is questionable whether Blu-ray had been able to recoup its arrears. Warner‘s 
exclusive support for Blu-ray was the fatal blow for HD-DVD. It set in motion a chain reaction of 
multiple companies announcing exclusive support for the Blu-ray format, which settled the format war. 
 
The companies behind the Blu-ray and HD-DVD format used different strategies. Blu-ray established a 
broad alliance, and developed the technology to meet the criteria of the alliance partners. Building on this, 
the alliance supporting Blu-ray focused on gaining an advantage in the availability of products, 
complementary goods (content for the discs) and establishing a ‗killer app‘. After Blu-ray obtained an 
advantage in installed base, its supporters used marketing and PR to manage expectations and stimulate 
tipping the market. HD-DVD, on the other hand, primarily relied on its technological positioning by 
offering acceptable quality for a lower price and being first to market. This was difficult for Blu-ray to 
counter, but after it overcame its initial arrear, the HD-DVD camp needed to come up with something 
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new. In its efforts to react to Blu-ray‘s manoeuvres to tip the market, the HD-DVD supporters identified 
the most important factor to tip the market; the availability of content for the discs. However, HD-DVD 
failed in the execution of gaining a decisive advantage. Although it started successfully by gaining 
exclusivity from Paramount and DreamWorks, support from Warner Bros. was essential to tip the scales. 
By first attracting Paramount and DreamWorks, the companies supporting Blu-ray were alarmed and 
could act to obtain exclusive commitment from Warner. 
 
At the end of the format war, the parties sponsoring HD-DVD incurred huge losses. Toshiba reported an 
approximate loss of $1 billion on the HD-DVD endeavour.246 The parties behind Blu-ray have invested 
large amounts of capital in the format while it remains to be seen if they will recoup their losses. Would 
joining forces been a better alternative? If Toshiba had joined Philips, Sony and Panasonic in 2003, or if 
they had agreed on a unified format in 2005, they would not only have prevented the format war and its 
related costs, it would have also enabled all consumer electronics manufacturers and film studios to fully 
focus on the unified format. This would have resulted in much faster market adoption, generating more 
income, but these proceeds would have also been divided over more parties. 
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Appendix 1.  High definition optical disc format war and business network build-up chronology, 1986-
2009. 
 
Phase Year Month Blu-ray HD-DVD 
R
&
D
 b
u
ild
-u
p
 1986  Start of development of blue laser diodes by Toyoda Gosei and Professor Akasaki of the 
Nagoya University 
1993 Nov. First commercial production of blue laser diodes at Nichia 
1996  Sony presents lens for higher density optical 
recording  
 
1997  Sony and Philips combine developments for a 
high definition optical disc format: DVR Blue 
 
P
re
p
ar
in
g 
fo
r 
m
ar
k
et
 e
n
tr
y 
2000 Oct. Sony and Philips present the first DVR Blue 
prototypes  
 
2001 Apr. Sony, Philips and Matsushita combine their 
separate developments 
 
2002 
 
Feb. DVR Blue project is announced as Blu-ray and 
9 consumer electronics manufacturers found 
the Blu-ray Disc Founders (BDF)  
 
June DVD-Forum's Steering Committee decides to form two Subgroups of the Forum's Working 
Group 11 to study the best technical approach for blue laser optical disc applications 
July Legal battle concerning blue laser diodes settled, ending uncertainty of blue laser diode IPR 
ownership 
Aug.  Toshiba and NEC announce their competing 
format: Advanced Optical Disc 
Oct.  Toshiba presents a AOD prototype  
2003 
 
Feb. Licensing of version 1.0 of the Blu-ray format 
(disc recorder and rewritable discs) begins 
 
Apr. The first Blu-ray product, the Sony BDZ-S77, 
becomes commercially available in Japan only  
 
May 28 Mitsubishi Electric joins the BDF  
Nov.  AOD gains support from the DVD-Forum 
and is renamed to HD-DVD 
2004 Jan. 12 Hewlett-Packard and Dell join the BDF, 
adding support from the world's two largest 
PC manufacturers 
 
Mar. 18 TDK, a leading manufacturer of optical discs 
joins the BDF   
 
May 18 The 13 members of the Blu-ray Disc Founders 
announce plans to be re-incorporated into the 
Blu-ray Disc Association 
 
Sep. 13 Sony acquires US film company MGM  
Sep. 21 Sony announces the PlayStation 3 game 
console will use Blu-ray  
 
Oct. 4 20th Century Fox joins BDA  
Oct. 11 JVC joins BDA  
Nov. Sony starts cooperation with Singulus to 
commercialize the manufacturing line for Blu-
Ray discs247 
 
Nov. 29  Paramount Pictures, Universal Pictures, 
Warner Bros. Pictures, HBO and New Line 
Cinema announce support for HD-DVD 
Dec. 8 The Walt Disney Company and Buena Vista 
Home Entertainment (BVHE)  announce their 
support for the Blu-ray Disc format 
 
Toshiba, Sanyo, NEC and Memory-Tech 
establish the HD-DVD Promotion Group 
2005 Jan. TDK develops a special hard coating polymer 
for the recording surface of the Blu-ray discs, 
cartridges are no longer necessary 
 
Mar. 14 Apple joins the BDA  
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Apr. Start of negotiations to come to a unified format 
May 3 Panasonic starts pilot production line for Blu-
ray disc replication based on inexpensive spin-
coating technology (developed with Origin 
Electric) 
 
June  Sun announces BDA to choose BDj codec  
Aug. Blu-ray Disc Association and DVD-Forum announce that the negotiations to unify their 
standards have failed 
Aug. 18  Lions Gate Home Entertainment and 
Universal Music Group decide to support Blu-
ray format 
 
Sep. 27  Microsoft and Intel announce support for 
HD-DVD 
Oct. 3 Paramount Home Entertainment drops exclusive support for HD-DVD and says it will offer 
movies on both formats 
Oct. 20 Warner Brothers drops exclusive support for HD-DVD and says it will offer movies on both 
formats 
Nov. NEC optical disc storage group sold to Sony  
Dec. 16 Hewlett-Packard decides to drop exclusive support for Blu-ray Disc and backs both formats 
2006 Jan. 4  
 
 
Microsoft announces it will offer an add-on 
HD-DVD drive for the Xbox 360 game 
console 
C
re
at
in
g 
th
e 
m
ar
k
et
 
Mar. 31  Toshiba releases the first consumer-based 
HD-DVD player in Japan 
Apr.  First HD-DVD players released in the United 
States 
June 25 Samsung releases the first consumer-based 
Blu-ray player 
 
Nov. 11 Sony releases its PS3 game console in Japan, 
on  17 November in the United States 
 
Nov.  Microsoft offers optional HD-DVD player 
for X-Box360 
2007 Jan.  LG launches its dual format player 
Feb. Launch of ‗The War is Over‘ marketing 
campaign 
 
D
ec
is
iv
e 
b
at
tl
e 
Aug.  Paramount and Dreamworks Animation 
announce to exclusively release in HD-DVD 
2008 Jan. 4th Warner Bros. announces to exclusively release 
in Blu-ray 
 
Feb. 11  Netflix and Bestbuy announce to phase out 
HD-DVD 
Feb. 15  Wall-Mart announces to phase out HD-DVD 
P
o
st
 d
o
m
in
an
ce
 Feb. 19  Toshiba announces to cease development, 
marketing and manufacturing of HD-DVD 
players and recorders 
Apr.  Toshiba starts sampling of SpursEngine™ 
processor which upgrades standard DVD 
video content to high definition quality 
2009 Aug. Toshiba applies for BDA membership   
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3.8 Epilogue 
In order to create consistency between the cases, this epilogue is added in order to complement the 
published paper with additional information. In this epilogue, some information is included on the 
research methodology and the frameworks of Section 2.5 are applied to the case. 
3.8.1 Research methodology 
Data for the case study stem from several sources. First, written documents and public announcements 
were used to gain a general insight in the technology competition between the Blu-ray and HD-DVD. 
Based on this initial desk research I performed a preliminary analysis. To complement and triangulate the 
data from the literature and gain an in-depth understanding of the technology competition, I conducted 
focused interviews with key persons from companies involved in the technology competition. I 
interviewed twelve respondents, of which an overview is provided in Table 13. The interviews were 
conducted from 2007 to 2010 and the length of the interviews varied from 0.5-2.5 hours. To ensure 
consistency and reliability, interview guidelines were used for all interviews. The findings from archival 
sources were compared to the findings from the interviews and the results were communicated to the 
interviewees for verification. The data were complemented by sales data and market intelligence reports 
from an independent market research firm and a few documents which were sent by or studied at the 
offices of the interviewees. 
 
Table 13: Overview of interviewees in the case of high density optical discs 
Company  Name  Relevance to case  
Panasonic Corporation  
Masayuki 
Kozuka  
General Manager Storage Devices Business Strategy Office, BoD 
member of Blu-ray Disc Association 
Nobuo Akahira  Senior Engineer, Storage Devices Business Strategy Office 
Sony Tadashi Ezaki Director at Standards and Intellectual Property Department 
Philips 
Maurice Maes 
Senior Director, Standardization BG Consumer Lifestyle, BoD member 
of Blu-ray Disc Association 
Jaap Nijboer  Standardization Officer, Intellectual Property and Standards Department 
Mitsubishi Electric 
Corporation 
Masaharu 
Ogawa 
In charge of standards promotion, former BoD member of Blu-ray Disc 
Association 
Blu-ray Disc Association Roel Kramer President of the Blu-ray Disc Association 
Warner Bros. Home 
Entertainment Group 
Jim Noonan Senior VP Worldwide Strategic Promotions & Communications 
Walt Disney Studios Benn Carr VP Studio New Technology, BoD member of Blu-ray Disc Association 
Microsoft David Rudin  Senior Attorney, Interoperability Group 
METI Manabu Eto  Director of METI‘s Japanese Industry Standard Research Office 
Screen Digest Richard Cooper  Senior Analyst, Video  
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3.8.2 Applying the frameworks 
Case analysis tool 
Table 14 shows the result of using the case analysis tool on the technology competition of the high 
definition optical discs. While gathering data, this tool was used to (abstractly) note if a particular element 
influenced the technology competition in a particular phase. In addition, it helped to identify gaps in the 
analysis and provided guidance to the focused interviews. Each phase of the detailed case description, as 
presented in sections 3.2-3.5, is based in essence on the elements that were identified in a particular phase, 
and therefore these sections can be considered as the result of Table 14. 
 
Table 14: Case analysis tool for the case of high density optical discs 
  R&D 
Build-up 
Preparing for 
market entry 
Creating the 
market 
Decisive 
battle 
Post-
dominance 
  1986-2000 2000-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-onward 
F
ir
m
 
Reputation and credibility  X X   
Installed base      
Pricing X X X X X 
Entry timing  X X   
Marketing and pre-
announcements 
 X X   
Availability of products   X X  
Availability of complementary 
goods 
  X X  
Killer application   X X X 
Size  X X X  
Complementary assets  X X X  
Technological knowledge and 
skill base 
X     
Absorptive capacity      
Pre-empting scarce assets  X  X  
Level of collaborative 
development 
X X    
Organizational community of 
supporters 
 X X X X 
Strategic partnerships  X  X  
Product proliferation  X X X  
Appropriability X     
Chance      
       
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
Technological superiority X X X X X 
Installed base   X X X 
Network effects      
Switching and homing cost  X X X  
Backward compatibility X X X X  
Increasing returns to adoption  X    
Technological breakthroughs in 
subsystems 
X X    
Type of technological 
innovation 
X X    
Adapters and gateways   X   
Technological performance 
trajectories 
     
Chance      
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M
a
rk
e
t 
/
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 
Market and industry 
characteristics 
X X X X  
Level of competition  X X X  
Rate and type of technological 
change 
   X X 
Network effects   X X X 
Availability of products   X X X 
Availability of complementary 
goods 
  X X X 
Killer application      
Availability of imitators      
Hetero- or homogeneity of 
customer needs 
X X    
Unclear assessment criteria      
Powerful rival technology 
sponsors 
 X X X  
Government intervention and 
industry regulation 
 X    
Product proliferation      
Appropriability  X X   
Chance      
 
Following the first application of the case analysis tool, the following things became apparent: 
- The five phases fit well with the technology competition. However, in the phase of post-
dominance Blu-ray still had to overcome DVD as de-facto standard. 
- By using the tool I found 35 elements influenced the technology competition between Blu-ray and 
HD-DVD. It appears that by using this tool, due to its combination of an extensive set of 
elements with the five phases, I was able to render a more detailed recollection of historic 
technology competitions. 
- Some elements became apparent to influence the technology competition, which were not 
included in the case analysis tool: 
o Subsidizing providers of complementary goods, in order to obtain their commitment to 
join the organizational community of supporters 
o History of the industry; events in previous technology competitions affect the new 
technology competition, especially with regard to the level of collaborative development; 
some technology sponsors may hold a grudge to each other and rather compete in the 
market than collaborate on a shared technology 
o Accommodating the needs and requirements of providers of complementary products, in 
order to obtain their commitment to join the organizational community of supporters. 
This aspect should be taken into account in the element of ‗level of collaborative 
development‘, for example by modifying the description as follows: extent to which a 
technology sponsor engages into a collaboration with its competitors and complementors 
to develop a shared technology 
 
Based on the above mentioned insights regarding the use of the case analysis tool, I decided to not 
modify the tool and reserve actions regarding the findings for the cross-case analysis (Chapter 8). 
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Applying the integrative framework 
Based on the data gathered in Table 14, for each phase of the technology competition a snapshot was 
made by applying the integrative framework (Figure 35 - Figure 39). Each Figure shows only those 
elements that were at play during the respective phase. The relationships between the elements were 
reconstructed based on the written documents, public announcements and interviews. When the 
relationships were the same as presented in the integrative framework, these were marked in black. 
Relationships that were not presented in the integrative framework, were marked in blue. 
 
Considering that Blu-ray and HD-DVD were in direct competition during multiple phases, I also 
attempted to apply the scoring method in accordance with Subsection 2.5.3 (an overview of the scoring 
options can be found in Table 10). I based the scores on the insights from the written documents, public 
announcements and interviews. Although this approach seems rather subjective, the scores were often 
based on solid data (sales data, product pricing, size of the organizational community of supporters, their 
market shares, etc). I did not attribute scores to the elements in the first and the last phase of the 
technology competition; the first phase was omitted because the rival technology (HD-DVD) was 
announced during the second phase and little is known about the technology before its announcement, 
and the phase of post-dominance was omitted since it was redundant (the scores are meant to compare a 
technology versus its rival and during the phase of post-dominance one technology has prevailed over its 
rival). 
 
 
Figure 35: Integrative framework applied to Phase 1 of the case of high density optical discs 
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Figure 36: Integrative framework applied to Phase 2 of the case of high density optical discs 
 
Figure 37: Integrative framework applied to Phase 3 of the case of high density optical discs 
Reputation and 
credibility
Technological 
superiority
Backward 
compatibility
Switching and 
homing cost
Level of 
competition
Pricing
Marketing and pre-
announcements
Market and industry 
characteristics
Firm size
Appropriability
Increasing returns 
to adoption
Product proliferation
Organizational 
community of supporters
Technological breakthroughs
in subsystems
Government intervention 
and industry regulation
Powerful rival 
technology sponsors
Level of collaborative  
development 
Complementary 
assets
Pre-empting scarce 
assets
Strategic partnerships
1st order
Hetero- or homogeneity 
of customer needs
Type of technological
innovation
Entry
timing
Phase 2: Preparing for market entry
Blu-ray
HD-DVD
2nd orderTechnology
Firm
Market / Industry
Installed base
Reputation and 
credibility
Technological 
superiority
Backward 
compatibility
Switching and 
homing cost
Network effects
Level of 
competition
Availability of 
complementary goods
Entry
timing
Pricing
Marketing and pre-
announcements
Killer application
Availability of products
Market and industry 
characteristics
Firm size
Appropriability
Product proliferation
Organizational 
community of supporters
Adapters and gateways
Powerful rival 
technology sponsors
Complementary 
assets
1st order
2nd order
Phase 3: Creating the market
Blu-ray
HD-DVD
Technology
Firm
Market / Industry
96_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
80 
 
 
Figure 38: Integrative framework applied to Phase 4 of the case of high density optical discs 
 
Figure 39: Integrative framework applied to Phase 5 of the case of high density optical discs 
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The methodological approach and the application of the integrative framework allows an analysis of the 
dynamics of each phase of the technology competition. When reviewing Figure 35, I note that the 
dynamics in the first phase are mostly related to the technology. This is in accordance with what one can 
expect during the phase of R&D build-up. The elements in this phase are mostly related to the Blu-ray 
technology, and shows that its original sponsors, Sony and Philips, made a strategic decision on the type 
of innovation, which influenced its technological superiority, backward compatibility, pricing and 
appropriability. During the phase of preparing for market entry, a rapid increase in the number of 
elements is clearly visible. The elements of the previous phase are still in play, and 13 additional elements 
have come into play. In this phase many firm-related elements come into play, because the activities of 
the technology sponsors are strongly focused on creating an organizational community of supporters, 
comprised of competitors and complementors. As shown in Figure 36, the organizational community of 
supporters for both technologies is influenced by the level of collaborative development, strategic 
partnerships, pre-announcements, technological superiority, industry characteristics, and that both 
technologies have powerful sponsors (due of this last point, some supporters join both communities). It is 
interesting to note that before entering the market of high definition disc players, Sony and Panasonic 
entered a ‗niche‘ market (video recorders for Japan) and thereby gained experience in manufacturing 
products based on the new technology and obtained insights in customer requirements (i.e. increasing 
returns to adoption). In the phase of creating the market, there is a small increase in the number of 
elements. The point that is most striking, and shown by Figure 37, is the shift from technology-related 
elements to firm- and market/industry- related elements. Both sides were focused on jump-starting the 
positive feedback loop of network effects by besting the rival technology in terms of entry timing, the 
availability of products and complementary goods in the market, penetration pricing, and marketing and 
pre-announcements. In the phase of the decisive battle, there is a small decrease in the number of 
elements; five elements go out of play and are replaced by three new ones. As can be seen from Figure 38, 
the ratio of firm-, technology-, and market/industry-related elements is similar to the previous phase. In 
this phase we see the focus of the technology sponsors shift again to the organizational community of 
supporters. The major film studios can be considered as scarce assets, and during this phase the rival 
technology sponsors set out to obtain exclusive support from the major film studios. In making their 
decision, these film studio‘s take the installed base of the rival technologies into account. In the last phase, 
post-dominance, there is a rapid decrease of elements in play. Of the 20 elements in play during the 
decisive battle, only 10 are remaining in the post-dominance phase (as shown in Figure 39). In this phase 
there are no new elements, and the remaining elements are mainly firm-related. 
 
While reviewing Figure 35 to Figure 38, I noted that Blu-ray and HD-DVD used different strategies. The 
technology sponsors of Blu-ray relied heavily on strategic elements; in order to deal with the uncertainty 
of who would be first to market and the effect of the technological positioning, before entering the 
market the Blu-ray sponsors focused on gaining an advantage in the availability of products and 
complementary goods through collaborative technology development and pro-actively building an 
organizational community of supporters, and one of them prepared a potential killer application. During 
the decisive battle they used marketing and PR to manage expectations to stimulate tipping the market. 
The HD-DVD camp primarily relied on the technological positioning (offering acceptable quality for a 
lower price) and being first to market. Although this was difficult to counter for the Blu-ray sponsors, 
when they did the HD-DVD camp had to come up with a countermove. They identified an important 
element for tipping the market: the availability of complementary goods. However, they failed in gaining 
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an advantage on that element as the Blu-ray sponsors managed to obtain exclusive support from Warner 
Brothers. 
 
Contrary to what was encountered in previous technology competitions in the consumer electronics 
industry, the market did not ‗tip‘ towards one technology due to consumer selection, but because the 
industry (consumer electronics manufacturers, film studios, retailers, movie rental outlets, etc.) tipped 
towards Blu-ray. The integrative framework is based on the premise that customer selection drives the 
emergence of a de-facto standard, so this raises the question if the integrative model requires modification 
/ adequately captures this. Considering that this is the first time that the industry rather than the 
customers has tipped to one technology, I have decided to not modify the integrative framework. The 
framework seems to have adequately captured this dynamic, and it should be noted for future work that a 
market can tip not only due to a bandwagon of customer support, but also due to a bandwagon of 
industry supporters. 
 
Does this first application of the scoring method indeed provide insight if a technology sponsor could 
evaluate the situation and identify the relevant elements to shape the odds in its favor? In retrospect, the 
scores show three clear signs that the main sponsor of HD-DVD, Toshiba, could have used to shape the 
odds in its favor. As Figure 36 shows, Sony and Philips were very successful in building an organizational 
community of supporters during the phase of preparing for market entry. Before Panasonic joined Sony 
and Philips, Toshiba had already learned about the development by Sony and Philips. They could have 
anticipated upon the plans of Sony and Philips and pre-empt their efforts to build-up an organizational 
community of supporters. The second sign occurred during the phase of ‗preparing for market entry‘ 
wherein Warner Bros. and Paramount decided to shift from exclusively supporting HD-DVD to also 
supporting Blu-ray. This showed that the Blu-ray sponsors were making an effort to actively recruit 
support from Hollywood movie studios, increasing the availability of complementary goods. While Figure 
36 and Figure 37 clearly show that the Blu-ray sponsors had the upper hand in terms of the organizational 
community of supporters, which led to a better availability of products and of complementary goods, it 
took till the phase of ‗the decisive battle‘ until Toshiba won back some support of the Hollywood movie 
studios. This was clearly much too late; based on their previous experience in DVD, they should have 
realized that the film studios are scarce assets which should be pre-empted, and therefore it was key to 
attract more supporters during the phase of ‗preparing for market entry‘. Lastly, on the 16th of May 2005 
Sony issued the news that they would integrate a Blu-ray player in their PlayStation3 game console. 
Toshiba could have anticipated on its effect and potential success, and counter it by going to great lengths 
to ensure a HD-DVD player would be integrated in one of the other game consoles with a major market 
share (either that of Microsoft or Nintendo). What happened in practice, that Microsoft offered a separate 
HD-DVD player for an X-Box360, had too little effect to counter the effect of the PS3. 
 
A few years after I finalized my research on the case of the high definition optical discs, Gallagher248 
published a paper on the same case. In his paper, Gallagher uses a model with 13 elements (of which 
most coincide with the first order elements in my integrative framework), but no phases. When 
comparing my results with those of Gallagher, I find that we both identify the same decisive elements in 
this technology competition; Sony‘s PlayStation3 as killer application, and tipping the industry by 
obtaining substantial exclusive support from film studio‘s. However, as Gallagher lacks most of the 
second order elements and the phases, his case reconstruction lacks clarification on how the first order 
elements developed over time and reached the point that they tipped the market in favour of the Blu-ray 
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technology. As Gallagher‘s paper shows, with the current state of the academic field, one can analyse a 
case, identify a range of elements (in this case 13) and determine which of these were decisive. My 
approach complements this by adding insight how these elements were influenced and shaped over time. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The recent downfall of the iconic photography company Kodak, caused by the paradigm shift from 
analog to digital photography, is a clear example of an innovative market leader that was among the first 
to identify a radical innovation but chose to bypass the opportunity because it cannibalized its existing 
market. Clayton Christensen first described this ‗innovator‘s dilemma‘ in his bestselling book.249 He 
showed that an excessive customer focus may prevent firms from creating new markets and finding new 
customers for the products of the future. As they unwittingly bypass opportunities, such firms clear the 
way for entrepreneurial companies to catch the next wave of industry growth. 
 
In the last two decades, we have witnessed how audio codecs, in particular the MP3 audio compression 
format (also known as the MPEG-1 Layer 3 standard), changed the music industry. In 1995, when a 
representative of one of the organizations behind MP3 presented the idea of compressed audio 
distribution using the Internet and copy protection to the music industry, they replied ―It all sounds very 
interesting, but what does this have to do with us?―. Not only did the music industry fail to embrace the 
opportunity for music distribution over the Internet, but so did the market leaders in consumer audio 
equipment which were involved in audio compression. 
 
This paper examines the rise of the MP3 audio compression technology, from its inception to when it 
became the dominant music format. It shows how a disruptive technology can change an industry and 
offer opportunities to new entrants. In the following sections, we will summarize previous research on 
platforms and platform competitions, and describe our research methodology. This is followed by a 
detailed case description, case analysis and our conclusions. 
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4.2 Theoretical overview 
The body of literature on management of technology and innovation, labels compressed audio formats as 
platform technologies. Platforms are products, technologies or services consisting of core components 
which remain stable, and interfaces which allow the core components to operate with complements as 
one system (Baldwin & Woodard250). Interfaces are often codified into standards. Platforms may occur on 
multiple levels of a product‘s architecture: a personal computer is a platform, and its operating system as 
well. Platforms may enable ‗platform-mediated networks‘, facilitating the interaction between two groups 
of users, the supply network (which provides complementary products) and the demand network 
(Eisenmann et al.251). For example, in the case of the Compact Disc platform, the record labels constitute 
the supply network and the consumers constitute the demand network. Other well-known examples 
where content providers and consumers interact through platforms can be found in the video (e.g. VHS 
and DVD) and videogame industry (e.g. PlayStation). The platform‘s value to a user depends on the size 
of the network on the other side, and the two networks attract each other (Rysman252). This phenomenon 
whereby the functionality for a user increases, i.e. complementary goods become more plentiful and lower 
in price, if more users join is known as cross-side or indirect network externalities (Arthur253; Arthur254; 
Eisenmann et al.255; Liebowitz & Margolis256). Platforms can also experience same-side or direct network 
externalities, whereby an increase in the number of users on one side of the network makes the platform 
either more or less valuable to users in that network. Since platform mediated networks are prone to 
externalities, industries governed by platform technologies often have a single platform that has a 
dominant market share, or in other words, can be regarded as the market standard. 
 
The field of innovation management includes a significant collection of academic papers and books on 
platforms competing to become the market standard, including VHS versus Betamax (Cusumano et al.257; 
Rosenbloom & Cusumano258), Blu-ray versus HD-DVD (Gallagher259), color television versus black and 
white television (Willard & Cooper260), and various generations of video game consoles (Gallagher & 
Park261; Schilling262; Shankar & Bayus263). Organizations that obtain technological market dominance can 
potentially earn near-monopoly rents (Schilling264), whereas those that are unsuccessful forfeit most of the 
investment in their technology. These ‗winner-take-all‘ markets demonstrate very different competitive 
dynamics than markets where competitors coexist relatively peacefully, as they often have a single tipping 
point which shifts the balance to one side. 
 
Eisenmann265 has shown that there are roughly four 
different models for organizing platforms: proprietary, 
licensing, joint venture and shared. As Figure 40 shows, 
these models differ by the number of platform sponsors 
(parties that control the technology and participation 
rights) and platform providers (parties mediating 
interactions between users in two-sided networks). The 
platform sponsors of competing platforms often choose 
different models. The specific situation dictates which 
model works best. During a platform competition, a 
model may evolve towards a hybrid form by 
implementing aspects of another model.   Figure 40: Models for organizing platforms (adapted from Eisenmann266) 
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Previous research by Suarez267 provides a framework which links eight elements (technological superiority, 
complementary assets and credibility, installed base, strategic maneuvering, regulation, network effects 
and switching cost, regime of appropriability, and characteristics of the technological field) to a five-phase 
division of a platform competition: R&D build-up, technical feasibility, creating the market, decisive 
battle, and post dominance. Suarez posits that a platform competition can be described in terms of a few 
key milestones, and each marks the start of a new phase in the competition. The start of the R&D build 
up can be traced back to the moment when a pioneer firm or research group starts applied R&D aimed at 
the technological innovation. The second milestone is the appearance of a first working prototype based 
on the technological innovation. This marks the start of the ‗technical feasibility‘ phase during which 
platform sponsors start to prepare for market entry. The phase of creating the market is triggered by the 
market introduction of a first commercial product of the new technology. After the platform competition 
has commenced, a particular design can become a front-runner. The presence of this front-runner is the 
fourth milestone and marks the start of the decisive battle. The front-runner has the best chance of 
winning the competition, as its larger installed base tends to create a bias towards the technology with the 
largest market share. Finally, a specific technological design achieves dominance and the competition 
moves into the last phase: post dominance. 
4.3 Research methodology 
In order to study the rise of MP3 as the market standard, we have refined Suarez‘s phase division of a 
platform competition, and combined these with elements known to influence the decision of users in 
two-sided networks to adopt a particular technology. 
 
In the emergence of a market standard, a new technology needs to compete against alternatives, displace 
the existing de-facto standard, and be cautious not to be leapfrogged by a substitute. While studying 
platform competitions, we found that a platform first becomes dominant in a specific market niche, and 
then competes for dominance in a product category. An example of this is the video industry where Blu-
ray first competed against HD-DVD and became the dominant platform for high-definition video storage 
and distribution, but is currently competing with DVD for dominance in the product category. We 
modified Suarez‘s model accordingly by adding the phase ‗Winning the mass market‘ and renaming some 
of the other phases to better fit our ideas. An overview of the phases is shown by Figure 41. 
 
 
Figure 41: Six phases of platform competition (adapted from Suarez268) 
 
To determine which elements influence the adoption of a particular technology by users in two-sided 
networks, we examined 40 papers in academic journals on the emergence of market standards, and 
identified and consolidated the elements which influence users to adopt a particular technology. The 
resulting overview provided 46 elements (Den Uijl & De Vries269). By combining these elements with the 
six phases in a data matrix, we created a framework for identifying which elements influenced the rise of 
MP3. The elements in the data matrix function as a checklist in each phase of the platform competition. 
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We used the same list of elements to determine the number of elements found in previous case studies 
(Christensen270; Cusumano et al.271; David272; David & Bunn273; Gallagher & Park274; Garud & 
Kumaraswamy275; Garud et al.276; Khazam & Mowery277; Rosenbloom & Cusumano278; Shankar & 
Bayus279; Smit & Pistorius280; Tripsas281; Wade282; Willard & Cooper283) and identified up to 22 elements 
per case. 
 
To analyze the MP3 case, we first collected data and made a chronological case description. Then we 
defined the phases of the platform competition by determining when the milestones occurred. 
Subsequently we identified which elements influenced the platform competition at each phase. Data was 
collected from several sources. Written documents such as academic papers (Denegri-Knott & 
Tadajewski, 2010) and market intelligence reports from independent market research firms, and public 
announcements were used to gain a general insight. Based on the initial desk research, a preliminary case 
study analysis was performed. To complement and triangulate the data from the literature and gain an in-
depth understanding of the platform competition, we conducted eleven focused interviews with key 
people from parties involved in the platform competition (e.g. Fraunhofer, Philips, AT&T, Thomson). 
These interviews were conducted during 2011-2012. Each interview lasted between hand an hour and 
three hours. To ensure consistency and reliability, interview guidelines were used. We compared the 
findings from archival sources to the findings of the interviews, and the results were communicated to the 
interviewees for verification. The data were complemented by documents which were sent by the 
interviewees, or studied at their offices. In the subsequent sections, the case will be described using the 
results in the data matrix. 
 
4.4 The evolution of audio formats and the origins of MP3 
The first time sound was mechanically reproduced, was in 1877 when Thomas Edison invented the 
phonograph. The device used a tinfoil wrapped cylinder or wax-coated cardboard cylinder on which the 
music was stored. This invention created a market for prerecorded music. The wax phonograph cylinder 
dominated the recorded sound market during the early 20th century. During the 1910s phonographs using 
flat double-sided records became the dominant audio technology and 78 revolutions per minute became 
the standardized speed in 1925. As technology improved, consumers became interested in better 
recording quality. This led to the market introduction of the 33-rpm and 45-rpm records in 1932 and 1949 
(Langlois & Robertson284). Sales of the 45-rpm format took off with the emergence of rock and roll music 
(Spanias et al.285), and the 33-rpm and 45-rpm records became the dominant format for albums and 
singles respectively. In 1963, the compact cassette tape format was introduced and became an instant 
success with accessories for home, portable, and car use (Musmann286). Nevertheless, it took twenty years 
to replace the 33-rpm and 45-rpm records as the dominant format (as shown by Figure 42). In 1982 the 
introduction of the Compact Disc Digital Audio (CD), marked the transfer of analog to digital audio 
storage. The CD took over the dominant position in 1991, thereby becoming one of the fastest 
technologies to obtain market dominance. 
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Figure 42: Volume of recorded music products sold in the United States by format287 
 
Shortly after the compact cassette tape format had been introduced and the 33-rpm and 45-rpm records 
dominated the market of recorded music, some academic and corporate (e.g. Bell Labs) visionaries 
recognized that audio and video transmission over telephone lines could result in new products and 
services. However, this required digitalized data and high data rate transmission. One of these visionaries 
was Professor Musmann of the University of Hannover (Germany), who focused on data reduction by 
encoding the amplitudes. In 1977, he managed to reduce the bit rate of moving images by a factor of 
three thousand to 64 kbit/s, which brought transmission via telephone lines and satellites within reach. In 
the early 1970s, another visionary, Professor Seitzer of the University of Erlangen (Germany), had the 
idea to compress and transmit audio data in high quality over telephone lines. As improvements were 
made to telecommunications infrastructure, he shifted his focus to transmitting music. This shift in focus 
was necessary to justify his research on data reduction. The industry was losing its interest in data 
reduction, due to the advances in optical transmission using optical fibers. Seitzer wondered what could 
be promoted as a step forward when using a digital phone line of 64 kbit/s, so he came with the idea of 
transmitting music over the telephone network from a central music database. He applied for a patent in 
1977, which was granted in December 1982. The patent was subsequently offered to the industry (e.g. 
Bosch, Telefunken, Grundig, Philips and Siemens), however no-one believed that there would be a need 
for the invention and it was discontinued in 1988. In 1979, Prof. Seitzer‘s team developed the first digital 
signal processor capable of audio compression, creating the basis for developing audio compression 
schemes. 
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4.5 The rise of MP3 as the market standard 
The following sections describe the subsequent phases in the rise of MP3, and identify the relevant 
elements and tactics that influenced the platform competition. 
4.5.1 R&D build-up (1982-1986) 
The first steps towards MP3 started with the development of ATC (Adaptive Transform Coding), which 
started in 1982 when a young German Engineer named Karlheinz Brandenburg was hired as a PhD 
student by Professor Seitzer at the University of Erlangen. He set out to work on digital audio coding for 
music transfer over a phone line, and to show the practical feasibility of Professor Seitzer‘s patented idea. 
To devise a functional algorithm for digital audio encoding, Brandenburg required a cross-disciplinary 
approach, combining knowledge from various fields such as psychoacoustics and quantization. The 
University of Erlangen had a broad knowledge base, and by consulting many of his colleagues, 
Brandenburg managed to learn about these disciplines. The difficulty was in combining these into a 
working algorithm. 
 
In 1986, Brandenburg achieved a major breakthrough when he read an article in a scientific journal, which 
proposed to combine several concepts in a different sequence. Brandenburg had also experimented with 
these concepts, and decided to develop a new algorithm based on the different sequence, and aimed at 
speech encoding. The tests of the new algorithm showed that the idea worked properly, compressing 
speech much more than before without a noticeable decline in quality. The result was a ‗proof of concept‘ 
of the algorithm and something new compared to what other people were working on. In the folloing 
year, he further revised and improved the algorithm in iterative steps. During this period he needed 
computer capacity to perform the tests, which was provided by Deutsche Thomson. The result was the 
ATC algorithm for speech encoding. After Brandenburg reached his breakthrough, he presented his 
findings at international conferences and learnt about other parties (e.g. Institut fur Rundfunktechnik and 
Bell Labs) that were working on a solution to the same problem. 
4.5.2 Preparing for market entry: reducing the level of competition (1987-1992) 
In 1987, the European Union funded EUREKA project for Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) started. 
The aim was to deliver near-CD quality audio programmes in digital form to domestic receivers. A 
powerful algorithm was required that would allow audio compression so that it could be transferred via 
the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN). The project embraced research institutes and industries 
from 29 European countries including electronic equipment manufacturers (e.g. Philips and Thomson), 
public and private broadcasters (e.g. IRT, CCETT and France Telecom), and regulatory bodies. The 
Fraunhofer Institute for Integrated Circuits (set up in 1985 as a department of the Fraunhofer 
Gesellschaft288) and the University of Erlangen participated with the ATC algorithm and a large team 
(including Brandenburg).  Although ATC was suitable for speech encoding, encoding music was more 
difficult. So the team worked on overcoming the problems of encoding music signals with ATC. They 
named the resulting algorithm Optimum Coding in the Frequency domain (OCF). Fraunhofer compiled 
this on signal processors, made dedicated hardware, and managed to build the first real-time OCF 
encoding/decoding device in the same year they started. Before this development, it would take several 
hours to encode or decode seconds of music. 
 
At the International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing in 1987, Brandenburg 
attended a presentation of an Australian university.  Brandenburg managed to reproduce their ideas and 
109_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
93 
 
use this to make significant progress in the encoding efficiency and audio quality of OCF. At the same 
conference Fraunhofer and AT&T Bell Labs presented their work on music encoding and discovered 
they had independently developed a similar algorithm. Just like the University of Erlangen, AT&T Bell 
Labs had the required core competences: the underlying technologies for audio compression were 
conceived at AT&T in the 1920s and 1930s (Spanias et al.289). Since the two approaches were similar, this 
offered a good basis to collaborate on developing the algorithm. So after Brandenburg finished his PhD 
in 1989, he went to AT&T Bell Labs to perform Postdoctoral research till 1991. In return, the 
collaboration gave AT&T access to Fraunhofer‘s hardware expertise, which they were lacking. However, 
AT&T was not focused on music, but on speech encoding, and consequently research on music encoding 
was not really valued An interviewee mentioned AT&T‗s attitude was ―we‘re not going to make any 
money on this―. As a result, AT&T gave Fraunhofer co-ownership of e.g. the intellectual property rights 
and code during their collaboration. 
 
In 1988, the Japanese telecommunications company NTT took a leading role in establishing a standard 
for digital video and audio encoding. The head of NTT‘s research laboratory, Hiroshi Yasuda, realized 
that market adoption of encoding required a worldwide standard. His approach was to make a standard 
for computer networks, whereby the data would be stored in the computer. At that time, the CD was the 
only means to play and store video and audio real time, and its short access time made it suitable for 
interactive communications. So it was important to include the CD in the standard as storage medium. To 
facilitate the standard development process, Yasuda approached a prominent standard development 
organization, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).  As a result of Yasuda‘s efforts, 
the ISO established the Motion Picture Expert Group (MPEG) in 1988 to develop a digital coding 
standard for video and audio signals. Two experts were appointed to lead the efforts (audio and video) in 
the MPEG: Didier LeGall (AT&T Bell Labs) for video and Prof. Musmann (University of Hannover) for 
audio. Since the CD had a bit rate of 1.5Mbit/s, Yasuda, Musmann and LeGall decided to split up the 
available data rate: 1.24 Mbit/s for video, and the rest (256 kbit/s) for audio  while keeping the sound 
quality intact. The parties issued a document describing the goals for the technical specifications. In the 
same year ISO posted a call, inviting interested parties to join the MPEG. NTT, AT&T Bell Labs, 
University of Hannover, and Deutsche Thomson were the first parties that joined. Subsequently, the first 
working group meeting was planned, and an invitation – open to all interested parties – was widely 
distributed. 
 
At the same time, the EUREKA project struggled to select an audio encoding format. During a 
EUREKA project meeting, the Chair proposed that the parties would work towards a single solution in 
the MPEG-1 audio working group, and the result would be adopted for DAB. The members agreed and 
submitted their DAB proposals to the MPEG-1 working group. 
 
The first meeting of the MPEG-1 audio working group was organized by Deutsche Thomson in 
Hannover (Germany) in December 1988 and was attended by approximately 20 company representatives. 
They appointed Professor Musmann as chair of the audio working group. They also defined the system 
requirements and selected applications (CD-ROM for audio and video, Digital Audio Tape Recorder, and 
Digital Audio Broadcasting). As part of the standardization process, task forces were formed to set 
commercial and technical requirements (aspects on which the compression algorithms would be tested 
and their measure of importance), and define objective test criteria. 
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After the first meeting, Professor Musmann issued a call for proposals. He received fourteen proposals 
before the deadline of June 1989.  Professor Musmann subsequently had to conceive a process that would 
lead to a single solution supported by all participants. From June to October 1989, he studied the 
proposals, and found they could be divided in four 
groups (see Figure 43). His suggestion to work 
towards a solution in four groups was accepted by 
all parties. As a result, Fraunhofer, AT&T, 
Thomson and France Telecom started to work 
together and each made their contribution:  
Fraunhofer‗s OCF filterbank, AT&T‗s PXFM 
perceptual  model, Thomson‗s window and block 
switching, and France Telecom‘s entropy coding. 
The four clusters set up research groups which had 
six months to develop hardware that combined the 
ideas of the members in the group. Since most of 
the companies in the MUSICAM and ASPEC 
clusters had already worked together in the DAB 
project, they had an important advantage over the 
other two clusters. 
    Figure 43: Coding concepts and members of the four groups (adapted from Musmann290) 
 
In July 1990, during the 4th meeting of the working group, the progress of the clusters was tested. It 
became apparent that the ATAC and SB/ADPCM cluster could not get their hardware for real time 
processing functioning properly (at that time the hardware for the real time processing was difficult to 
develop, and the required signal processors were developed not long before). As a result, it was not 
possible to complete the full range of tests, and much additional work was required to reach the level of 
the other two proposals. Since the MPEG audio standard had a strict deadline to be completed by the end 
of 1991, there was no time for the two clusters to catch up, so Professor Musmann suggested that the 
companies in ATAC and SB/ADPCM to join the MUSICAM and ASPEC clusters. Only few companies 
actually did, and the others remained involved in the working group as neutral parties. 
 
During the next meeting in September, the tests results were discussed. These showed MUSICAM had 
achieved the best overall results. The outcome was based on an agreed formula that took into account 
audio quality, complexity (which translates into cost of the integrated circuit for the decoder and encoder), 
delay and some other parameters. Although ASPEC and MUSICAM scored similarly on most tests, the 
difference in complexity was 10:1. However, ASPEC showed better audio quality at low bit rates, and 
several parties (including AT&T and two parties involved in testing the codecs: BBC and Swedish Radio) 
were dissatisfied with the idea that a codec with better results on the low bit rate would not be included in 
the standard.  As a result, the MPEG-1 audio working group feared that the national standards bodies 
would vote down the outcome (especially the US standards body, ANSI, due to the influential role of 
AT&T). Since MUSICAM inherently consisted of two layers (Layer 1 was aimed at the Digital Compact 
Cassette application, and Layer 2 was aimed at the DAB application), the working group managed to 
reach consensus by agreeing to add a third layer for lower data rate applications that would be backwards 
compatible to Layer 1 and 2. Layer 1 had a data rate of 192kbit/s, Layer 2 had a data rate of 128kbit/s, 
and Layer 3 was set at 64kbit/s (reducing the original sound data from a CD by a factor of 12). The latter 
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was selected to enable data transfer over ISDN. Brandenburg became responsible for writing the Layer 3 
specification, under the review of two people from MUSICAM. While writing the Layer 3 specification, 
Brandenburg had to mix the different technologies in order to maintain the good performance of ASPEC 
at low data rate, while maintaining compability with Layer 1 and 2. 
 
During an intermediate test event in Paris in June 1991, the results showed that Layer 1 and 2 were nearly 
completed. But the working group found there were problems in meeting the requirements for Layer 3. 
After this test, one of Professor Musmann‘s PhD students discovered a mistake had been made while 
combining ASPEC and MUSICAM. He came up with a solution on how to reduce the efficiency 
impairment of the combined technologies and improve the sound quality. But due to the lack of interest 
from the University of Hannover, this idea was patented by Fraunhofer. The day before the Layer 3 team 
had to deliver their equipment for the final test, the Fraunhofer team managed to solve a software bug 
which greatly increased the audio quality and resulted in meeting the quality requirements. 
 
The last test before completing the specification was conducted in October 1991 in Hannover. The group 
concluded that most of the problems that had been found at the intermediate meeting in June were 
solved. Since the deviations from CD sound quality were minor and there was little time before the 
deadline, they agreed to include Layer 3 in the MPEG-1 audio standard. MPEG-1 audio was finalized in 
November 1991. The complete MPEG-1 standard, which comprised both audio and video, was approved 
as ISO/IEC IS 11172 in November 1992. The standard was published several months later. 
 
The MPEG-1 standardization process and the willingness of its participants to collaborate greatly reduced 
the amount of competition among compressed audio formats. Nevertheless, next to Layer 2 (which 
became the audio compression format for DAB), there were several other audio compression formats 
that competed for market adoption. Sony renamed the ATAC technology to ATRAC and implemented 
this in their products such the portable music player MiniDisc which was launched in 1992. Dolby was 
very active with a proprietary format, AC-1, which they introduced in 1987 at the beginning of the High 
Definition Television (HDTV) standardization process (Todd et al.291). In 1989, they introduced AC-2 
which had better audio quality and a reduced bit-rate. Finally, in 1991 AC-3 (also known as Dolby Digital) 
was introduced, which was implemented in a commercial cinema product and later also in HDTV and 
DVD. 
4.5.3 Initiating market adoption: finding the first applications (1993-1996) 
After the MPEG-1 audio standard was published, it became clear that this was no guarantee for Layer 3 
to be utilized in an application. Unlike the MUSICAM supporters, the ASPEC supporters were not 
strongly positioned to implement the MPEG-1 audio standard. Fraunhofer focused on applied science, 
AT&T and France Telecom offered telecom services whereby music compression was out of scope, so 
this left Thomson (which was active in the consumer electronics field) as the only ASPEC supporter able 
to implement Layer 3 in products. To overcome this problem, the Fraunhofer team took it upon 
themselves to find applications for Layer 3. They made an effort to promote the application of Layer 3 by 
attending many conferences, giving demonstrations, and by creating a website to inform interested parties 
about the technology. They also searched for applications they could service themselves. Due to the 
relatively high complexity of Layer 3, the implementation required a market which was not sensitive to the 
price of the integrated circuit. This led them to the radio broadcasting market. Between 1989 and 1992, 
Fraunhofer had sold a small series of equipment that was able to encode music (first using OCF and later 
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ASPEC) and could be distributed via low-cost ISDN telephone lines, and in 1993 these were converted to 
MPEG-1 Layer 3. These systems were used by, for example the Christian Science Publishing Society and 
the U.S. Army Research Laboratory. They also did contract research for professional ISDN broadcasting 
systems and speech announcements for buses to customers such as Philips Kommunikations Industrie 
(PKI), Dialog4, NSM Löwen and Meister Electronic. These parties were interested to use high quality low 
bitrate audio coding because this allowed them to save cost by using fewer cables or less data storage. 
These were small initial markets for the technology and showed its advantages. In that same year, Telos 
Systems (at that time a small US based firm) was the first to buy a MPEG-1 Layer 3 license and the 
equipment to encode and distribute MPEG-1 Layer 3 for newscasting of sport matches. Telos was 
successful with the system, and afterwards purchased additional equipment. This increased the visibility of 
MPEG-1 Layer 3 in the industry. In addition, Telos introduced Fraunhofer to other companies. One of 
these was one of the first internet service providers, and the respective contact person later switched to 
Microsoft. The resulting relationship with Microsoft later became important to the market adoption of 
Layer 3. 
 
In 1993, Fraunhofer established a partnership with Thomson for their essential patents on Layer 3. Since 
Thomson was experienced in licensing negotiations, they agreed that Thomson would focus on the 
consumer market and provide licenses on the combined patent portfolio (approximately 18 patent 
families) while Fraunhofer would service the professional market with equipment. Although Thomson 
actively licensed the combined patent portfolio to all commercial enterprises interested in using Layer 3, a 
license from them alone was not sufficient since it did not include the MUSICAM patents. In order to 
obtain access to these, companies had to negotiate a license with the Italian company SISVEL, which 
Philips, IRT and CCETT appointed as the licensing agent for their combined MPEG-1 patent portfolio in 
1996. 
 
After the ISO MPEG audio standard was finalized, several companies started developing chipsets for 
Layer 2, a prerequisite for implementing the technology in mass-produced devices. To enable this for 
Layer 3, the Fraunhofer team entered into discussion with the German company Intermetall. The two 
companies got acquainted during the EUREKA project. Intermetall had just developed a new chip, and 
were looking for a complex task to showcase its capabilities. Layer 3 was ideal for this due to its 
complexity. Intermetall was also interested to provide receiver chips for the DAB digital radio. Although 
DAB was based on Layer 2, Intermetall was hoping that DAB would eventually move toward Layer 
3.This led to the development of the Layer 3 decoder chip prototype, which became available in 1994. 
The Fraunhofer team used this chip to develop a prototype of a portable Layer 3 player. The device was 
battery powered, used an EEPROM decoder chip to store and play music, and had 1MB memory. At that 
time, memory was expensive. A portable player with sufficient memory to store one hour of music would 
have cost several thousands of US Dollars.  Using Moore‘s law (Moore292) which states that the number 
of transistors per semiconductor (and thereby the amount of bits that can be stored on a chip) doubles 
roughly every two years, they calculated that solid state memory would become attractively priced for the 
mass market around 2000. The prototype was shown publicly for the first time at an academic conference 
in fall 1994. Even though the idea of storing music on solid state memory was not new, it attracted 
substantial academic interest. 
 
In the same year, the Fraunhofer team held an internal meeting about the commercialization strategy. 
They identified a rapid increase in the adoption of the World Wide Web and the interest of its users to 
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share music through this new means of communication as an important opportunity, and realized there 
was a limited window of opportunity to establish Layer 3 as dominant audio distribution format in this 
niche. Fraunhofer was aware of the development of the World Wide Web because Brandenburg had used 
Usenet (a hybrid between e-mail and web discussion forums) during his postdoc at AT&T to exchange 
research results with the University of Erlangen. The interest to share music via the Internet became 
apparent in 1993, when the Internet Underground Music Archive (IUMA) started sharing music of 
independent artists over File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and Gopher sites in Layer 3 format. The IUMA 
was founded by a group of Californian engineers that had attended the MPEG-1 audio working group 
meetings. Their intention was to develop a new distribution method for music of independent bands, 
eliminating the need for record companies. At that time, it was commonly known that a CD-ROM drive 
(which was introduced in the personal computer market in 1985) could be used to ―rip‖ the music (which 
was stored using Pulse Code Modulation which digitally represented sampled analog signals, and this 
signal had no copy protection mechanism) from an audio CD. The IUMA used a software program to 
grab songs as WAV files and an encoder (based on the source code which was published in part 4 of the 
MPEG-1 audio standard) to convert and compress the files to Layer 3 format for storage, computer 
playback and Internet distribution. The IUMA showed that the Internet was a suitable means to exchange 
music. The Layer 3 format was used because it had several important advantages compared to its 
alternatives. It was one of the few formats that was fully developed, it required a low data rate (while 
maintaining good quality) which matched well with the requirements for music transfer over the Internet 
(the vast majority of Internet users accessed it through a 56 kilobit per second dial-up modem), and it had 
shown to provide high quality audio at low bitrates in the radio station market. The interest for music 
distribution over the Internet was enabled by the developments in personal computers, which became 
capable of playing good quality audio due to the implementation of sound cards. In order to capitalize on 
the limited window of opportunity and facilitate the use of Layer 3 on the Internet, in July 1994 
Fraunhofer released the first software MP3 encoder called L3enc on their web site for US$25017. These 
developments enabled Layer 3 to cross over from the professional market to the consumer market. 
 
In July 1995, the Fraunhofer team renamed MPEG Layer 3 to MP3 because it was shorter and easier to 
utilize, and changed the file extension to .mp3. They released a media player named WinPlay3 later that 
year. WinPlay3 was the first real-time MP3 audio player for PCs running Microsoft's Windows293, and 
could be downloaded from the Internet. Previous to the release of the application, audio compressed with 
MP3 technology had to be manually decompressed by the users prior to listening. 
 
In the same year, Fraunhofer started selling and licensing encoder hardware boards for the PC domain. In 
addition, the software company Macromedia obtained a license on MP3 and integrated the encoder and 
decoder in their Shockwave media (audio and video) player. Soon thereafter Xing Technology and 
RealNetworks introduced their streaming media players: Streamwork and RealAudio. The RealAudio 
media player could play MP3 but also used a propietary format called RealAudio which was based on 
Dolby‘s AC3. According to statistics from International Webcasting Association in September 1997, the 
web broadcasting (e.g. radio stations transmissions) market share of RealAudio almost reached 90%. 
Although the RealAudio player was popular during the early years of the Internet, it was surpassed in 
market share by Microsoft‘s media player in 2000. 
 
In 1996, another competitor, Liquid Audio, entered the stage. The company had developed a website 
where customers could purchase, download and play music using its own software player, encoded in a 
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proprietary, secure format. In order to create the compression format, the company had worked with 
Dolby. By 1999, Liquid Audio had enlisted over 200 partners and affiliates that agreed to sell or distribute 
music in the Liquid format (Hause, 2000). Major labels EMI and BMG and several hundreds of small 
labels were using the Liquid format and another major label, Warner Music, was utilizing Liquid‘s server 
software. However, the format was hindered by its PC-only playback capabilities, since there was little 
support from integrated circuit vendors and therefore could not be implemented in portable compressed 
audio players. 
 
MP3‗s lack of copy protection spurred its popularity for illegal music distribution, but this feature was 
unintentional. Fraunhofer was able to offer copy protection, but they also wanted to agree upon a 
standard with the record labels. However, at that time the record labels did not recognize the increasing 
popularity of the Internet and the potential impact on their business model. In 1995, the Fraunhofer team 
participated in a European project: Music on Demand. Only the small record labels participated in the 
project. Fraunhofer held a presentation about digital rights management, however the record labels failed 
to recognize the urgent need to discuss the topic. Fraunhofer also contacted the project leader of a 
European project on real time audio encoding on PCs. This project included participants from the 
computer and music industry, and it was the first time Fraunhofer established contact with the major 
record labels in the music industry. During a meeting at BMG Ariola in Munchen, the major record labels 
said ―it all sounds very interesting, but what does this have to do with us?―.  
4.5.4 Gaining critical mass in the Internet music distribution market: the rise of complementary assets (1997-1999) 
Several years after the Internet music distribution market started, several compressed audio formats were 
competing for market adoption and MP3 was in the lead. In 1997, AAC, a technologically superior audio 
compression format joined the competition. The initial idea to start with the development of AAC can be 
traced back to the end of 1992. At that time, the MPEG-1 audio working group finalized the first MPEG 
audio standard, and MPEG continued with the development of the next standard by starting the MPEG-
2 audio working group. This working group focused on developing an audio compression format that 
could be used for low data rates, enable multichannel sound, and would be compatible with the MPEG-1 
audio standard. However, during this development there were concerns that the backwards compatibility 
requirement put too many restrictions on the capabilities of the new format. In 1993, the MPEG-2 audio 
working group decided to compare the new format to two codecs that were not compatible with MPEG-
1: Dolby‘s AC-3 and AT&T‗s new Perceptual Audio Coder (PAC).  In January 1994, the test results 
became available, showing that AC-3 and PAC were better than the newly developed backwards 
compatible codecs. Subsequenty, the MPEG-2 audio working group started a new work item on ‘non 
backwards compatible coding‗. Several parties submitted proposals. After testing these, the working group 
decided to move forward by combining the proposals of Fraunhofer, AT&T, Dolby and Sony. Their 
respective proposals showed good results and were technically similar.  The parties together created the 
AAC codec, which was finalized in April 1997. After the AAC standard was finalized, industry insiders 
expected the market would switch to the new format. An interviewee reported: ―From a technical 
perspective MP3 had lost its right to exist after AAC became available―. However, market adoption was 
hindered due to two reasons. First, after the AAC codec became available, the standard developers 
wanted to put different licensing constraints on AAC, making it difficult to obtain a license on the 
‗standard-essential‗ patents. This issue was solved when the parties agreed on a collaborative patent 
licensing program in 1998. As result, the first implementations of AAC entered the market in 1999. By 
this time, MP3 had an extensive installed base and a large number of complementary products. Secondly, 
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Dolby was appointed by the patent holders to act as the licensing agent (in 2003 this role was appointed 
to VIA Licensing, a Dolby subsidiary), while the company was simultaneously marketing its proprietary 
AC-3 codec, causing a conflict of interest. 
 
In 1997, two important events boosted the market adoption of MP3. Firstly, the MP3 decoder software 
was hacked by an Australian student and published on-line as freeware. Due to the lack of a regime of 
appropriability, this could not be counteracted and Fraunhofer and Thomson decided to support the 
distribution of unrestricted MP3 media players. Secondly, Microsoft obtained a license from Thomson294, 
and included MP3 in their Windows Media Player (WMP) 6.1. This media player was the multimedia 
platform that came with Windows 98 as the default front end for playing audio and video files, and since 
Windows was the dominant personal computer operating system, many consumers had access to WMP. 
Microsoft included MP3 rather than AAC in WMP 6.1 mainly because it was already a popular codec with 
much available audio content, but also because AAC was not finalized in time to be included in WMP 6.1. 
 
In the same year, the type of complementary assets for MP3 broadened with the launch of the world‗s 
first commercially available portable players that could store and play MP3 files and websites for MP3 file 
sharing. The portable MP3 player was introduced by Audio Highway and contained software for 
uploading MP3 audio content to a personal computer and then downloading it onto the portable MP3 
player. The device had no moving parts, therefore (unlike the compact disc) the music did not skip when 
consumers were exercising or driving. The portable MP3 player used Intermetall‘s first commercial Layer 
3 decoder chipset which had become available the previous year. About half a year later, the South 
Korean company SaeHan introduced the MPMan, which was the first mass produced portable MP3 
player. The first dedicated website for sharing MP3 files was MP3.com. It quickly became one of the most 
popular websites on the Internet that offered the possibility to stream, play and store MP3 encoded 
music. 
 
A media player called Winamp, introduced in 1997 as MP3 playback engine, was distributed as shareware 
and quickly became a success (Paxton295) due to the expanding penetration of multimedia computers and 
high-speed Internet connections. Within months of its first release, Winamp was consistently topping the 
download list at shareware sites, new media players were entering the market, and the user base quickly 
expanded. At the same time, new websites started offering MP3 songs for free download, and other sites 
allowed people to upload music, creating a virtual market for free music. In addition, most people did not 
notice or care that this trading of music was illegal. 
 
In 1998, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) began to take notice and started to 
actively shut down these websites. However, the number of sites that were started significantly 
outnumbered those that were shut down. Since people could only listen to the music on their computer, 
the problem for the recording industry was limited. Later that year, Diamond Multimedia, a large 
company with retail distribution capabilities, entered the market with its own portable MP3 player: the Rio 
PMP300 (Paxton296). This became the first commercially successful portable MP3 player. With the 
prospect of MP3 moving off the PC and into the mainstream, the RIAA filed a lawsuit against Diamond 
for encouraging illegal music copying. This lawsuit attracted much press coverage, ironically bringing MP3 
under the attention of the mainstream, creating mass-market awareness and increasing demand for 
portable MP3 players and MP3 files. 
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In October 1998, Diamond Multimedia, GoodNoise, MP3.com, MusicMatch, and Xing Technology 
founded the MP3 Association to promote MP3 technology as the standard for downloadable music, 
thereby increasing both the visibility and use of the technology. In addition, the organization pooled 
together legal resources to strengthen its lobbying efforts, while attempting to improve the relationship 
with the recording industry. 
 
In June 1999, the user-friendly peer-to-peer music sharing site Napster was launched. Although there 
were already websites which facilitated file sharing (e.g. IRC and Hotline), Napster specialized exclusively 
in MP3 files and presented an interface that made it easy to find the audio file of interest. The result was a 
system whose popularity generated an enormous selection of downloadable MP3 files. By the end of the 
first week, Napster had 15,000 users, and this number had grown to over 25 million by 2001. Due to 
Napster‘s popularity, the RIAA filed a lawsuit against the website end of 1999, based on the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The DMCA had been passed in the United States at the end of 
1998, and criminalized services that controlled access to copyrighted works. This legislation gave the 
RIAA a strong legal basis to strike against the rising popularity of websites that facilitated sharing MP3 
files. 
 
Although Microsoft had a license on the MP3 technology, in 1999 they introduced a proprietary format 
named Windows Media Audio (WMA) with copy protection. This new format became a serious 
competitor to MP3. Microsoft, as a strong market player, aggressively pushed WMA as the market 
standard. They bundled WMA with the release of the fourth version of Windows Media Player in 1999, 
and licensed their codec to other software providers so users would not be tied to WMP. They embedded 
support for WMA in other products using Windows, such as set-top boxes, and used marketing slogans 
to manage industry expectations. At the CES conference in 2000, Microsoft requested its licensees to 
mention that WMA was ‗twice as good as MP3‗ on their booths. However, the technological superiority 
of WMA over MP3 was not evident. There were tests that showed both codecs gave similar results. 
Microsoft had two reasons to introduce WMA. First, they wanted to be free of license payments, and 
secondly they believed an alternative audio compression format with adequate copy protection could win 
the support of the music industry and gain significant market traction. By the time WMA entered the 
market, MP3 had gathered significant momentum 
and held a large advantage over other compressed 
audio formats due to its significant installed base, 
availability of songs in the MP3 format, and 
complementary assets (software and hardware 
players). Strong direct and indirect network 
externalities helped to increase this momentum. By 
1999, MP3 was regarded as the market standard for 
Internet distribution of music, and the Internet had 
become a fast growing medium for information, 
communication and entertainment exchange (see 
Figure 44), reaching 35% penetration among U.S. 
households, at a 49% consumer PC penetration5.    Figure 44: Percentage of American adults using the Internet297 
4.5.6 Winning the mass market: the power of network effects (2000-2009) 
Although by 2000, MP3 was regarded as the market standard for music distribution over the Internet, it 
still needed to replace the Compact Disc as the dominant format for music storage and distribution. 
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Simultaneously there were several physical formats (of which MiniDisc was the most prominent) on the 
market that aimed to replace the CD. MPEG-1 Layer 2, one of MP3‘s first competitors, was no longer an 
important contender. DAB did not achieve the commercial success that was expected and the format 
resided in several very successful applications for video distribution (Video CD and Digital Video 
Broadcasting). 
 
In 2000, several major consumer electronics players (e.g. Philips, Sony, Sanyo, Sharp, Samsung and LG) 
entered the market for portable MP3 players. The major consumer electronics company Panasonic and 
the personal computer company Apple (with its first generation iPod) joined the competition in 2001, and 
in the same year MP3 file sharing websites KaZaa and Bittorrent were launched. In 2004, KaZaa‘s 
popularity peaked, and the same happened for Bittorrent in 2006. The combination of an increase in 
availability of portable MP3 players and websites providing MP3 files created strong network effects and 
reinforced the market adoption of MP3. Between 2000 and 2007, the market adoption of portable MP3 
players grew rapidly (see Figure 45). The first boost (between 2000 and 2002) resulted from the large 
number of companies entering the portable MP3 player market, especially the major consumer electronics 
players. The second boost (between 2003 and 2006) was caused by the network effects and the market 
tipping towards the MP3 format. This was also driven by the popularity of Apple‘s portable compressed 
audio player, the iPod, which turned out to be the ´killer application´ of the compressed audio players. 
iPod sales were a significant part of the MP3 player sales (see Figure  45). 
 
 
Figure 45: Sales of portable compressed music players from 1998-2008298 
 
In 2000, the major record labels BMG, Sony, EMI and Warner (which had been working with Liquid 
Audio and RealNetworks) decided to use Microsoft‘s WMA format for online music downloads because 
of its copy protection and its tie-in to Windows Media Player299. This significant increase in content 
support boosted WMA‘s market traction and made it the major up-and-coming competitor in the audio 
codec domain. However, the additional support from the music industry hardly resulted in compressed 
audio players supporting the format, limiting the use of WMA to the computer. When the market 
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adoption for portable MP3 players accelerated, and Apple‘s iPod (which supported several audio codecs, 
amongst which MP3, but not WMA) became successful, the window of opportunity for WMA in the 
portable compressed audio market closed. In an attempt to boost compressed audio player support, 
Microsoft launched the Zune in 2006. However, this did not become successful.  
 
Up to 2001, MiniDisc players, which could be used to record and play music in Sony‘s proprietary 
ATRAC codec, had the highest market adoption in the compressed audio player segment. MiniDisc was 
launched by Sony in 1992, taking a proprietary approach and focusing on the portable music player 
market after the ATAC audio compression format was removed from the MPEG-1 audio standardization 
process. MiniDisc players quickly became popular in Japan, accounting for most of the worldwide sales. 
Although Sony was the major sponsor behind MiniDisc, they also licensed it to others (in 2001 Sony‘s 
player shipments constituted 25% of the MiniDisc market). Despite MiniDisc‗s early entry in the portable 
compressed audio player market, the format failed to gain critical mass outside Japan. 
   
After 2001, sales of portable MP3 players exceeded those of MiniDisc players. Sales of MiniDiscs peaked 
in 2001 and then decreased sharply (see Figure 46). 
 
In February 2001, the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal ruled that Napster should stop allowing music 
fans to share copyrighted material (Smith & Wingfield300). However, not all attempts of the RIAA were 
successful. In April 2003, the court ruled that Grokster and Streamcast Networks could continue to 
distribute Internet file-sharing software, forcing the music industry to intensify the legal pursuit of 
individuals who distributed copyrighted works online. By July 2003, the RIAA had issued hundreds of 
federal subpoenas demanding Internet service providers and some universities to turn over names of 
users suspected of illegally sharing music. Several months later, the RIAA filed 261 lawsuits against 
individuals who allegedly illegally used file-sharing software to distribute copyrighted music online. 
      
 
Figure 46: Volume of MiniDiscs sold from 1994-2011
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Amidst all this turmoil, in 2003 Apple launched iTunes 4.0 (version 1.0 was introduced in January 2001 as 
an MP3 media player for Apple‘s Mac operating system) which contained a new feature: the iTunes Store. 
The iTunes Store was a proprietary software-based online digital media store where consumers could 
purchase music files in the AAC format including Apple‘s Fairplay data rights management. The use of a 
strong data rights management system was a prerequisite from the record labels to make their music 
catalogues available for iTunes (Jobs302). The AAC codec was very suitable to Apple‘s needs, because it 
provided high audio quality at low bitrates and its design allowed an extension with a DRM 
implementation. Apple‘s Fairplay software restricted purchased song playback to Apple products. When 
the iTunes Store was launched, it had content support from the five major record labels (EMI, Universal, 
Warner, Sony Music Entertainment, and BMG). During this time, the iPod was becoming increasingly 
popular, and the iTunes Store allowed iPod users easy access to a broad selection of music and to 
download songs legally. Consumers were thrilled, and the iTunes Store quickly became a success. The 
store sold about 275,000 tracks in its first 18 hours in business and more than one million in its first 5 
days. In August 2004, Apple announced that the iTunes Store was the world‘s number one online music 
service. It had over one million songs available for download in the US, more than 100 million songs had 
been downloaded and the store had more than 70 percent market share of legal downloads for singles and 
albums303. The success of the iPod and the iTunes Store proved to be a potent combination and 
reinforced the market adoption of both products. 
 
Table 15: Market share of music acquisition by US consumers304 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Physical CDs 51% n.a. 41% 32% 27% 22% 
Digital 49% n.a. 59% 68% 73% 78% 
Paid downloads   7% 10% 13% 15% 
iTunes    69% 68% 69% 
Amazon MP3     5% 8% 
Rhapsody    2% 3% 4% 
Zune    1% 2% 3% 
Napster    4% 2% 2% 
Other    24% 20% 14% 
Un-paid music acquisition   52% 58% 61% 63% 
P2P   27% 33% n/a 29% 
Burned from others   40% 33% n/a 17% 
Ripped from others   33% 33% n/a 19% 
Music transferred from external hard drive      29% 
Music downloaded from digital storage locker      5% 
       
Market share per compressed audio format       
MP3 72%   64.3%305 62.5% 60.9% 
WMA 19.6%   17.5% 17% 16.6% 
iTunes (AAC) 4.3%   10.1% 11.6% 13.3% 
Other 3.9%   8% 8.9% 9.3% 
Market share of music formats       
MP3    43.7% 46.2% 48.7% 
WMA    11.9% 12.4% 12.9% 
AAC    6.9% 8.5% 10.4% 
CD    32% 27% 22% 
Other    5.5% 5.9% 6% 
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With the introduction of portable MP3 players, compressed audio formats competed more directly with 
CDs. This initiated the decline of CD sales. In 2004, the share of physical CDs and digital music acquired 
by US customers was almost equal (Josephson, 2005). The market started to reach a tipping point, 
whereby MP3 was taking over the dominant position from the CD (see Table 15). MP3‘s market share in 
the music industry is difficult to measure since its use is largely based on unpaid music acquisition. Based 
on CD sales data and paid downloads (see Figure 47) and the market share of the different ways of music 
acquisition (see Table 15), we calculated the volume of unpaid music acquisition between 2006 and 2009 
(see Figure 8). The volume of unpaid music acquisition surpassed the CD sales in 2006. While much of 
the unpaid music acquisition was based on the MP3 format, alternate formats were also. In addition, some 
paid downloads used MP3 files (for example, from the Amazon MP3 store). With the drop in CD sales, 
and the rise of compressed audio formats, MP3 became the dominant audio format.  However, in order 
to pinpoint when this actually occurred, we need an indication of the market share of the audio 
compression formats that were used for music distribution. The last available research on this was 
conducted in 2004 by the NPD Group, and provided the following results: 72% market share for MP3, 
19.6% for WMA, 4.3% for AAC, and 3.9% for other formats306. 
 
 
Figure 47: Volume of music products sold in US from 2000-2011307 
 
When we cross reference these figures with the actual market development of paid and unpaid music 
acquisition, and extrapolate the figures for MP3, we find that by 2009 the MP3 format had nearly 
obtained 50% market share of of music acquisition by US customers. 
 
However, the extrapolation does not account for the positive effect that the rapid market adoption of 
portable MP3 players had on the market share of MP3. This suggests it likely exceeded 50% by 2009 
(perhaps already in 2008) and can therefore be regarded as the dominant music format in the US. 
4.5.7 Post dominance (2010-ongoing) 
As we have seen from Figure 47 and Table 15, the market share of paid downloads is increasing fast. This 
is largely driven by Apple‘s iTunes store which uses the AAC format. As Table 15 shows, the market 
share of AAC in terms of the overall music formats has grown relatively fast, but its absolute growth is 
similar to that of MP3. With the introduction of the iPhone in 2007 and the iPad in 2010, Apple leveraged 
its iTunes store to cellphones and tablet computers. The rapid market adoption of the iPhone and iPad 
boosted the adoption of AAC. As the MP3 standard was finalized in 1993, most essential patents will be 
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expired by 2013, lowering the cost for a MP3 license and making the format more commercially attractive. 
Both MP3 and AAC will benefit from the steady decrease of the CD, and although AAC could take over 
the dominant position from MP3 at some time, this is not likely to happen any time soon. 
4.6 Case analysis 
It took MP3 17 years from the start of its development to become the market standard for music on the 
Internet (see Figure 48). At that time, it was still far from becoming the dominant music format. While 
competing against the CD as incumbent dominant format, the adoption of MP3 experienced a period of 
rapid growth and within nine years it had become the overall dominant music format. By modeling an S-
curve (Foster308) on the market adoption of MP3, we can see the importance of the phases from a market 
adoption perspective. It was useful to add the phase of ‗winning the mass market‘ to our scope of 
analysis, because during this period MP3‘s market adoption increased the most (see Figure 9). At present, 
MP3 is in a phase where the market is mature and saturated. This is often the time when a new platform 
emerges to compete for the position of dominant platform (Anderson & Tushman309; Clark310; Dosi311; 
Foster312). As noted in the previous section, the market share of paid downloads (which is mainly driven 
by the AAC codec) is steadily increasing and could challenge MP3 for market dominance. 
 
 
Figure 48: Phases, respective timeframes and milestones in the rise of MP3 as the market standard 
 
Over the lifetime of MP3, there were several audio compression formats that competed for market 
dominance. The first major competitor for MP3 was MPEG-1 Layer 2. Initially, this technology had more 
market adoption. However, contrary to expectations, DAB failed to become a market success. With the 
rise of the Internet, the adoption of MP3 quickly surpassed that of MPEG-1 Layer 2. The parties behind 
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Layer 2 did not foresee the market of music distribution over the Internet, and the Internet had initially 
specific technological characteristics that gave MP3 a distinct advantage over Layer 2. However, while the 
Internet started to boom, the competing format AAC became available and various parties expected the 
market to switch to the new format. However, the market adoption of MP3 accelerated while the 
adoption of AAC progressed slowly. On the one hand, this was due to certain developments that 
benefitted the adoption of MP3 (the license to Microsoft and the hacked decoder), but on the other hand, 
it was also caused by certain errors by the AAC supporters (e.g. assigning the patent licensing and format 
promotion to a party that had a conflict of interest). When Microsoft launched its WMA on the market in 
1999, MP3 had already become the dominant music distribution format on the Internet, and the first 
popular portable players had been launched on the market. However, during 2000 and 2001, WMA 
quickly gained market share. The rise of WMA was countered by rapid market adoption of portable 
compressed audio players supporting MP3, especially the iPod. WMA‘s market entry was too late and it 
missed the boost in market adoption caused by portable compressed audio players. The combined growth 
of portable players supporting MP3 and their positive reinforcement on the popularity of MP3 files 
sharing websites enabled the market to tip towards MP3, and as a result it became the dominant audio 
format. CD was well entrenched as the market standard, and much time (approximately 16 years after it 
entered the market) and momentum was required for MP3 to take over its position. Sony‘s MiniDisc 
technology could have been a significant threat to MP3. If it had replaced the CD between 1992 and 
2000, the outcome of the competition against MP3 would have been unclear.  
 
We identified 26 elements that influenced the platform competition. Following the detailed description in 
the previous sections, we determined nine key elements that enabled MP3 to become the dominant 
format (see Figure 49 for an overview). As can be seen from Figure 49, the focal point of the key 
elements is the phase of ‗Initiating market adoption‘. The combination of elements reflects the efforts to 
harness available chances and accelerate the initial momentum. In the period when mass market 
applications for compressed music formats emerged, the level of competition was reduced by the MPEG-
1 audio standardization process (stimulating parties to collaborate and develop a single standard). The rise 
of MP3 was enabled by four technologies: the rise of the Internet, the CD which digitized music without 
content protection, personal computers with sufficient processing power and sound cards, and low cost 
integrated circuits able to perform real time encoding/decoding (leading to the introduction of portable 
MP3 players). The timing of MP3‘s market entry was another key factor. When the rise of the Internet 
took place, MP3 was one of the few fully developed audio compression formats, and it offered the 
highest compression ratio while maintaining near CD audio quality. The high compression ratio made it 
technologically superior to other formats. MP3 had very dedicated sponsors, Fraunhofer and Thomson, 
that actively promoted its use and had the endurance to explore various market niches. Before the 
Internet gained rapid market adoption, Fraunhofer managed to identify music distribution over the 
Internet as a ‗killer application‘ that matched well with the benefits of MP3 and they facilitated the use of 
MP3 on the Internet. The weak regime of appropriability, caused by MP3‘s lack of content protection and 
the difficulty to enforce rights on the Internet, allowed MP3 files to be shared easily, made it difficult for 
the RIAA to take action against this, and made Fraunhofer and Thomson release their control over the 
use of MP3 decoders after the software was published as freeware by an Australian student. The 
popularity of MP3 was not only due to its technological benefits, but also caused by the availability of 
complementary assets: the large number of websites offering MP3 files and MP3 (software and hardware) 
players. Lastly, direct and indirect network effects created self-reinforcing mechanisms that tipped the 
market towards MP3. 
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Figure 49: Nine key elements that influenced the platform competition through the six phases of platform competition 
 
As noted in the theoretical overview, MP3 is a platform technology that enables ‗platform-mediated 
networks‘. In general, platforms face the difficulty that they first require support from the supply network 
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standard. Subsequently the main platform sponsors, Fraunhofer and Thomson, had to find the initial 
market niches where market adoption would take root and grow. The organizational design evolved by 
including elements from a licensing mode. Fraunhofer and Thomson entered into a joint licensing 
agreement and actively licensed their patents. This enabled many platform providers to enter the market 
and target various applications. The result was a significant amount of momentum which could not be 
counteracted by powerful sponsors with a proprietary platform approach, or industry associations 
enforcing legislation. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The paradigm shift towards compressed audio in the music industry is a textbook example of 
Christensen‘s Innovators Dilemma.  The incumbent parties were among the first that were able to benefit 
but passed the opportunity on to others since they failed to recognize that the technology would be 
successful in the market. Whereas Christensen‘s lessons are derived from the hard disc drive industry, the 
MP3 case shows that similar events occur with platform technologies. Not only did the market leaders in 
consumer audio equipment fail to embrace the opportunity, but so did the content providers. This latter 
point is where the MP3 case adds to Christensen‘s lessons. 
 
Our study adds to the field of platform competitions, by showing that platform mediated networks can 
have a demand and supply network which are one and the same. When the demand and supply network 
are one and the same, the direct and indirect network externalities overlap and reinforce each other. This 
enables fast market adoption and undermines the position of the incumbent supply network. 
 
We add to the work of Eisenmann315 by illustrating how a platform‘s organizational mode may evolve 
over time, and how these changes affect the platform competition. We subscribe to Eisenmann‘s claim 
regarding the importance of selecting the right organizational mode, but the case shows that the success 
of a particular organizational mode heavily depends on various other elements, such as the timing of 
market entry and the availability of complementary goods. A platform‘s organizational mode has an 
influence on these elements, but with multiple platforms competing in the market the influence is vice-
versa. 
 
The case of the MP3 audio compression format shows that the road to becoming the market standard is 
complex, involves many elements that influence the process, and takes many years. The case confirms 
known success elements, but also adds nuances; 
- Technological superiority is a multifaceted concept whereby customer requirements are leading. 
Before audio compression formats, the history of music formats shows that a format had to have 
superior audio quality to become the market standard. While MP3 did not provide superior audio 
quality, it managed to outcompete the CD because the technology provided superior performance 
on other customer requirements; 
- First mover advantage is only relevant when targeting the key applications.  Several studies (e.g. 
Cusumano et al.316; Suarez317) have shown that being first to enter a market provides an advantage 
in building up an installed base. As the case shows, technologies often have several applications 
and competing in the right market is more important than being first; 
- The killer application follows from product proliferation. It is difficult to identify up-front which 
application will drive a technology‘s market adoption to the extent that it becomes the market 
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standard. When implementing the technology in various products and addressing different 
applications, the chance to find the killer application increases. 
 
We conclude that adding a sixth phase to Suarez‘s model was an important modification which enhanced 
our understanding of how technologies become the dominant platform. If we had taken Suarez‘s 
approach, the ‗decisive battle‘ would have resulted in MP3 becoming the dominant format for music on 
the Internet, and the ‗post-dominance‘ phase would have constituted the period when MP3 competed 
with the CD. As we see in this case, MP3 first became dominant in the niche of music distribution over 
the Internet, and subsequently competed with CD for the overall dominant music format. This distinction 
is essential for our understanding of how MP3 became the dominant format and underpins our 
assumption that a platform technology first becomes dominant in a niche market before competing for 
dominance in the product category. 
 
4.8 Epilogue 
As in the case of Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD, an epilogue was added to complement the published paper with 
additional information, and create consistency between the cases. This epilogue adds an overview of the 
interviewees, and the frameworks of Section 2.5 are applied to the case. 
4.8.1 Overview of interviewees 
In Section 4.3 it is mentioned that eleven focused interviews were held, but it does not specify who was 
interviewed. Table 16 provides an overview of the eleven people that were interviewed. 
 
Table 16: Overview of interviewees in the case of the emergence of MP3 as de-facto standard in music formats 
Company  Name  Relevance to case  
University of 
Hannover  
Hans Georg 
Musmann  
Head of Institut für Theoretische Nachrichtentechnik und 
Informationsverarbeitung. Main research field is video and audio coding for 
communication systems. From 1988- 1992 Chair of the ISO MPEG/Audio group 
which developed the ISO Audio Coding Standards. 
University of 
Erlangen  
Dieter Seitzer  
Started with the idea of compression and transmission of music over telephone 
lines in the 1970s. Founding director of Fraunhofer Institute for Integrated 
Circuits (IIS), and head of the institute from 1985-1998. 
Fraunhofer 
Institute  
Karlheinz 
Brandenburg  
PhD on digital audio coding and perceptual measurement techniques. His 
research results were the basis of MPEG-1 Layer 3 and MPEG-2 Advanced 
Audio Coding. From 1989 to 1990 worked with AT&T Bell Laboratories on 
ASPEC and MPEG-1 Layer 3. In 1993, became head of the Audio/Multimedia 
department at the Fraunhofer Institute. Since 2000, full professor at Technical 
University of Ilmenau and director of the Fraunhofer Institute for Digital Media 
Technology.  
Harald Popp  
Since 1987 responsible for development of real-time systems for audio coding at 
Fraunhofer IIS. From 1989 onwards contributed substantially to worldwide 
marketing and licensing of audio formats MP3 and AAC. Currently the head of 
the Multimedia Realtime Systems department at Fraunhofer IIS. 
Bernard Grill  
1988-1995 engaged in development and implementation of audio coding 
algorithms at Fraunhofer IIS. Since 2000 head of Audio department at 
Fraunhofer IIS. 
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Philips 
Leon van de 
Kerkhof 
Philips representative during the development of the MPEG1 audio standard. 
One of the leading developers of MPEG Audio Layer 2. Former program 
manager of Philips audio processing activities.  
Gerard Lokhoff  
Joined Philips in 1985. Attended early standardization meetings of the DAB 
specification (with a focus on Audio Coding), and the first MPEG Audio 
workgroup meeting.  
Swedish 
Telecom  
Thomas Ryden  
Worked at Swedish Telecom from 1984 till 2000 and was often involved in ITU 
committees. Was Swedish Radio‘s representative for MPEG.  
CCETT 
Yves Francois 
Dehery  
Head of CCETT‘s R&D department for audio and video signal processing from 
1986-1995.  
IBM 
James D. 
Johnston  
From 1976-2002 worked as member of the research staff of the Acoustics 
Research Department at AT&T Bell Labs, afterwards he held positions at 
Microsoft, Neural Audio, and DTC Inc. Primary researcher within AT&T 
working on music encoding during the period of the development of the MPEG-
1 audio standard.  
Deutsche 
Thomson-
Brandt 
(Telefunken)  
Jens Spille  
Worked on subband coding and became the Thomson representative in the 
MPEG-1 audio standardization in 1989.  
4.8.2 Applying the frameworks 
Case analysis tool 
Table 17 shows the result of using the case analysis tool on the case of MP3. While gathering data, this 
tool was used to (abstractly) note if a particular element influenced the technology competition in a 
particular phase. In addition, it helped to identify gaps in the analysis and provided guidance to the 
focused interviews. Each phase of the detailed case description, as presented in Section 6.5, is based in 
essence on the elements that were identified in a particular phase, and therefore these sections can be seen 
as the result of Table 17. 
 
When applying the case analysis tool to the technology competition of MP3, I found that the five phases 
as provided by Suarez (2004) were not completely adequate for studying the case. After MP3 arose 
victorious from the ‗decisive battle‘ against other compressed audio formats, it still had to displace the 
Compact Disc as de-facto standard. However, according to Suarez‘s process, the technology competition 
was now in the ‗post-dominance‘ phase. Looking back at the case of Blu-ray versus HD-DVD, I saw the 
same; after Blu-ray had won from HD-DVD, it still had to displace DVD as the de-facto standard but 
according to the process that should take place in the ‗post-dominance‘ phase. Therefore, I decided to add 
the phase of ‗Winning the mass market‘ before the phase of ‗Post-dominance‘. This new insight placed 
the terms of the phases ‗Creating the market‘ and ‗Decisive battle‘ in a different light, and I renamed these 
into the more fitting ‗Initiating market adoption‘ and ‗Gaining critical mass‘. 
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Table 17: Case analysis tool for the case of the emergence of MP3 as de-facto standard in music formats 
  R&D 
Build-up 
Preparing 
for market 
entry 
Initiating 
market 
adoption 
Gaining 
critical 
mass 
Winning the 
mass market 
Post-
dominance 
  1982-
1986 
1987-1992 1993-1996 1997-1999 2000-2009 2010-
Onward 
F
ir
m
 
Reputation and credibility       
Installed base       
Pricing   X X X X 
Entry timing   X    
Marketing and pre-announcements   X X   
Availability of products   X    
Availability of complementary 
goods 
  X    
Killer application   X    
Size       
Complementary assets       
Technological knowledge and skill 
base 
X X X    
Absorptive capacity X X     
Pre-empting scarce assets       
Level of collaborative development  X     
Organizational community of 
supporters 
  X X X X 
Strategic partnerships X X X    
Product proliferation   X    
Appropriability  X X X X X 
Chance   X    
        
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
Technological superiority X X X X X X 
Installed base   X X X X 
Network effects   X X X X 
Switching and homing cost       
Backward compatibility       
Increasing returns to adoption       
Technological breakthroughs in 
subsystems 
 X X X   
Type of technological innovation       
Adapters and gateways       
Technological performance 
trajectories 
    
 
 
Chance X      
        
M
a
rk
e
t 
/
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 
Market and industry characteristics  X X X X X 
Level of competition  X X X X X 
Rate and type of technological 
change 
      
Network effects    X X X 
Availability of products       
Availability of complementary 
goods 
  X X X X 
Killer application    X X  
Availability of imitators       
Hetero- or homogeneity of 
customer needs 
      
Unclear assessment criteria       
Powerful rival technology sponsors  X  X X X 
Government intervention and 
industry regulation 
 X  X X  
Product proliferation       
Appropriability   X X X X 
Chance       
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Following the second application of the case analysis tool, the following insights became apparent: 
- By using the tool, this time I identified 26 elements that influenced the technology competition. 
- The level of collaborative development through the MPEG initiative was an initiative that came 
from the industry. Therefore, this element should not only be seen as a firm-related element, but 
also as an industry-related element 
 
Applying the integrative framework 
Based on the data gathered in Table 17, for each phase of the technology competition a snapshot was 
made by applying the integrative framework (Figure 50 - Figure 55). Each Figure shows only those 
elements that were at play during the respective phase. The relationships between the elements were 
reconstructed based on the written documents, public announcements and interviews. When the 
relationships were the same as presented in the integrative framework, these were marked in black. When 
the relationships were not presented in the integrative framework, these were marked in blue. 
 
In this case, the scoring method (as proposed in Subsection 2.5.3) could not be applied. For each phase 
the main rival was a different technology (MP3 had multiple rivals over time), and this rendered the 
proposed scoring mechanism useless. 
 
 
Figure 50: Integrative framework applied to Phase 1 of the case of the emergence of MP3 as de-facto standard in music formats 
Technological 
superiority
Absorptive capacity
Technological knowledge 
and skill base
1st order
Strategic partnerships
2nd order
Phase 1: R&D Build-up
MP3
Technology
Firm
Market / Industry
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Figure 51: Integrative framework applied to Phase 2 of the case of the emergence of MP3 as de-facto standard in music formats 
 
Figure 52: Integrative framework applied to Phase 3 of the case of the emergence of MP3 as de-facto standard in music formats 
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Appropriability
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Organizational 
community of supporters
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in subsystems
Technological knowledge 
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Strategic partnerships
1st order
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2nd orderTechnology
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130_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
114 
 
 
Figure 53: Integrative framework applied to Phase 4 of the case of the emergence of MP3 as de-facto standard in music formats 
 
Figure 54: Integrative framework applied to Phase 5 of the case of the emergence of MP3 as de-facto standard in music formats 
Installed base
Technological 
superiority
Network effects
Level of 
competition
Availability of 
complementary goods
Pricing
Marketing and pre-
announcements
Killer application
Availability of products
Market and industry 
characteristics
Appropriability
Organizational 
community of supporters
Technological breakthroughs 
in subsystems
Government intervention 
and industry regulation
Powerful rival 
technology sponsors
1st order
Phase 4: Gaining critical mass
MP3
2nd orderTechnology
Firm
Market / Industry
Installed base
Technological 
superiority
Network effects
Level of 
competition
Availability of 
complementary goods
Pricing
Killer application
Availability of products
Market and industry 
characteristics
Appropriability
Organizational 
community of supporters
Government intervention 
and industry regulation
Powerful rival 
technology sponsors
1st order
Phase 5: Winning the mass market
MP3
2nd orderTechnology
Firm
Market / Industry
131_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
115 
 
 
Figure 55: Integrative framework applied to Phase 6 of the case of the emergence of MP3 as de-facto standard in music formats 
 
The emergence of MP3 as the de-facto standard is very different from Blu-ray‘s emergence. This is mainly 
due to the different type of technology sponsors (multinational companies versus an applied research 
institute) with very different resources and access to complementary assets, and a very different type of 
technology (Blu-ray constituted of physical products and complementary goods which requires access to 
shelf space and distribution channels, whereas MP3 constituted of digital products and complementary 
goods which could be distributed over the WorldWideWeb). 
 
In the first phase of the technology competition, the R&D build-up, the technology sponsor focused on 
the technology development. As Figure 50 shows, in this case the broad technological knowledge and skill 
base, and the ability to easily implement ideas of others contributed to the technological superiority 
(amount of compression while maintaining a certain measure of sound quality). 
 
Moving to the second phase, I note an increase in the number of elements, which in relative terms is 
similar to the case of high definition optical discs. The elements of the first phase were still in play, and 
seven new elements came into play. As shown by Figure 51, the new elements were mainly market / 
industry related. This is due to the MPEG standardization activity, which was mainly an industry initiative, 
whereby multiple powerful rival technology sponsors recognized the importance to develop a shared 
technology through a standardization body. The European Union had an influence by funding the 
EUREKA project for Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB); the decision of this project to adopt the result 
of the MPEG standardization activity as the audio encoding format for DAB, motivated the rival 
technology sponsors to collaborate in the MPEG activity. 
Installed base
Technological 
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Level of 
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Pricing
Availability of products
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During the phase of ‗initiating market adoption‘, the number of elements increased from 11 to 20, and the 
focus shifted to firm-related elements. As can be seen from Figure 52, the technology sponsor employed 
several elements to jump-start the market adoption of MP3. It used product proliferation to find an initial 
niche in order to create an installed base. While looking for potentially interesting markets the technology 
sponsor identified an application, music distribution via the WorldWideWeb, that turned out to be a killer 
application; the use of the WorldWideWeb grew quickly, users were very interested to share music and the 
technical features of MP3 made it well suited to address this application. The technology sponsor also 
proactively built an organizational community of supporters. This resulted in a range of complementary 
goods, which fuelled the network effects. 
 
The phase of ‗gaining critical mass‘, shows a small decrease in the number of elements. As Figure 53 
shows, several firm-related elements have gone out of play, and are replaced by few market/industry 
related elements. In this phase the government agency RIAA attempted to shut down websites for sharing 
MP3 files (complementary goods). But due to the weak appropriability regime of the WorldWideWeb, 
many supporters of MP3 were able to enter the market with websites for MP3 file sharing and it was 
difficult for the RIAA to counteract this. Technological breakthroughs in subsystems enabled the 
commercial implementation of portable MP3 players. This increased the amount of complementary goods 
and enabled the MP3 technology to thread beyond its niche and compete for the mass market. During the 
phase of ‗gaining critical mass‘, the powerful network effects were the main driver for MP3 to become the 
de-facto standard in the niche of music distribution over the WorldWideWeb. However, the strength of 
the network effects is not adequately reflected by Figure 53. 
 
During the phase of ‗winning the mass market‘, MP3 had to compete with the Compact Disc. Compared 
to the previous phase, this phase had the same elements, except for two that left the play. As such, this 
phase had very similar dynamics as the previous one. The major exception was that many portable MP3 
players entered the market and from these, Apple‘s iPod emerged as killer application. This fuelled the 
network effects further and, combined with all the other elements such as the availability of the other 
complementary goods, the large installed base, and the weak appropriability regime, enabled MP3 to 
emerge as the de-facto standard in music formats. Lastly, we come to the phase of ‗post dominance‘. This 
phase has many of the same elements as the previous phase, as only two elements left the play. 
 
What is interesting about the development of the MP3 case, is that during the first phases of the 
technology competition (from R&D build-up to Gaining critical mass) the fate of MP3 was dependent on 
a single technology sponsor (i.e. the Fraunhofer Institute), but after the technology was picked up by the 
market, very strong network effects came into play, causing the market adoption to have its own 
momentum and tip the market in its favor. A rare aspect of this case is that the technology sponsor was 
an applied research institute. As a result, none of the phases show the elements of ‗size‘, ‗complementary 
assets‘, ‗reputation‘. Fraunhofer was an institute that was not well known in the consumer market, and 
with little means to commercialize a technology and none of the conventionally important assets such as 
distribution channels and marketing capabilities. The success of MP3 hinged on Fraunhofer‘s 
identification of the WorldWideWeb as an upcoming technology, which turned out to be a killer 
application for MP3. A key benefit of this application, was that the WorldWideWeb functioned as a 
distribution channel, which allowed Fraunhofer to distribute its technology without the complementary 
assets that are usually attributed to companies. 
133_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
117 
 
References Chapter 4  
                                                          
249 Christensen, C. M., The innovator‟s dilemma: When new technologies cause great firms to fail, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1997 
250 Baldwin, C. Y., & Woodard, C. J., The architecture of platforms: A unified view. In Platforms, markets and innovation. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2009 
251 Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., & Van Alstyne, M. W., Strategies for two-sided markets. Harvard Business Review, 84(10), 2006, pp. 
92–101 
252 Rysman, M., The economics of two-sided markets. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(3), 2009, pp. 125–143 
253 Arthur, W. B., Positive feedbacks in the economy. The McKinsey Quarterly, 1(Reprinted from Scientific American), 1994, pp. 
81-95 
254 Arthur, W. B., Increasing returns and the new world of business. Harvard Business Review, (July- August): 1996, pp. 100–109 
255 Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., & Van Alstyne, M. W., Strategies for two-sided markets. Harvard Business Review, 84(10), 2006, pp. 
92–101 
256 Liebowitz, S. J., & Margolis, S. E., Network externality: An uncommon tragedy. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(2), 1994, 
pp. 133–150 
257 Cusumano, M. A., Mylonadis, Y., & Rosenbloom, R. S., Strategic maneuvering and mass-market dynamics: The triumph of 
VHS over Beta. Business History Review, 66(1), 1992, pp. 51–95 
258 Rosenbloom, R. S., & Cusumano, M. A., Technological pioneering and competitive advantage: The birth of the VCR 
industry. California Management Review, 29(4), 1987, pp. 51–76 
259 Gallagher, S. R., The battle of the blue laser DVDs: The significance of corporate strategy in standards battles. Technovation, 
32, 2002, pp. 90–98 
260 Willard, G. E., & Cooper, A. C., Survivors of industry shake-outs: The case of the U.S. color television set industry. Strategic 
Management Journal, 6(4), 1985, pp. 299–318 
261 Gallagher, S., & Park, S. H., Innovation and competition in standard-based industries: A historical analysis of the U.S. home 
video game market. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 49(1), 2002, pp. 67–82 
262 Schilling, M. A., Technological leapfrogging: Lessons from the U.S. video game console industry. California Management 
Review, 45(3), 2003, pp. 6–32 
263 Shankar, V., & Bayus, B. L., Network effects and competition: An empirical analysis of the home video game industry. 
Strategic Management Journal, 24, 2003, pp. 375–384 
264 Schilling, M. A., Strategic management of technological innovation. New York, NY: McGraw- Hill, 2005 
265 Eisenmann, T.,Managing proprietary and shared platforms. California Management Review, 50(4), 2008, pp. 31–53 
266 Eisenmann, T.,Managing proprietary and shared platforms. California Management Review, 50(4), 2008, pp. 31–53 
267 Suarez, F. F., Battles for technological dominance: An integrative framework, Research Policy, 33 (2), 2004, pp. 271–286 
268 Suarez, F. F., Battles for technological dominance: An integrative framework, Research Policy, 33 (2), 2004, pp. 271–286 
269 Den Uijl, S., De Vries, H. J., Setting a technological standard: Which elements can organizations influence to achieve 
dominance? In K. Jakobs & E. Söderström (Eds.), Proceedings 13th EURAS Workshop on Standardisation (pp. 105-119). Aachener 
Beiträge zur Informatik, Band 40, Aachen: Wissenschaftsverlag Mainz in Aachen, 2008 
270 Christensen, C. M., The rigid disk drive industry: A history of commercial and technological turbulence. Business History 
Review, 67(4), 1993, pp. 531–589 
271 Cusumano, M. A., Mylonadis, Y., & Rosenbloom, R. S., Strategic maneuvering and mass-market dynamics: The triumph of 
VHS over Beta. Business History Review, 66(1), 1992, pp. 51–95 
272 David, P. A., Clio and the economics of QWERTY. The American Economic Review, 75(2), 1985, pp. 332–337 
273 David, P. A., & Bunn, J. A., The economics of gateway technologies and network evolution: Lessons from the electricity 
supply history. Information Economics and Policy, 3, 1988, pp. 165–202 
274 Gallagher, S., & Park, S. H., Innovation and competition in standard-based industries: A historical analysis of the U.S. home 
video game market. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 49(1), 2002, pp. 67–82 
275 Garud, R., & Kumaraswamy, A., Changing competitive dynamics in network industries: An exploration of Sun 
Microsystems‘ open systems strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 14(5), 1993, pp. 351–369 
276 Garud, R., Jain, S., & Kumaraswamy, A., Institutional entrepreneurship in the sponsorship of common technological 
standards: The case of Sun Microsystems and JAVA. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 2002, pp. 196–214 
277 Khazam, J., & Mowery, D., The commercialization of RISC: Strategies for the creation of dominant designs. Research Policy, 
23(1), 1994, pp. 89–102 
278 Rosenbloom, R. S., & Cusumano, M. A., Technological pioneering and competitive advantage: The birth of the VCR 
industry. California Management Review, 29(4), 1987, pp. 51–76 
279 Shankar, V., & Bayus, B. L., Network effects and competition: An empirical analysis of the home video game industry. 
Strategic Management Journal, 24, 2003,  pp. 375–384 
280 Smit, F. C., & Pistorius, C. W. I., Implications of the dominant design in electronic initiation systems in the South African 
mining industry. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 59, 1998, pp. 255–274. 
281 Tripsas, M., Unraveling the process of creative destruction: Complementary assets and incumbent survival in the typesetter 
industry. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 1997, pp. 119–142 
134_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
118 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
282 Wade, J., Dynamics of organizational communities and technological bandwagons: An empirical investigation of community 
evolution in the microprocessor market. Strategic Management Journal, 16, 1995, pp. 111–133 
283 Willard, G. E., & Cooper, A. C., Survivors of industry shake-outs: The case of the U.S. color television set industry. Strategic 
Management Journal, 6(4), 1985, pp. 299–318 
284 Langlois, R. N., & Robertson, P. L., Networks and innovation in a modular system: Lessons from the microcomputer and 
stereo component industries. Research Policy, 21, 1992, pp. 297–313 
285 Spanias, A., Painter, T., & Venkatraman, A., Audio signal processing and coding. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007 
286 Musmann, H. G., Genesis of the MP3 audio coding standard, IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, 52(3), 2006, pp. 
1043–1049 
287 Data provided by the Recording Industry Association of America. Data is compiled by accounting firm 
PricewaterhouseCoopers on behalf of the Recording Industry Association of America. It is the RIAA‘s estimate of the size of 
the U.S. recorded music industry based on data collected directly from the major music companies (which create and/or 
distribute about 85% of the music sold in the U.S.) 
288 The Fraunhofer Gesellschaft is a German research organization with a focus on applied  science 
289 Spanias, A., Painter, T., & Venkatraman, A., Audio signal processing and coding. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007 
290 Musmann, H. G., Genesis of the MP3 audio coding standard, IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, 52(3), 2006, pp. 
1043–1049 
291 Todd, C. C., Davidson, G. A., Davis, M. F., Fielder, L. D., Link, B. D., & Vernon, S. (1994, February 26–March 1). AC-3: 
Flexible perceptual coding for audio transmission and storage. In Proceedings of the 96th Convention of the Audio Engineering Society. 
292 Moore, G. E., Cramming more components onto integrated circuits. Electronics, 38(8), 1965 
293 < http://www.iis.fraunhofer.de/en/bf/amm/diemp3geschichte/zeitleiste/> (accessed 22th of March 2012) 
294 < http://www.handelsblatt.com/archiv/interview-mit-den-mp3-erfindern-interview-die-musikindustrie-schlaeft-
weiter/2003290.html> (retrieved March 22 2012) 
295 Paxton, M., Portable digital music players ride the MP3 wave. Santa Clara, CA: Cahners In- Stat Group, 2000 
296 Paxton, M., Portable digital music players ride the MP3 wave. Santa Clara, CA: Cahners In- Stat Group, 2000 
297 Pew Internet & American Life Project Surveys, March 2000 – December 2010 
298 Based on various sources: Ethier, 2008; Abel, 2008; Apple Quarterly Results Reports from 14 May 2002 – 21 January 2009; 
MiniDisc player/recorder shipments rise, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 9 August 2000, 
<http://www.telecompaper.com/news/minidisc-playerrecorder-shipments-rise> (retrieved April 29 2012); MiniDisc 
player/recorder shipments rise, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 24 July 2002, <http://www.telecompaper.com/news/minidisc-
playerrecorder-shipments-rise-2> (retrieved April 29 2012) 
299 < http://www.geek.com/articles/news/warner-music-likes-windows-media-2000111/> (retrieved April 29 2012) 
300 Smith, E., & Wingfield, N. (2003, September 9). The high cost of sharing. The Wall Street Journal, B1-B8 
301 Based on various press releases, statistical data, and reports of the Japan Recording-Media Industries Association (JRIA) 
302 Jobs, S. (2007, February 6). Thoughts on music [Press release]. Apple Inc. Retrieved from http://www.apple. 
com/fr/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/ 
303 Apple Inc. press release (August 10 2004). iTunes Music Store Catalog Tops One Million Songs,  
 < http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2004/08/10iTunes-Music-Store-Catalog-Tops-One-Million-Songs.html> (retrieved 
April 29 2012) 
304 Based on various market research reports of the NPD Group on how music was acquired from 2004-2009 
305 Figures in grey marked zones are based on market share data from 2004, extrapolated based on actual data from 2007-2009 
306 <http://news.cnet.com/MP3-losing-steam/2100-1027_3-5409604.html> (retrieved April 29 2012) 
307 Based on various sources: Data provided by the Recording Industry Association of America. In order to match this data 
with figures obtained from market research reports of the NPD Group and compare music acquisition across formats, we 
utilized the NPD Group methodology and used an equivalent of 10 standalone digital tracks for each CD album 
<www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/pressreleases/pr_120306> (retrieved April 29 2012) 
308 Foster, R., Innovation: The attacker‟s advantage, New York, NY: Summit Books, 1986 
309 Anderson, P., Tushman, M. L., Technological discontinuities and dominant designs: A cyclical model of technological 
change, Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(4), 1990, pp. 604–633 
310 Clark, K. B., The interaction of design hierarchies and market concepts in technological evolution, Research Policy, 14, 1985, 
pp. 235–251 
311 Dosi, G., Technological paradigms and technological trajectories: A suggested interpretation of the determinants and 
directions of technical change, Research Policy, 11, 1982, pp. 147–162 
312 Foster, R., Innovation: The attacker‟s advantage, New York, NY: Summit Books, 1986 
313 International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), 2000 recording industry world sales, April 2001; International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), The Recording Industry in Numbers; The Recorded Music Market in 2010, 
March 2011 
314 Eisenmann, T., Managing proprietary and shared platforms, California Management Review, 50 (4), 2008, pp. 31–53 
315 Eisenmann, T., Managing proprietary and shared platforms, California Management Review, 50 (4), 2008, pp. 31–53 
316 Cusumano, M. A., Mylonadis, Y., & Rosenbloom, R. S., Strategic maneuvering and mass-market dynamics: The triumph of VHS over 
Beta, Business History Review, 66 (1), 1992, pp. 51–95 
317 Suarez, F. F., Battles for technological dominance: An integrative framework, Research Policy, 33 (2), 2004, pp. 271–286 
135_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
119 
 
Chapter 5 – Technology leapfrogging in high-definition audio platforms: 
The competition between SA-CD and DVD-Audio 
 
5.1 Introduction 
There are many examples of technology competitions whereby two technologies compete for market 
adoption (e.g. VHS versus Betamax in the home video recording systems, and Blu-ray versus HD-DVD 
in high definition optical discs). After one technology has prevailed over its rival, one would expect that 
this technology has acquired sufficient momentum to take over the mass market and become the new de-
facto standard. An example of this is shown by the case of MP3. However, as this chapter will show, 
winning the technology competition is no guarantee for the victor to take over the mass market. This 
chapter describes the competition between Super Audio CD (SA-CD) and DVD-Audio (DVD-A), which 
occurred around the year 2000. These two technologies both aimed to take over the position of the 
Compact Disc as the de-facto standard for music storage and distribution. Although they were supported 
by major industry players, the technologies did not manage to gain substantial traction in the market. In 
the subsequent sections, first the methodology will be addressed, then a historic reconstruction of the 
technology competition between SA-CD and DVD-A is provided, and lastly the case is analysed using the 
integrative framework. 
5.2 Research methodology 
Data for the case study stem from several sources. First, a preliminary data analysis was conducted 
through market research reports, academic papers, public announcements, online interviews, discussion 
forums of user groups, and blogs. The aforementioned sources came from an extended online research 
on the search engine Google using the keywords Super Audio CD, DVD-Audio, as well as their 
abbreviations. Subsequently, in accordance with the case analysis tool, the start and end of each of the 
phases of the technology competition were determined. A content analysis of the preliminary data was 
performed, and the elements that were identified per phase were noted in the case analysis tool. To 
complement and triangulate the preliminary data analysis and gain an in-depth understanding of the 
technology competition, focused interviews were conducted with key persons from companies involved 
in the technology competition (i.e. professionals that were involved in the development and 
commercialization of SA-CD or DVD-A, record companies, hardware manufacturers and distributors of 
authoring and mastering systems). Several respondents were identified from the preliminary data analysis. 
In addition, the social network LinkedIn was used for identifying and contacting these professionals. 
Initially, a long list was constructed using the keywords Super Audio CD, DVD-Audio, as well as their 
abbreviations. Subsequently their LinkedIn profiles were more closely studied to understand their position 
during the technology competition. Based on this review, the long list was reduced to a short list and 
these people were contacted. The initial respondents were also asked to identify other experts. In total, 
twelve respondents were interviewed. The interviews were conducted during the period June-August 2012 
and the length of the interviews varied from 0.5-3 hours. The interviews were conducted in person and by 
telephone. To ensure consistency and reliability, interview guidelines were used for all interviews. The 
interviews were recorded, and meeting minutes were sent back to the respondents for verification. The 
findings from archival sources were compared to the findings from the interviews. Whenever the 
comparison led to additional questions, these were asked by e-mail. After each interview, a content 
136_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
120 
 
analysis was performed on the minutes, and the identified elements were noted in the case analysis tool. 
This resulted in a completed case analysis tool (Table 21) and a clear view of the technology competition. 
In total 30 elements were found to influence this technology competition. The data and the case analysis 
tool were used to construct a case description, and the integrative framework was applied to perform a 
case analysis. The results were sent to the interviewees for feedback. 
5.3 Relevant background 
During the technology competition between SA-CD and DVD-A, the de-facto standard for music storage 
and distribution was the CD. This technology, developed by Sony and Philips, was introduced in 1982 
and became the de-facto standard in 1991 (as shown by Figure 42). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, following the success of the CD format, in December 1994 Sony and Philips 
announced that they were developing an optical disc format for digital video storage, the MultiMedia 
Compact Disc (MMCD). One month later a consortium of several companies including Panasonic 
(wanting to uphold its strong market position in video storage, which it had gained as main proponent of 
the VHS video storage technology), Toshiba and Warner Music announced that they were developing an 
alternative format: the SuperDensity (SD) disc. In September 1995, pressured by the computer industry, 
the two factions agreed to combine their technologies into a new format: the Digital Versatile Disc 
(DVD). The DVD format was much closer to the SD disc format than the MMCD format. Little of 
MMCD's fundamental technology was transferred into the DVD format. The groups united to form the 
DVD Consortium (which was renamed ‗DVD-Forum‘ in 1997), to help the DVD format to rapidly gain 
adoption. The market introduction of DVD was very successful, and the transition from video cassettes 
to optical discs took only six years (from 1997 to 2003). 
 
At the beginning of the competition between SA-CD and DVD-A, the music industry was comprised of 
six major record labels, and many small independent labels. Figure 56 shows the market shares of the 
record labels in 1996.318 The largest record label, Polygram, was owned by Philips, and the second largest 
was owned by Sony. The sixth label, MCA, was sold by Matsushita Electrical Industrial Company (parent 
company of Panasonic, JVC and Technics) to Seagram Company in April 1995.319 The market for CD and 
DVD players was also dominated by several major manufacturers and many small players. To illustrate 
this, Figure 57 shows the worldwide market share of DVD player manufacturers in the year 2000.320 This 
Figure shows that Sony had the largest market share, followed by Toshiba. Roughly a third of the market 
was addressed by smaller manufacturers, whereby low cost DVD players from Samsung and LG were 
doing well in the Japanese market.321 
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Figure 56: Market share of record labels in 1996    Figure 57: Market share DVD player manufacturers in 2000 
 
5.4 Initial development of DVD-A and SA-CD, the R&D build-up (1996-1997) 
The development of DVD-A began in January 1996, when the DVD-Forum started a working group to 
create a next-generation digital audio format. The main reason for initiating this activity was to leverage 
the technology of the DVD-Video format to adjacent areas. While DVD had the same form factor as CD, 
it was able to store roughly seven times as much data on a disc (4.7GB for a single layer DVD disc versus 
650MB for CD). This made it possible to store audio with higher quality on the discs. In addition, 
Toshiba, Panasonic, and other consumer electronics manufacturers offering CD players had to pay license 
fees to Philips and Sony, and they were keen to have a new format in place that would allow them to 
collect license fees instead of paying them. The creation of the activity was pushed by Toshiba‘s Hisashi 
Yamada, the chairman of the Technology Coordination Group, which coordinated all the working groups 
within DVD-Forum. At that moment, the activities of the DVD-Forum consisted of three working 
groups (WG-1 for DVD-Video applications, WG-2 for the physical specifications for DVD-ROM, and 
WG-3 for the file system specifications for discs). Therefore the new working group became WG-4, and 
was chaired by the Victor Company of Japan (JVC). WG-4 consisted of 40 member companies, including 
Toshiba, Panasonic, Pioneer, Warner Music, Thomson, JVC, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Sony and Philips. The 
most active members were Toshiba, Panasonic, Pioneer, and Warner Music, which had also closely 
collaborated in the development of DVD‘s predecessor (Super Density Disc). 
 
In order to create buy-in from the music industry, and secure content for its format, WG-4 developed a 
close relationship with the ‗International Steering Committee‘ (comprised of representatives from the 
Recording Industry Association of America, the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, 
and the Recording Industry Association of Japan). WG-4 and the ISC met almost once a month. The 
purpose of these meetings was to review the ISC‘s Recommended Technical Requirements for a new 
format. The Recommended Technical Requirements were designed with two principal considerations in 
mind: copyright protection and maintaining strong consumer confidence in compact disc investments as 
the industry considered a new format. The top four items of the ISC‘s Recommended Technical 
Requirements were as follows:322 
1) Active Copyright Management Systems (ACMS); a new copyright management system which 
would enable comprehensive protection of rights holders in the sound recording; 
2) Copyright Identification; the discs and players had to contain a copyright identifier; 
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3) Anti-Piracy Measures; (a) all discs should carry SID mold codes, (b) space must be allocated on 
the disc to allow for anti-piracy identifiers, (c) recordable and prerecorded discs should carry 
identifying and distinguishing marks; 
4) Compatibility; (a) CD discs must play on the new players, (b) the new discs must play on CD 
machines. 
 
As WG-4 wanted to leverage the DVD technology, it re-used several aspects: the physical format of the 
disc, and the Linear Pulse-Code Modulation (PCM) format to store audio on the disc. As noted before, 
the disc offered more storage space than a CD, which was used to: 
 Increase the sampling rate and quantization323 levels. Whereas CD used a sampling rate of 44.000 
samples per second and 16 bits per sample, DVD-A typically used 96.000 samples per second and 
24 bits per sample; 
 Record in surround sound. Whereas CD could only use two channels (stereo sound), DVD-A was 
able to use six channels, which enabled surround sound. 
In terms of content protection, WG-4 decided to adopt CSS2. CSS2 was a newer version of DVD-
Video‘s content scrambling system (CSS), and was developed in a collaborative effort by Matsushita, 
Toshiba, Intel and IBM.324 Table 18 provides a comparison between the discs of CD, DVD-Video and 
DVD-A. 
 
Table 18: Comparison between features of Compact Discs, DVD-Video discs, and DVD-A discs325 
 CD DVD-Video DVD-A 
Disk Capacity 650Mb 4.7Gb - Single layer 4.7Gb - Single layer 
Stereo (2 channel) 
audio options 
Uncompressed 
PCM at 16-bit 
resolution, sample 
rate of 44.1kHz 
Data-compressed: Dolby Digital 
Uncompressed: PCM at 16, 20 
or 24-bit resolution, sample rate 
of 48 or 96 kHz 
Uncompressed PCM at 16, 20, or 24-
bit resolution. Sample rates from 44.1 
(CD standard) to 192kHz 
Multichannel surround 
audio options 
Does not support 
multichannel 
5.1 discrete surround using 
Dolby Digital or DTS data 
compression 
6-channel surround, uncompressed, 
at resolution up to 24 bits and sample 
rate of 96 kHz 
Frequency Response 5 - 20kHz 0 - 20kHz 0 - 96kHz (max) 
Dynamic Range 96db 108db 144db 
Maximum Data Rate 1.4Mbps 6.144 Mbps 9.6 Mbps. 
Security None CSS CCS2 
Region coding No Yes, six regions No 
 
In addition, the hardware of the DVD-A players was largely similar that of DVD-Video players. The main 
difference was that the DVD-A players had to physically support the 6-channel surround capability. By 
reusing so many aspects of the DVD-Video technology, the participants of WG-4 ensured that the DVD-
A format would be able to benefit from economies of scale in components, manufacturing equipment, 
and production facilities. 
 
While DVD-A discs could have been developed to be backwards compatible with the installed base of 
CD players and DVD-Video players, the companies involved in WG-4 opted to only make the discs 
compatible with DVD-Video players. The decision to omit a CD-type data layer was based on the 
additional cost and lack of copy protection. Compatibility with DVD-Video was realized by adding a 
DVD-Video type data layer on the disc. However, a DVD-Video player could not provide the high 
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resolution benefits of the DVD-A format. Most DVD-A discs provided three different audio playback 
options:326  
1) A high-resolution stereo track 
2) A high-resolution surround sound track  
3) A default DVD-Video compatible surround sound track based on DTS or Dolby Digital. 
 
Due to the overlap between the hardware in DVD-A and DVD-Video players, the companies in WG-4 
expected at some point all DVD-Video players would also have the DVD-A capability. With the rapid 
adoption of DVD-Video, this would result in a large installed base of DVD-A players. 
 
Although Sony and Philips were part of WG-4, they just observed the meetings. During 1996, it became 
clear that DVD-Audio could become a serious threat to the CD, and Sony and Philips decided to develop 
their own next-generation digital audio format outside the DVD-Forum; Super Audio CD (SA-CD). Since 
the DVD-Forum was a large organization with conflicting interests and slow decision making, Sony and 
Philips believed they could develop SA-CD faster than the DVD-Forum. In addition, their collaboration 
allowed them to combine their latest technologies, which were covered by new intellectual property rights 
that could replenish the pool of CDs expiring patents327. 
 
In developing SA-CD, Sony and Philips decided to take a radically different approach for the signal 
processing. Instead of using PCM, Sony contributed an encoding technology called Direct Stream Digital 
(DSD)328. Sony originally developed DSD for archiving, but the technology could also be used for high 
quality sound. Whereas conventional CD used 16 bit PCM with a sample-rate of 44,1 kHz, the DSD 
technology used a 1-bit signal, sampled at 64 times 44,1 kHz (2,8224 MHz). As a result, it provides a 
dynamic range over 120 dB and a bandwidth of 80-100 kHz, whereas CD has a dynamic range of 96 dB 
and a bandwidth of 20 kHz.329 In addition, due to the high sample rate of DSD, less steps were required 
(see Figure 58) and signal distortions were virtually absent. Due to the DSD technology, some considered 
the audio quality of SA-CD as superior to DVD-Audio,330 whereas others questioned whether people 
were able hear the difference. DSD was covered by recent intellectual property that could be used to 
extend the lifetime of Sony and Philips‘ lucrative CD license program. A drawback of DSD was that 
making recordings was more expensive than with PCM. 
 
 
Figure 58: Comparison of DSD versus PCM (source: Sony and Philips)331 
 
Philips contributed the multichannel capability and her Analog to Digital Conversion (ADC) technology. 
Due to the DSD encoding, a storage capacity of 4-5GB was required. Therefore, Sony and Philips 
140_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
124 
 
decided to also use the physical format of the DVD discs. The downside of these discs was that they were 
not backward compatible with the CD format. Philips valued backwards compatibility to reduce 
consumer switching cost, and pushed for dual-layer discs (‗hybrid‘ discs with a CD and SA-CD audio 
layer) to offer a transition path to the new technology. However, due to the two audio layers these discs 
were more expensive to manufacture, and the record labels were not in favor of hybrid discs because they 
did not mitigate the issue of copying music from the CD layer (which lacked content protection). The 
architecture of SA-CD players was based on DVD players, but required additional hardware. A special 
chip was required to decode the DSD signal, and another one to deal with the copy protection. Therefore, 
SA-CD discs could not be played on the installed base of DVD players, and the extra hardware resulted in 
an increased price for SA-CD players. Both Philips and Sony had the capabilities to manufacture these 
chips.332 
 
In order to meet the content protection requirements of the music industry, Sony and Philips 
incorporated several lines of defense.333 The first was the ‗Super Audio CD mark‘, which scrambled the 
lead-in data area of a SA-CD and prevented a disc drive to initialize reading the disc. Only disc drives that 
were licensed for SA-CD could read the Super Audio CD mark. However, PC disc drives did not receive 
a license and this made it impossible for hackers to copy the information to their hard disc drives. The 
second was the ‗Pit Signal Processing Physical Disc Mark‘ (PSP-PDM). This mark was embedded into the 
relief structure of the disc during the manufacturing process, and a SA-CD would first detect the PSP-
PDM before playing a disc. This made it impossible for a consumer to make copies of a disc. Lastly, the 
DSD data on the disc was scrambled with a complex 80-bits encryption, which would take months on a 
high end computer to descramble. Considering that every album had a unique 80 bits encryption, this 
exhaustive ‗key search‘ would have to be repeated for each SA-CD album. 
 
At the 103rd Audio Engineering Society in New York, on September 26-29, 1997, Marantz, Sharp and 
AccuPhase announced their support for SA-CD.334 In October, Sony and Philips unveiled details of the 
Super Audio CD technology, and claimed that they were confident it would satisfactorily address all 
criteria set by the ISC.335 On December 8, 1997, Sony announced that it planned to market the SA-CD 
technology in Japan by Spring of 1999.336 
 
WG-4 released a first draft of its DVD-Audio specification in January 1998.337 
 
Compressed audio codecs, like MP3, were not considered a threat by the sponsors of DVD-Audio and 
SA-CD because these formats were positioned as a high quality that supported multichannel sound (two 
features that compressed audio codecs lacked), and they used a form factor that was well understood by 
the consumer and could use the existing distribution channels. The sponsors regarded compressed audio 
codecs as a technology that was suitable for the niche of low-quality music sharing via the 
WorldWideWeb. 
 
5.5 Preparing for market entry (1998-1999) 
On February 17, 1998, Philips and Sony held the first demonstration of SA-CD at the Abbey Road 
Studios in London. They also announced plans to license SA-CD, whereby licensees of the audio CD 
format would have the option of expanding their agreements to include the SA-CD under the same 
royalty structure; new licenses for SA-CD would be issued under the same terms and conditions.338 In 
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April, version 0.95 of the SA-CD specifications was released.339 At the same time, it was announced that 
SA-CD was supported by four additional companies; Sharp, Marantz (a subsidiary of Philips), Nakamichi 
Corp. and Accuphase Laboratory Inc. These companies were Japan-based hi-fi audio manufacturers. 
 
On May 22 1998, Philips sold Polygram to Seagram, parent company of Universal (previously named 
MCA).340 The two record label divisions were merged into the Universal Media Group, and the combined 
market shares strengthened its position as the largest record label worldwide. This left Sony as the last 
major consumer electronics manufacturer which owned a major record label. 
 
At the Hi-Fi ‘98 tradeshow in June, audiophile labels DMP, Mobile Fidelity Sound Lab and Telarc 
announced their support for the SA-CD technology.341 
 
In June 1998, WG-4 released version 0.9 of the DVD-Audio specification.342 The music industry reviewed 
this specification and provided several requests to WG-4, of which the most important was to add the 
option of a lossless transmission system for multichannel signal processing. The record labels, and 
Universal in specific, believed that multichannel was a differentiating factor that would appeal to the mass 
market. To accommodate to this request of the music industry, WG-4 issued a request for lossless-
compression technology proposals, which delayed issuing the 1.0 version of the standard by three 
months.343 Two proposals were received, and in August 1998,344 a technology called Meridian Lossless 
Packing (MLP) was selected. Although the company Meridian developed the technology, it was Dolby 
Labs that licensed the technology out to interested companies. 
 
During 1998-1999, Sony and Philips approached record labels in order to convince them to support SA-
CD. They held several demonstrations to the ―golden ears‖ of the music industry in order to get feedback 
regarding the quality of the format. They started with independent labels, and provided them with 
recording equipment which would run in parallel to their existing equipment. They also sponsored labels 
with editing and mastering equipment. 
In the same period, Panasonic also approached various record labels to convince them to support DVD-
A, including Sony Music US and independent labels. Panasonic also sponsored record labels, in a similar 
fashion as Sony and Philips. 
 
The Consumer Electronics Show (CES) in January 1999 was the first time that retailers could hear 
demonstrations of both DVD-A and SA-CD.345 At the event, DVD-A demonstrations were held by 
Pioneer, Toshiba, JVC, Technics, Kenwood, and Meridian. Of these, the first four also demonstrated 
their first prototype DVD-A players. These were combined DVD-A and Video players. During a press 
conference, Universal Music announced its support for DVD-A and stated that it would release its first 
DVD-A discs later that year.346 During the interviews, the Panasonic representative stated that Universal 
had a close relationship with Matsushita. Universal was the second major record label (next to Warner 
Musci that was an active member of WG-4) to support DVD-A, giving DVD-A an advantage over SA-
CD which only had Sony Music as record label. On the side of SA-CD, Sony and Marantz demonstrated 
prototypes of SA-CD players. Philips provided a demonstration of the SA-CD technology, but did not 
demonstrate a product prototype. 
 
The final DVD-A 1.0 specification was approved in February 1999 and released in March. Upon the 
release of version 1.0, the ISC stated: ‗The DVD-Forum's approval of Version 1.0 will facilitate 
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development and adoption of the copyright protection technology that is vital in the modern digital era; 
the rollout of DVD-A products is near, and it will be a milestone for consumers to enjoy a totally new 
music listening experience.‘347 At the same time, March 1999, the specification for SA-CD was finalized, 
and version 1.0 of the ‗Scarlet Book‘348 was released.349 
 
On March 3, 1999, it was announced that the five major record labels, including Sony Music 
Entertainment, approved the content protection framework for DVD-A, which was developed by IBM, 
Intel, Panasonic and IBM.350 
 
On March 22, 1999, TWICE (This Week In Consumer Electronics) reported that EMI Music and BMG 
Entertainment confirmed plans to ship DVD-A discs in the fourth quarter, considering that this would 
coincide with the market launch of DVD-A players in the U.S.351 This meant that four out of the big five 
music companies (the other two being Warner and Universal) would provide content for the DVD-A 
format. The last remaining big music company, Sony Music, also stated it would release DVD-A discs. A 
Sony Music spokesperson said ‗Sony Music is eager to support formats with copy-right protection, 
including DVD-A‖.352 Although Sony Music US was indeed interested in exploring opportunities 
regarding DVD-A (they had created some prototypes of DVD-A titles), due to pressure from Sony‘s 
hardware department they never introduced a DVD-A title. Among the major labels, no company other 
than Sony announced plans to support SA-CD. A spokesperson from EMI stated ‗We have not been 
informed of SA-CD‘s copy-protection scheme yet, so we can‘t commit yet‘. BMG also indicated that they 
were not fully informed about Super Audio CD‘s copyright protection framework. A music industry 
executive was quoted saying ‗the music companies gave feedback to Sony and Philips about needed 
copyright-protection requirements months ago, but literally months have gone by and we still don‘t know 
where they are with copy protection. There hasn‘t been continuous proactive outreach‘. 
 
During the Hi-Fi ‘99 trade and consumer show, 11-16 May in Chicago, Sony announced that it would 
introduce its first SA-CD player in the US in October 1999, and the model would be accompanied by 56 
titles from Sony Music and six independent labels.353 Separately, Panasonic announced during its dealer 
event in Hawaii that its first two DVD-A/Video players would likely be introduced in the fall at prices of 
roughly $1,000. At the same event, Universal Music Group announced they would support Panasonic‘s 
DVD-A launch with 15-20 titles. 
5.6 Initiating market adoption (1999-2001) 
On May 21 1999, Sony launched its first SA-CD players in Japan. These players, the SCD-1 and SCD-
777ES, were accompanied by 13 software titles that were offered by Sony Music.354 Sony would 
subsequently launch the SA-CD players in the US in October 1999 and in Europe in autumn 1999. The 
SCD-1 was priced at $4,595 (500,000 yen) and the SCD-777ES was priced at $3,500.355 They were high-
performance component systems, targeted to appeal mainly to the so called ‗audiophiles‘ or ‗music lovers‘ 
that would appreciate the high quality of the format. The US launch was accompanied by 40 SA-CD titles, 
of which half were provided by Sony Music. The discs were priced at $24.98. In order to reduce the price 
mark-up of SA-CDs versus CDs and stimulate the adoption of SA-CD discs, Sony and Philips initially 
subsidized the recording process of the record labels. The titles which were released by Sony Music were 
only in single (SA-CD) layer, and therefore not compatible with the installed base of CD players. A 
director at Sony Music Japan believed that releasing hybrid discs upon launch would be the wrong 
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strategy; the initial titles were re-releases of existing titles, and he believed consumers wouldn‘t buy a title 
they already had. Sony Music International followed Sony Music Japan in this approach. 
 
On August 1st, Panasonic announced that it would ship its first two DVD-A/Video players, the Panasonic 
DVD-A7 and the Technics DVD-A10, in October to retailers in the United States.356 The DVD-A7 
would be priced at ‗roughly 1,000 dollars‘ and the DVD-A10 at around 1,200 dollars. On October 4th, 
Pioneer announced it would introduce two DVD-A/DVD-video players to the Japanese domestic market 
by late December 1999.357 
 
During the IFA tradeshow in Berlin, late August, Philips surprisingly announced plans to enter the DVD-
A market.358 A representative announced that Philips was planning to first introduce a DVD-Video / SA-
CD player by end of the second quarter of 2000, and subsequently an all-in-one SA-CD / DVD-A /  
Video player in the third quarter of 2000. This announcement was a blow to the SA-CD camp. 
 
By October 1999, SA-CD had the first mover advantage, but DVD-A held a major advantage in terms of 
the number of major record labels and consumer electronics manufacturers supporting the format. 
 
Beginning of December, Matsushita and Toshiba announced they would delay the launch of their DVD-
A products until mid 2000.359 The cause of these announcements was the release of a software program 
called DeCSS on November 5 by a small group of Norwegian hackers.360 This program could break the 
CSS encryption on almost any DVD disc, including the CSS2 system developed for DVD-A. As a result 
of this hack, Matsushita, Toshiba, Intel and IBM had to develop a new system of copy protection with a 
much stronger key and completely new encoding system,361 and propose this to DVD-Forum‘s WG-4 for 
inclusion in the DVD-A standard. Announcing its decision, Matsushita expressed that withholding 
products at this stage, just weeks before their planned launch, would not be beneficial to the DVD-A 
industry. 
 
Pioneer decided otherwise and moved forward to launch two combined DVD-A/DVD-Video players in 
December 1999 for the Japanese market only.362 As the expectation was that it would take six months or 
more to have a new copy protection system in place, Pioneer did not want to lose time and offered 
customers a free upgrade when the new system was finalized. The two products were the DV-S10A, 
priced at 200,000 yen (US$1,950) and capable of playing DVD-A, DVD-Video and Audio-CD discs, and 
the DV-AX10, priced at 500,000 yen ($5,500) was able to also play SA-CD discs.363  
 
The hack not only affected the hardware manufacturers, the record labels supporting DVD-A also 
decided to postpone the introduction of DVD-A software titles until a more effective copy protection 
system was developed.364 
 
In December 1999, Sharp introduced its first SA-CD player in Japan, the DX-SX1, priced at 250,000 
Yen.365 
 
At the Consumer Electronics Show 2000, January 19, Matsushita and Toshiba announced a new DVD-A 
encryption system366, called CPPM.367 Although the music industry was still evaluating the proposed 
encryption technology, Matsushita and Toshiba were optimistic that the music industry would move 
quickly to endorse the proposal - which they said would allow for summer or fall commercial launches of 
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hardware and software. A Toshiba representative stated its first DVD-A/ Video player, the SD9200 
($1,999 retail price), could ship as soon as August 2000. A Philips representative reaffirmed previously 
announced plans for third-quarter U.S. availability of a Philips multichannel SA-CD / DVD Video player, 
but the model would exclude previously planned DVD-A playback due to the delay caused by the 
format's encryption-standard reevaluation. 
 
Marantz launched its first SA-CD-player, the SA-1, in Japan in February 2000. It was priced at 550,000 
Yen.368 It went on sale in Europe around September.369 On October 2, it was launched in the US with a 
suggested retail price of $7,500.370 In addition, Marantz offered its PM-17SA Stereo Integrated Amplifier 
and SM-17SA Stereo Power Amplifier, two high-end components designed to complement the SA-1. 
 
In June, Sony launched the SCD-XB9 SA-CD player, priced at 80,000 yen ($735), significantly lower than 
its first SA-CD player to appeal to a mass market.371 
 
In July, the first DVD-A players with the new and approved CPPM copy protection system were 
introduced in the US. These products were the Panasonic DVD-A7 and the Technics DVD-A10, priced 
at $999.95 and $1,199.95 respectively.372 Technics also introduced a line of DVD-A ready components 
which were necessary to gain the full fidelity of the DVD-A format. This line was comprised of the SA-
DA8 ($599.95) and SA-DA10 ($799.95) DVD-A ready receivers and speakers, SB-T300 ($599.95) and SB-
AFC300 multi-purpose speaker for front, center or surround sound ($149.95). 
 
On August 1st, Toshiba, entered the fray by launching their first DVD-A player in Japan. This device, the 
SD-9200, was priced at 220,000 Yen ($1,999.95).373 It was launched in the US and Europe early 2001. 
 
At the 109th Audio Engineering Society conference in September, the Sony / Philips SA-CD booth 
displayed logos of 22 companies supporting the format, including 12 manufacturers of SA-CD players: 
Accuphase, Kenwood, Krell, Marantz, Nakamichi, Onkyo, Philips, Pioneer, Sharp, Sony, Teac, and 
Yamaha.374 
 
On October 8, Warner Music released the first DVD-A discs;375 they initially released seven titles. An 
independent record label, Silverline Records, soon followed suit by announcing to release several titles as 
well.376 
 
From November 2000 till end of January 2001, Panasonic started a rebate action to promote the adoption 
of its DVD-A products. They offered a $75 rebate with the purchase of a Panasonic DVD-A7 or $100 
with purchase of a Technics DVD-A10 DVD-A/Video player, and customers could choose two or three 
DVD-A recordings (depending on product purchased).377 
 
At the end of 2000, SA-CD had over 200 titles available.378 The average SA-CD disc retail price was about 
$25. Half of the SA-CD‘s were issued by labels owned by Sony (Sony Music, Legacy, Columbia), and the 
other half by specialty record companies. 
 
At CES in January 2001, Sony unveiled the SCD-CE775, a $400 SA-CD player, and the SCD-C555ES, 
priced at $1,700.379 From the side of DVD-A, three record labels offered DVD-A titles: Warner Music 
(about 15 titles) and independent labels 5.1 Entertainment (36 titles) and Surrounded By Entertainment (3 
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titles).380 BMG announced it would release its first titles during 2001. An executive from Universal Music 
declined to say when the studio would deliver titles. 
 
Philips entered the market with its first SA-CD player (SA-CD-1000) in January 2001. This player, priced 
at $1999, was the first SA-CD player to play multichannel as well as stereo recordings. In addition, it 
could play DVD-Video, CD, CD-R and CD-RW. Philips considered the feature of multichannel audio 
and multichannel SA-CD disc titles as a key requirement for the market adoption of SA-CD. Market 
research had shown that approximately 60% of the people couldn‘t hear the difference in audio quality 
between CD and SA-CD (the DVD-Audio supporters had learned the same for CD and DVD-Audio). 
However, people could clearly hear the difference between stereo and surround sound, and they valued 
this feature. The launch of the SA-CD-1000 coincided with the release of the first multichannel SA-CD 
by a major record label; the album ‗Tubular Bells‘ of Virgin Records (at the time owned by EMI).381 
 
During IFA 2001, a major consumer electronics show in Berlin, several major record labels announced 
their support for SA-CD. On August 25 2001, Universal Music announced they would release SA-CDs, 
thereby supporting both formats.382 Then on August 31, EMI, the third largest record label and parent 
company behind Virgin Records and Capitol Records, announced that they would release SA-CD titles, 
thereby also supporting both formats.383 
5.7 Gaining critical mass (2002 - mid 2004) 
In order to regain momentum for DVD-A, on March 25 2002, Panasonic Automotive Electronics 
introduced and demonstrated its first DVD-A system for in-car music delivery. Panasonic considered cars 
an ideal environment for surround sound. They worked closely with car manufacturers to convince them 
to include DVD-A. On March 9 2003, Honda announced that its 2004 Acura model would be the first 
U.S. car with a DVD-A system as standard feature.384 Although the sales of the car itself were good, and 
Honda actively promoted the DVD-A feature, the effect on the market adoption of DVD-A was minor. 
 
In April 28, 2002, BMG‘s RCA record label issued several SA-CDs in the Hong Kong market, which 
marked the first time that BMG and RCA Records issued albums in the SA-CD format.385 During the 
112th AES Conference, on May 13, 2002, Sony and Philips announced that the BMG Group of Record 
Labels (e.g. RCA Victor, J Records, Arista) would release their first SA-CD discs outside the Hong Kong 
market.386 This meant that BMG would support both SA-CD and DVD-A. With BMG‘s support to SA-
CD, both formats had an even amount of support from the major record labels. 
 
On August 9, 2002, DVD-A proponents, ranging from record labels to CE manufacturers, staged a press 
event at Dolby Labs in Los Angeles in the hopes of rekindling interest in their format. Warner Bros 
Records called the effort a "re-launch".387 During the event, it was announced that there were 230 DVD-
A titles available, which were being sold through 160 retailers with 2000 retail locations. A representative 
from Warner stated that in 2001 and 2002 they had so far sold 170,000 discs to consumers. Regarding the 
hardware, they announced 40 DVD-A players were available from 12 manufacturers. 
 
Besides the number of albums, another important aspect was securing popular albums for the high 
definition audio formats. On May 30, 2002, during Home Entertainment 2002, the major independent 
record label ABKCO (of which albums were distributed by Universal Music), announced a collaboration 
with Sony to reissue their entire catalog (22 records) of early recordings by the Rolling Stones.388 This 
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‗remastered‘ series was released on August 27 2002 and was very successful.389 During the Surround 2002 
Expo on 13 December, engineer Alan Parsons confirmed that the release of the 30th Anniversary edition 
of Pink Floyd‘s famous hit album ‗Dark Side of the Moon‘ album would be released on DVD-Audio.390 
This album held the record of staying 741 weeks on Billboard‘s Album Chart and had (at that moment) 
sold over 30 million albums. Therefore, the 30th Anniversary edition was expected to provide a significant 
amount of sales. However, on January 10 2003, EMI Recorded Music announced that ‗The Dark Side of 
the Moon‘ would be released worldwide on hybrid SA-CDs (capable of playing on both CD and SA-CD 
players) on March 3, 2003.391 Tony Wadsworth, Chairman and CEO of EMI Recorded Music UK, 
explained: ―The hybrid SA-CD technology allows us to give the Pink Floyd fan a highly value-added 
product, both as a fully surround sound capable disc on SA-CD players and as a newly remastered CD for 
CD players.‖ On June 5 2003, during the Home Entertainment Show in San Francisco, Sony announced 
that ‗The Dark Side of the Moon‘ reached #1 on the Billboard catalog chart and was rapidly approaching 
100,000 unit sales in the U.S. since its release.392 On May 20, 2004, Sony announced that the Rolling 
Stones' "Remastered" Series (with more than 2.2 million units sold), Pink Floyd's "Dark Side of the 
Moon" (800,000) and ABKCO's Sam Cooke reissue series (300,000) were leading the sales of SA-CD 
recordings.393 
 
While there were several positive events for SA-CD, it faced some problems as well. These were mostly 
related to customer confusion. The SA-CD standard was developed in such a manner that companies had 
flexibility regarding both the players and the discs; some players supported two-channel audio, whereas 
other players supported multichannel, and some discs were hybrids (and therefore backwards compatible 
with CD players), whereas others only had the SA-CD layer, and lastly not all discs were released as 
multichannel recordings. Therefore, a consumer that purchased a SA-CD player and SA-CD discs had to 
look carefully at the product specifications. 
 
On June 5 2003, it was announced that SA-CD gained support from additional hardware manufacturers, 
including manufacturers of high-end audio players such as Bel Canto, Krell, MSB Technology, and 
Musical Fidelity.394 
 
On June 23, during the Home Entertainment Expo, the DVD-A Marketing Council was announced.395 
This organization was founded by eight DVD-A supporters; Warner Music, Silverline Records, BMG, 
EMI Recorded Music, 5.1 Entertainment Group, Meridian Audio, Dolby Laboratories and Panasonic. 
The DVD-A Marketing Council served as a resource for all technical, press and marketing information 
related to the DVD-A format in the United States and Europe. It also educated hardware and software 
retailers to the benefits and features of DVD-A while simultaneously promoting consumer awareness of 
the format. 
 
During the IFA 2003 consumer electronics show in Berlin, Philips announced a partnership with Harman 
International to develop car SA-CD players.396 In addition, Philips announced that over 1,300 SA-CD 
titles were available worldwide from more than 100 record companies, including four of the five major 
record labels (i.e. Universal Music, Sony Music Entertainment, EMI/Virgin and BMG). 
 
In October 2003, Sony announced that it was preparing a $20 million promotional campaign in the US to 
boost the awareness of SA-CD.397 In the same announcement, Sony noted that prices of SA-CD discs 
were dropping to $19-20 per disc which was helping the market adoption. 
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On November 7, 2003, Sony Music (the 2nd largest music label), and BMG (the 5th largest music label) 
announced that they would merge their activities, forming Sony BMG.398 At that time, the music industry 
was facing a decline in music sales due to a weaker retail market and a rapidly growing use of file-sharing 
services on the Internet. 
 
At CES 2004 in January, Toshiba and Samsung announced their first DVD players which supported both 
DVD-A and SA-CD.399 Toshiba showed two models; the SD-4960 was introduced in June 2004 and 
retailed at $179.99, the SD-6915 (a carrousel model) was introduced in May 2004 at a price of $199.99. 
Samsung also showed two models, the DVD-HD841 and the DVD-HD941.400 Both became available in 
the third quarter of 2004, and retailed at $249.99 and $349.99 respectively. 
 
By May 5 2004, the 2000th SA-CD title was released.401 The announcement also noted that well over 20 
million SA-CD discs had been sold. A representative from Sony noted an increase in dedicated space for 
SA-CD with European retailers. On May 20, it was announced that the SA-CD camp comprised of 26 
manufacturers offering more than 118 SA-CD-compatible products.402 
 
By mid 2004, both formats had an equal amount of support from the major record labels, and of the 
major consumer electronics manufacturers, five supported SA-CD, versus three for DVD-A. As Figure 
59 shows, by mid 2004 SA-CD had roughly three times as many titles available. As Figure 60 shows, in 
2003 and 2004 DVD-Audio sales were negligible. In 2004, SA-CD discs outsold DVD-A discs 3:1. An 
announcement in September 2004 noted that the installed base of SA-CD players had reached 10 million 
units,403 versus 1 million DVD-Audio players in March 2003.404 Based on these insights, one could say that 
by mid-2004, SA-CD was dominating the market for high definition audio. 
 
Figure 59: Number of available SA-CD and DVD-A titles from 1999-2004 Figure 60: Sales of SA-CD and DVD-A discs in the US from 2003-2004405 
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5.8 Winning the mass market (mid 2004 - onwards) 
From mid 2004 the focus shifted towards a competition with the incumbent de-facto standard, CD, and 
the other (substitute) technologies that aimed to replace CD as de-facto standard as well. There were two 
substitute technologies at this time that could be seen at the main rivals; MiniDisc (an optical disc based 
technology sponsored by Sony) and MP3 (see Chapter 4). As can be seen from Figure 61, from the year 
2002 the sales of CDs and MiniDiscs were declining.  
Figure 61: Number of CDs and MiniDiscs sold in the US from 2002-2007406 
 
If one compares these numbers with the sales of SA-CDs as shown in Table 19, two things become 
apparent: 
- the sales of SA-CDs were only a fraction of CDs 
- instead of growth of sales, which one would expect during the phase of ‗gaining critical mass‘ and 
‗winning the mass market‘, the sales of SA-CDs were also declining, similar to the sales of CDs 
and MiniDiscs 
 
Table 19: Sales of SA-CD discs from 2003-2005 (in millions)407 
 2003 2004 2005 
USA  3 1 0.6 
Canada 0.18 0.19 0.06 
UK 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Germany 0.48 0.25 0.2 
France 0.28 0.3 0.25 
Italy  0.04 0.05 0.04 
Spain 0.14 0.15 0.01 
Netherlands 0.16 0.2 0.15 
Australia 0.1 0.07 0 
Japan 1 1 0.7 
Total 5.98 3.71 2.41 
 
These declining sales were caused by the rapid market adoption of compressed audio files, in particular 
MP3, as was shown in Chapter 4. With the rise in popularity of compressed audio formats, manufacturers 
of disc players started to phase out both SA-CD and DVD-A support, and started to add docks for 
compressed audio players (e.g. Apple‘s iPod) instead. 
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By September 2004 the declining sales of SA-CD was not yet publicly known. SA-CDs‘ growing number 
of titles and hardware sales were recognized, but it was noted that SA-CD struggled to find space at 
retail.408 At that point 2.300 SA-CD album titles were available, from more than 250 record labels. A 
representative of Universal Music said ‗We are ready to go mass market. There‘s sufficient production 
capacity, but it is hard to get it permanently and visibly at retail. It is difficult to convince the retailers to 
put SA-CD prominently, because they will not sell big quantities.‘ It was further noted that retailers such 
as Tower Locations, Best Buy, Circuit City, Borders Books and Music in the U.S., HMV and Virgin in the 
United Kingdom, FNAC in France, and Media Markt in Germany were proactive in stimulating SA-CD 
sales. According to a Sony representative, the sales of SA-CDs took off with the introduction of hybrid 
SA-CDs in 2001. In addition, it was noted that sales of SA-CD players were close to 10 million. 
 
By May 2006, the installed base of SA-CD players had reached 13 million units worldwide.409 
 
SA-CD supporters expected that market adoption would get a great boost when Sony decided to include 
a SA-CD decoder in its PlayStation3 (PS3). Sony wanted its game console to also function as a high 
quality audio and video player, for that reason they made it capable of playing SA-CD and Blu-ray discs. 
On 11 November 2006, the PS3 was launched in Japan, and the week thereafter in the US. The PS3 was 
well received and sold roughly 12 million units worldwide in its first year (as shown by Figure 31). 
However, price competition in the game console market was extreme and Sony decided to remove the 
hardware required for SA-CD support (a chip for decoding the copy protection) from its third generation 
PS3. This third generation PS3 was launched in the last quarter of 2007, so one could argue that the PS3 
added roughly 12 million units to the installed base of SA-CD players. It is unknown if this led to an 
increase in SA-CD disc sales. 
 
On November 15, 2007, the Steering Committee of the DVD-Forum decided to merge WG-4 with WG-
1 (DVD-Video), effectively disbanding WG-4 and transferring its activities to WG-1.410 
 
In 2011, Warner Music Group released their first SA-CD titles for the Japanese market.411 The titles were 
reissued from their dormant DVD-Audio line. Warner was the last of the major record labels to release 
SA-CDs. 
 
To date, the SA-CD format still 
exists, however it is well recognized 
that it resides in its niche for 
‗audiophiles‘. As Figure 62 shows, 
over time there has been a steady 
increase in the number of available 
SA-CD titles. According to Philips, 
roughly 60% of the SA-CD discs 
that have been sold were 
multichannel recordings, and 40% 
were stereo recordings. 
 
Figure 62: Number of available SA-CD titles from 2004-2011412 
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5.9 Epilogue 
In order to maintain consistency with the other cases, an epilogue was added. In this epilogue, an 
overview of the interviewees is added and the frameworks of Section 2.5 are applied to the case. 
5.9.1 Overview of interviewees 
In Section 5.2 it is mentioned that eleven focused interviews were held, but it does not specify who was 
interviewed. Table 20 provides an overview of the twelve people that were interviewed. 
 
Table 20: Overview of interviewees in the case of the high definition audio discs 
Company  Name  Relevance to case  
JVC  Nick Kuroda  Chairman of the DVD-Forum‘s WG-4 from 2004  
Panasonic  Gene Kelsey  
Involved in the marketing and market introduction of DVD-A in US under the 
Technics brand  
MediArte Markus Hintz  
From 1999-2003 involved with DVD-A as Managing Director of DVD Produktions, a 
100% subsidiary of MediArteH, offering DVD-A production services and equipment 
to Deutsche Grammophon, Philips, DECCA, TELDEC, Warner Music, EMI, 
Sonopress / Bertelsmann and others. After 2003 he moved to MediArte, as Director 
International Business in charge of European distribution of digital audio, video, DVD 
and SA-CD workstations  
Universal 
Music 
Group  
Larry Kenswil  
Headed the eLabs department from 1999 until 2008. Prior to that, he held the position 
of Executive Vice President, Business and Legal affairs. Held Board of Directors seat 
on the RIAA and IFPA  
Sony  David Walstra  
Involved with the development of DSD on a laboratory level. Started preparing the 
recording industry for SA-CD in 1997  
Philips  
Wally 
Heijnemans  
Responsible for overall development and commercialization of SA-CD  
Gerard Lokhoff  
Worked as Technical Project Leader on the SA-CD system on behalf of the Standards 
and Licensing. From that position he led the Philips team involved in the 
standardization discussions with Sony  
Menno Treffers  
Technology Manager for the development of SA-CD‘s copy protection technology, 
including contract negotiations with the record companies and licensing agreement 
negotiations of the format  
Jos Bruins  
Worked on the commercialization of SA-CD technology as the Commercial Project 
Leader  
Yoeri Geutskens  
Editor of www.sa-cd.net , a website dedicated to SA-CD. Worked from 1996-1998 in 
Consumer Electronics Market Intelligence, conducting research including focus 
groups, with regard (amongst others) to SA-CD. From 1999-2000  Product Manager of 
SA-CD players for Philips Consumer Electronics  
Charles 
Knibbeler  
In charge of development of several SA-CD prototypes  
Pentatone  Giel Bessels  
Senior VP for Philips Classics until 1999 when the department was closed. In 2001, he 
founded PentaTone Music B.V. together with two other former executives of Philips 
Classics and Polyhymnia International  
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5.9.2. Applying the case analysis tool 
Table 21 shows the result of using the case analysis tool on the case of SA-CD vs. DVD-A. In accordance 
with the outcome of the MP3 case, the phase of ‗Winning the mass market‘ was included in the case 
analysis tool. While gathering data, the tool was used to (abstractly) note if a particular element influenced 
the technology competition in a particular phase. In addition, it helped to identify gaps in the analysis and 
provided guidance to the focused interviews. Each phase of the detailed case description, as presented in 
Section 5.4-5.8, is based in essence on the elements that were identified in a particular phase, and 
therefore these sections can be seen as the result of Table 21. 
 
While applying the case analysis tool to this particular case, I noticed that as the phases progressed it 
became increasingly difficult to identify the milestones that marked the transition from one phase to the 
next. This was especially the case for the last three phases. In this technology competition a substitute 
leapfrogged both SA-CD and DVD-A, and as a result the market adoption of both technologies already 
started to decline during the phase of ‗gaining critical mass‘. Although the approach of the phases and 
milestones appears to be applicable to cases where a de-facto standard emerges, this case shows that it has 
some limitations in technology competitions where no de-facto standard emerges. 
 
Table 21: Case analysis tool for the case of the high definition audio discs 
  R&D 
Build-up 
Preparing 
for 
market 
entry 
Initiating 
market 
adoption 
Gaining 
critical 
mass 
Winning 
the mass 
market 
Post-
dominance 
  1996-
1997 
1998-
1999 
1999-2001 2002-
2004 
2004-
onwards 
 
F
ir
m
 
Reputation and credibility X X X    
Installed base       
Pricing X X X X X  
Entry timing   X    
Marketing and pre-announcements  X X X   
Availability of products   X X X  
Availability of complementary goods   X X X  
Killer application       
Size  X X    
Complementary assets  X X X   
Technological knowledge and skill base X      
Absorptive capacity       
Pre-empting scarce assets X X     
Level of collaborative development X X     
Organizational community of supporters X X X X X  
Strategic partnerships       
Product proliferation    X X  
Appropriability X      
Chance       
        
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
Technological superiority X X X X X  
Installed base   X X X  
Network effects       
Switching and homing cost X X X X X  
Backward compatibility X X X X X  
Increasing returns to adoption       
Technological breakthroughs in       
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subsystems 
Type of technological innovation X      
Adapters and gateways  X X X X  
Technological performance trajectories       
Chance       
        
M
a
rk
e
t 
/
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 
Market and industry characteristics   X X   
Level of competition X X X X   
Rate and type of technological change    X X  
Network effects   X X   
Availability of products   X X X  
Availability of complementary goods   X X X  
Killer application       
Availability of imitators       
Hetero- or homogeneity of customer 
needs 
    
 
 
Unclear assessment criteria   X X   
Powerful rival technology sponsors X X X X   
Government intervention and industry 
regulation 
    
 
 
Product proliferation       
Appropriability X X X    
Chance   X    
5.9.3. Applying the integrative framework and case analysis 
Based on the data gathered in Table 21, for each phase of the technology competition a snapshot was 
made by applying the integrative framework (Figure 63 - Figure 67). Each Figure shows only those 
elements that were at play during the respective phase. The relationships between the elements were 
reconstructed based on the written documents, public announcements and interviews. When the 
relationships were the same as presented in the integrative framework, these were marked in black. When 
the relationships were not presented in the integrative framework, these were marked in blue. 
 
Considering that DVD-A and SA-CD were in direct competition during multiple phases, I also attempted 
to apply the scoring method in accordance with Subsection 2.5.3 (an overview of the scoring options can 
be found in Table 10). I based the scores on the insights from the written documents, public 
announcements and interviews. Although this approach seems rather subjective, the scores were often 
based on solid data (sales data, product pricing, size of the organizational community of supporters, etc). I 
did not attribute scores to the elements in the last phase of the technology competition, because in this 
phase of ‗winning the mass market‘, SA-CD had prevailed over DVD-A and faced different competitors. 
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Figure 63: Integrative framework applied to Phase 1 of the case of high density audio discs 
 
Figure 64: Integrative framework applied to Phase 2 of the case of high density audio discs 
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Figure 65: Integrative framework applied to Phase 3 of the case of high density audio discs 
 
Figure 66: Integrative framework applied to Phase 4 of the case of high density audio discs 
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Figure 67: Integrative framework applied to Phase 5 of the case of high density audio discs 
As Figure 63 shows, there were already 14 elements in play during the phase of R&D build-up. These 
elements were mostly firm- and technology related, but also included some market/industry related 
elements. Similar to the cases of MP3 and Blu-ray, the technology sponsors focused on the technology 
development. The sponsors of both technologies made different decisions regarding the type of 
technological innovation, influencing its backward compatibility and technological superiority. Different 
from the other two cases, the technology sponsors started early with developing their technologies in 
collaboration with others, and to establish an organizational community of supporters. The collaborative 
development of SA-CD influenced its measure of technological superiority versus DVD-A, whereas the 
collaborative development of DVD-A helped to build an organizational community of supporters and 
pre-empt scarce assets (i.e. support from the major record labels and the major consumer electronics 
manufacturers). As there were two rival camps, both with powerful rival technology sponsors with 
formidable reputations in establishing de-facto standards, both sides made an effort to actively build an 
organizational community of supporters for its technology.  
 
During the phase of ‗preparing for market entry‘, there was a minor increase in the number of elements 
and the focus shifted slightly from the technology development towards building an organizational 
community. As Figure 64 shows, the organizational community of supporters was influenced by the level 
of collaborative development, the reputation and credibility of the technology sponsors, marketing and 
pre-announcements, and the powerful rival technology sponsors in the industry. 
 
In the phase of ‗initiating market adoption‘, there was a rapid increase in the number of elements; nearly 
all elements from the previous phase stayed in play, and ten new elements came into play. The new 
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elements were mainly firm- and market/industry related. As Figure 65 shows, an appropriability-related 
event in the industry impacted the entry timing, which in turn impacted the availability of complementary 
goods and the availability of products. 
 
In the phase of the decisive battle, there is a small decrease in the number of elements; five elements go 
out of play and are replaced by two new ones. As can be seen from Figure 66, the elements in this phase 
are well balanced between firm-, market/industry- and technology related elements. 
 
In the phase of ‗winning the mass market‘, there is a rapid decrease in the number of elements. This is 
mainly due to market/industry-related elements leaving the play (e.g. caused by the victory over the direct 
competitor in the previous phase). In this phase there are no new elements, and the remaining elements 
are mainly firm- and technology-related. 
 
Figure 63 to Figure 66 show the sponsors of SA-CD and DVD-A used very similar strategies. From an 
early stage, both focused heavily on collaborative development and building an organizational community 
of supporters. The DVD-A sponsors had an advantage in the sense that they were the first to start the 
development of a high definition audio disc, and they started from a position whereby much of the 
required technological basis was already in place. In order to differentiate from DVD-A, the SA-CD 
supporters decided to take a different technological approach, which required more technological 
development. In order to catch up with the DVD-A development, and ensure they would be able to enter 
the market around the same time, the SA-CD supporters adopted a closed collaboration model; Sony and 
Philips managed to win time by combining their respective technologies which were required for the SA-
CD format, and they limited the number of technology sponsors to only themselves. This enabled them 
to efficiently address any issues and quickly move forward, however this was not beneficial to gaining 
support from other companies. On the other side, the open collaboration model that the DVD-A 
sponsors adopted was beneficial to building an organizational community of supporters, but as 40 
companies were involved in WG-4, agreement on technological solutions was more difficult and progress 
was slower. The approach by the SA-CD supporters paid off, in the sense that it was the first on the 
market, thereby offering a product to consumers with similar performance as the announced DVD-A 
technology. However, the DVD-A camp was set to introduce products and complementary goods shortly 
after SA-CD was launched, and outperform SA-CD in terms of the number of available products and 
complementary goods. In addition, these would be offered at a substantially lower price. Although SA-
CD was a worthy competitor and would have hampered the market adoption of DVD-A, the signs 
indicated that DVD-A would win the competition. However, fate struck when, a few weeks before the 
market introduction of DVD-A, the content protection of DVD was hacked and various DVD-A 
supporters decided to cancel the launch of their products and complementary goods. This delayed the 
market introduction of DVD-A by eight months (from December 1999 to July 2000), and gave SA-CD a 
time to market advantage of little over a year. This timing advantage allowed Sony to introduce a new SA-
CD player which was cheaper than the announced DVD-A players, a few months before the DVD-A 
players were launched in July 2000. In addition, the timing advantage combined with the element that 
Sony was the only remaining consumer electronics manufacturer that owned one of the major record 
labels, allowed SA-CD to have a distinct advantage in the availability of complementary goods by the time 
DVD-A entered the market. As can be seen from Figure 64 and Figure 65, the element of appropriability 
impacted the element of entry timing, which in turn shifted the advantage in the technology competition 
from DVD-A to SA-CD. When comparing Figure 65 and Figure 66, it becomes apparent that the SA-CD 
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sponsors were successful in winning organizational support for their technology (both from consumer 
electronics manufacturers as well as record labels). Thereby, the last advantage of DVD-A was 
neutralized, and this element (combined with the network effects) enabled SA-CD to win from DVD-A. 
As shown by Figure 66, both parties engaged in market efforts to enhance network effect, and utilized 
product proliferation to enhance the availability of products, however this had little effect on the adoption 
of the technologies. This can be explained by the impact of the rate and type of technological change on 
the installed base; the rapid adoption of a substitute technology hampered the adoption of both SA-CD 
and DVD-A, and it was too late for their product proliferation and marketing efforts to counter this. 
 
Does this second application of the scoring method provide insight if a technology sponsor could 
evaluate the situation and identify the relevant elements to shape the odds in its favor? In retrospect, from 
a strategic choice perspective there was little that the DVD-A sponsors could have done to shape the 
odds of the competition in their favor; the two major events in the competition (i.e. the timing of the 
hack of DVD‘s content protection, and the rise of a substitute that became the de-facto standard) were 
unforeseen and outside the scope of control of the DVD-A sponsors. Additionally, during the first two 
phases the DVD-A sponsors were focusing on the right aspects (i.e. building an organizational 
community of supporters) and managed to obtain a clear advantage versus its main competitor. In 
hindsight, the DVD-A camp could have improved its situation if it would have applied product 
proliferation (e.g. DVD-A systems for cars) during the phase of ‗initiating market adoption‘. This could 
(in theory) have brought forth a ‗killer application‘ that could have boosted the market adoption. 
 
While the integrative framework can be used to clarify the dynamics of the technology competition, this 
case shows that the model insufficiently accounts for the power of substitutes. If we take a broader scope 
and investigate the state of the CD and MiniDisc sales from the start of the technology competition 
between SA-CD and DVD-A (Figure 68), this shows that the sales of CD did not grow between 1999-
2000, and after 2000 the sales of CDs rapidly decreased. The same applies to MiniDisc after 2001. 
Considering this information, one could argue that in retrospect the timing of SA-CD and DVD-A in 
1999 and 2000 respectively was fine (perhaps one year earlier would have been even better). However, the 
technology competition between SA-CD and DVD-A caused consumer confusion, and hampered their 
market adoption. By the time the technology competition was resolved in favor of SA-CD in 2004, not 
only the sales of SA-CD, but also the sales of CD and MiniDisc were rapidly declining as compressed 
audio formats, led by MP3, were rapidly adopted by the market. One could argue that (in hindsight) if the 
consumer electronics manufacturers and record labels had agreed on a single technology (as had been 
done with DVD), this would have greatly benefitted the market adoption of high definition audio discs. It 
would, however, be too liberal to state that this new technology would have slowed down the momentum 
of MP3. 
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Figure 68: Number of CDs and MiniDiscs sold in the US from 1996-2007413 
 
As this case shows, strategic decision making during a technology competition could benefit from a good 
assessment of the sales of the incumbent de-facto standard and the substitute technologies aiming to 
become the de-facto standard. The utility of the integrative framework would improve if it would take 
these aspects into account. 
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Prologue Chapter 6 
 
As explained in Section 1.5, in the upcoming chapter the limitations and comprehensiveness of the 
integrative framework are further investigated by ‗zooming in‘ on the relationship between two elements. 
When selecting the particular relationship, I took into account the relevant themes in academia regarding 
de-facto standards in 2010. This resulted in aligning the selected relationship with a special issue of the 
prominent academic journal ‗Organization Studies‘. The topic for the special issue was ‗the dynamics of 
standardization‘, and a closer investigation of the relationship between the elements ‗collaborative 
technology development‘ and ‗organizational community of supporters‘ appeared to be fitting. Figure 69 
highlights the selected relationship between the two elements in the integrative framework. In 
collaboration with three colleagues, several competitions between compatibility standards were selected 
(i.e. Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD, USB vs. Firewire, and WiFi vs. HomeRF), and in-depth case studies were 
performed to investigate the effect of the measure of collaborative technology development on the size 
and diversity of the organizational community of technology supporters. 
 
 
Figure 69: Position of the two selected elements and their relationship in the integrative framework 
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6.1 Introduction 
Several authors have studied the effects of networks of standard supporting organizations on the success 
of standards (Keil414, Markus et al.415). They showed the influence of network characteristics, such as the 
size of the network in standardization committees (Egyedi416, Fomin417, Schmidt and Werle418) or industry 
consortia (Weiss and Cargill)419 and the diversity of actors (Gomes-Casseras)420 on the chances that a 
standard achieves dominance. Some authors go a step further and study the antecedents of the formation 
of standard setting alliances (Axelrod et al.421, Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven422). However, authors 
have, thus far, treated the standard itself as exogenous to network formation. In other words, the 
literature has studied how the network of standard supporters affected standard success, but considers the 
standard itself as an effect of the network members‘ actions and not as an endogenous element in the 
formation of the network. 
 
In this paper, we study the reciprocal relation between standard flexibility and interorganizational network 
formation. We focus on compatibility standards, defined as ‗codified specifications defining the 
interrelations between entities in order to enable them to function together‘ (based on De Vries423; Garud 
and Kumaraswamy424). Standard flexibility refers to the number and degree of changes to a standard over 
time. The concept of standard flexibility is paradoxical since standards aim at creating sustained 
compatibility between different technologies, and therefore stability in markets, while flexibility creates 
instability. However, we show that flexibility of standards can promote support by a network of 
supporters and thereby stability on the longer term. More in particular, we propose that on the one hand 
standard flexibility can enhance both network diversity and size, and on the other hand the diversity of 
standard-supporting networks will have further effects on standard flexibility. Through an exploratory 
study of three cases of compatibility standards, we examine the specifics of the co-evolutionary process 
resulting from this reciprocal relationship over time and show its effects on standard success. In addition, 
by investigating the emergence of path dependencies in the process, we explore the forces that restrict the 
process over time.  
 
By studying the reciprocal relationship between network characteristics and network outcomes, we not 
only contribute to the standardization literature, but also to the social network literature in general. In this 
literature, there is widespread recognition that social networks are important for the performance of 
individuals, firms or even regions (e.g., Borgatti and Foster425; Burt426; Granovetter427). There has also been 
some attention to the antecedents of networks (Brass et al.428; Nebus429). However, in part due to the 
limited availability of longitudinal network studies (Elfring and Hulsink430; Streier and Greenwood431; 
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Zaheer and Soda432), the effects of network outcomes on the dynamics of the network itself have hardly 
been addressed (Perry-Smith and Shalley433). Exceptions are Autry and Golicic‘s 434 study on buyer-supplier 
relations and Lee‘s435 study on patent networks. Our study contributes to this research by investigating a so far 
unaddressed issue: the effects of the interaction between changes in network outcomes (standard flexibility) 
and network characteristics (size and diversity) on (standard) success. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First we explain our theory on the relation between networks of 
organizations supporting standards and standard flexibility. We also address the issue of path dependency 
in standardization processes. We then present our methodology and the three case studies of standards 
battles, each followed by a short analysis. This is followed by a cross-case analysis. In the discussion and 
conclusion section we summarize our findings and relate these to existing literature. We also address the 
practical implications of our study. Finally, we set out paths for future research. 
6.2 Networks and standard performance  
Standardization literature has pointed to several characteristics of interorganizational networks affecting 
the success chances of standards. The seminal paper of Cusumano et al.436 on standard competition in the 
video recorder industry shows that the size of the interorganizational network was an important 
determinant in the success of VHS over competitors such as Betamax and V2000. The VHS network 
included more stakeholders from the core industries, consumer electronics and film studios, and this 
stakeholder network was built earlier. Other authors studied the effect of a firm‘s position in a network on 
the firm‘s influence in standard setting (Leiponen437) and the role of networks of individuals for the firm‘s 
influence in standards setting (Dokko and Rosenkopf438). 
 
In accordance with general literature on social and interorganizational networks (Burt439; Coleman440; 
Provan et al.441), standardization literature on interorganizational networks emphasizes the benefits of 
networks for collective action and coordination of tasks. Amongst others, it shows that coordinated 
action is required in the interorganizational network behind a standard, in order to develop a joint 
marketing strategy, such as a market penetration strategy (Ehrhardt442), and to spend sufficient resources 
on marketing the standard (Schilling443). Collective action can also refer to strategic marketing 
communications (pre-announcements) which discourage users from adopting rivals' standards (Besen and 
Farrell444; Shapiro and Varian445), or to a collective licensing strategy with respect to the standard (Bekkers 
et al.446; Clarke447; Marasco and Dodson448; Merges et al.449). 
 
The general network literature shows the importance of networks for information exchange, particularly 
diverse information (Burt450; Campbell et al.451; Coleman452; Granovetter453). The notion that diverse 
information, if combined, can lead to new knowledge is deeply rooted in the literature on innovation 
(Allen454). Information and coordinated action are mutually reinforcing and cumulative over time (Burt455). 
Also in the standardization literature, information exchange between actors with diverse backgrounds is 
considered important, particularly in the early phase of the development of a standard (De Vries456; 
Markus et al.457; Susanto458). Diversity of participants in standards development shapes the contents of the 
standards, and improves performance (Beckman and Haunschild459; Egyedi460; Schmidt and Werle461). 
Involvement of stakeholders will likely result in a standard with a content that reflects their specific needs 
(Markus et al.462). Evans et al.463 and Lundval464 show this in the case of user involvement in 
standardization. On the other hand, diversity can put challenges for decision making. Cargill465 suggests 
that the key to successful standardization is managing the diversity of the participants; in turn, their input 
165_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
149 
 
leads to a standard‘s content that meets the needs of the sectors represented by the stakeholder. 
Deliberation processes resulting in consensus can be extremely important (Scherer and Palazzo466), but the 
more participants, the more difficult it is to achieve consensus (Rada467; Vercoulen and Van Wegberg468) 
leading to delay. 
 
A third benefit of networks refers to their role in creating status and legitimacy (Podolny469). The 
reputations of firms in standard supporting networks with respect to successful standard setting in the 
past are important in creating future prospects for customers and other parties (Axelrod et al. 470). A 
group of standard supporters with a good reputation will also find it easier to attract new members to join 
the group (Foray471). The standardization literature has also shown that the involvement of a broad variety 
of stakeholders may contribute to the legitimacy of the standard development process and the resulting 
standards (Lundval472; Scharf473), thus yielding a higher likelihood of market acceptance. 
 
In this paper we focus on the role of interorganizational networks for information exchange and 
coordinated action. Information can provide actors with opportunities, and coordinated action can 
provide the cooperative behaviour needed to explore those opportunities (Podolny and Baron474). Of 
course, when collective action leads to an extension of the network of standard supporters, the legitimacy 
of the network is often also strengthened. While the standardization literature emphasizes the importance 
of information exchange between actors in the early phase of the life of a standard, in this paper we 
extend the role of information exchange to later phases. We expect that diverse network members can use 
their repositories of knowledge and the experience acquired in the standard diffusion process to define 
the future direction of the standard. Subsequently, collective action serves to adapt the standard to current 
and expected future requirements, particularly to the requirements from different industries and consumer 
groups. The modification of the standard will attract network members from those new industries, further 
increasing the diversity and size of the network. Information exchange in the network can subsequently 
lead to new adaptations of the standard to suit both current and prospective network members.  
 
The topic of standard flexibility has been addressed by Egyedi and Blind,475 who speak of ‗standards 
dynamics‘, referring to ‗the changes to and interactions between standards, that is, what happens to 
standards once they have been set‘ (p. 4). While they use the term standard dynamics to include local 
changes in the standards by specific implementers, and the succession between standards, we use the term 
standard flexibility for changes in a standard‘s contents over time. While Egyedi and Blind476 emphasize 
the replacement of standards, and thus a selection perspective, we apply an adaptation perspective, 
emphasizing the abilities of standard supporting networks to change the standard as well as the network 
over time (Hodgson477; Lewin and Volberda478).  
 
Since we study the joint dynamics of standards and their supporting networks, we include in our analysis 
the processes that create path dependencies in the evolution of a standard. The evolutionary economics 
literature has pervasively shown how so-called network effects may lead to path dependencies in the 
development of products and markets. These network effects occur as a consequence of the installed base 
(direct network effects) of a standard and the availability of complementary products (indirect network 
effects) (Adler479; Farrell and Saloner480; Van den Ende and Wijnberg481). Network effects lead to self-
reinforcing processes, resulting in path dependencies and sometimes in a winner-takes-all situation. Actors 
become locked in to a single standard, unless switching costs are very low (Shy482). A classic and well 
known example of lock-in is the QWERTY keyboard. Existing skills of typists reinforce the dominance 
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of a keyboard layout geared to the needs of mechanical typewriters (David483). Not always do networks 
effects lead to a single outcome. For instance, in the case of video game consoles (Schilling484) and flash 
memory cards (De Vries et al.485) multiple standards remained to co-exist. 
 
In this paper, we investigate how the reciprocal process between a standard‘s support network and 
standard flexibility contributes to network effects and path dependencies. For instance, the network of 
standard supporters may contribute to the installed base and availability of complementary products, and 
thus enhance both direct and indirect network effects. On the other hand, standard supporting networks 
themselves represent a certain degree of vested interests and stability, and thus may create path 
dependencies in the dynamics of standards. Thus, networks of standard supporters can be a source of 
network effects as well as of path dependencies and lock-in. We will study phases in the dynamics of 
standard supporting networks and standards. Schreyögg and Sydow486 and Sydow et al.487 distinguish three 
phases in the process of creating path dependencies: 
(1)  The pre-formation phase: the range of options in the choice of a solution is broad;  
(2)  The formation phase: self-reinforcing processes narrow the range of options, and the 
process becomes partly irreversible – a path is evolving;  
(3)  The lock-in phase: the dominant decision pattern only leaves room for very limited 
change, since this pattern becomes deeply embedded in organizational practice and is 
replicated. 
According to the authors, specific events trigger the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2. Sydow et al.488 
give the example of the standard for video recorders, where the initial cooperation between the dominant 
actor, Matsushita, and movie studios for complementary product development (pre-recorded movies) 
initiated indirect network effects and path dependencies that led to the dominance of VHS.  
 
In this paper we specifically investigate to which extent different phases can be distinguished in the 
evolution of standards, how network formation and standard flexibility evolve in the different phases, and 
how they contribute to path dependencies. We also address the events that trigger the transition between 
phases from a network perspective. This analysis of the role of networks in path dependency may reveal 
the conditions under which the co-evolutionary, and sometimes spiral, process between network 
formation and standard flexibility terminates. 
 
In summary, we explore the antecedents and effects of changes in standards, particularly with respect to 
diversity and size of the standard‘s network. We presume that information exchange within and the 
collective action of the network of standard supporters leads to a dynamic relation between standard 
flexibility and network formation. Specifically, we examine the effects that changes in a standard‘s content 
have on the size and diversity of the network of standard supporters, and in turn, the subsequent effects 
of the network‘s increased size and diversity on further adaptations of the standard. Additionally, we 
explore the role of the network-flexibility dynamics in path dependencies which in turn limit the 
reciprocal process between the standard and the standard supporting network. 
6.3 Methodology 
Since we are the first to conduct a focused study on the relationship between standard flexibility and 
interorganizational networks, we perform explorative research based on a case study approach, involving 
an in-depth study of standards battles. We selected three cases of battles between compatibility standards: 
the battle between Blu-ray and HD-DVD for a high definition optical disc standard, the battle between 
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Firewire and USB (Universal Serial Bus) for interconnectivity of peripherals to the PC and the battle 
between WiFi and HomeRF for wireless connectivity in the home. 
 
For each standards battle, we examined news archives including Factiva and Lexis-Nexis and press 
releases from the websites of the organizations that develop and promote the standards. We also analyzed 
written documents to gain a general insight on the development paths of the standards. These documents 
included the minutes of meetings (organized by standards committees and consortia), presentations, press 
releases and actual standards drafts and specifications. To complement the data and assess the 
substantiality of each change in the standards, we conducted focused interviews with key persons involved 
in the development of each standard. Often one interviewee introduced us to a key informant at another 
company involved in the battle. These contact persons gave us access to relevant documents as well. In 
total, fifteen face to face interviews were conducted in Europe, Japan and the US, complemented with 
thirteen telephone interviews in Europe, Japan and the US. In the case of Blu-ray versus HD-DVD, we 
interviewed ten respondents, including members of the Board of Directors of the Blu-ray Disc 
Association, the President of the Blu-ray Disc Association, and one of the key members of the HD-DVD 
promotion group. For the USB versus Firewire battle, we interviewed eight respondents, including Intel‘s 
project leader for the implementation of USB and a technology manager closely involved in the 
development of Firewire. For the WiFi versus HomeRF case, we interviewed ten respondents, including 
the chairman of the IEEE 802.11 committee (from 1990 to 2000), the co-founder of the WiFi alliance, 
the former internal WiFi project leader at NCR (the company that initiated the WiFi standard), and a 
project manager involved in the HomeRF standard. The interviews were conducted from 2007 to 2010 
and the length of the interviews varied from one to 2.5 hours. To ensure consistency and reliability, we 
used interview guidelines for all interviews. We communicated the results to the interviewees for 
verification. We translated quotations from non-English-speaking interviewees into English. 
 
We define the success of a standard in terms of market share; a standard is highly successful (dominant) 
when it has achieved more than 50% market share among new buyers in a certain product or service 
category for a significant amount of time (Lee et al.489; Suarez490). A standard achieves medium success if it 
survives for a long period of time, but does not become dominant. Low success means that the standard 
disappears from the market. We define the network of a standard as all the connections between two or 
more actors with the goal of developing and promoting the standard (Mulder 1992, as cited by Egyedi491). 
Examples of networks include standardization alliances (Hill492), consortia, and committees of formal 
standards organizations (De Vries493). We define network diversity as the number of relevant industries that 
are represented in the network. According to Jiang et al.494, alliances can be differentiated in terms of 
degree of variance in partners (industry diversity, national diversity, and organizational diversity), 
functional purposes, and governance structure. In our research, the industry diversity is the main point of 
interest. Our definition of standard diversity is based on the notion from network literature that diverse 
network members use their knowledge and experience to adapt a standard to the requirements from 
different industry groups, and that the modified standard will attract network members from those new 
industries. If actors operate in multiple industries, we looked at the divisions within the firm that 
participated in the network and counted the number of industries in which these divisions were active. 
Network size is defined as the number of companies that supported the standard by, for example, adopting 
the standard in their products.  
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Standard flexibility is defined as the number and degree of changes since the start of the standard‘s 
development. To the extent possible, we distinguish substantial changes from minor changes. Substantial 
changes are modifications of the specification that are important for the functionality of the standard. 
Examples are, in the case of Blu-ray, the addition of region coding and copy protection or the removal of 
a disc cartridge. The first and the second of these changes modified the standard‘s functionality to the 
benefit of content providers, and the third lowered cost and improved ease of use. Minor changes are 
modifications that do not or hardly impact the standard‘s functionality. 
 
Each interview began by presenting the interviewee with a chronological list of changes for each of the 
standards, which we deduced from the initial desk research. We asked the interviewee to modify the list 
where needed. For every change, the interviewee was asked how substantial the change was, which parties 
proposed the change, which parties were active in drafting the new version of the specification and which 
parties were involved in approving it. Then, we asked about the reasons for changing the standard. 
Subsequently, we inquired whether certain changes were incorporated with the goal of attracting other 
parties to the standard and whether these parties originated from new industries. We also asked whether 
these new parties contributed to the success of the standard and whether they would have joined had the 
standard not been changed. Lastly, we asked whether these new parties contributed to the further 
development of the standard. 
 
The data was analyzed following Miles and Huberman‘s495 recommended three steps: data reduction, data 
display, conclusion drawing and verification. First, we analyze the primary and secondary data marking the 
events that took place during each standards battle. We focused on changes in the standards and in the 
networks supporting the standards. This resulted in a historical reconstruction of the standard 
development, respective changes and support network build-up. To assess how standard flexibility, 
network diversity, network size and standard success related to each other in each case, we triangulated 
the evidence obtained from the news archives, written documents and interviews. Based on this 
triangulated evidence, we derived, for each standard, the values for each variable. We created several 
displays to evaluate the changes in our constructs of interest over time. We examined the displays and 
narratives to fully understand each case. We also assessed to what extent different phases can be 
distinguished in the dynamics of the evolution of each standard. Then, we determined whether patterns 
could be established for our constructs across different standards battles to arrive at evidence regarding 
the nature of the relationship between our constructs. This was a highly iterative process in which we 
frequently reviewed our data to verify and reformulate our claims. It resulted in additional data collection 
including several follow-up interviews. 
6.4 Case study 1: Blu-ray versus HD-DVD 
Background 
In 1998, the market introduction of commercial high definition televisions in both the US and Japan 
created the need for a commonly accepted, inexpensive way to record and play high definition content. 
Two standards competed for dominance; Blu-ray and HD-DVD. In 2008, Blu-ray became dominant (see 
Table 22 for a chronology). 
 
Blu-ray 
At the end of 1997, Sony and Philips decided to combine their high definition optical disc technologies 
and develop Blu-ray. Primarily, the consumer electronics divisions of Sony and Philips were involved in 
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the development, but also the disc replication and optical disc drive manufacturing divisions of Sony 
participated. Sony and Philips developed the new technology to be backwards compatible with DVDs, 
but substantially better in terms of disc capacity. An interviewee at Philips expressed that: ―It was a strategic 
choice to work on a technology with five times more storage capacity than DVD because we believed that in the future motion 
picture studios would have the need for more disc capacity”. The development started with standards for re-writable 
discs and disc recorders.  
 
After developing the standard up to version 0.5, Sony and Philips invited other major consumer 
electronics companies with the goal of preventing a standards battle. Simultaneously, in April 2001, 
Panasonic (then known as Matsushita) presented a competing format (Peek et al. 2009). A respondent 
from Sony noted: “Through history, when Panasonic supported a technology, that technology won the standards battle. 
Therefore Panasonic was an obvious key player that we wanted to attract in the Blu-ray development”. Panasonic was 
approached for a collaboration, which they accepted, and they contributed their dual layer technology, 
doubling the storage capacity. The three companies started attracting other large consumer electronics 
manufacturers and planned to form a group of ten companies. One of them, Toshiba, decided not to 
accept the invitation and continued to work on its own format, HD-DVD. In February 2002, nine major 
consumer electronics companies established the Blu-ray Disc Founders consortium. They completed 
version 1.0 in June 2002.  
 
The new network members made clear that pre-recorded discs and content were required to make the 
technology successful. This led to a substantial change by parallel development of variations in the 
standard in different working groups – for re-writable, recordable and read-only discs. In April 2003, Sony 
introduced the first commercially available high definition disc recorder for recording HD images, but in 
Japan only. Consumer adoption was disappointing due to the price and technological problems; 
production was soon stopped.  
 
With the shift in focus towards pre-recorded discs, the companies supporting Blu-ray realized that gaining 
commitment from movie studios and the IT industry was imperative. Sony‘s movie studio and computer 
manufacturing business joined in 2003. In January 2004, they gained the support from the two largest 
computer manufacturers, HP and Dell. This was done by adhering to their requests to make substantial 
modifications to the format replacing Sony‘s logical format with the non-proprietary Universal Disc 
Format and working towards a disc without a cartridge. In March 2004, TDK (a leading manufacturer of 
optical discs) joined the consortium. Their hard-coat technology eliminated the need for the disc 
cartridge. In order to obtain support from the major Hollywood studios, the Blu-ray Disc Foundation 
agreed to a new and substantial set of changes in the standard, by including two additional layers of 
content protection, region coding and a new video application format. According to an executive at 
Panasonic, ―20th Century Fox and Walt Disney have fewer, but very strong titles in comparison to other major film 
studios, and due to their size it is more difficult to launch movies world-wide on the same date. Therefore, both content 
protection and region coding are especially important to these two studios‖. As a result, between October and 
December 2004, 20th Century Fox, the Walt Disney Company and Buena Vista Home Entertainment 
decided to join the Blu-ray consortium. A year later, this also led to non-exclusive support from two other 
major film studios, Paramount and Warner Bros. (which initially exclusively supported HD-DVD). 
 
In May 2004, before the movie studios announced their support, the 13 members of the Blu-ray Disc 
Founders created an open platform which any company could join; the Blu-ray Disc Association. This 
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boosted the amount and diversity of company support: three months later, more than 70 companies from 
the consumer electronics, information technology, media and software industry had joined. The Board of 
Directors of the Blu-ray Disc Association initially consisted of the 13 founders and over time grew to 19 
members. In 2005, the association evaluated its video format, from Sun Microsystems, against Microsoft‘s 
video format. It decided to stick with its application for technological reasons and because the movie 
studios preferred the format. This choice led Microsoft and Intel to choose exclusively for HD-DVD. 
Soon HP followed. 
 
In 2005, at the request of the Japanese government, Toshiba, Panasonic and Sony negotiated to arrive at a 
common standard. However, the negotiations stalled, leaving it up to the market to decide which 
technology would win. The first Blu-ray players entered the market in June 2006. In November 2006, 
Sony launched its PlayStation3 video game console with integrated Blu-ray player. In January 2008, 
Warner Bros. decided to exclusively support Blu-ray. Warner saw that the market was leaning towards 
Blu-ray since it had the most support from the consumer electronics and movie studio industry and 
because of the success of the Playstation3. With four of the six major movie studios exclusively 
supporting Blu-ray, influential retailers such as Walmart followed. Blu-ray became the dominant standard 
for high definition optical discs in 2008. After this victory, the standard was upgraded to keep it up to 
date e.g. by increasing the disc capacity and integrating 3-D technology. The network‘s diversity and size 
stayed stable, since the exit of some parties was compensated by new entrants. 
 
HD-DVD 
After deciding not to join the development of Blu-ray, in August 2002, Toshiba and NEC announced the 
competing format, HD-DVD. HD-DVD was built upon the intellectual property of the DVD standard 
and a combination of new technology from both companies. By building on the DVD format, there was 
less freedom to modify the HD-DVD standard. Toshiba and NEC had activities in the consumer 
electronics, computer and optical disc drive industry. They immediately tried to expand the number and 
diversity of supporting companies by getting it accepted by the DVD-Forum, the existing organization for 
support of the DVD standard. The companies supporting Blu-ray, which were also members of the 
DVD-Forum, managed to prevent this twice. But in November 2003 the DVD-Forum decided to 
officially support HD-DVD. The HD-DVD format became the focus of development in Working Group 
11 of the DVD-Forum. Adoption by the DVD-Forum greatly enhanced the amount and diversity of 
companies that supported the standard; by March 2004, 79 companies were involved in Working Group 
11. The DVD-Forum‘s Steering Committee approved Version 1.0 in June 2004. Subsequently, there were 
numerous follow-up changes. These were often ‗optional specifications‘ that constituted small 
amendments to version 1.0. 
 
Toshiba and NEC made an effort to gain commitment from movie studios with which they had a good 
relationship. In November 2004, three of the six major Hollywood studios announced that they would 
issue movies for HD-DVD. In December 2004, Toshiba, NEC, Sanyo and Memory Tech established the 
HD-DVD Promotional Group to provide additional momentum behind the standard and to enhance the 
development of content and hardware made in compliance with the standard. This increased support for 
the standard: by September 2005, 84 companies were participating in Working Group 11, and 110 
companies in the Promotional Group.  
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In 2005, Microsoft and Intel, dissatisfied with Blu-ray, issued exclusive support for HD-DVD. Microsoft‘s 
software and hardware knowledge helped Toshiba with some minor changes to create a fully-formed 
playback system and special menu features. Microsoft decided to provide an HD-DVD drive as a separate 
add-on to its Xbox360 game console – a further diversification of HD-DVD‘s support network. The 
Xbox360 itself had been launched in November 2005, but only contained a traditional DVD drive.  
 
In March 2006, Toshiba released their first HD-DVD player in Japan and, one month later, in the United 
States. In 2007, the HD-DVD camp increased efforts to obtain exclusive support from Hollywood 
studios, but Warner Bros. decided to exclusively support Blu-ray. As a result, in February 2008, Toshiba 
announced discontinuing production of HD-DVD products and the HD-DVD promotion group was 
dissolved in March 2008.  
 
Case analysis 
This case suggests three phases in the development of each of the two standards. In the first period, a 
limited number of companies from the same industry started developing the standard. In the second 
period, the initiators started adapting the standard and inviting companies from other industries. In this 
phase the standards battle took place. In the third phase, which started when Blu-ray became dominant, 
the network became stable although the standard continued to be adapted to new requirements.  
 
The size and diversity of the two networks were initially similar, but the dynamics of the processes and 
the market shares of the network members in their respective industries were different. Some of Blu-ray‘s 
new members requested several substantial changes in the content of the standard. These changes also 
served to attract new members, particularly IT and movie companies, with a significant market share in 
their respective industries. Specifically the substantial changes that Blu-ray made to accommodate the 
requirements of the movie studios created higher commitment and support in that sector. 
 
HD-DVD showed less dynamics (see Figure 70). Microsoft‘s involvement led to minor changes. By 
incorporating the DVD-Forum in the network, Toshiba and NEC created a large and diverse network, 
but this network was less committed since the standard had not been adapted to the requirements of the 
network members from the beginning. The reason for Toshiba and NEC‘s strategy of requesting 
adoption by the DVD Form was that they were later in the process of inviting other companies, and 
support by the DVD-Forum was the fastest way to build up industry support.  
 
Other reasons for the difference in dynamics are firstly that HD-DVD had more technical limitations to 
modification than Blu-ray due to the initial choice to use DVD technology, and secondly because the 
development of HD-DVD started later than Blu-ray. Therefore Toshiba focused on completing the 
format and did not want to delay market introduction by modifying the format. HD-DVD eventually had 
the advantage of being slightly earlier to the market, and at a lower price, whereas Blu-ray‘s technical 
superiority was not a strong driver for consumer adoption. Thus, this case also shows that price, early 
timing of market entrance and technical superiority are of influence, but are not decisive. By being more 
flexible and adhering to some of the wishes of non-participating stakeholders, the Blu-ray supporters 
managed to bring these stakeholders on board with a high level of commitment; once on board they more 
often than with HD-DVD provided exclusive support to the format. 
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Table 22: Chronology of events for Blu-ray and HD-DVD 
 
Blu-ray  HD-DVD 
Events relating to standard Events relating to network  Events relating to 
standard 
Events relating to 
network 
 
 
 
2000: Preliminary record-only 
format finalized. 
1997: Sony and Philips 
(consumer electronics, disc 
replication and optical disc 
drive manufacturing) start 
development. 
   
2001: Disc storage capacity 
doubles to 50GB. 
2001: Panasonic (consumer 
electronics) joins. 
   
2002: First version record-only 
format finalized, focus changed 
to read-only, additional copy-
protection and region coding. 
2002: Six major consumer 
electronics companies join. 
  2002: Toshiba and NEC 
(consumer electronics, 
disc replication and 
optical disc drive 
manufacturing) start 
development. 
2003: Removal of disc 
cartridge, change in logical 
format, new video based 
application format. 
2003: Sony‘s computer 
manufacturing and movie 
studio join. 
 
   
2004: First version of read-only 
physical specifications finalized 
incorporating bare disc system. 
2004: Computer 
manufacturers (Hewlett 
Packard, Dell), optical disc 
manufacturer (TDK), 
Sony‘s game console 
department, movie studios 
(Walt Disney, 20th Century 
Fox)  join. 
 2004: First version of 
read-only and rewritable 
physical specification 
finalized. 
2004: Movie studios 
(Paramount, Universal 
and Warner Bros.) join.  
2005: Improved version 
writable and rewritable physical 
specification finalized, using 
bare disc system. 
2005: Hewlett-Packard 
(computer manufacturer) 
drops exclusive support. 
  2005: Software and game 
consoles (Microsoft), 
semiconductors (Intel), 
and computer 
manufacturer (Hewlett 
Packard) join. Warner 
Bros. and Paramount 
drop exclusive support. 
2006: Improved version read-
only format, new video-based 
application format, additional 
copy protection and region 
coding. 
  2006: First version of 
read-only file system 
specification finalized. 
 
   2007: Storage capacity 
increased to 51GB. 
2007: Paramount provides 
exclusive support. 
 2008: Warner Bros (movie 
studio) exclusively supports 
Blu-ray. 
  2008: Warner Bros. 
(movie studio), Walmart, 
Bestbuy and Netflix 
(retailers) leave. 
HD-DVD promotion 
group is dissolved. 
2009: 3D functionality added.     
2010: Writable format storage 
capacity increased to 100GB. 
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Figure 70: Network size, diversity, and standard flexibility for Blu-ray and HD-DVD (Standard flexibility relates to the number of major changes 
only). 
6.5 Case study 2: Firewire versus USB 
Background 
Peripheral computer devices such as speakers and webcams and products like digital cameras, requiring 
connection to the PC, arrived to the market in the 1990s. Two standards emerged specifying this 
connection, Firewire and USB. USB achieved dominance but Firewire continued to be used in specific 
niche markets (see Table 23 for a chronology). 
 
 
 
174_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
158 
 
Firewire 
Apple started to develop its Firewire standard in 1986. The first version was ready in 1987. Apple 
submitted it to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in order to obtain support for 
the standard. It was difficult for other companies to influence the further development of the standard 
because Apple sent many experts to the committee. One respondent noted: “Apple was sitting on their core 
standard as a chicken protecting her egg; nobody was allowed to touch it.” In 1995, the standard was ratified as IEEE 
1394. The consumer electronics industry perceived the need for greater bandwidth capacity and from 
1995 companies such as Sony became involved. One respondent noted: “People do not accept it when the 
television suddenly malfunctions whereas PC people accept it because they can press the reset button… Therefore, at the time, 
we chose the Firewire standard because we knew that this standard would always function properly”. As a result, network 
diversity increased from one (Apple, computer manufacturers) to two (consumer electronics). Actors 
from other relevant industries such as semiconductors, pre-packaged software, and computer networking 
were not involved. In 1994, Apple established the 1394 Trade Association, open to all companies that 
wanted to implement the standard in their products.  
 
In 2000, IEEE 1394a was ratified enabling higher efficiency and additional functionality (such as 
streaming). In 2002, IEEE 1394b was ratified, enabling a higher bandwidth capacity and reliable data 
communication over a longer distance. The intention was to make the standard appropriate for new areas 
such as home networking and automotive electronics. Some companies from those industries adopted the 
standard, which increased the size of the standard supporting network. Also, more computer 
manufacturers adopted the standard; their interest was driven by the standard‘s increased speed which 
could be used for the internal bus within the PC. 
 
From 2002 to 2008, additional changes were incorporated in the standard which further strengthened the 
standard‘s position in its high bandwidth niche market. For example, in 2006, an interface specification 
was added which enabled interconnection with Ethernet-based Local Area Networks. The size and 
diversity of the support network remained stable. 
 
USB 
Intel started the development of the USB (Universal Serial Bus) in 1992. When, in November 1994, the 
standard was developed up to version 0.7, they decided to formally sign-up other companies. According 
to Intel‘s USB project leader: ―A personal computer is based on open interfaces, but the industry does not trust an „open 
standard‟ developed by just one company‖. Intel wanted the group‘s size small enough for rapid progress, but 
large and diverse enough to sufficiently represent the industry. Intel scheduled a meeting in which it 
invited several companies, including Apple, to present the specification they prepared. However, Intel did 
not want to further collaborate with Apple because of Firewire.  
 
In March 1995, Intel established a two tier alliance; the USB Promotor Group (for developing and 
promoting the USB standard) and the USB Implementers Forum (open to a larger group of firms in order 
to create products and market momentum). The standard supporting network became diverse: 
semiconductors (Intel), computer manufacturers (Compaq, IBM), pre-packaged software (Microsoft), 
computer networking (Northern Telecom), and companies operating in several of these industries (DEC, 
NEC). 
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Between versions 0.7 and 1.0 there were no substantial changes to the standard; only details were refined. 
Version 1.0, launched in 1996, enabled a data rate sufficient for data communication between personal 
computers and peripheral devices. This capacity improvement satisfied the direct needs of the companies 
involved in the USB Promoter Group. In order to build industry momentum, the USB Promoter Group 
organized compliance workshops for peripheral suppliers and a conference for developers. This resulted 
in the rapid increase of members in the USB Implementers Forum. New companies, including suppliers 
of personal computers and consumer electronics, were invited to participate and suggest changes in the 
standard. This led to several extensions to the standard. One respondent noted: “If we can think of a couple of 
applications for the standard and establish working groups for these applications, then automatically the standard will be 
implemented in more products”.  
 
USB version 1.1 was introduced in 1998 to increase USB applications and make the standard fit for audio, 
voice and video by increasing data rate. As a result, Philips (consumer electronics) and Lucent 
(telecommunications) joined the USB Promoter Group in 1999. Their membership increased network 
diversity and the legitimacy of the standard in the eyes of potential adopters. New participants became 
involved in the further development of the standard. The USB representative at Philips noted: ―In USB 
1.1, it was certainly not possible to get a good quality audio signal over USB. In that respect Philips certainly contributed to 
the standard. We also contributed to making the USB hub more robust.‖ As a result, more consumer electronics 
companies chose to adopt the standard.  
 
In 2000, USB version 2.0 was introduced, enabling an even higher data rate. As a result, many companies 
from different industries including consumer electronics, digital photography, and data storage chose to 
adopt USB for products such as video peripherals and hard disks. After 2000, additional functionality was 
added to the standard through many changes (e.g., battery charging functionality through USB, and the 
possibility for USB peripherals to communicate directly with each other). As a result the standard 
attracted many producers of complementary products (including MP3 players, external hard drives, and 
mobile phones). The number of companies supporting the standard grew from 600 in 2000 to 900 in 
2002. After 2002, the number of supporting companies remained constant. Since 1999, the diversity in the 
Promoter Group has also remained more or less constant; some parties left the group while others joined. 
 
Case analysis 
Also in the case of Firewire and USB, the three phases can be distinguished. Single companies, Apple and 
Intel, started the development of the two standards, Firewire (1986) and USB (1992) respectively. In the 
second phase, after one or two years, each standard initiator decided to seek broader support. Apple did 
this by participating in IEEE. Consumer electronics companies in need of high capacity joined and the 
group upgraded the standard (higher data rate). The 1394 Trade Association was established to bind 
implementing companies together, and membership grew steadily. However, the dominant role of Apple 
and its reluctance to allow major changes in the standard hampered other companies in coming up with 
suggestions to improve the standard. As a consequence, the group did not take full advantage of the 
opportunities of attracting other actors to the network. Figure 71 shows that the number of changes 
remained relatively low, while network diversity and size were lower for Firewire than for USB. 
Nevertheless, the standard acquired sufficient support to maintain a foothold in the high bandwidth niche 
market. 
 
176_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
160 
 
Intel aimed for a cheap standard with a broad application. It was more active in its attempts to extend the 
network. Figure 71 shows that they allowed many more modifications and were more successful in terms 
of size and diversity of the network. The standard supporters also created a separate ―Implementers 
Forum‖ and actively invited parties to propose modifications of the standard. This strategy resulted in the 
network‘s growth in both size and diversity as well as growth in the standard‘s market use. The case thus 
confirms our expectation that changes in the standard can facilitate the growth of network size and 
diversity, and thereby increase the standard‘s chances of success. But the case also shows that the attitude 
and behaviour of the dominant actor or actors with respect to flexibility can have substantial influence. 
 
The process came to a halt around 2002 when the growth in size and diversity of the networks of both 
standards ended, entering the rather stable third phase. To date, USB outperforms Firewire considerably 
in market share, but Firewire keeps its niche. Users can choose between the two standards although in 
most cases they opt for USB. Only in some cases of high bandwidth capacity Firewire is preferred. After 
2002, both standards continued to change and we cannot exclude the possibility that future upgrades of 
USB may affect Firewire‘s position and vice versa. 
 
Table 23: Chronology of events for Firewire and USB 
Firewire  USB 
Events relating to standard Events relating to network  Events relating to 
standard 
Events relating to 
network 
1987: First version finalized. 
 
1986: Apple (computer 
manufacturer) starts 
development of Firewire. 
   
1992: Intel 
(semiconductors) starts 
development of USB. 
 
1995: Data rate increases to 
400 mbps. 
 
 
1995: Consumer 
electronics industry (e.g. 
Sony) joins. 
 
 1994: First version USB 
finalized.  
1996: Data rate increases 
to 1.5 mbps. 
1998: Data rate increases 
to 12 mbps. 
1995: Computer 
manufacturer, pre-
packaged software, and 
computer networking 
industry join. 
 
2000: Changes incorporated 
enabling higher efficiency 
and additional functionality 
such as streaming. 
2002: Date rate increases to 
3200 mbps. Changes 
incorporated to enable more 
reliable data communication 
over longer distance. 
 
 
 
 
 2000: Data rate increases 
to 480 mbps.  
 
 
 
2006: Functionality added 
to enable USB peripherals 
to communicate directly 
with each other. 
1999: Consumer 
electronics (Philips) and 
telecommunications 
(Lucent) industry join. 
2006: Changes incorporated 
enabling interconnection 
with Ethernet-based Local 
Area Networks. 
  2007: Battery charging 
functionality added. 
2008: Data rate increases 
to 5000 mbps. 
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Figure 71: Network size, diversity, and standard flexibility for Firewire and USB (Standard flexibility relates to the number of major changes only)  
 
6.6 Case study 3: WiFi versus HomeRF 
Background 
The third case describes the battle between two standards for commercial wireless data communication: 
WiFi and HomeRF. The battle resulted in a clear winner: WiFi has become the dominant standard for 
wireless networks in homes and offices (see Table 24 for a chronology).  
 
 
 
178_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
162 
 
WiFi 
In 1985, the Federal Communications Committee (FCC) passed a ruling which made commercial wireless 
data communication possible in the US. This triggered National Cash Register (NCR) to begin a study 
into the feasibility of a wireless radio for cash registers sold in the US. The goal was to achieve the highest 
possible bandwidth capacity so that wireless communication would feel like wired communication. The 
data from the banking terminals and cash registers had to be downloaded in the morning. The project 
leader explains: “When you come in with a wireless solution and you say that you could move the cash registers around 
anywhere you want that‟s fine, but you can‟t say „And by the way when you turn it on in the morning you will have to wait 
for half an hour‟.” A small team of engineers worked on succeeding prototypes.  
 
In 1988, NCR engaged with the IEEE to identify an appropriate wireless protocol for the standard. In 
1990, the IEEE 802.11 working group was established. From 1990-1997 mostly computer manufacturers 
(such as IBM) and computer networking manufacturers (such as NCR) were active on the committee. 
The standard was finally approved as IEEE 802.11 in September 1997. In 1998, Breezecom joined, later 
followed by other telecommunications companies (such as Nokia and Motorola). This increased network 
diversity. Earlier, work had started on two specifications for a higher bandwidth capacity. Wireless data 
communication was possible in two frequency bands, low and high. In some countries, the low band was 
reserved for other purposes and the only option was to use the high band. In France, for example, the 
organizers of the Tour de France had exclusive access to the low band. At the November 1996 meeting, 
two projects were established: project 802.11b for a low bandwidth capacity over longer distances in a low 
band and project 802.11a for a high data rate over shorter distances in a high band. These revisions, 
enabling speeds of 11 megabit per second (mbps) and 54 mbps, were approved in December 1999 and 
January 2000, respectively. The IEEE 802.11 committee chairman explained the importance of increased 
bandwidth capacity: “At that time Ethernet [a wired alternative for WiFi] already guaranteed a data rate of 10 
mbps so consumers perceived the data rate of 2 mbps to be too slow. To respond to their wishes we began work on an 
extension for a higher data rate.” The former CTO of NCR added to that: “We were always trying to keep up with 
the wired equivalent of the LAN. […] You always had this sort of data rate hungry appetite.” The increased 
bandwidth capacity attracted many companies to the standard. In 2000, the diversity in the network 
increased further as consumer electronics companies (such as Philips and later Samsung) joined. In 1999, 
the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA) was established in order to promote the standard 
and certify products. This further increased network size. 
 
From 2000 onwards, many companies became active in the IEEE 802.11 committee and established 
different task groups which each worked on several enhancements to the IEEE standard. The committee 
also specifically invited firms to form task groups to ensure that certain required changes would be 
incorporated in the standard. As the chair of IEEE 802.11 commented: “We began with a standard that 
worked, then you can adapt that standard and by doing so create a larger market for it. […] Through these changes the 
number of applications that can make use of the standard increases and so more companies joined‖. Many revisions were 
developed which resulted in an increase in complementary products that could make use of the standard 
and subsequently in an increase in the number of companies that adopted the standard. Also, network 
diversity continued to increase. In 2002, the pre-packaged software industry (Microsoft) joined and in 
2003, the aircraft industry (Boeing). Boeing wanted to use WiFi in its manufacturing process. However, 
for them the connection had to be more reliable as planes are built in an environment with a lot of 
reflections creating background noise. After 2003, the diversity in the network remained constant over 
time while the size of the network gradually increased. 
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HomeRF 
In 1997, Intel established the Home Radio Frequency Working Group to develop a standard for wireless 
communication of both data and traditional telephone signals. At that time, WiFi was not fit for providing 
home telephone applications of sufficient quality. Working group participants covered semiconductors 
(Intel), pre-packaged software (Microsoft), computer manufacturing (e.g. Compaq), telecommunications 
(e.g. Ericsson) and consumer electronics (Philips). From 1997 to 1998, several meetings were held 
resulting in a first standard (version 1.0). As one respondent notes: “The initial meetings were very open, 
everybody was encouraged to work on the first HomeRF specification with the rules of the FCC that, at that moment, 
applied.[…] The development process was very efficient and quick; there was little friction between the members as they were 
highly committed.” The FCC rules implied that the bandwidth for ‗Frequency Hopping‘ could reach a limited 
capacity. The HomeRF workgroup chose the ‗Frequency Hopping‘ modulation technology instead of the 
‗Direct Sequence‘ modulation technology since devices that implement ‗Frequency Hopping‘ are cheaper, 
use less power, and are more reliable. In that respect they were not as flexible as WiFi which chose to 
support both modulation technologies in its standard. 
 
Later, HomeRF meetings were less efficient. As one respondent noted: ―In later meetings some of the big 
firms in the developing process had some serious doubts about the standard. […] They disagreed about 
the standard‖. As a consequence, it took a long time before the members could agree on additional 
changes to the standard. In 1999, Philips left the group, followed in 2000 by Microsoft. The main reason 
for departure was that the choice to stick to the ‗Frequency Hopping‘ modulation technology could not 
provide them with the higher bandwidth capacity they required. 
 
In 2000, the FCC changed the rules for frequency hopping enabling higher bandwidth capacity. Following 
that decision, the Working Group started to develop a new generation of the standard. However, as one 
of the members noted: “The FCC ruling came just too late for us”. Indeed, by the time HomeRF 2.0 was 
introduced (2001), WiFi had also been upgraded sufficiently. Intel left the group causing many companies 
to follow. Eventually, the Working Group was disbanded.  
 
Case analysis 
The development of the WiFi standard started in the second half of the 1980s, when NCR saw a business 
opportunity in developing a solution for wireless interconnection. Around 1988 they recognized that they 
needed others, primarily for knowledge (protocols), and engaged with IEEE, which formed a working 
group. The diversity of the group was relatively low, but nevertheless it had difficulty making decisions. 
As Figure 72 shows, the group needed six years to develop the standard. Due to the lack of diversity, this 
standard did not meet all market needs.  
 
In 1997, Intel initiated the development of a competing standard for high-quality wireless phones at 
home. They immediately involved other companies and together established a consortium. They invited 
more companies so they were fast in establishing a broad and diverse network. This triggered the IEEE 
committee working on WiFi to create additional organisational opportunities for participation: anyone 
could propose changes and form ‗task groups‘ to address the proposed changes. As a result, participation 
increased in both numbers and diversity. However, while HomeRF had a jump-start with highly 
motivated participants, the group gradually faced more problems in achieving consensus; they became too 
slow in upgrading the standard. They stuck to their initial technological choices resulting in a standard that 
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enabled a comparatively lower bandwidth capacity in only one frequency band. WiFi, on the other hand, 
was more flexible; it chose to support two modulation technologies in its standard instead of one and 
developed a standard for both of the available bands. Furthermore, they not only – like HomeRF – 
sought improvements in bandwidth capacity, but also in other functionality. As a result, many companies 
left HomeRF and chose to support WiFi. Size and diversity of the HomeRF network decreased 
considerably. The companies that left HomeRF chose to adopt the WiFi standard, contributing to its 
dominance. It made no sense for HomeRF to continue, the consortium was dismantled. This marks the 
start of the third phase, in which, as Figure 72 shows, work on improving WiFi continued and its network 
grew further in size, but not in diversity.  
 
So, both standards initially obtained a similar network diversity. The explanation for the higher success of 
WiFi and the failure of HomeRF is mainly related to the flexibility of the standard. Due to lower 
flexibility, industries left HomeRF, and the use of the standard diminished. 
 
Table 24: Chronology of events for WiFi and HomeRF 
WiFi  HomeRF 
Events relating to standard Events relating to 
network 
 Events relating to 
standard 
Events relating to network 
 
 
 
 
1997: First version WiFi 
finalized. 
 
 
 
1999: Data rate increases to 
11 mbps (over the low band). 
1985: NCR (Computer 
networking) starts 
development of the 
standard. 
 
1990: Computer 
manufacturer industry 
(e.g. IBM) joins. 
 
1998: 
Telecommunications 
industry (Breezecom) 
joins. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
1998: First version 
HomeRF finalized. 
 
 
 
1997: Intel 
(semiconductors) starts 
development of the 
HomeRF standard 
together with firms 
representing pre-packaged 
software, computer 
manufacturing, 
telecommunications, and 
consumer electronics 
industries.  
1999: Consumer 
electronics industry leaves. 
2000: Data rate increases to 
54 mbps (over the high 
band). 
 
2003: Data rate increases to 
54 mbps (over the low band). 
2000: Consumer 
electronics industry 
(Philips) joins.  
2002: Pre-packaged 
software industry joins. 
2003: Boeing joins. 
  
2001: Data rate 
increases to 10 mbps. 
2000: Pre-packaged 
software industry leaves.  
 
 
 
 
2003: Network disbanded 
2004: Changes incorporated 
to resolve security issues and 
to support more frequencies.  
2005: Functionality 
(streaming) added. 
2008: Changes incorporated: 
higher efficiency (reduced 
power consumption) and 
additional functionality (fast 
roaming). 
2009: Data rate increases to 
600 mbps. 
   . 
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Figure 72: Standard flexibility, network diversity, and network size for WiFi and HomeRF (Standard flexibility relates to the number of major 
changes only) 
6.7 Cross-case analysis 
The cases show that the evolution of each standard was characterized by three phases. In the initial phase, 
one or a small group of firms, often from a single industry, took the initiative to develop the standard. In 
the second phase, they invited additional companies, often from a diverse set of industries, to support the 
standard. In this phase, the more successful standards (Blu-ray, USB, and WiFi) show a strong increase in 
the size and diversity of the standard supporting network. More than their competitors, the networks of 
standard supporters each made substantial changes to the standard. As a result, new actors joined. In the 
case of Blu-ray, firms in the consumer electronics, disc replication and optical disc drive manufacturing 
industry started the development, but adaptations of the standard helped to include companies from the 
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computer manufacturing industry and movie studios. In the USB case, a company from the 
semiconductor industry started the development, later joined by other companies from other industries 
and the standard was modified to include consumer electronics and telecommunications firms. In the 
WiFi case, companies from the computer networking industry started the development, but they managed 
to involve consumer electronics and other companies by adapting the standard. The additional companies 
were invited at a point when they could have sufficient influence on the specifications; the standard still 
had substantial development flexibility. These companies subsequently collaborated to develop improved 
versions of the standard. In the third phase, both the support network of the standard and the market 
position of the standard were relatively stable (dominant, surviving or disappearing). 
 
In the cases of the less successful or failed standards, the dynamics between flexibility of the standard and 
size and flexibility of the network took place to a lesser extent. Firewire lacked flexibility, network size and 
diversity, explaining its minimal success. The strategy of Apple as the dominant actor was the main 
reason. In both of the other cases, the degree of diversity of the networks supporting the failed standards 
(HD-DVD and Home RF) was relatively high but the flexibility of the standard remained low. In the case 
of HD-DVD, the main reason was the initial choice to make use of existing DVD technology (for reasons 
of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)), which limited flexibility considerably.  The higher flexibility of the 
Blu-ray standard led to higher commitment. In the HomeRF case, the actors valued aspects such as 
reliability of the data connection more than increasing the data rate whereas the latter turned out to be 
decisive for market acceptance. As a result, important actors left the HomeRF WG and joined WiFi 
instead. So, in this case the initial diversity did not lead to flexibility and thereby diversity did not continue 
to grow over time. 
 
6.8 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper focuses on the relationship between standard flexibility and network evolution. We 
investigated the reciprocal relation between changes in standards and changes in interorganizational 
network size and diversity. We made an exploratory study of three cases of standards battles. In each, we 
investigated the networks of the two most prominent standards in the battle.  
 
Our cases provide clear support for the existence of a reciprocal relationship between standard flexibility 
and network formation. Successful standards showed more dynamic interactions between standard 
flexibility and network formation, in particular during the second phase of the process. The paradox of 
standard flexibility appeared to entail that flexibility involves a temporary instability of the standard, but 
contributes to the standard‘s acceptance which results in stability. Changes in the standard's contents led 
to the inclusion of new actors in the network; often from new industries, thus increasing both the size and 
diversity of the network. In some cases, these changes were made with the deliberate intention of 
attracting new companies, and then often the changes in the standard and in the network took place 
simultaneously. In other cases, the extension of the network occurred later (e.g., Boeing in the WiFi case). 
Network extensions sometimes led to further adaptation of the standard‘s contents in order to meet 
requirements of existing and potential new network members. This process created a spiral co-
evolutionary process of standard flexibility and growing network diversity, leading to increased network 
size. In the case of Blu-ray, standard flexibility also appeared to increase actors‘ commitment, 
strengthening the ties in the network as compared to the competing HD-DVD case. For the less 
successful or failed standards the co-evolutionary process took place to a lesser extent, for different 
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reasons. In the Firewire case, the central actor, Apple, allowed only for minimal changes to the standard, 
and as a consequence the network did not grow sufficiently to make the standard a real success. In the 
HD-DVD case, initial choice of technology was the main reason. In general, our cases show that creating 
the reciprocal evolution between standard flexibility and network formation is key to the success of the 
standard. We visualized the most important relations in this process in Figure 73. We did not include the 
effects of flexibility on commitment of actors, since the Blu-ray case is the only one in which we clearly 
observed this effect.  
 
 
Figure 73: Relations between flexibility, network characteristics and success. 
 
Our cases suggest that early timing of the co-evolutionary process between standard change and network 
build-up was important for the outcome of the battle, and even more important than an early start of the 
standardization process itself (Takahashi and Tojo496). In two cases, Blu-ray and USB, the standard 
network that was earlier in engendering the relationship between standard flexibility and the network 
achieved dominance. Firewire started much earlier than USB, but still USB was more successful. In the 
third case, WiFi started earlier but initially made hardly any progress. The start of HomeRF triggered the 
WiFi consortium to become more active and, better than HomeRF, create the dynamics between 
flexibility and network formation. 
 
We also observed an increasing degree of path dependency in the evolution of the standards. In the first 
phase, the initiators had a broad range of options for the standard. In the second phase, the room for 
choices in the standard‘s specifications was still clearly available, but diminished for three reasons. First, 
existing network members and market applications of the standard, and the growing diversity of the 
members, limited the range of options. This is the reason of lock-in (Arthur497). For instance, we saw that 
the Blu-ray Disc Association did not adopt technology from Microsoft because the new technology 
conflicted with the interests of some of the already committed companies. Second, inherent inflexibility of 
standards themselves could restrict changes in this phase (Egyedi and Blind498; Thomke499). Inherent 
inflexibility refers to the lack of capacity to change functioning (De Haan et al.500) resulting from the 
technical specifications laid down in the standard, which limit the room for later adaptations. Inherent 
inflexibility is established at the start of the process and potentially causes a tradeoff: in the beginning it 
may create an advantage in the price of the products or a shorter time-to-market due to simpler product 
development. This may increase the standard‘s initial success. However, in the second phase of the 
process, inherent inflexibility limits the standard consortia in developing and changing the standard 
specifications to address the needs of new product and market combinations. For example, in the case of 
HD-DVD, a large and diverse group of firms were included in the network of the standard, but the 
choice to base the HD-DVD on DVD technology limited standard flexibility. The standard could not 
provide the level of interactivity and security preferred by movie studios, and consequently the network 
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co-evolution process hardly took place. Third, our cases showed an example of restriction of the number 
of alliance members to keep decision-making manageable (Das and Teng).501 In the USB case, Intel 
preferred the group to remain small. This also limited the co-evolutionary process between standard 
flexibility and network formation. However, the USB consortium solved the problem by creating a 
parallel group to implement the standard (the USB Implementers forum). In Phase 3, the room for 
changes in the standard was lowest. Particularly market implementations limited the room for change in 
this period. Nevertheless upgrades continued, sometimes in the form of variations next to the main 
standard.  
 
We see that the networks of organizations supporting the standard were one of the reasons for the 
emergence of path dependency, particularly in the second phase of the process. Over time, the increasing 
installed base of network partners that have implemented the standard limited the freedom to adapt the 
standard, and thus flexibility. Standards, by definition, are intended and expected to ‗freeze‘ a solution and 
thus to stabilize after a certain period (De Vries502, Verman503). In this paper we show that the flexibility in 
the process before the freeze is most influential on success. 
 
Theoretical implications 
Our results have implications for the standardization and general network literature. The standardization 
literature recognizes that the size and diversity of the network are important for standard success. For 
instance, Cusumano et al.504 showed that size of the network contributes to standard success because 
network members use the standard leading to a higher installed base. Others have shown that the size of 
the network also signals market support causing others to follow (Katz and Shapiro505). Rosenkopf and 
Padula506 studied the evolution of standardization networks but did not include the effects on the success 
of standards. Our study confirms the effects of networks on outcome, but shows that the content of the 
standard itself contributes to network formation. Some authors have already investigated the relation 
between diversity and content of standards. They argued that a diverse network contributes to reflecting 
the needs of more different user groups in a standard‘s content, and that a more user-oriented standard 
will attract more supporters and products, and generate better sales (Cargill507, Evans et al.508, Lundval509, 
Markus et al.510). However, these authors apply a static perspective in the sense that they suggest that 
diversity would be required at the start of the standard development process to exert its one-time positive 
effect on the standard contents. We add by showing that the relation between diversity and standard 
contents is dynamic and develops in a co-evolutionary manner over time. We even show that networks of 
organizations supporting a standard do often start from a single industry and that only in the second 
phase diversity increases while the standard is modified. In doing so, we follow Rosenkopf and Padula‘s511 
recommendation to connect network evolution to technological trajectories. 
 
Remarkably, data from earlier case descriptions in the standardization literature (Funk512, Schmidt and 
Werle513) implicitly illustrate the dynamics addressed in this paper. However, the authors do not reflect on 
the influence of the change on the acceptance of the standards. For instance, Cusumano et al.514 mention 
that Sony adapted the Betamax standard (to facilitate two hours playing time) before seeking new 
partners. In this case the change in the standard prolonged the life of the product, but didn‘t rescue it in 
the longer term, which partly justifies the lack of attention for it by the authors. In a study of conflict 
resolution in standardization processes, Schmidt and Werle515 mention that in the battle for the fax 
standard, one of the consortia, led by Matsushita and NEC, increased support for its solution by including 
a specific modulation system. The authors do not mention this change in the standard when they discuss 
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the reasons for the dominance of the standard. Leiponen516 shows that firms propose changes to 
standards in an attempt to influence the contents of the standard to their own advantage but not as a 
strategy to create dominance of that standard in competition with other standards. The same emphasis on 
competition between committee participants is given by Funk517 who describes that in the development of 
the GSM standards for mobile telecommunications deliberately German and French technology was 
added to the initial standard specification to enlarge the network with firms and governments in those 
countries. Both were essential for common European support for the standard. These examples suggest 
that the dynamics addressed in this paper are more widespread in standardization processes, but are often 
interpreted only as competition within committees and not as part of the dominance battle between that 
standard and competing ones. 
 
Another contribution of this paper to the standardization field relates to the topic of Funk‘s518 study, the 
distinction commonly made between coordination via ‗committees‘ and ‗markets‘. Committees involve 
explicit communication and negotiation before irrevocable choices are made. The market mechanism 
involves no explicit communication and depends on unilateral irrevocable choices: it succeeds if one agent 
chooses first and the other(s) follow(s) (Farrell and Saloner519). Our cases show that this distinction does 
not hold – agreement in a committee does not guarantee market acceptance, since also committee 
standards may have to compete for acceptance in the market. Leiponen520 has already shown that 
committees and consortia complement each other in standards development, but she only shows how 
consortia served as preparation of committee decisions. In her cases, those decisions were final. Our 
study shows that committees and consortia may also compete in the market, that committees and 
consortia sometimes support the same standard in the battle, and that committees are not necessarily the 
winners. Both committees and consortia are networks as such and may be part of a larger network 
including non-members of the committee or consortium. The strength of this overall network is an 
important factor for success.  
 
Our findings are relevant for the literature on path dependency (Arthur521, Shapiro and Varian522). While 
that literature has concentrated on the economic mechanisms behind path dependency of standards, we 
focus on the role of the networks of organizations supporting a standard. Amongst others, we 
demonstrate that existing network members pose their requirements with respect to standards, in that way 
creating path dependency during the development process. We also showed how we can recognize three 
different phases in this process, similar to the three phases that Sydow et al.523 distinguish. The similarity 
of our phases with the ones of Sydow appears mainly from the scope of action in each phase: broad in the 
first phase, a narrowing range of options in the second phase, and lock-in in the third phase. We 
contribute to their theory in several ways. First, we show that concrete mechanisms, particularly 
interorganizational networks and their characteristics and inherent inflexibility, are antecedents of the 
diminishing scope of action in the different phases, so of the path dependency process. Second, we show 
that networks are not a simple cause of the scope of action, but that choices made within this scope 
(changes in the standards) strengthen the network. And thirdly, while Sydow et al.524 demarcate the first 
phase from the second by means of a rather unspecified ‗critical juncture‘, we defined the transition 
between the phases based on changes in the diversity of the standard supporting network. In the first 
phase a limited group of actors use their freedom to define a first version of the standard, the second 
phase shows the dynamics between involving more diverse stakeholders and adapting the standard, and in 
the third phase there is less or no adaptation of the standard and the stakeholder network is stable.  
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Our study also contributes to the investigation of the network-outcome dynamics in the general network 
literature. Two types of network outcomes can be distinguished: the definition of the object to which the 
network refers (the standard, a research project, an NPD project, a commercialization project) and the 
degree of success of the network. Our project investigates the influence of changes of the first type of 
outcome, in our case the contents of the standard, on network characteristics, and thereby on the type of 
second outcome, the success of the network. The literature on networks of organizations is paying 
attention to the formation process of networks. For instance, Doz et al.525 explored the relations between 
environmental elements, partner behaviors and performance in the formation process of networks, but 
did not address the network-outcome dynamics. This network-outcome dynamics may also be evident in 
other areas of network collaboration, such as NPD alliances, where adapting the product design may help 
to interest new partners in the alliance and increase commitment. Another contribution of our study to 
this field concerns the effects of diversity of networks. Both positive effects of network diversity on 
performance (Brass et al.526) and U-shaped relationships have been found in the literature (Jiang et al.527). 
Our study supports the first view by suggesting a positive effect of industry diversity on performance in 
the context of networks of organizations supporting a standard.  
 
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on co-evolution. Several authors have emphasized co-
evolution between firm behavior and firm environment (Lewin et al.528, Koza and Lewin529). Authors in this 
field hold that firms have reciprocal relationships with their environment, leading to specific outcomes. 
Our paper contributes to this literature by addressing not just co-evolution between developments 
between single firms and their environment, but the interaction between the development of networks of 
organizations and one of the main outcomes of those networks, the changing contents of standards. As 
indicated above, we also address the endogenous and exogenous forces that bring the co-evolutionary 
process to a stable state. 
 
Implications for practice 
The outcome of standards battles depends on the amount of industry support for the standards, including 
a willingness from manufacturers to use the standard for their products and customer decisions to buy 
these products. These groups differ in the needs they may have. Our study shows that it is important to 
involve a variety of manufacturers and in some cases also professional customers (see our example of 
Boeing) in the development of the standard; and, if necessary, to adapt the standard to meet their 
requirements. This can be done before they belong to the network, in order to persuade them to join, but 
also once they have joined opportunities to propose modifications (such as upgrades) to the standard 
should be provided. Our study shows that the adaptations of standards over time should not be 
considered an unwanted side-effect, but an integral part of the standardization process – a part that 
should be carefully managed.  
 
Our study indicates the importance of timing. Being early to incorporate changes appears to be important 
for success, and potentially more important than just early timing of market entry (Schilling530). The 
phases we distinguished may be helpful in this respect. They suggest that it may be appropriate to make a 
jumpstart with just a few actors who possess essential know-how than with a bigger and diverse group. 
However, the latter is essential to prepare for broad market acceptance and to avoid that essential 
stakeholders join a competing alliance. Thus, the process of expanding the initial network and adapting 
the standard (Phase 2) should be started early. The network can then be gradually extended further – the 
required speed also depends on what the competing standards alliances, if any, do. Creating a layered 
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network structure in which modifying activities on the standard are separated from standard promotion 
keeps the processes manageable. Flexibility of the standard may be hindered by inherent technical 
limitations and therefore it makes sense to be aware of possible later changes in the standard when 
making initial technical choices. It may be a disadvantage in the beginning (higher costs), but an advantage 
in later phases. During the third phase, adaptations may be needed to keep pace with technical progress 
and keep the standard attractive to the members of the alliance, but the implications of modifications for 
the network become less prominent in that phase. 
 
Limitations and future research 
Of course this study has its limitations. One limitation concerns our measures. In our description of our 
cases, we distinguished minor versus substantial changes in standards. Although we asked our 
respondents about the significance of every change, we had no hard criterion to make the distinction. 
Future research should develop more objective measures regarding the size of standard changes. For 
instance, this set of measures could be based on an analysis of the technical contents to come to an even 
better understanding of the influence of standard flexibility. 
 
A second limitation of this study was its exploratory nature. As such, we performed in-depth case-studies. 
Future research should validate our findings with large scale empirical research. More longitudinal studies 
are needed which include other elements, such as additional, structural network characteristics, power 
relations in networks (Knoke531), technological developments and changing customer requirements over 
time. 
 
As a third limitation, we focused on two characteristics of standard networks – diversity and size. We 
briefly touched upon a third characteristic, tie strength, when discussing the role of commitment in the 
Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD case. Future studies should also address the relation between other network 
characteristics and network outcomes. An interesting avenue for future research in this line is to further 
investigate the roles of committee networks versus consortia networks. As we indicated above, these are 
not separate worlds, but these two standardization processes co-exist and interact, and some parties may 
be a member of the two types of networks, creating ties between them. An interesting question concerns 
the effects of these two types of networks and their interaction on standard success. Also the role of the 
layered network structures mentioned above can be integrated in such studies. 
 
Fourth, our study was confined to compatibility standards, which define interrelations between entities in 
order to enable them to function together. Typically, such standards describe a solution whereas other 
types of standards may provide performance criteria or a method for measuring. However, we expect that 
our findings also apply to such types of standards and we see no reason why there should not also be a 
reciprocal relationship in the evolution of these standards. For instance, the recently published 
international standard ISO 26000 on corporate social responsibility is intended to bring unity between 
different, but similar standards on social responsibility. Consumer representatives united in ISO‘s 
Consumer Policy Committee ISO/Copolco – a rather homogeneous group – initiated ISO 26001 in 2001. 
The drafting process started in 2005 and involved a diverse group of stakeholders, such as nations, firms, 
and research institutes, adapting the standard over time (Frost532). This standard has been modified to 
make it more acceptable for a variety of stakeholders. For instance, industry representatives were afraid 
that governments would refer to this standard in future legislation so that they would be forced to meet 
CSR requirements. In order to get them involved it was decided from the outset that this standard should 
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be a guidance document only, that it should not be used as a basis for certification and that it should thus 
not be appropriate for reference in laws. This also had consequences for the contents, which was not 
allowed to resemble the existing management system standards. The relevance of our findings for such 
categories of standards is an interesting topic for further research. 
 
Extensions of this study do not have to be confined to standards, but may also concern new product 
designs. The literature on new product development has emphasized the importance of flexible product 
designs during development as a means to adapt to changing customer requirements and new 
technological knowledge (Garud et al.533, Kamoche and Cunha534; MacCormack et al.535). However, while 
this literature focuses on reactive adaptation to changes in the environment, particularly with respect to 
user requirements, we focus on modifications (in standards) to shape the environment and the network of 
actors supporting the standard. In this way, the network of supporting actors can create new markets for 
products in which the standard is implemented. This topic also deserves attention in research on new 
product development, since firms can include complementary product developers and specific user 
groups by adapting the product design. 
 
6.9 Epilogue: Reflection on the limitations of the integrative framework 
The findings from this Chapter indicate the integrative framework has two limitations. 
 
Firstly, little is known about the nature of the relationships that are shown in the framework. From the 
body of literature, both Hill536 and Garud et al.537 found that collaborative technology development has a 
positive effect on the organizational community of technology supporters, but little is known beyond that. 
This Chapter has shown there is a reciprocal relationship between the measure of modifications to a 
compatibility standard, and the diversity of the organizational community supporting the technology, 
which subsequently leads to a greater size of the organizational community. As such, this part of the 
integrative framework appears to be very dynamic. 
 
Secondly, when investigating relationships in more detail it can become useful to split-up an element in 
sub-elements. In this Chapter, the element of ‗organizational community of supporters‘ was split into two 
determinants; ‗size of the network‘ and ‗network diversity‘. 
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Prologue Chapter 7 
 
As explained in Section 1.5, with the upcoming Chapter the limitations and comprehensiveness of the 
integrative framework are further investigated by ‗zooming in‘ on a single element and its position in the 
framework.  I decided to study a new element; accessibility of intellectual property rights. There are three 
motives for this selection: 
- Firstly, I took into account the relevant themes in academia regarding de-facto standards in 2012. 
This resulted in aligning the selected element with a special issue of the prominent management 
journal ‗California Management Review‘ on ‗intellectual property management‘. 
- Secondly, the topic of intellectual property has an interesting link to the findings of Chapter 6.  
One of the main findings from Chapter 6 is that a higher measure of collaborative technology 
development leads to a larger organizational community of supporters. However, the higher the 
measure of collaborative technology development, the more the intellectual property on the 
technology is fragmented over its contributors, and the more difficult it becomes for companies 
to obtain access to the intellectual property and join the organizational community of supporters. 
So one element that has a positive impact on the size of the organizational community may have a 
negative effect on another element that could impact the size of the organizational community. 
This matter requires further investigation. 
- Lastly, the topic of intellectual property rights was traditionally underappreciated in the body of 
literature on de-facto standards. Efforts have focused on appropriability: a firm‘s ability to protect 
its innovation from imitation. Appendix 1, no.3, provides a synthesis of the literature on de-facto 
standards regarding appropriability. 
 
The upcoming Chapter investigates the measures taken by technology sponsors to make their intellectual 
property rights accessible, in order to facilitate the growth of an organizational community of technology 
supporters. In addition, the impact of an increasing degree of collaborative technology development on 
the accessibility of intellectual property rights is studied. 
 
In order to study the accessibility of intellectual property rights, a multiple case study was conducted. 
First, three de-facto standards where technology sponsors were successful in enhancing the accessibility 
of their intellectual property rights (i.e. three generations of optical disc technologies: Compact Disc, 
DVD, and Blu-ray) were studied. Subsequently, two de-facto standards were studied from a different 
industry where technology sponsors were unsuccessful in enhancing the accessibility of their intellectual 
property rights: UMTS and LTE, two generations of mobile telecommunications technologies. The 
material on the latter two cases was written as part of one of the drafts of the paper for California 
Management Review, but on recommendation of the editors omitted in order to give the paper a clearer 
focus. Therefore, this information had been allocated to the epilogue of this chapter (Subsection 7.5.1.). 
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The development of consumer electronics, telecommunications, computer and related high-tech 
industries is defined by a myriad of technologies. Increasingly, these technologies involve numerous 
blocking patents owned by multiple patent owners. A recent example is the competition between three 
prominent smartphone operating systems: iOS, Android and Windows Mobile.538 The companies that 
developed these operating systems use patents to make the other platforms more expensive and spread 
uncertainty among app developers. When a technological field develops through the contributions of 
many entities, negotiating the number of requisite patent licenses may become inefficient and too costly 
for users. To solve this issue, which is inevitable for any area where many parties invest in research and 
development, companies increasingly employ a patent pool licensing model. A patent pool aggregates 
intellectual property rights (IPR) for the purpose of joint licensing. It is an innovative business model to 
enhance technology adoption and IPR monetization by facilitating the interaction of multiple licensors 
with many licensees. This paper analyzes the conditions for successful patent pools by examining three 
generations of patent pools in the optical disc industry. We observe that patent pools are becoming more 
and more sophisticated. The current state of the art is the novel ‗pool-of-pools‘. We present a generic 
framework to guide strategy and innovation managers in establishing and managing a patent pool through 
the four phases of its lifecycle. 
7.1 Using patent pools to facilitate market adoption and appropriate IPR 
Companies have been pooling patents since the mid-1900s.539 However, due to anti-trust scrutiny, the 
concept was nearly abandoned until in 1995 the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) issued new intellectual 
property guidelines that recognized the precompetitive aspects of patent pools.540 These guidelines 
triggered the creation of ‗modern‘ patent pools, in a wide variety of industries (shown by Figure 74), many 
of them emerging out of co-created technologies such as compatibility standards and platform 
technologies. A compatibility standard is the technical specification of an interface between interacting 
components. Examples include MPEG-2 digital video compression, Bluetooth wireless personal area 
networking, and RFID non-intrusive identification. Platform technologies are products or services that 
act as a foundation upon which an array of complementary products (e.g. software, movies or music) can 
be offered.541 A well-known example is the DVD platform and the movies available on DVD discs. 
Technology platforms can incorporate multiple compatibility standards; the movies on DVD discs are 
compressed using MPEG-2 for the images and Dolby Digital for audio.542 In the last decade, patent pools 
have expanded to new areas, unrelated to compatibility standards. Some examples include agricultural 
technologies such as the ‗Golden Rice pool‘,543 pharmaceuticals such as the Medicines Patent Pool which 
aims to facilitate the development of better-adapted HIV medicines (e.g. special formulations for 
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children), and Librassay which provides a one-stop license for diagnostics and tools in support of 
personalized medicine and healthcare.544 
 
Figure 74: Number of Patent Pools Established Since 1995.545 
Modern patent pools have the following characteristics: (i) all pooled patents are available to licensors 
participating in the pool, as well as to external licensees, (ii) licensees are offered standard licensing terms; 
usually a simple, coherent menu of ‗patent packages‘ with prices and other terms, (iii) licensing fees are 
allocated to each member according to a pre-set formula or procedure, (iv) an independent party is 
involved to evaluate the essentiality of patents before they are included in the pool, (v) membership for 
licensors is voluntary, and most allow additional patent owners to join after formation of the pool, (vi) 
they include various adjustment mechanisms for adding new patents and recalibrating royalty shares.546 
Modern patent pools often bundle patents for a specific compatibility standard, because antitrust 
authorities require such pools to include complementary patents only, and patents that are essential for 
implementing a standard are by definition complementary. Pooling patents for technologies that directly 
compete is regarded as anti-competitive. In 2002, there was an initiative to establish a ‗3G platform pool‘ 
to pool patents into packages constituting five competing compatibility standards for 3G mobile 
telecommunications. Under pressure of the competition authorities, the proposal had to be changed to 
ensure that each standard would have its own pool, with independent decision and price setting 
structures.547 Only for one of these standards a pool was actually formed.  
7.1.1 Why firms engage in patent pools 
Managers in strategy and innovation are increasingly challenged to move beyond conventional thinking 
and need to compete on the basis of technology platforms.548 Competitions between technology 
platforms are subject to network externalities: the technology with the largest number of users attracts 
providers of complementary products, which, in turn, increases the technology‘s utility to a customer.549 
These self-reinforcing feedback loops result in a virtuous cycle that often ‗tips‘ a competition in favor of 
the technology that has the leading user base or complementary products that offer the most utility. These 
‗winner-take-all‘ markets demonstrate different competitive dynamics than markets in which competitors 
coexist relatively peacefully. A company does not need to have the best technology to achieve a dominant 
market share. Companies need to encourage innovation around their platforms at the broad industry level 
(i.e. create an ecosystem of businesses that support the platform) because the value of their platforms 
depends on the availability and innovativeness of complementary products and services.  
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In order to jump start the self-reinforcing feedback loop and outcompete technological alternatives, 
companies have started to collaborate in developing the platform‘s technology and then compete with 
each other in providing differentiated but compatible versions of the ‗shared‘ platform.550 However, 
involving multiple parties during technology development allows these to contribute their inventions and 
related IPR. The result is a ‗patent thicket‘; an overlapping set of patent rights requiring those that seek to 
commercialize new technology to obtain licenses from multiple patentees.551 Circumventing the IPR by 
implementing alternate inventions is typically impractical, as it would preclude the manufacturer from 
claiming that its products are compliant and thus assuring consumers that they are fully compatible. 
Patent thickets lead to three problems: 552 (i) each individual patent holder may charge a royalty that seems 
reasonable when viewed in isolation, but together the royalties represent an unreasonable burden, (ii) even 
if other firms agree to license their patents at a modest rate, a hold-up problem may result if a single firm 
sets a high license fee for its technology, (iii) the very process of obtaining the required licenses may prove 
to be time consuming. The rapid growth in research and development expenditures553, number of 
patents554, patent holders, and their diversity is making it increasingly difficult to navigate through these 
thickets. This affects high-tech industries in general, including agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and 
personalized healthcare. 
 
With such excessive property rights, co-created technologies are likely to be underused. However, in 
several cases (e.g. CD, DVD, Blu-ray and MP3) sponsors of co-created technologies have been effective 
in establishing an industry ecosystem by using patent pools to simplify the patent thicket. Patent pools 
create transparency, a level playing field, and facilitate market adoption. For licensees, patent pools 
function as a one-stop shop to access a technology‘s IPR. They offer lower transaction cost and a 
discounted royalty compared to concluding multiple individual licenses. These lower costs make the 
technology more attractive and are beneficial for its users. For licensors, patent pools lead to higher 
profits15 due to the more effective and efficient licensing and collection of royalties. For example, AT&T 
has signed up 13 licensees for patents essential for implementing the popular H.264 / Advanced Video 
Coding (AVC) standard.555 In contrast, the AVC patent pool, in which 29 other companies have united 
their essential patents, has attracted over 1,100 licensees.556 Due to the increasing use of IT and 
telecommunications technologies as enabling technologies in larger systems, tomorrow‘s market will have 
to deal with many more diverged buyers, rendering bi-lateral licensing between patent holders increasingly 
ineffective. Examples include intelligent transport systems, where RFID tags now play a central role, and 
banking, with mobile payments. This trend will continue into many more areas, such as smart grids, 
personal health, and the ‗internet-of-things‘. 
7.1.2 Difficulties in implementing patent pools 
Establishing a patent pool is not easy, and its benefits are rarely realized to the full extent. Lerner and 
Tirole16 identify several elements that restrict the formation of pools: 
 Negotiating cost. Forming a pool involves a process with substantial legal expenditures. The 
benefits of forming a pool have to be compared with the resulting costs; 
 Asymmetric information. Asymmetries in information (e.g. regarding the value of individual 
patents) can cause bargaining breakdown; 
 Self-imposed constraints. Efficient bargaining requires sufficient flexibility to tailor patent 
pool conditions (e.g. license fee and royalty distribution) to individual needs and bargaining 
powers. Many pools go for an equal treatment of all members.  
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In addition, a patent pool can only be successful if it manages to obtain a critical mass of IPR. The more 
parties involved in the development of a co-created technology, the more IPR is fragmented among many 
owners. As Figure 75 illustrates the first generation of a technology platform or compatibility standard is 
often covered by relatively few patents, but as subsequent generations are developed and experience path 
dependency,557 the number of patents and patent holders rapidly increases.558 While a high number of 
patent owners makes one-stop shopping especially attractive, it is also more difficult to negotiate a patent 
pool arrangement. 
 
Figure 75: Indicative Number of Essential Patent Families Associated with Subsequent Technology Generations in Optical Discs, Mobile 
Telecommunications, and Video Coding559 
 
In addition to the increasing number of essential patents per subsequent technology generation, there are 
two other trends that are enhancing the IPR fragmentation. Firstly, to facilitate customers to switch to a 
new platform, implementers often need to offer backwards compatibility by incorporating several 
technology generations into products: a Blu-ray player is expected to play older DVDs, and a 3G 
smartphone is expected to make calls on older GSM networks. Each of these technology generations 
comes with its own set of essential IPR and IPR owners. Secondly, there is an increased convergence of 
functionalities into devices and products. Whereas traditional technologies could often be exploited as a 
device or service in its own rights, today‘s devices often incorporate many different technologies. The 
evident example is the smartphone that includes a camera, a music player, an internet browser, GPS, and 
much more. A modern Blu-ray player will often include internet access, streaming video services, and Wi-
Fi. As the level of complexity increases, patent pool formation becomes more demanding. 
7.2 Patent pools in the optical disc industry 
To demonstrate how companies can successfully manage their IPR on co-created technologies and deal 
with the increasing complexity, we describe the evolution of patent pools in the optical disc industry. The 
success of the first optical disc platform, the Compact Disc (CD), fostered several generations of shared 
platforms that became the market standard. These generations display different levels of maturity with 
regard to the number of essential patents, and the number of companies involved. The optical disc is one 
of the most successful industry platforms of all times. The related patent pools were among the first of 
the modern patent pools and their success has made them an example for others. Over time, the optical 
disc platforms also enveloped other areas such as video and computer data storage, thereby entering the 
domain of other companies with their own IPR interests. Nevertheless, most companies agreed to bring 
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their essential patents into a patent pool. Table 25 shows an overview of three optical disc generations, 
their patent pools and the main characteristics of these pools. 
 
Table 25: Overview of Three Optical Disc Generations and Main Characteristics of their Patent Pools560 
 CD Audio DVD Video Blu-Ray Video 
Year of market 
introduction 
1982 1996 2006 
Billions of 
discs sold 
worldwide  
100 62 2 
Billions of 
players sold 
worldwide  
2.8 1.3 0.1 
Patents 
divided over 
owners 
 
 
 
Patent pool CD DVD3C DVD6C One Blue Premier BD 
Administrator Philips Philips Toshiba One Blue LLC Toshiba 
Comfort letter n/a December 1998 June 1999 Mid 2011 March 2010 
Original 
licensors 
Philips, Sony (2) Philips, Sony, 
Pioneer (3) 
Hitachi, 
Matsushita, 
Mitsubishi 
Electric, Time 
Warner, 
Toshiba, JVC (6) 
CyberLink, Hitachi, 
Panasonic, Philips, Sony 
(5) 
Mitsubishi Electric, 
Thomson, Toshiba, 
Warner Bros (4) 
Subsequent 
licensors 
 LG, HP (+2) IBM, Samsung, 
Sanyo, Sharp 
(+4) 
HP, JVC Kenwood, LG, 
Dell, Pioneer, Samsung, 
Yamaha, Taiyo Yuden, 
Fujitsu, Sharp (+10) 
Disney, Columbia 
University (+2) 
No. of 
licensees 
118 (discs), 51 (players) 551 467 50 31 
No. of 
essential 
patents 
~100 263 608 83,000 n/a 
Player royalties 2% of net sales price 3.5% of net sales 
price, minimum of 
$7.00 (dropped to 
$5.00 after 2000) 
4% of net sales 
per unit, 
minimum of 
$4.00 
$9.00 $4.50 
Disc royalties $0.03 $0.05 $0.075 $0.0725 $0.04 
Royalty 
allocation 
method 
Fixed Fixed (based on 
amount of patents 
and contribution 
to the 
development of 
the platform) 
Each patent 
weighs equally 
(per-patent 
basis) 
Limited number of 
divisionals, differentiation 
on application and physical 
format, differentiation on 
market and manufacturing 
countries 
n/a 
Royalty 
collection 
Post-netting principle Post-netting 
principle, batch 
license, customs 
program 
Post-netting 
principle 
Pre-netting principle, batch 
license, mandatory 
participation in 
enforcement action, 
enforcement fund 
n/a 
PhilipsSony
DVA (Pioneer)
Philips-Sony
joint license
Philips
Sony
Pioneer
LG
Thomson
Toshiba
Panasonic
Hitachi
Mitsubishi
AOLTW
JVC
DVA (Pioneer)
DVD3CDVD6C
Philips
Sony
Pioneer
LG
Panasonic
Samsung
Hitachi
Cyberlink
JVC-Kenwood
Sharp
HP
Dell
Fujitsu
Yamaha
MKM
UV Winconsin
UV Columbia
Toshiba
Warner
Technicolor
Mitsubishi Disney
One-Blue
Premier BD
200_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
184 
 
7.2.1 The Compact Disc 
In 1979 Philips and Sony combined their technologies for optical discs in a shared platform, the Compact 
Disc (CD). Although both were major players in the consumer electronics industry, they realized 
additional market momentum was required to replace the installed base of the LP and Compact Cassette. 
Therefore, they decided to license the CD technology. To facilitate platform support and enable other 
parties to easily manufacture interoperable products, the specifications of the CD discs and players were 
described in the ‗Red Book‘. After the Red Book was finalized in 1980, other companies could access it to 
develop prototypes and evaluate the platform.  
 
In order to make it easy for companies to obtain a license, Sony and Philips decided to jointly license their 
CD patents. Sony appointed Philips to act as the patent pool administrator, responsible for issuing 
licenses and collecting license fees. This role proved to be an effective solution. Philips had the licensing 
experience, only two companies were involved, the number of patents was relatively small, and the patent 
climate in the early 1980s was easy and benign. While, Philips and Sony held most of the patents on CD, 
there was also a third company, DVA. Their patents were related to optical storage technologies 
developed for LaserDisc, CD‘s failed predecessor that was co-created by Philips and DVA. DVA licensed 
its patents separately, and was later acquired by Pioneer.  
 
The patent pool consisted of the patents essential for implementing the Red Book, and these were offered 
as ‗patent packages‘ for the discs and players. This allowed the hardware manufacturers and record labels 
to take a license on the package they required. The licenses also included the use of a logo. The 
compliance logo showed consumers that the products were interoperable, but licensees could only use 
this after they were independently certified for adhering to the specifications in the Red Book. Because of 
this tight link between the logo, Red Book, and patent pool license, it was clear that every product with a 
logo was subject to license fees. 
 
The approach of the Red Book and the joint licensing program proved to be very successful. Matsushita 
announced support for the CD format in January 1981, which meant that the three largest consumer 
electronics manufacturers supported the format. Other manufacturers followed suit and by March 1982 
the format was supported by 30 CD player manufacturers. During the development of the CD, two major 
record labels, CBS/Sony and Philips‘s Polygram announced their support for the format. Nevertheless, 
due to the license fee demanded by Philips and Sony for the discs, the record industry threatened to 
become organized and offer almost unanimous resistance several months before Philips and Sony‘s 1982 
product launch. In fear of being rejected by the music industry, Sony decided to drop its royalty claims for 
the discs561 which left Philips as the sole recipient. As a result, any organized effort to resist this 
technology could face antitrust consequences. The threatened collective action did not occur, and many 
record companies decided to become licensees of the format instead. By August 1983, the format had 55 
licensees; 39 were player manufacturers and 16 were disc producers who collectively offered 1,000 titles. 
With the successful market adoption of the CD, Philips had to take measures to counteract illegal 
manufacturing. It set up a dedicated team that proactively attended trade shows and approached parties 
without a license on the patents. 
7.2.2 The Digital Versatile Disc 
After the success of CD audio, the platform was successfully leveraged as CD-ROM (Yellow Book) for 
the market of computer software distribution and as CD writeable and re-writeable (Orange Book) for the 
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data copying market. The next step was to enter the market for video storage and distribution. Initially, 
Sony, Philips, Toshiba and Time Warner explored the possibility to enter this market with a shared 
platform, but this was unsuccessful and they split up in two camps. Sony and Philips developed the 
MultiMedia CD. Toshiba and Time Warner, joined by Matsushita, developed the SuperDensity Disc. With 
a platform competition looming, the computer and movie industry pressured the respective camps to 
merge their formats into a single platform. In 1995, agreement on a unified concept, the Digital Versatile 
Disc (DVD), was announced. With all the major consumer electronics companies and some of the major 
film studios supporting DVD, it quickly became popular and in six years it replaced VHS video tapes as 
the market standard. However, the uneasy merger of the two platforms was limited to pre-recorded discs. 
When the companies set out to extend the format to writeable and re-writeable discs, the competition 
flared up again and the two camps introduced their own formats (DVD+R and DVD-R). Both sides 
recognized the importance of creating a patent pool for DVD, but their competition led each to establish 
their own pool. Philips, Sony and Pioneer established the DVD3C pool, while Toshiba, Time Warner, 
Matsushita, Hitachi, JVC and Mitsubishi set up the DVD6C pool. 
 
The patent pools were established in a few steps. First, the major DVD patent owners established small 
groups of companies that were interested to create a pool together. These groups internally discussed the 
main parameters of their patent pools: 
• The companies of the DVD3C patent pool appointed Philips as license administrator, and the 
companies in the DVD6C pool appointed Toshiba as administrator. 
• The license fees were defined as modest royalties. The main business of the patent holders 
was to market and sell products. Therefore, they were also licensees, and stood to benefit 
from reasonable fees. 
• The pools chose the post-netting principle to calculate royalty payments. This meant that a 
licensee would make full royalty payments to the patent pool regardless of any licenses that 
the licensee already had on patents in the pool, for which refunds would have to be arranged 
outside the pool. 
• The allocation of the royalties for DVD6C was based on the number of essential patents, 
multiplied by the number of countries in which the patents were filed. For DVD3C, there was 
a fixed allocation based on the number of essential patents and the contribution of the firms 
to the platform‘s development. 
• If a company infringed on the patents in the pool, each individual firm in the pool could 
choose to make its patents available for an enforcement action. 
Following agreement on these parameters, the two groups issued a call for other patent holders to join. 
The interested patent holders submitted their patents to an independent evaluator (a patent attorney or a 
law firm specialized in IPR) which determined if they were essential for implementing the platform. The 
last step in the process was compliance with international antitrust regulation. The initiators of the 
DVD3C and DVD6C patent pools collectively held a large market share in the consumer electronics 
industry, and their IPR could potentially be used to create entry barriers. To check whether the proposed 
patent pools were considered pro-competitive, the respective companies requested a comfort letter (also 
known as Business Review Letter), which is a statement of the DoJ's intentions not to challenge the pool. 
There are several must-haves for approval:562 the patents should be essential for implementing the 
technology and complement each other, licensors should be permitted to license their patents outside the 
pool, and royalty rates must be reasonable and nondiscriminatory. DVD3C was the first to receive 
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notification that the pool would not be challenged, and DVD6C received the same response in the 
following year. After the respective comfort letters were secured, the license administrators initiated the 
worldwide licensing effort. It took two years to complete the process of setting up the patent pools.  
 
Once operational, the patent pools were open to new licensors who could add their essential patents to 
the joint license on the same terms and conditions as other patent holders. Licensees that owned essential 
patents were obliged to grant a license back to the other patent holders in the pool on comparable terms 
and conditions. The patent pool retained the right to suspend a license when a licensee defaulted on its 
commitments. Moreover, a patent owner was allowed to remove its patents from license coverage as to a 
particular licensee if that licensee brought a lawsuit for infringement of a related patent against the 
licensor. 
 
 The license for the DVD format and the essential patents license were separated. So in order to 
manufacture DVD discs or players, a licensee had to obtain the technical specification and a logo license 
from the DVD-Forum (a legal entity in which the DVD platform sponsors collaborated to promote the 
market adoption of the platform). Subsequently, they had to deal with two separate patent pools for DVD 
products, a number of individual DVD patent holders, various CD patent pools (not only on CD audio, 
but also on e.g. CD-ROM and CD-recordable) and additional CD licenses from individual companies. 
This fragmentation resulted in royalty stacking, and increased transaction costs for both licensors and 
licensees. Due to the large number of licensors, the playing field became more antagonistic. Each pool 
and individual company adopted its own strategy for enforcement. A trend developed in which some 
companies signed a license agreement, but deliberately failed to pay royalty fees. A licensee that does not 
pay royalties (or only a small portion) has a competitive advantage over licensees that do. While it is 
relatively easy to act against a non-licensee that infringes patents, legal action to force a licensee that is 
unwilling to pay is difficult and can take years. To tackle this problem for the DVD3C pool, Philips 
introduced a per-batch licensing system. This implies a license per shipment of products of DVD discs 
and player products, rather than for all products sold over a set number of years. The system directly tied 
the licensee‘s legal right to use patented technology to the payment of royalties. 
7.2.3 Blu-ray 
Shortly after the market introduction of DVD, Sony, Philips and Panasonic initiated the development of 
Blu-ray, a next generation platform. They were quick to get other major consumer electronics companies 
on board such as Samsung, Pioneer, LG, Sharp, Hitachi, Mitsubishi and Thomson. The competing 
platform HD-DVD was developed by Toshiba, NEC and Sanyo. Blu-ray emerged victorious after most 
of the major film studios and major retailers announced exclusive support for the platform early 2008. In 
the competition between Blu-ray and HD-DVD, the importance of winning support from providers of 
complementary products (film studios) was greater than in previous platform competitions. The Blu-ray 
platform sponsors managed to attract more support than HD-DVD by acknowledging the preferences of 
the film studios. For example, they incorporated certain audio and video compression formats and 
content protection technologies in the platform. Some of these technologies were covered by IPR of 
complementary product providers, and these had different incentives for monetizing IPR than the major 
consumer electronics companies. 
 
Sony, Panasonic and Philips started discussions for setting up a patent pool in September 2005, almost a 
year before the first Blu-ray players and discs were introduced on the market. By the end of 2009, Sony, 
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Panasonic, Philips, CyberLink and Hitachi issued a public patent call. By August 2011, the One-Blue 
patent pool was launched. The sponsors of the HD-DVD platform had incurred severe losses563, and 
were not ready to join One-Blue. Toshiba set up a competing patent pool, Premier BD, with Warner, 
Mitsubishi and Thomson. 
 
In setting up the One-Blue patent pool, Blu-ray‘s main platform sponsors set out to reduce the huge 
efforts required in collecting royalty payments from non-compliant DVD licensees, as this led to an 
unlevel playing field and distorted competition. To counteract this and encourage platform implementers 
to become licensees, Blu-ray‘s main platform sponsors wanted to limit IPR fragmentation and make life 
easier for licensees. They decided to go beyond a ‗DVD‘ type of patent pool and created a pool for all the 
patents required to implement the Blu-ray platform (i.e. including patents required for CD and DVD 
because Blu-ray was backwards compatible to these platforms), thereby reducing total royalties and 
transaction costs. As Figure 76 shows, One-Blue‘s founders managed to pool their patents on Blu-ray, 
most of the DVD patents and CD. The pool also included patents required for DVD-R, -RW, +R, +RW 
and CD-R which were required for Blu-ray recorders. They also tried to include the patents regarding 
some externally developed compatibility standards, but these efforts did not bear fruit. 
 
 
Figure 76: Non-Exhaustive Overview of Licenses Required to Manufacture a CD, DVD or Blu-ray Player (packages with dotted lines represent 
additional licenses required for recorders) 
 
In October 2009, the founders of One-Blue established a separate legal entity, One-Blue LLC, as 
independent pool administrator with the sole task to act in the interest of the pool. The founders wanted 
to avoid the problems experienced in previous patent pools whereby one of the IPR owners regulated 
licensing and enforcement. When one of the IPR owners acts as pool administrator, it may need to deal 
with the backfire of enforcing the patents in the pool, hindering its capacity to operate effectively. An 
independent pool administrator has two main advantages: it mitigates the possibility or illusion of a 
conflict of interest, and the pool‘s stakeholders are better able to monitor the performance of the 
administrator and hold it accountable.  
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One of the key issues was how to allocate the royalties over the optical disc formats in the pool. The 
companies agreed on a fixed allocation, which will be adjusted over time to account for shifts in the 
weight of the patent packages related to the different optical disc formats. Considering that the DVD 
format was introduced in the market in 1997, and patents have a maximum lifetime of 20 years, one can 
imagine the shift in allocation that will occur in the coming years. 
 
While Philips, Sony and Panasonic were setting up the patent pool, they held discussions with potential 
licensees to understand their views and expectations. One of the key requirements for these potential 
licensees was a true level playing field whereby the pool would ensure that all participants in the market 
for Blu-ray products would take licenses and would pay all royalties due. To achieve this, One-Blue had to 
find a way to protect licensees and licensors from companies that failed to pay royalties, and to be 
effective in engaging non-licensees. They decided to re-use the per-batch licensing system which was 
introduced for DVD discs, for all Blu-ray products. To make the system easier and avoid unnecessary 
cost, the pool initiators applied a pre-netting principle, whereby licensees only paid their net royalties to 
the licensors in the patent pool. The existing bilateral agreements between licensors and licensees and the 
related royalty payments are taken into account when calculating payments. Regarding the enforcement of 
patent rights, One-Blue applied mandatory participation in enforcement action. This was a response to 
the serious free rider problem in the existing patent pools, like MPEG-2 video, due to the voluntarily 
participation in enforcement actions. The members of One-Blue agreed that each licensor would make its 
patents available for use when One-Blue decided an enforcement action was warranted. 
 
In One-Blue, the IPR owners moved away from the conventional and easy ‗one patent one dollar‘ 
approach of valuing patents, because it encourages companies to apply for a high number of separate 
essential patents per invention. They achieve this by filing as many divisional- or continuation patents as 
possible for one invention covered by a parent patent. The only brake on this ‗patents race‘ is the cost of 
filing and maintaining a patent. As long as these costs are lower than the income of an extra patent in the 
pool, a company has an incentive to file an extra divisional. However, if all patent owners adopt this 
tactic, everyone has higher costs. To stop this undesired practice, the founders of One-Blue decided that 
they would limit the number of divisionals or continuations for each parent patent. In addition, One-Blue 
differentiated the value of the patent based on the nature of its invention. Physical format patents were 
given more weight than application format patents, because physical format inventions require more 
costly research and are used in products all the time. 
 
While the One-Blue patent pool was established fairly recently, the number of licensors quickly grew to 
15 (including the major contributors to the Blu-ray platform) and as a result contains a large majority of 
all Blu-ray essential patents. The rapid increase in the number of licensees shows that the license 
conditions are considered appealing. This is not surprising when we consider the pricing and the 
efficiency that One-Blue offers over bi-lateral licenses. As Table 26 shows, the cumulative amount of 
separate licenses required to manufacture Blu-ray players is roughly $25, whereas One-Blue offers the 
license at $9. This constitutes a differential saving of 64%. 
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Table 26: Estimated Fees for Bi-lateral Licenses on a Blu-ray Player, instead of a License from One-Blue564 
Licenses included in One-Blue Comparable Fees for Bi-lateral licenses 
CD <$1 
DVD 3C pool $5 
DVD 6C poola $2 
Blu-ray $17.25 (Philips $3.50, Sony $2.25, others $11.50) 
 
Total per Blu-ray player $25 
 
a) about 50% of the necessary patents for the DVD 6C pool is included in the One-Blue 
license, remaining patents have to be licensed in addition 
7.3 The evolution towards a ‘pool-of-pools’ 
Based on the three generations of optical disc patent pools, we can distinguish three types of pools (as 
shown in Figure 77). The evolution of these patent pools was influenced by two elements; the number of 
parties involved in co-creating the technology, and the complexity of the technology platform. In order to 
cope with the increased number of parties involved in platform development and the increased platform 
complexity, the patent pools became more sophisticated and evolved towards the novel pool-of-pools. 
 
Figure 77: Three Patent Pool Models, Typical Features, and Elements Influencing the Choice of Patent Pools 
 
In a Joint Licensing Program (JLP), a few parties combine their patents and offer them to licensees at 
predetermined rates. JLPs are a relatively quick and cost-effective means of collaboration, and are often 
administered by the party which is most experienced in licensing. A JLP is especially suitable when few 
parties are involved in the development of the technology and when it is relatively simple. This is often 
the case when a radical innovation disrupts the industry. JLPs are seldom open to new members. 
 
‗Regular‟ Patent Pools are the most widely used type of patent pools.565 This model is based on the MPEG-2 
patent pool, which was the first modern patent pool to receive a comfort letter from the antitrust 
authorities and became very successful.566 This model is a suitable solution when multiple parties are 
involved in technology co-creation and these are willing to collaborate in a joint license. 
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The novel „pool-of-pools‟ is the most sophisticated. It aims to facilitate the market adoption of complex 
products. This pool may encompass the patents of multiple generations of technology. Due to the large 
number of players involved in the co-creation, the success of this type of pool depends to a large extent 
on the willingness to collaborate. Compared to the other patent pools, the pool-of-pools has high 
negotiating cost and takes several years to become operational. 
7.3.1 Designing and managing patent pools 
Based on our observations, we have found that the lifecycle of patent pools passes through four phases; 
investigation, formation, gaining traction and maturity (Figure 78). Each phase comprises several activities 
which are important to the success of a patent pool. 
 
Figure 78: Phases in the Lifecycle of a Patent Pool 
 
Phase 1: Investigation 
The lifecycle of a patent pool starts when a company takes the initiative to determine the scope of the 
pool and drives the process. The initiator can be one of the patent holders, a professional license 
administrator or a Standard Development Organization. In the case of the optical disc patent pools, the 
initiators were major patent holders that could provide the pool with the required critical mass. The scope 
is defined by the pool‘s mission and goals. Whereas patent pools in the field of consumer electronics and 
telecommunication generally aim to facilitate worldwide market adoption of a technology and to 
appropriate license income, patent pools in the field of agriculture and healthcare often serve a 
humanitarian goal by aggregating IPR on medicines or seeds and licensing this on royalty free basis in 
developing countries. The next step is to determine the patent packages that will be offered by the patent 
pool. The CD-Audio pool offered a package for CD-discs and for CD-players, whereas the Librassay 
pool offers many packages divided over eleven categories. The last consideration is the type of patent 
pool (joint licensing program, regular patent pool, or pool-of-pools), which has been discussed above. 
 
When investigating which parties have a common interest to establish a patent pool, one can initially take 
an ‗open‘ approach by extending a call to any party that may own an essential patent, or a ‗closed‘ 
approach by selecting only a few major patent holders. To simplify negotiations and minimize associated 
costs, the initial groups that started the optical disc patent pools consisted of up to six major patent 
holders. For efficient follow-up discussions, it helps to establish a homogeneous group of companies, 
however the optical disc patent pools show there can be exceptions. Whereas both and open and a closed 
approach can work, the latter has most benefit when the group of patent holders is large and diverse, as is 
usually the case when creating a pool-of-pools. 
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Phase 2: Formation 
In the formation process, the initial group has to determine whether the patent pool will be administered 
by one of the members, whether a new entity will collaboratively be established for this purpose, or to 
outsource this task to an established commercial license administrator.567 For inexperienced parties, it can 
be helpful to enlist the services of a commercial license administrator to provide support in establishing a 
patent pool. When aiming to establish a regular patent pool or a pool-of-pools, the best practice from the 
optical disc industry is to let an independent license administrator manage the pool. 
 
The next step is to determine the charter of the patent pool. Table 27 shows the charter‘s main 
parameters, considerations per parameter and associated lessons learned from the optical disc patent 
pools. 
 
Table 27: Main Parameters of Patent Pool Charter, Considerations and Lessons from Optical Disc Patent Pools 
Main 
parameter 
Considerations Lessons learned from optical disc patent pools 
Pricing / 
License fees 
The license should reflect a balance of royalty, revenue, 
and administrative fee that gives a reasonable return to 
patent owners, and reasonable access for licensees. 
Pool licenses should be lower than the aggregate 
individual licenses of the companies that participate in 
the pool. 
Use a fixed fee per device instead of a percentage 
of the net sales price. With the success of the 
platform, product costs decrease and put pressure 
on the minimum fixed fee. 
Royalty 
collection 
Which measures will the patent pool use to ensure a 
level playing field (e.g. batch licensing), and how are 
royalty payments settled among licensees and licensors 
in the pool (pre-netting vs. post-netting)? 
Batch licensing works as an effective mechanism 
to ensure a level playing field. Pre-netting ensures 
that companies only have to pay once for the same 
license. 
Royalty 
allocation 
Will royalties be allocated on a ‗fixed‘ or ‗per-patent‘ 
basis? Will there be restrictions on the number of 
divisionals per parent patent? Will patents be weighted 
differently based on the type of patent (e.g. application 
or physical format), and how will the royalties be 
allocated over various technology generations? 
Per-patent-basis is the easiest method. Variations 
can do more justice to the efforts of the 
companies and the type of patents but make 
negotiations more difficult. 
IPR 
enforcement 
Will the pool use mandatory or voluntary participation 
in enforcement actions? 
Mandatory participation mitigates free rider 
behavior 
 
Once the charter has been defined, the group can issue a call, inviting other patent holders to join. 
Interested parties submit the patents that they deem essential to an independent patent evaluator.568 The 
group with essential patents may consider requesting a comfort letter from the antitrust authorities. This 
is recommended when the patent pool is expected to meet scrutiny from antitrust authorities. 
 
Phase 3: Gaining traction 
After a patent pool has started, access to licenses is open and non-discriminatory, and it is important to 
create public transparency by making license rates and terms, licensors, licensees and the respective 
patents in the pool publicly available. The next step is to actively market the license, e.g. by visiting 
potential licensees and identifying parties that sell products based on the technology platform. To prevent 
unauthorized use of the patents in the pool, the administrator will have to enforce the patent rights.  
 
While the patent pool is gaining traction, other patent holders may want to join. This requires an on-going 
process of patent evaluation and recalibration of the royalty allocation. To deal with these changes and the 
various other aspects, a patent pool may hold regular administrative committee meetings where all the 
licensors are invited to discuss ongoing business. 
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Phase 4: Maturity 
In the maturity phase, the pool administrator will need to enforce contractual compliance by auditing its 
licensees. As patents are often granted for a period of twenty years, the pool administrator will need to 
monitor the expiration of patents and the countries in which they expire, recalibrate the royalty allocation 
and possibly adjust the license fees. 
7.4 Discussion and conclusion 
For modern technologies, access to IPR is often complex and sometimes problematic because it is 
fragmented among many owners. The bilateral licensing agreements that need to be concluded are time 
consuming, invoke considerable transaction costs, and can result in royalty stacking. Often it is in the 
interest of the technology sponsor to ease access to the required IPR, whether owned by himself or by 
other parties that are willing to cooperate. In the optical disc industry, patent pools have proven to be a 
useful way to achieve this goal. Over time, these patent pools have become more sophisticated. The small, 
relatively simple and closed Joint Licensing Program was succeeded by Regular Patent Pools that catered 
to a larger number of pool members and licensees. The latest development is the ‗Pool-of-Pools‘, which 
addresses the increasingly occurring situation in which consumers demand devices that not only support a 
new technology, but also previous generation technologies. 
 
Though our analysis has thus far been focusing on the optical disc industry, we believe that pools and 
pool formation (using the process described in Figure 5) can be equally well applied to other standards-
based industries that face patent thickets, e.g. radio, television, telecommunications, computers, and 
automotive. We also see indications that pools are now being established in industries where technology 
platforms and compatibility standards are less prominent, such as in agriculture, pharmaceutics, and 
healthcare. The use of the novel pool-of-pools model is likely to be appealing specifically to industries 
with complex products that incorporate several technology generations. For instance, the IEEE 802.11 
standard (popularly known as Wi-Fi569) has developed through as much as six generations, and devices 
usually incorporate several (if not all) of these generations. Currently, there is a modestly successful patent 
pool for the first three generations of this standard, and recently an initiative was started for a separate 
pool that covers the latest generations. Instead, the pool-of-pools model could be used as reference for a 
one-stop-shop of all generations. In the computer industry, the Ethernet standard (IEEE 802.3) and the 
related Power over Ethernet standard (IEEE 802.3af) also comprise of multiple technology generations 
and a patent thicket. Arguably, industries such as mobile telecommunications could also make a sensible 
case for pools of pools, because typical modern phones incorporate at least two or three technology 
generations. While earlier attempts to create pools in this industry have met only moderate success,570 
multiple new pool initiatives have been taken for the latest technology generation in that field, called 4G 
LTE.571  
 
As noted earlier in this paper, there are several trends that make it increasingly difficult for companies to 
navigate through the patent thicket. We believe this will foster the adoption of future pools, as well as 
pools-of-pools, even in industries where this has been difficult. The first trend is the rapid growth in 
research and development expenditures, patenting intensity, and the typical number and diversity of 
patent holders for any specific technology. The second trend is increased convergence of functionalities 
into devices and products. Whereas traditional technologies could often be exploited as a device or service 
in its own rights, today‘s devices often incorporate many different technologies. The third trend is the 
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increasing use of IT and telecommunications technologies as enabling technologies in larger systems 
including smart grids, logistics and transportation, personal health, and the ‗internet-of-things‘, to name a 
few. These three trends have the effect that many of tomorrow‘s markets will have to deal with a more 
diverse and more fragmented  IPR market, both in terms of sellers (patent owners) and buyers 
(technology implementers). This increases transaction costs and renders current practices of bi-lateral or 
cross licensing increasingly ineffective. As a result, we believe that patent pools will be more and more 
recognized as an attractive way to facilitate these IPR markets, benefiting technology developers and 
technology implementers alike. 
 
7.5 Epilogue 
While the previous sections illustrated examples of successful patent pools, many attempts to pool patents 
have also failed. This can be illustrated by several cases in the telecommunications industry.  
7.5.1. Patent pools in mobile telecommunication 
Although compatibility standards are different from technology platforms, they have just as much impact 
on our daily lives. Well known examples include WiFi, USB, GSM, 3G, LTE, RFID, MPEG-2 and 
MPEG-4. However, establishing a successful patent pool requires the right conditions regarding the 
technology and the industry. To contrast the three generations of the optical disc technologies and their 
patent pools, we illustrate the difficulties of establishing patent pools in the mobile telecommunications 
industry. Table 28 provides an overview of these patent pools. 
 
Table 28 Overview of Two Generations of Mobile Telecommunication Standards and Characteristics of their Patent Pools572 
 
 3G 4G 
Year of market 
introduction 
2001 2009 
Patents divided 
over main 
owners 
  
Patent pool W-CMDA CDMA2000 LTE (1) LTE (2) 
Starting date September 2003 June 2009 October 2012 November 2012 
Original 
licensors 
France Télécom, Fujitsu, 
KPN, NEC, NTT, NTT 
DOCOMO, Panasonic, 
Sharp, Siemens, SK 
Telecom, Toshiba (3, 
+8) 
France Télécom, NTT, 
NTT DOCOMO,  KPN, 
Siemens (5) 
AT&T, Clear Wireless, 
Deutsche Telekom, DTVG 
Licensing, Hewlett-Packard, 
KDDI, NTT DOCOMO, SK 
Telecom, Telecom Italia, 
Telefonica, ZTE (11) 
Cassidian (EADS), CATT, 
ETRI, France Telecom, 
KPN, TDF, SISVEL 
(patents acquired from 
Nokia) (7) 
Subsequent 
licensors 
SK Telecom (+1)   
Royalties for 
terminals 
Variable, ranging from 
$0.22-$2.00 per unit 
$0.05  per patent family 
per unit, maximum of 
$0.50 
Variable, ranging from $2.10-
$3.00 per unit 
€0.99 per unit 
Administrator SIPRO LAB SISVEL Via Licensing SISVEL 
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The mass adoption of mobile telecommunications coincided with the implementation of the second 
generation standards GSM and CDMA. GSM was a co-created standard and became the dominant 
standard worldwide. CDMA was pioneered by Qualcomm, and became the dominant standard in the U.S. 
Access to the necessary GSM patents was problematic573. However, the major licensees were also the 
major patent owners (i.e. Ericsson, Nokia, Siemens, Motorola and Alcatel574), so these companies resolved 
the IPR issues through bi-lateral licensing agreements. The first patent pool was initiated during the 
development of GSM‘s successor. 
 
In January 1998, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) set out to establish a close 
collaboration with standards bodies from several regions to develop a joint standard. This collaboration 
became known as the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). Together they developed W-CDMA, in 
Europe known as UMTS. At an early point in the collaboration, IPR concerns were extensively addressed 
and the parties agreed to explore the feasibility of a patent pool for W-CDMA.575 This task was taken up 
by the IPR Working Group576.  
 
Although it was clear that implementing such a task was not going to be easy, the exercise was taken 
seriously. In September 1998, the working group had 33 member companies. Many of the major mobile 
equipment suppliers (Nokia, Ericsson, Alcatel, Siemens, Motorola, and Sony) were actively involved. 
Various IPR approaches were studied, including several pool variants. At the same time a number of 
other, competing 3G standards were being developed. Five of them (W-CDMA, CDMA2000, TD-
CDMA, EDGE and DECT) were recognized as such by the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) as a ‗family of standards‘.577 Eventually, the working group decided to go forward with what it 
called a ‗patent platform‘. The idea was to create a menu of five patent packages, each containing the 
patents for one of the competing 3G standards, to facilitate multi-mode products. The central motivation 
of the participants was to restrict the cumulative royalty fees, whereby the maximum cumulative royalty 
rate should be in the ‗single digit‘ range.578 
 
A lot of work went into the various design parameters of the pool, including the royalty sharing scheme. 
To attract major IPR owners that were not vertically integrated, e.g. Qualcomm and InterDigital, it was 
considered to have a higher fee category for such companies. However, when it became clear that such 
mechanisms would not attract key companies in that category, the idea was abandoned. Another feature 
of the pool was the royalty exemption clause, which allowed for a pre-netting scheme that mitigated 
double royalty payments in case the licensee already has a bilateral license with one of the pool members.  
 
The initiators sought comfort letters from antitrust authorities across the globe. Most authorities sent a 
favorable response within a short timeframe, however the Department of Justice (DoJ) was concerned 
that the model of a patent platform could lead to anticompetitive behavior. Eventually, the DoJ sent a 
positive response in November 2002, three years after the request was submitted. In its response, the DoJ 
firmly stressed that the group had to create an independent pool for each competing technology. 
Regardless of these important issues, large firms continued to underline the raison d‟être of the pool. In 
September 2002, Ericsson, Nokia, Siemens, Sony and five more companies issued a joint press release, 
expressing desire to have the aggregate W-CDMA licensing royalty rate set at a low level, below 5%.579 
 
When the patent pool became operational in September 2003, it focused on the W-CMDA standard in 
order to adhere to the requests of the DoJ. However, against expectations, only three minor players 
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actually joined the pool. Pool membership gradually increased over the years – by late 2012 there were 11 
members. Large players such as Nokia and Ericsson never signed up, despite their aforementioned letter 
supporting the main objective of the pool. Many other companies involved in the initiation phase of the 
pool also never signed up. While it would be incorrect to state that the pool was insignificant, it did not 
gain critical mass. Of the other 3G standards, the CDMA2000 standard was the only one for which an 
independent patent pool was established. 
 
As successor of 3G, various parties started working on 4G technologies. The two main competitors were 
LTE and WiMAX. For both technologies there were many different companies that held essential 
patents. To accelerate the widespread adoption and deployment of WiMAX, Alcatel-Lucent, Cisco, 
Clearwire, Intel, Samsung, and Sprint announced in June 2008 the formation of the Open Patent Alliance 
(OPA). This alliance aimed to establish a WiMAX patent pool. Although the initiative showed potential in 
the beginning, little has been heard from it in the past years and we assume the negotiations have failed. 
From the two competitors, the most successful technology to date is LTE. In 2009, the Next Generation 
Mobile Network (NGMN) Alliance, a group of leading mobile network operators (representing more 
than half of all worldwide users) and equipment vendors (representing 90% of mobile wireless 
infrastructure) issued a call for information to parties that could act as  licensing administrator for an LTE 
patent pool.580 Three commercial patent pool administrators – MPEG LA, Via Licensing and SISVEL – 
responded to this call. They engaged in discussions with LTE‘s essential patent owners and issued calls 
for patents. While MPEG LA withdrew its pool imitative, Via Licensing and SISVEL continued. Late 
2012, two different LTE pools became operational. 
 
As of late 2012, the Via Licensing LTE pool comprised eleven members of which ZTE contributes the 
most essential patents. The SISVEL LTE pool has seven members, including SISVEL itself which 
acquired 47 patent families from Nokia late 2011 (these patent families comprise over 350 patents that are 
claimed essential for 2G, 3G and 4G standards). Although the two LTE pools have more mass than the 
WCDMA pool, they still only represent a modest part of the total number of patents. 
 
While the roll-out of LTE is currently ongoing, we shall see how this market will develop and if the two 
LTE patent pools will become successful. An interesting recent development is the redistribution of the 
some of LTE‘s major essential patent holders (i.e. the acquisition of Nortel‘s patent portfolio by Apple, 
Microsoft, Sony and RIM in 2011, and the acquisition of Motorola by Google in May 2012). 
7.5.2. „Accessibility of intellectual property rights‟ in the integrative framework 
As the optical disc and telecommunications cases have shown, the more parties involved in the 
development of a technology, the more difficult it becomes for third parties to obtain access to the 
respective intellectual property rights, and the more difficult it becomes for the technology sponsors to 
make the joint intellectual property rights accessible. So the cases substantiate that an increase in the 
measure of collaborative technology development has a negative impact on the accessibility of the 
required intellectual property rights. The optical disc cases also show that by setting-up a patent pool, 
access to the intellectual property becomes easier, and a large organizational community that supports the 
technology can be established. However, the mobile telecommunication cases show that the lack of a 
patent pool does not preclude a sizeable organizational community to support a particular technology, nor 
does the fragmented ownership of intellectual property rights prevent a technology from becoming the 
de-facto standard. Further research is required to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the impact 
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of accessible intellectual property rights on the size of a organizational community, and its effect on a 
technology‘s ability to become the de-facto standard. 
7.5.3. Reflection on limitations of the integrative framework 
As was found in Chapter 6, the findings from this Chapter show there are elements that influence the 
emergence of a de-facto standard which are unaccounted for in the integrative framework. In addition, 
with the identification and closer investigation of these elements, also new relationships to existing 
elements are found. 
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578 UMTS IPR Working Group, UMTS IPR Working Group paper, 98/74, (1999) 
579 ―Industry leaders NTT DoCoMo, Ericsson, Nokia and Siemens, and Japanese manufacturers reach a mutual understanding to support 
modest royalty rates for W CDMA technology worldwide‖ (Press Release by NTT DoCoMo, Ericsson, Nokia and Siemens, dated 1 
September 2002). 
580 NGMN Alliance (2009). NGMN Alliance Announces Request for Information to LTE Patent Pool Administrators (press 
release of 17 August 2009) 
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Chapter 8 - Cross case analysis 
 
This chapter will first reflect on the use of the integrative framework on the cases. Thereafter, patterns 
across the cases will be investigated, and used to complement the integrative framework. 
8.1 Reflection on the integrative framework 
This section will start with a reflection on the separate aspects of the integrative framework, i.e. its 
elements, categories, first and second order elements, and phases. It concludes with a reflection on the 
integrative framework as a whole, and presents a revised integrative framework. The sections on the 
separate aspects will reflect on the assumptions made when developing the integrative framework in 
Chapter 2, and describe the new insights gained from the cases. 
8.1.1. Elements 
Of the 45 elements that were identified in Section 2.1 and 2.2, 41 elements were confirmed by the three 
case studies. The following elements were not found in the three case studies: 
- Installed base (in the ‗firm‘ category) 
- Technological performance trajectories 
- Availability of imitators 
- Product proliferation (in the ‗market / industry‘ category) 
 
Considering that the elements of ‗installed base‘ and ‗product proliferation‘ can be allocated to multiple 
categories, and were found in another category (installed base was found when related to the technology, 
and product proliferation was found when related to the firm), these elements should remain part of the 
integrative framework. 
 
When reviewing the element of ‗technological breakthroughs in subsystems‘, it became clear that it is 
actually encompassed by the element ‗technological breakthroughs in subsystems‘. Hence, it makes sense 
to combine the two. I will retain the element of ‗technological breakthroughs in subsystems‘, and modify 
its description into: advances and breakthroughs in subsystems that enhance the technology‘s 
performance or utility. 
 
Following the insights from the case studies, it has become apparent that the element of ‗availability of 
imitators‘ is strongly related to ‗appropriability‘. In an embryonic market, there is always competition, and 
weak appropriability will enable companies to imitate a product, rather than become part of a technology 
sponsors‘ ‗organizational community of supporters‘. Hence, it makes sense to merge the two. I will retain 
the element of ‗appropriability‘, and modify its description into: ability to protect the innovation from 
imitation by competitors and capture the profits generated by it. Dependent on solid intellectual property 
rights, a secure R&D and manufacturing environment, and the efficacy of legal mechanisms. Weak 
appropriability may enable imitators, enhancing the number of products or complements on the market. 
 
In order to make the integrative framework more parsimonious, I reviewed the results of the case studies 
to verify if the individual elements contributed to understanding the emergence of a de-facto standard. 
While doing so, I found that: 
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- The element ‗powerful rival technology sponsors‘ can be merged with the element of ‗level of 
competition‘. The description of level of competition (i.e. number of incompatible technological 
alternatives that are competing in the market for adoption and the strength, financially and in 
terms of market share, of their supporters) encompasses the point of ‗powerful rival technology 
sponsors‘ and doesn‘t require modification. 
- The elements of ‗unclear assessment criteria‘ and ‗hereto- or homogeneity of customer needs‘ can 
be merged with the element of ‗market and industry characteristics‘. The resulting description 
would need to be changed into: structure and dynamics of the market and technological field, e.g. 
excess inertia vs. insufficient friction, hetero- or homogeneity of customer needs, and maturity of 
assessment criteria for technology adoption. 
 
While performing the case studies, three new elements were identified. Table 29 provides an overview of 
these new elements. 
 
Table 29: Overview of new elements as identified in the individual cases 
Element 
Chapter 3 
High definition optical 
discs 
Chapter 4 
MP3 
Chapter 5 
High definition 
audio discs 
Chapter 6 Chapter 7 
Subsidizing providers of 
complementary goods 
X  X   
History of the industry X  X   
Accessible intellectual 
property rights 
X X   X 
 
The element of subsidizing providers of complementary goods was found in both Chapter 3 and 5. It was 
not found in the case of MP3, which can be attributed to the lack of a need to involve content providers 
in the organizational community of supporters. Contrary to the cases of the optical discs, in the case of 
MP3 the users of the technology were also the content providers. Going back to the academic literature, 
two aspects appear to be relevant; firstly the literature on platforms (Subsection 1.1.3.) distinguishes 
between the ‗supply network‘ (parties providing complementary goods) and the ‗demand network‘ 
(customers), and secondly the literature on pricing (Appendix 1, no.25) notes that technology sponsors 
can subsidize customers by applying penetration pricing. Interestingly, the aspect of subsidizing providers 
of complementary goods fits well into the existing literature581, however it had not yet been identified as 
such. As two cases support the relevance of this element, in accordance with Section 1.5, it should be 
included in the integrative framework. The findings of Chapter 3 and 5 indicate that this element falls in 
the ‗firm‘ category, and it is subject to strategic decision making. This element has been found to influence 
the organizational community of supporters, but no other elements. Considering that the organizational 
community of supporters is a second order element, the element of ‗subsidizing providers of 
complementary goods‘ should be positioned as a third order element in the framework. 
 
Chapter 3 and 5 both show that events in previous technology competitions (i.e. the history of the 
industry) affect the new technology competition, especially with regard to the level of collaborative 
development; some technology sponsors may hold a grudge to each other and rather compete in the 
market than collaborate on a shared technology. This element was not found in the case of MP3; MP3 
was a radical innovation that disrupted the existing linkages in the industry‘s value chain, and it was 
therefore not influenced by the history of the industry. As two cases support the relevance of this 
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element, in accordance with Section 1.5, it should be included in the integrative framework. The findings 
of Chapter 3 and 5 indicate that this element falls in the ‗market/industry‘ category. It has been found to 
influence the level of collaborative development, but no other elements. Considering that the level of 
collaborative development is a second order element, the element of ‗history of the industry‘ should be 
positioned as a third order element in the framework. 
 
Chapter 7 delved into the aspect of accessibility to intellectual property rights. It found that the greater 
the level of collaborative development, the more difficult it becomes to provide access to the intellectual 
property governing the technology. While multiple cases in Chapter 7 indicate that the accessibility to the 
required intellectual property has an influence on the organizational community of supporters, it does not 
provide insights regarding the measure and nature of this influence. This element also becomes apparent 
in Chapter 4, and it applies to the case of Chapter 3 as Blu-ray is one of the cases studied in Chapter 7. 
However, the effect of this element does not become apparent in these Chapters. Considering that 
multiple cases in Chapter 7 support the element of accessibility to intellectual property rights, the 
condition for analytic generalization (as provided in Section 1.5) is met and the element will be included in 
the framework. Chapter 7 shows that the initiative for a patent pool can come from a technology sponsor 
or from external parties. Therefore, this element can be categorized as both firm- and market/industry-
related, and it is subject to strategic decision making. Considering that the organizational community of 
supporters is a second order element, the element of ‗accessibility to intellectual property rights‘ should be 
positioned as a third order element in the framework. 
8.1.2. Categories of elements 
In Chapter 2, three categories of elements were defined: firm, technology and market/industry. The 
insights from the three cases support this distinction, and do not indicate a need for an additional 
category or that one of the three is redundant. Differentiating between three categories has provided the 
following benefits: 
- Of the 34 elements, 10 were allocated to multiple categories. This proved important during the 
case studies, as it allowed for more accurate analysis. For example: if the case showed network 
effects, a differentiation was made if the network effects were related to the technology, which in 
the academic literature is known as direct network effects, or to the market / industry, which is 
known as indirect network effects. 
- The categories helped to identify major shifts in the balance of the type of elements over the 
course of the emergence of a de-facto standard. 
- Lastly, the firm-related elements led to identifying the elements that are subject to strategic 
decision making. 
 
In Subsection 2.2.2., eight elements were found to be attributable to multiple categories. The cases 
confirmed six of these in the categories to which they were attributed. As noted in Section 8.1, two 
elements (installed base and product proliferation) were only found in one category. However, 
considering there is no compelling argument why those two elements should not be found in the other 
category in other cases, and considering our small sample size, the allocation of these elements in the 
integrative framework will not be modified. 
 
Regarding the categorization of elements, it became apparent during the case of MP3 that the element 
‗level of collaborative development‘ could be attributed to the industry. While the case of MP3 is the only 
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occasion where the initiative for collaborative development was found to come from the industry rather 
than from the technology sponsor, I will include it in the integrative framework because it is important to 
note that it can be an external event in which a technology sponsor can participate. 
 
Lastly, in Subsection 2.2.3., 16 elements were identified as being subject to strategic decision making. Of 
the three newly identified elements, two are also subject to strategic decision making, resulting in a total of 
18 elements that can be used to shape the odds of a technology emerging as de-facto standard. The results 
from the cases support that these 18 elements are indeed subject to strategic decision making and can be 
used to shape the odds. In the case of the high definition optical discs, all 18 elements were used. The two 
elements that proved decisive were the result of strategic decision making. In the case of MP3, 13 
elements were used. Of the nine elements that were key in influencing the competition, five were subject 
to strategic decision making. So in this case strategic decision making played a significant role in the 
outcome. In the case of the high definition audio discs, 17 elements were used. Here strategic decision 
making was actively applied by both sides and resulted in a toe-to-toe competition, whereby the outcome 
was determined by external forces. The results from the cases confirm the notion that companies can 
indeed shape the odds of their technology emerging as de-facto standard through strategic decision 
making, however the outcome does not rely solely on strategic decision making. 
8.1.3. First- and second order elements, and inter-element relationships 
At the beginning of Chapter 2, several starting points for the integrative framework were adopted. One of 
these was that the de-facto standard is determined by customers adopting a technology. In Section 2.3, 
the elements were divided into those with a first- and second order influence on the customer‘s decision 
to adopt a technology. This was done using the body of academic literature to identify the first order 
elements, and subsequently investigating the inter-element relationships. 
 
When overlooking the insights from the three cases, it becomes clear that these are insufficient to verify 
the order of the elements. This can be attributed to several reasons. Firstly, while performing the case 
studies, no measures were included to test the causality of the individual first order elements on a 
customer‘s decision to adopt a technology (for example, no customers were approached to identify the 
elements which led them to adopt a particular technology). Therefore, the results from the case studies 
lack structured data to substantiate the distinction between first- and second order elements. Secondly, in 
the case of the high definition optical discs, a de-facto standard emerged because the industry tipped 
towards one technology. This outcome goes against the starting point in Chapter 2 that a de-facto 
standard is determined by customers adopting a technology. While the literature on platform technologies 
highlights the importance of both the network of customers and the network of companies providing 
complementary products (Subsection 1.1.3.), the literature on network effects only describes tipping on 
the customer side of the platform (Appendix 1). The case of the high definition optical discs adds the 
insight that tipping can also occur on the side of the companies providing complementary goods. 
Although the case of the high definition optical discs is the only known case where the network of 
complementors tipped, this shows that customers do not always determine which technology emerges as 
the de-facto standard.  Considering that this is a single occurrence, there are insufficient grounds to justify 
the required substantial modification to the integrative framework. However, as ‗tipping the network of 
complementors‘ may be encountered more often in the future, it would be interesting to investigate how 
this would impact the integrative framework. Thirdly, in the case of the high definition audio discs, none 
of the two rivals emerged as the de-facto standard because they were leapfrogged by a substitute. This 
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case provided support for ‗rate and type of technological change‘ as first order element. From the three 
case studies, the case of MP3 was the only one which clearly showed that the customer determined the 
emergence of the de-facto standard. Although the case does not provide insights that oppose the selection 
of first order elements, this single case and lack of data on the causality between the first order elements 
and a customer‘s decision to adopt a technology are insufficient to provide support to the selection of 
first order elements. This would require further research.  
 
In order to review the inter-element relationships, as defined in Subsection 2.3.2., the set-up of the matrix 
as shown in Appendix 2 was re-used to note the inter-element relationships as found in the three case 
analyses (Figure 35 - Figure 39, Figure 50 - Figure 55, and Figure 63 - Figure 67). The results are shown in 
Appendix 3. The relationships that were found in the case of the high definition optical discs were 
labelled ‗A‘, those from the case of MP3 were labelled ‗B‘, and those from the case of the high definition 
audio discs were labelled ‗C‘. In order to make a good comparison of the two matrices, they were merged 
(Appendix 4). As noted in Subsection 2.3.2., 122 relationships were found from the academic literature. 
Appendix 3 shows that 66 inter-element relationships were found in the three case-studies. The combined 
findings, corrected for the merger of several elements in Subsection 8.1.1., provide 132 relationships. The 
inter-element relationships found in the three cases mostly support the relationships found in Chapter 2, 
and they complemented the earlier findings with 21 relationships. 
 
As noted in Subsection 2.3.2., the relationships shown in the graphical representation were the one or two 
per element that had the highest concentration in the matrix shown in Appendix 2. With the insights of 
the three case studies, the concentration of the relationships in the matrix has changed. After reviewing 
Appendix 4, it became apparent that most relationships in the graphical representation could remain 
shown because the additions were mostly to those relationships that already had a high concentration. 
The following relationships were hidden or included in the graphical representation: 
- The influence of ‗entry timing‘ on the ‗availability of complementary goods‘ was replaced by the 
influence of ‗entry timing‘ on ‗increasing returns to adoption‘, because this relationship overtook 
the other in terms of number of sources. 
- The element of ‗reputation and credibility‘ was noted to influence entry timing. Firms with a 
reputation for being innovative may feel pressure to be first to market with a new technology. 
- The element of ‗rate and type of technological change‘ was noted to influence the ‗level of 
competition‘. When there is a high rate of technological change, the industry will see many new 
entrants with their own technologies, thus increasing the level of competition. 
- The element of ‗type of technological innovation‘ was noted to influence ‗appropriability‘. A 
radical technology in general offers a technology sponsor more opportunity to claim intellectual 
property rights than when a technology is incremental. 
- The influence of ‗adapters and gateways‘ on ‗backwards compatibility‘ was replaced by the 
influence of ‗adapters and gateways‘ on ‗switching and homing cost‘. The new insights from the 
cases show that while backwards compatibility often needs to be designed into the technology at 
an early stage, in the later stages adapters and gateways may be provided to influence the switching 
and homing cost. 
- The element of ‗technological breakthroughs in subsystems‘ was noted to influence ‗pricing‘. 
Technological breakthroughs in subsystems often lead to an improvement of the performance or 
a reduction in the cost of a technology. 
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As mentioned in Subsection 8.1.1., three new elements were found that can be regarded as third-order 
elements. Chapter 3, 4 and 7 showed that the elements ‗subsidizing providers of complementary goods‘ 
and ‗accommodating to needs and requirements of providers of complementary goods‘ influenced the 
organizational community of supporters. Chapter 3 and 7 showed that the element ‘history of the 
industry‘ influenced the level of collaborative development. 
 
Lastly, the insights from the case studies (Figure 35 - Figure 39, Figure 50 - Figure 55, and Figure 63 - 
Figure 67) show that the inter-element element relationships are dynamic throughout the emergence of a 
de-facto standard: one element may influence another in a particular phase, this  may dissolve in the next 
phase, and become active again in the phase thereafter. In addition, the results of Chapter 6 show that the 
relationship between elements can be very dynamic, and its  nature (i.e. strong or weak influence, positive 
or negative effect) can change over time.  
8.1.4. Phases 
When studying the emergence of MP3 as de-facto standard, I found that the five phases as defined by 
Suarez582 did not completely fit with my observations. To accommodate for my observations, I added a 
phase in the process ‗winning the mass market‘ (reflecting the phase when a technology has won from its 
direct rivals, but still needs to dislodge the existing de-facto standard) and renamed a few of the other 
phases. The resulting six phases were: R&D Build-up, Preparing for Market Entry, Initiating Market 
Adoption, Gaining Critical Mass, Winning the Mass Market, Post-Dominance. 
 
Looking back at the emergence of Blu-ray as the de-facto standard, the case analysis stopped at the ‗Post-
Dominance‘ phase, while Blu-ray still had to overcome DVD as the de-facto standard. One could argue 
that Blu-ray could not have been considered as the de-facto standard at that point, and the process was 
actually in the phase of ‗winning the mass market‘. Therefore, a sixth phase process could have also been 
applied to the high density optical disc case, and would have provided a more accurate view by providing 
the understanding that the case was not in ‗post-dominance‘ yet. 
 
The case of the high definition audio discs shows the limitations of the phases. The six phases were 
applied, but as a substitute technology leapfrogged both SA-CD and DVD-A, the phase of ‗winning the 
mass market‘ becomes moot and the transition from the phase of ‗gaining critical mass‘ to ‗winning the 
mass market‘ becomes debateable; this transition typically occurs when one of the technologies becomes 
dominant in its initial niche, but when this is caused by the rival‘s more rapid decrease in sales, it defeats 
the point. So while the six phases were applicable to this last case, the transition to the later phases 
becomes more apparent when a technology is successfully adopted. 
 
Overall, it appears that defining the emergence of a de-facto standard as a six-phase process is applicable 
to all three cases, and adds an important insight to our understanding of the emergence of a de-facto 
standard; the technology competition initially focuses on the immediate technological rivals, and later 
transitions to a competition versus the incumbent de-facto standard and technological substitutes. 
8.1.5. Integrative framework 
The case analysis tool as presented in Subsection 2.5.1. proved to be an important aid in performing the 
in-depth case studies. It helped to structure the insights gained from executing the initial desk research on 
a case, and to identify gaps in the case which could subsequently be addressed in the focused interviews. 
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The combination of the extensive list of elements and the phases of the emergence of a de-facto standard, 
allowed for a very detailed case description and more thorough understanding of how a technology 
became the de-facto standard. In the case of the high definition optical discs, 35 elements were identified. 
26 elements were identified in the case of MP3, and 30 elements were identified in the case of the high 
definition audio discs. So by applying the case analysis tool, consistently more elements were found than 
in previous empirical studies shown by Table 3. In addition, on average 16 elements were identified per 
phase (the case of the high density optical discs had 89 influences over 5 phases, the case of MP3 had 77 
influences over 6 phases, and the case of high definition audio discs had 88 influences over 5 phases). 
Lastly, the case analysis tool provided all cases with a common basis for the integrative framework and the 
subsequent case analysis.   
 
When comparing the case analysis tool of each of the cases (Table 14, Table 17, and Table 21), these 
show that the three technology competitions display a unique pattern; each of the technology 
competitions show a different composition of elements per phase, and these compositions develop 
differently over the phases. This provides support to the notion that all technology competitions are 
unique, and therefore require a framework approach to support strategic decision making. 
 
The integrative framework, in combination with the phases, has shown to provide a fine-grained view of 
the emergence of a de-facto standard. It takes the elements as found in the case evaluation tool, and 
graphically adds relevant contextual information such as their category (firm, technology, or 
market/industry related), the elements by which they are influenced or which they influence themselves, 
and if they have a direct or indirect influence on the customer‘s decision to adopt a technology. By 
applying the integrative framework on the case studies, per case five or six snapshots were generated of 
the emergence of a de-facto standard. These showed how each phase was comprised of a particular set of 
elements, how these developed over time, and provided insight in the major shifts in the balance of the 
type of elements over the course of the emergence of a de-facto standard. The insights gained from the 
integrative framework had a central role in the case analysis. In addition, in the cases of high definition 
optical discs and MP3, it led to identifying several elements that proved decisive in the technology 
competition (as noted in Section 3.7 and 6.6).  
 
In Section 1.4 I noted that the framework should be able to cater to the variety and dynamics of 
technology competitions. The insights of applying the framework to the three cases confirm that the 
framework is indeed able to cater to the variety and dynamics of technology competitions. However, as 
noted in Section 7.8, during all phases it is important to closely monitor the incumbent de-facto standard 
and any substitute technologies that are also vying to become the de-facto standard. The integrative 
framework provides a relatively detailed view on a technology competition and offers a strong focus how 
the odds of technology adoption are shaped, as a consequence these ‗higher level‘ market forces are taken 
insufficiently into account. Considering that these aspects require a different perspective (‗market forces‘ 
rather than ‗shaping the odds of technology adoption‘), it may be wise to adopt an additional framework 
that can be used to complement to the integrative framework, rather than trying to incorporate these 
aspects in the integrative framework.  
 
In Subsection 2.5.3., I proposed to score the elements. This turned out to be a valuable addition; whereas 
the integrative framework can be used to show which elements influenced the adoption of a technology, it 
does not show how one technology performs versus its rival. The scores provided an insight per phase on 
which elements the competing technologies had an advantage or disadvantage. In addition, elements that 
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showed distinct advantages/disadvantages for each technology, or a change in the scores over the phases, 
served as an indicator regarding the importance of those elements to either rival (i.e. showing if both 
rivals focused on the same elements, or on different elements). As a result, it gave an insight (in hindsight) 
if the technology sponsors used similar or different strategies to establish their technologies as the de-
facto standard. The scoring of the elements was also relevant when I evaluated how the losing side could 
have shaped the odds in its favour. When considering the scoring options as proposed in Table 10, my 
experience is that these sufficed; it would not have been beneficial to use fewer options, and it would have 
been impractical to use a wider range of scoring options because the level of detail for such fine-grained 
scoring is often not available. 
8.1.6. Revised integrative framework 
Before moving to the integrative framework, it is relevant to revise the case evaluation tool in accordance 
with the outcomes of Subsections 8.1.1. to 8.1.5. Table 30 shows the revised case evaluation tool, which 
now includes six phases, the three additional (third order) elements, and the element of ‗Level of 
collaborative development‘ as part of the ‗market / industry‘ category.   
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Table 30: Revised case evaluation tool 
  R&D 
Build-
up 
Preparing 
for 
market 
entry 
Initiating 
market 
adoption 
Gaining 
critical 
mass 
Winning 
the 
mass 
market 
Post-
dominance 
F
ir
m
 
Reputation and credibility       
Installed base       
Pricing       
Entry timing       
Marketing and pre-announcements       
Availability of products       
Availability of complementary goods       
Killer application       
Size       
Complementary assets       
Technological knowledge and skill 
base 
    
 
 
Absorptive capacity       
Pre-empting scarce assets       
Level of collaborative development       
Organizational community of 
supporters 
    
 
 
Strategic partnerships       
Product proliferation       
Appropriability       
Subsidizing providers of 
complementary goods 
    
 
 
Accessible intellectual property rights       
Chance       
        
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
Technological superiority       
Installed base       
Network effects       
Switching and homing cost       
Backward compatibility       
Increasing returns to adoption       
Technological breakthroughs in 
subsystems 
    
 
 
Type of technological innovation       
Adapters and gateways       
Chance       
        
M
a
rk
e
t 
/
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 
Market and industry characteristics       
Level of competition       
Rate and type of technological change       
Network effects       
Availability of products       
Availability of complementary goods       
Killer application       
Level of collaborative development       
Government intervention and industry 
regulation 
    
 
 
Product proliferation       
Appropriability       
History of the industry       
Chance       
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Now, moving to the integrative framework, this can be revised using the outcomes of Subsections 8.1.1. 
to 8.1.5. Figure 79 shows the revised integrative framework. It shows much resemblance to Figure 27, but 
includes the additions of the third order elements, whilst overall being more parsimonious. 
 
Figure 79: Revised integrative  framework 
 
Figure 79 needs to be used in conjunction with the phases and milestones of the emergence of a de-facto 
standard. Figure 80 shows the revised phases and milestones, based on Subsection 8.1.4. For clarification, 
I will provide a short description of the revised phases and milestones. The start of the R&D Build-up 
can be traced back to the moment when a pioneer firm or research group starts doing applied R&D 
aimed at the technological innovation. The appearance of the first working prototype based on that 
innovation marks the start of the Preparing for market entry phase. The phase of Creating the market is 
marked by the launch of a first commercial product of the new technology. This first commercial product 
is often aimed at a particular niche which fits well with the specific features and benefits that are offered 
by the new technology. After several technological rivals have entered that niche, the market starts 
showing a pattern in the adoption of the technologies. The phase of Gaining critical mass starts when this 
pattern shows a clear market preference for one of the technologies. This front runner has the best 
chance of winning the competition, as its larger market share tends to create a bias towards the 
technology. At some point, one technology may obtain a dominant market share in its initial niche (for 
Blu-ray this was the niche of high definition movies, and for MP3 this was the niche of music distribution 
over the WorldWideWeb), and the competition progresses to the next phase ‗Winning the mass market‘ 
where it needs to dislodge the incumbent de-facto standard in the product category (for Blu-ray this was 
DVD, and for MP3 this was CD) while competing against technological substitutes. Once the technology 
manages to obtain widespread acceptance (>50% market share in the product category), it has become 
the new de-facto standard. This marks the beginning of the final phase of Post dominance. 
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Figure 80: Revised phases in the emergence of a de-facto standard 
As noted in Subsection 8.1.5., one can further enhance the insights from the integrative framework by 
scoring the elements. 
8.2 Patterns across the cases 
Although Subsection 8.1.5. points out that all cases display a unique pattern, this section investigates if 
there are certain patterns that can be found across the cases. These may complement the integrative 
framework and provide additional insights on how firms can shape the odds of their technology emerging 
as the de-facto standard. 
 
Let‘s first look at how the number of elements developed over the phases in the three cases. Figure 81 
shows the number of elements that were found per phase in each of the cases. It shows that early in a 
technology competition only a few drivers need to be taken into account. In the subsequent phases the 
number of elements expands cumulatively because the influence of an element often influences the 
technology competition during multiple phases. The number of elements culminates during the phase of 
Initiating market adoption, and slowly decreases thereafter. 
 
Figure 81: Number of elements in play per phase per case 
 
As noted in Subsection 8.1.5., each phase in the three case studies was marked by a different subset of 
elements, resulting in a different dynamic per phase. In addition, shifts in the balance of the type of 
elements were identified over the course of the emergence of a de-facto standard. However, following a 
close analysis of the commonalities between the three cases (shown in Appendix 5, main commonalities 
are highlighted per phase), I found they all share a common set of dynamics that govern technology 
competitions. This common set of dynamics is complemented by elements that make the technology 
competition unique and requires strategic decision making to shape the odds. An overview of the 
common dynamics per phase is shown in Table 31. The following sections provide a description of the 
common dynamics per phase. 
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Table 31: Common dynamics during the emergence of a de-facto standard 
Phase Common dynamics 
R&D build-up Determine technological positioning and level of collaborative development 
Preparing for market entry Build the organizational community of supporters 
Initiating market adoption Jump starting increasing returns 
Gaining critical mass Tip the network of customers or complementors 
Winning the mass market 4 Ps of marketing, economies of scale, and incremental product improvements 
Post dominance Create lock-in and leverage to adjacent markets 
 
R&D build-up: Positioning the technology and level of collaborative development 
In the R&D build-up phase, the technology sponsor needs to make several key trade-offs concerning the 
positioning of his technology. The trade-offs concern the technological superiority, pricing, backwards 
compatibility, and switching cost. These are themselves also influenced by the type of technological 
innovation, technological breakthroughs in subsystems, the firm‘s absorptive capacity, technological 
knowledge and skill base, the level of collaborative development, and strategic partnerships. Ideally, one 
would develop a technology to be (backwards) compatible, technological superior and with an attractive 
price level. However, technological superiority and (backward) compatibility tend to increase the price. 
The difficulty lies in finding a good balance, which needs to appeal to the customer and potential partners. 
The positioning can be used to distinguish a technology from its alternatives. 
 
After the initial R&D, but before publicly presenting a prototype, the technology sponsor needs to 
consider ‗if‘, ‗at what point‘ and ‗with whom‘ it would like to engage into collaborative technology 
development. It is a trade-off between letting other companies participate in refining the technology 
versus the risk of losing grip over the direction of technological developments and sharing potential 
license revenues. This decision can be based on an assessment of the chances of a firm to achieve 
dominance by itself (which is dependent on firm size, complementary assets, reputation, installed base, and 
superiority of its technology), the market and industry characteristics and the strategy of its rivals. This decision will 
influence the level of competition in the industry. The cases of high definition optical discs and high definition 
audio discs showed that starting the collaborative technology development during the phase of R&D 
build-up positively influences the organizational community of supporters at a later stage. However, the more 
parties involved in the collaborative process, the longer the time-to-market of a technology will be. 
 
Preparing for market entry: Build the organizational community of supporters 
While preparing for market entry, the technology sponsor needs to build-up the organizational 
community of supporters (i.e. complementors and/or competitors) in order to outperform its rivals 
regarding the availability of products and/or complementary goods when entering the phase of ‗Creating 
the market‘. As described in Appendix 1, the community of supporters can be built through licensing and 
OEM agreements. In addition, the organizational community of supporters can be stimulated by engaging 
into collaborative technology development, strategic partnerships, pre-empting scarce assets (identifying 
key companies and providing these with preferential treatment), subsidizing providers of complementary 
goods, accommodating to needs and requirements of providers of complementary goods (as noted in 
Subsection 8.1.7.). Organizations are more prone to support a particular technology when it is first to 
market, superior to its rivals, has an advantage in terms of installed base, the technology sponsor is a large 
firm that has a good track record in establishing de-facto standards, it believes the technology will become 
successful (perhaps due to perception, shaped by marketing), and when collaboration is common practice 
in the industry.  Alternatively, organizations are less prone to support a particular technology when there 
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is much competition in the industry and when rival technologies are sponsored by powerful companies, 
or when the technological innovation requires a different skill set or complementary assets. 
 
Creating the market: Jump starting increasing returns 
Moving into the next phase, all three cases showed a shift from technology related elements to firm- and 
market/industry related elements. This is because the technology sponsor shifted their focus towards 
jump-starting the two processes with a positive feedback loop; increasing returns to adoption and 
network effects. The technology sponsors used the following elements to jump-start the increasing 
returns: entry timing, pricing, marketing and pre-announcements, availability of products, availability of 
complementary goods, and killer applications.  
 
When combining the insights from the cases with the insights from the academic literature, one can state 
that the chance of successfully jump starting the increasing returns processes improves when a company 
is first to market, has a good reputation, applies penetration pricing, actively markets its technology and 
uses pre-announcements to shape expectations regarding the technology, uses its installed base to leverage 
clients towards the new technology, enables large availability of products and complementary goods, and 
the technology has a better match with customer requirements than the technological rivals, and is 
backwards compatible with the incumbent de-facto standard. Elements such as a high rate of technology 
change, heterogeneous customer needs and unclear assessment criteria will hamper technology adoption 
and the increasing returns. 
 
Gaining critical mass: Tip the network of customers or complementors 
In this phase one of the rival technologies competing for adoption has gained a front runner position (a 
lead in terms of installed base). In markets with strong increasing returns, this advantage will enhance the 
market adoption of the technology and attract more providers of complementary goods. In markets with 
weak network effects, or when the network of customers or complementors has not reached the critical 
mass required for tipping, a technology sponsor may provide stimuli. The cases and academic literature583 
provides the following elements to stimulate tipping: 
- Tipping network of customers: product proliferation, influence market perception through 
marketing, penetration pricing, introduce a killer application. 
- Tipping network of complementors: subsidizing providers of complementary goods, influence 
market perception through marketing. 
 
Winning the mass market: 4 Ps of marketing, economies of scale, and incremental product improvements 
Now that the technology has bested its rivals in the initial market niche, it has gained substantial 
momentum, a sizeable installed base, and an organizational community of supporters. In this phase the 
focus of the strategic efforts shifts towards conventional ways of market competition, known as the four 
Ps of marketing; product variety, price, place (channels, locations), and promotion.584 Now that the 
technology has gained critical mass, manufacturing will start to benefit from economies of scale, which 
result in lower manufacturing cost and consequently lower prices. This will make the technology more 
attractive to the mass market, spurring adoption, and leading to further economies of scale. In addition, 
incremental improvements will make the technology more attractive to the customers. These dynamics 
coincide with those attributed to the transitional phase of Utterback and Abernathy‘s model of product 
and process innovation (Figure 7). 
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Post dominance: Create lock-in and leverage to adjacent markets 
In the phase of Post dominance, it is important to create lock-in and leverage the strong market position 
to adjacent markets. The appearance of a de-facto standard shifts the competitive emphasis to cost 
efficiency.585 If companies, specialized in low cost production, are able to copy the de-facto standard, they 
could potentially reap most of the benefits. This means that appropriability, on both the firm and industry 
level, becomes important in this phase. In addition, by tightly controlling its complementary assets, a 
technology sponsor creates entry barriers for potential competitors and can realize cost reductions.586 In 
addition, the technology sponsor can evaluate if it can leverage its technology to adjacent markets, as was 
done very successfully with the Compact Disc. 
 
The dynamics described above can complement the revised integrative framework (Figure 79) and 
provide insight regarding the focus areas for strategic decision making per phase of the emergence of the 
de-facto standard. 
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Chapter 9 - Concluding remarks and contributions 
 
This chapter will first reflect on the research questions of Section 1.4. Subsequently the theoretical and 
managerial contributions are summarized. Lastly, a critical reflection on the theoretical and 
methodological limitations is provided, including suggestions for future research. 
 
Main findings 
The results from this dissertation show that every technology that emerges as de-facto standard displays a 
unique path. This provides support to the notion that all technology competitions are unique, and 
therefore require a framework approach to support strategic decision making. In addition, the results 
confirm that companies can shape the odds of their technology emerging as de-facto standard through 
strategic decision making, however the outcome does not solely rely on strategic decision making. Over 
the course of this dissertation, I developed and tested an integrative framework that adheres to the 
following requirements: 
- Shall be able to support strategic decision making to shape the odds of a technology emerging as 
the de-facto standard; 
- Shall provide an integral approach (covering the various aspects relevant for strategic decision 
making); 
- Shall be able to cater to the variety and dynamics of technology competitions. 
The result is presented in Section 9.2 as the primary theoretical contribution. The framework is the result 
of several research questions, of which the findings are summarized below. 
9.1.1. What are the various elements of the emergence of a de-facto standard that we would need to incorporate in the 
framework? 
Following an extensive review of the academic literature, insights from three in-depth case studies, and 
evaluation of the relevance of the individual elements, in total 34 unique elements587 were found to 
influence the emergence of a de-facto standard. An overview of these elements can be found in Figure 
79.588  
9.1.2. How to integrate the elements in a framework? 
Using the insights from the academic literature and the in-depth case studies, the 34 elements were first 
allocated to three categories: firm-, technology-, and market/industry related. 12 were found to be firm-
related, seven were technology-related, five were market/industry related, and 10 could be allocated to 
multiple categories. Then they were divided into those with first, second and third order influence on a 
customer‘s decision to adopt a technology. This resulted in 16 first-order, 14 second-order, and three 
third-order elements. One, the element of chance, was applicable to all categories and level, and was 
therefore excluded from the framework. The result was nine groups of elements, which could be 
graphically represented by placing the customer in the centre and placing the respective elements around 
this centre in a layered approach. The academic literature and in-depth case studies also provided insight 
in the inter-element relationships. In total, 132 inter-element relationships were identified, of which the 
most important ones were included in the graphical representation of the framework. The final version of 
the framework is shown by Figure 79. 
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9.1.3. Which phases and milestones can we identify in the emergence of a de-facto standard? 
Following a review of the academic literature, and insights from three in-depth case studies, I found that 
the emergence of a de-facto standard can be divided into six phases: R&D build-up, Preparing for market 
entry, Creating the market, Gaining critical mass, Winning the mass market, and Post dominance. These 
phases and their respective milestones are shown by Figure 80. The start of the R&D Build-up can be 
traced back to the moment when a pioneer firm or research group starts doing applied R&D aimed at the 
technological innovation. The appearance of the first working prototype based on that innovation marks 
the start of the Preparing for market entry phase. The phase of Creating the market is marked by the 
launch of a first commercial product of the new technology. This first commercial product is often aimed 
at a particular niche which fits well with the specific features and benefits that are offered by the new 
technology. After several technological rivals have entered that niche, the market starts showing a pattern 
in the adoption of the technologies. The phase of Gaining critical mass starts when this pattern shows a 
clear market preference for one of the technologies. This front runner has the best chance of winning the 
competition, as its larger market share tends to create a bias towards the technology. At some point, one 
technology may obtain a dominant market share in its initial niche, and the competition progresses to the 
next phase ‗Winning the mass market‘ where it needs to dislodge the incumbent de-facto standard in the 
product category while competing against technological substitutes. Once the technology manages to 
obtain widespread acceptance (>50% market share in the product category), it has become the new de-
facto standard. This marks the beginning of the final phase: Post dominance. My research confirms 
Suarez‘s589 notion that each technology competition progresses through the same phases. 
9.1.4. How can the framework be applied to technology competitions? 
In order to address this research question, I selected three cases and applied the framework to these. For 
each case first the timing of the respective milestones and phases had to be defined. Subsequently, the 
relevant elements per phase could be identified using written documents, public announcements and 
focused interviews with key persons from companies involved in the respective technology competitions. 
The case analysis tool was used as a checklist, the integrative framework can be seen as the starting point, 
whereby an overview of the situation is gained by eliminating elements from the framework that are not 
applicable to the phase. This approach worked well for each of the cases, and especially for the 
technology competitions wherein a de-facto standard emerged; in one of the cases both competing 
technologies did not become the de-facto standard and this caused some difficulties in defining the 
milestones in the later phases. While working on the case analysis, the insights gained from the framework 
showed several advances over the existing academic literature: 
- A much more comprehensive insight in technology competitions and the emergence of de-facto 
standards, leading to a better understanding of the dynamics and the differences /  commonalities 
between technology competitions; 
- It allowed for a better insight in the strategic approaches of the rival technology sponsors during 
the emergence of the de-facto standard; 
- It enabled an analysis on how, in hindsight, the losing side could have shaped odds of its 
technology to emerge as the de-facto standard; 
- Out of the comprehensive number of elements that were found to influence each of the 
technology competitions, a subset of key elements could be identified which proved to be decisive 
in the process. These decisive elements, and their number, differ per case. 
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9.2 Contributions, Implications & Discussion 
9.2.1. Theoretical contributions and implications 
The results of this dissertation have implications for the strategic-choice view in the literature on de-facto 
standards. The primary contribution of this dissertation is the integrative framework that can be used to 
support strategic decision making to shape the odds of a technology emerging as the de-facto standard. 
Figure 82 shows a graphical representation of the framework, which includes elements influencing the 
emergence of a de-facto standard (e.g. market mechanisms, models for creating a technological 
bandwagon, elements for shaping the odds of technology selection), scoring options, phases and 
milestones in the emergence of a de-facto standard, and dynamics which are typical for each of the 
phases. Although the framework draws upon many findings from the existing body of academic literature, 
the novelty lies in the way these are combined. This enabled new insights in accordance with the findings 
described in Subsection 9.1.4. 
 
In addition, the approach of the framework is novel; it requires the researcher to delineate the timing of 
the start and end of the phases in the emergence of a particular de-facto standard, and to identify per 
phase which subset of the 33 elements influenced the technology competition. By combining the concept 
of phases with a ‗menu‘ of elements, the result is a framework that is able to cater to the variety and 
dynamics of technology competitions. The literature provides static models which suggest a ‗recipe for 
success‘ (Lee et al.590, Gallagher and Park591, Suarez592), but these are not robust as technology 
competitions in practice are all different and dynamic: my research confirmed that the emergence of every 
de-facto standard displays a unique ‗path‘. In addition, technology competitions require trade-offs: i.e. 
while one could recommend that a technology sponsor should be the first to market with a 
technologically superior product that is backwards compatible with the incumbent de-facto standard and 
conveniently priced, this neglects the issue that technological superiority requires a type of innovation is 
marked by a long development time, and results in relatively expensive products that may lack backward 
compatibility. Rather than providing a ‗recipe for success‘, the framework aims to support the strategic 
decision maker through a series of questions: 
- Which phases of the technology competition can be defined, and in which phase are we currently? 
- Which elements are influencing the technology competition in each of the phases? 
- When applying scores to those elements, what can be learnt regarding the position of a technology 
versus its rival? 
- When considering the common dynamics, the elements in play and scores, which actions should 
be taken, and which elements for strategic decision making could be utilized?  
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Figure 82: Integrative framework, scoring options, phases and milestones of the process, and common dynamics 
 
The separate parts of the framework also contain contributions: 
- My results suggest that the emergence of de-facto standards is better understood when adding a 
sixth phase (Winning the mass market), between Suarez‘s593 fourth- and fifth phase (respectively 
‗decisive battle‘ and ‗post dominance‘). 
- Common set of dynamics that govern technology competitions. Although literature related to the 
strategic-choice view often provides suggestions regarding the elements that are important in the 
emergence of a de-facto standard (Grindley594, Shapiro595, Hill596), these do not take into account 
that the relevance of the elements may change during the emergence of the de-facto standard. 
Suarez597 suggests that the relevance of the elements changes during the process. However, his 
‗key elements of success at each stage of the dominance process‘ lack empirical evidence. In order 
to advance this part of the literature, I studied the common patterns across the case studies. This 
resulted in identifying the main attention points per phase, providing guidance on the subset of 
elements that are especially relevant for each phase. These research findings complement Suarez‘s 
Installed base
Reputation and 
credibility
Technological 
superiority
Backward 
compatibility
Switching and 
homing cost
Rate and type of 
technological change
Network effects
Level of 
competition
Availability of 
complementary goods
Entry timing
Pricing
Marketing and pre-
announcements
Killer application
Availability of products
Market and industry 
characteristics
Firm size
Appropriability
Increasing returns 
to adoption
Product proliferation
Organizational 
community of supporters
Technological breakthroughs 
in subsystems
Government intervention 
and industry regulation
Adapters and gateways
Level of collaborative  
development 
Absorptive capacity
Technological knowledge 
and skill base
Complementary 
assets
Pre-empting scarce 
assets
Strategic partnerships
1st order
Type of technological innovation
2nd order
3rd order
Accessibility of 
intellectual property 
rights
History of the industry
Subsidizing providers  of 
complementary goods
Scoring options
A has a distinct advantage over B
A has the advantage over B
No apparent advantage for either A or B
B has the advantage over A
B has a distinct advantage over A
Blank Element is not utilized or not applicable
Technology
Firm
Market / Industry
233_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
217 
 
‗key elements‘ with new insights. Besides their theoretical contribution, they primarily have 
managerial relevance. 
 
The results of my research also contribute to the field of network externalities. The body of literature (e.g. 
Arthur598, Hill599) describes the notion of ‗tipping‘, but only with regard to the customer network. The case 
of the high definition optical discs showed that it is possible to tip the network of companies providing 
complementary goods. In effect, it shows that two-sided tipping possible: a de-facto standard can emerge 
not only by customer-driven process, but also by industry-ecosystem driven process. This sheds new light 
on the element ‗size of the organizational community that supports a technology‘. Although previous 
research has shown that this element is important,600 my research has shown that it can be decisive in the 
emergence of a de-facto standard. 
 
Another contribution concerns the elements that influence the emergence of a de-facto standard. In the 
body of literature, merely a few have undertaken an effort to provide a comprehensive overview of 
elements that influence the emergence of a de-facto standard. A notable, recent, effort was done by Van 
de Kaa et al. 601, whom studied 127 sources and identified 29 elements. In my research, I identified 34 
unique elements, thereby extending the current state-of-the-art by five elements. Of these elements, three 
were newly found during the case studies, i.e. accommodating to needs and requirements of providers of 
complementary goods, subsidizing providers of complementary goods, history of the industry, and 
accessibility of intellectual property rights. 
 
The results of my research also contribute to the field of inter-element relationships. Whereas previous 
studies have thoroughly studied the causality between a few elements (e.g. Katz and Shapiro602, Farrell and 
Saloner603), in my research these were combined into a more comprehensive overview, complemented 
with insights from three case studies. In total, 132 inter-element relationships were identified: 114 
relationships were deduced from the body of literature, the results from the case studies in this 
dissertation led to an additional 18 relationships. This constitutes a far more comprehensive overview 
than can be found in the current body of literature. The overview adds to our understanding about the 
interrelatedness of the elements, helps us to better understand what may cause the status change of an 
element, and which other elements may be affected when a status-change of a particular element occurs. 
In addition, the results show that inter-element relationships are dynamic: throughout the emergence of a 
de-facto standard the relationship between two elements may be intermittent, and the nature of the 
relationship (i.e. strong or weak influence, positive or negative effect) can change over time.  
 
In the body of literature on de-facto standards, studies can be found that either provide an extensive 
number of elements (Van de Kaa et al.), provide a limited set of elements that directly influence the 
emergence of a de-facto standard (Suarez604, Lee et al.605), or provide a model of elements which 
directly/indirectly influence a particular aspect of de-facto standards (Schilling606, Gallagher and West607). 
Gallagher and Park608 presented a framework that combines the latter two aspects. Their framework is 
comprised of 11 elements, and includes the notion that elements can have a direct and indirect influence 
on ‗competitive success‘. They propose two first order-, seven second order-, and two third order 
elements. The integrative framework that resulted from my research comprised of 16 first order-, 14 
second order-, and three third order elements. The integrative framework therefore provides a more 
comprehensive insight in the direct and indirect influences on a customer decision to adopt a particular 
technology, which allows researchers to better understand the outcomes of technology competitions.  
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If we focus on the elements with a first order influence on a customers‘ decision (i.e. the most relevant 
elements), there are two frameworks in the body of literature that approximate the overview of first order 
elements provided in this dissertation: one from Suarez609 (shown in Figure 22), and one from Gallagher 
and West610 (shown in Figure 13). Table 32 shows the list of first order elements in this dissertation, and a 
comparison with Suarez, and Gallagher and West. The number of first order elements in my integrative 
framework extends those of Suarez by six elements, and those of Gallagher and West by four elements. 
This translates into an increase of 60% and 33% respectively. In addition, the lack of second and third 
order elements, and phases in the process of the emergence of a de-facto standard, hampers their models‘ 
ability to clarify how the technology competition was shaped over time. 
 
Table 32: Comparison of first order elements with frameworks from literature on de-facto standards 
Elements with first order influence Suarez 
(2004) 
Gallagher and West 
(2009) 
Firm reputation and credibility X X 
Entry timing X X 
Pricing X X 
Marketing and pre-announcements X X 
Installed base X X 
Availability of products  X 
Availability of complementary goods  X 
Killer application  X 
Network effects X X 
Increasing returns to adoption   
Technological superiority X X 
Switching and homing cost X X 
Backward compatibility  X 
Market and industry characteristics X  
Level of competition X  
Rate and type of technological change   
 
Out of the comprehensive number of elements that were found to influence each of the technology 
competitions, it was possible to identify a small subset of ‗key elements‘ that proved decisive in the 
process. One could question if the elaborate integrative framework is required to identify the decisive 
elements: as noted in Subsection 3.8.2., Gallagher and West611 managed to indentify the same two decisive 
elements in their study on the high definition video discs, using a model with 13 elements. However, as 
Section 6.6 shows, there were nine key elements in the case of MP3. Of these nine, there was one 
common element (killer application) between the two cases. Five of the elements are not part of 
Gallagher‘s framework, and would have likely been missed. The insights from the two cases indicate that 
the decisive elements, and their number, differ per case. As the decisive elements are a subset of the total 
number of elements that influence the emergence of a de-facto standard, an elaborate framework is 
required to ensure identification of all elements that may turn out to be decisive. 
 
This dissertation contributes to extending the definition of ‗de-facto standards‘, by providing an integral 
view of the concepts ‗compatibility standard‘, ‗dominant design‘, and ‗platform‘. One could say it is a pity 
that the academic field is fragmented in its terminology for studying de-facto standards, but this would 
not do justice to the underlying issue that the phenomenon of de-facto standards is multi-faceted: the 
three concepts actually highlight these different facets. Current literature, however, falls short in linking 
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the three concepts together. This makes it difficult to combine the insights from the three fields, and to 
identify where they complement each other. To overcome this, I illustrated the overlap and boundaries 
between the concepts through 19 examples of de-facto standards (Figure 4). This integral view shows that 
technologies can be allocated to six distinct categories, whereby one needs to consider that market 
adoption of compatibility standards, platforms and product design specifications is governed by specific 
dynamics. The implications for academia are twofold. Firstly, it provides additional limitations to the 
generalization of case study results; while USB, the Ford Model-T and Google‘s web search engine are all 
examples of de-facto standards, whatever caused their success cannot be generalized to all de-facto 
standards. Secondly, for academics that perform multiple case study research in the field of de-facto 
standards, it is important to allocate their cases to the six categories in order to check if the fit between 
the cases is sufficiently close to support analytic generalization. 
 
The insights from this research can also be used to provide 
contributions to other fields, such as the literature on game 
theory (i.e. collective-action view). As described in Subsection 
1.2.3, Grindley provides examples of two ‗games‘; ‗Battle of the 
sexes‘ and ‗Rather fight than switch‘ (Figure 15 and Figure 16 
respectively). But when overlooking the optical disc 
technologies which were studied in this dissertation (i.e. CD, 
DVD, SA-CD and Blu-ray), a game as shown in Figure 83 
provides a more accurate representation for industry consortia 
in winner-take-all markets. This can be explained based on the 
optical disc technologies. Starting with the parties involved, 
Firm A and B in Figure 83 could be substituted for Toshiba 
and Panasonic, and Firm C and D could be substituted for 
Sony and Philips. Let‘s assume that the potential revenue from a de-facto standard is ‗30‘ for all parties 
involved (please note that this is a fictitious number, and purposefully no measure is used). As this game 
has a ‗winner-take-all‘ outcome, the revenue from the de-facto standard is optimal when all parties 
collaborate or when one side follows the other, i.e. they all support the same technology and differentiate 
on product implementations. In such a situation there is no confusion in the market, and the technology 
has significant industry support which will lead to rapid market adoption. The main difference is the 
distribution of the benefits; when all parties collaborate, the gains are shared (more-or-less) evenly, 
whereas the situations in which one side leads and others follow will results in more benefits to accrue at 
the leading side. These two situations can be illustrated by CD and DVD. In the case of CD, Toshiba and 
Panasonic followed Sony and Philips which led to a large market for the CD whereby all parties reaped 
the benefits. However, Sony and Philips reaped more benefits than others due to licensing income on the 
intellectual property rights. In the case of DVD, both sides merged their technologies before entering the 
market due to pressure from their customers (especially the PC industry). This unified format resulted in 
rapid market adoption of the DVD technology whereby the contributors benefitted (relatively) evenly. In 
the case of a technology competition (also known as ‗standards battle‘ or ‗format war‘) a situation as 
shown in the top-left quadrant will occur. In this situation, the competition will hamper market adoption 
of the new technologies, the incumbent de-facto standard will maintain its market position for a longer 
time, and therefore the total potential revenues from the de-facto standard will be ‘20‘ for all parties 
involved. However, an alternate scenario is possible, whereby the sponsors of both technologies lose, 
which results in a total value of ‗0‘. These two situations can be illustrated by SA-CD and Blu-ray. In the 
Figure 83: „Competition of the industry consortia‟ game 
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case of SA-CD vs. DVD-A, Sony and Philips had a lot to lose (they were benefitting from their lucrative 
position in CD). So when Toshiba and Panasonic announced the development of DVD-A, Sony and 
Philips were reluctant to give up their position and invested in developing a competing technology. As a 
result, both technologies came on the market and competed for adoption. This competition hampered the 
market adoption, but nonetheless both sides invested heavily to obtain an outcome as displayed top left 
(1,19) or (19,1). However, the technologies were leapfrogged by an alternative (MP3), and the outcome 
was a result as displayed in the bottom of the top-left quadrant (-1,1). DVD-A was removed from the 
market, and its sponsors  had to take a loss while having no possibility to recoup it. SA-CD remained on 
the market but made little return-on-investment. In the case of Blu-ray, Sony and Philips were the first to 
announce the development of a new technology, and they made an effort to involve other parties. As the 
move represented merely a shift from the lower-right quadrant (DVD) to the top-right quadrant, Sony 
and Philips were quite successful in obtaining support for their technology (e.g. from Panasonic). 
However, Toshiba aimed to defend its position in DVD and invested in the development of a competing 
technology, HD-DVD. The resulting competition slowed down the market adoption of both 
technologies, and both sides aimed for the outcome in the top-left quadrant. After a few years, Blu-ray 
emerged as the victor, and Toshiba had to take a significant loss. Toshiba is nowadays a member of the 
Blu-ray Disc Association and offers its own Blu-ray products to recoup its losses.  
 
Lastly, my research provides a methodological contribution. The body of literature lacks guidelines or 
tools for performing case studies on de-facto standards, which limits the measure to which case studies 
can be compared to each other. This dissertation presents a framework for studying the emergence of de-
facto standards, called ‗the case evaluation tool‘. Instructions are provided on how to use this framework, 
so other researchers can use it to systematically collect all the relevant details, and obtain the required in-
depth insights. 
9.2.2. Implications for practice 
Although one could argue that any contribution to the ‗strategic-choice view‘ has practical relevance, this 
section will focus more specifically on how the theoretical contributions translate into practical 
implications. 
 
First, the results of this dissertation support that executive teams need to treat the emergence of a de-
facto standard as a highly dynamic game between multiple technologies that compete for market 
adoption. To provide an accessible explanation how executive teams need to approach the emergence of a 
de-facto standard, I will provide an explanation based on a commonly known game.  Based on the 
insights of this dissertation, I believe the emergence of a de-facto standard can be compared to the game 
of chess. In chess, many different situations are possible, but the game is comprised of several phases (i.e. 
the opening, mid-game, and end game). For each phase there are generic guidelines that serve as heuristics 
to help the player to determine its moves. Each player has 16 chess-pieces on the board which he can use 
as instruments to influence the game. When playing a move, a player takes into account his own strategy 
and the need to respond to the actions of the opponent. 
 
Instead of three phases, my research shows that the emergence of a de-facto standard can be regarded as 
a six-phase process whereby transitions are marked by milestones. As in chess, there are generic guidelines 
that apply for each phase. These function as heuristics that provide guidance to the executive teams 
regarding the relevant matters to address in any particular phase of the technology competition, and to 
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consider the strategic decisions that need to be made in the next phase. As analogy to the 16 chess-pieces, 
in total 40 elements were found to influence the emergence of a de-facto standard, whereby my research 
identified 19 to be subject to strategic decision making. Of these, eight have first order-, eight second 
order-, and three a third order influence on the decision of a customer to adopt a particular technology. 
Of the elements that are subject to strategic decision making, the eight first order elements (i.e. pricing, 
entry timing, marketing and pre-announcements, availability of products, availability of complementary 
goods, killer application, technological superiority, and backward compatibility) exert most influence on 
the customers‘ decision. Hence, these are naturally the ones which require an executive teams‘ closest 
consideration. But considering that the first, second, and third order elements are interrelated, the second 
and third order elements should not be forgotten. Instead, they should be considered as a means to obtain 
an advantage in all first order elements, even those outside a firms‘ scope of control.  The cases of high 
density optical video discs and compressed audio files show that by using these elements, executive teams 
are capable of shaping the odds of technology selection. However, the case of high definition audio discs 
shows that the outcome of a technology competition can be heavily influenced by matters outside a firms‘ 
scope of control. Per phase the studied technology competitions showed a different composition of 
elements that influenced the competition. The composition of elements throughout the phases of the 
emergence of the de-facto standard was unique for each of the studied technology competitions. The 
three in-depth case studies have also shown that the technology competitions have an action-response 
dynamic; the technology sponsors respond to each others‘ moves. The matters above are captured in a 
framework (Figure 82) that can be used by executive teams to assess the technology competition and 
provides guidance by asking the right questions.  
 
The case studies of the high density optical video discs, compressed audio files, and high-definition audio 
discs (Chapter 3-5) provide examples of technology competitions, which in itself are useful for executive 
teams that aim to establish their technology as the de-facto standard. Again, drawing the analogy to chess; 
by studying recorded matches, one can gain insights regarding the tactics and moves that have worked 
well, or did not work well, in the past. When facing a specific situation that requires strategic decision 
making, executive teams may use their repository of knowledge of previous technology competitions to 
generate reference points. 
 
In Chapter 6, the research focused on the relationship between ‗collaborative technology development‘ 
and the ‗organizational community of supporters‘, and bared several practical implications. Firstly, the 
outcome of technology competitions is influenced by the amount of industry support for the respective 
technologies, including their willingness to use the technology in their products, therefore it is important to 
involve a variety of manufacturers and in some cases also professional customers in the development of the 
technology. This includes adapting the standard to meet their requirements, if necessary. Involving other 
parties can be done before they belong to the network, in order to persuade them to join, but also once they 
have joined (i.e. by providing opportunities to propose modifications to the technology). Secondly, the timing 
of incorporating changes is important for success. The results suggest that it is appropriate to start with just a 
few actors who possess essential know-how. The network can then be gradually extended further to enable a 
large and diverse group, which is essential for broad market acceptance and to avoid that essential stakeholders 
join a competing alliance. The required speed also depends on what the competing standards alliances, if any, 
do. Creating a layered network structure in which contributors are differentiated from adopters in terms of 
privileges and voting rights keeps the processes manageable. 
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Lastly, the research in Chapter 7, which focused on the role of ‗accessibility of intellectual property rights‘ 
in the framework, resulted in a managerial contribution; a novel model for patent pool lifecycle 
management (Figure 77, Figure 78, and the corresponding explanation in Section 7.3). This model is 
applicable for technologies that have been developed through a collaborative effort, whereby an executive 
team can utilize it to establish and manage a patent pool. When establishing a patent pool, the team needs 
to select a patent pool model (i.e. a joint licensing program, a regular patent pool, or a pool-of-pools). In 
addition, it needs to manage a patent pool through the four stages of its lifecycle (i.e. investigation, 
formation, gaining traction, and maturity). A patent pool can provide potential supporters with easy 
access to the technology‘s intellectual property rights, and therefore enable a larger organizational 
community of supporters. 
 
9.3 Limitations and further research 
9.3.1. Theoretical limitations 
Although my research addressed the research questions as set out in Section 1.4, it also has its limitations. 
The following sections will reflect on these limitations, and will discuss these per research question (i.e. 
which elements to incorporate in the framework, how to integrate the elements in the framework, which 
phases and milestones in the emergence of a de-facto standard, how can the framework be applied to 
technology competitions). 
 
Elements to incorporate in the framework 
In this dissertation, four new elements were found (i.e. accommodating to needs and requirements of 
providers of complementary goods, subsidizing providers of complementary goods, history of the 
industry, and accessibility of intellectual property rights). Based on the insights of the cases in this 
dissertation, these elements were allocated to the level of ‗third order influence‘. However, this allocation 
was based on a small number of findings. Future research is required to find out more about these 
elements and their relationships with other elements. If these new insights would show that an element 
directly influences the customers‘ decision, or directly influences a first order element, it would need to be 
upgraded to the first or second order respectively. 
 
In addition, there may be other, non-identified, elements. As this research showed, new case studies lead 
to the identification of new elements, and therefore we cannot exclude that additional case studies will 
again lead to new elements. Next to this, I cannot guarantee that all elements noted in the literature on de-
facto standards have been taken into account. Firstly, the literature research was based on a non-
exhaustive set, and secondly it is possible that elements were overlooked during the content analysis (this 
latter point will be discussed in more detail in the next section on methodological limitations). It is, 
however, interesting that the newly identified elements were merely third order elements, which may 
indicate that the most important (i.e. first and second order elements) have already been identified. 
 
In Section 1.2 a synthesis of the literature on de-facto standards was provided, whereby the literature was 
divided into four quadrants; natural-selection view, collective-action view, system-structural view‘, and 
strategic-choice view. In constructing the integrative framework, literature from the strategic-choice view 
and specific elements from the natural-selection view, collective-action view, and system-structural view 
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were taken into account (these elements were listed in Section 1.5). This raises the question if relevant 
insights were missed by omitting parts of the literature from the integrative framework. 
 
Looking back at the three case studies, additional insights regarding the case of high definition audio discs 
could have been gained by applying the literature on game theory (i.e. collective-action view). In this case, 
the technology sponsors of SA-CD and DVD-A invested heavily in the success of their formats. It led to 
a ‗bidding war‘, which is similar to the ‗Rather fight than switch‘ game described in Subsection 1.2.3. 
However, as both sides were focused on outcompeting each other, the market adoption of both 
technologies was delayed, which provided sufficient time for another (outsider) technology to enter  the 
market and become the de-facto standard. Hence, both sides had to incur significant losses on their 
respective investments. By including game-theory in the framework, academics and executive teams could 
gain a better insight in the motives of companies to either develop their own technology, support a 
competing technology, or to collaborate on a technology.612 In addition, it helps to understand why 
companies choose to compete whereas cooperation appears to render an overall better result for all 
parties involved, as discussed in Subsection 9.2.1. 
 
Integration of the elements in the framework 
Using the academic literature, a sub-set of the total number of elements was defined as having a first 
order influence on a consumer‘s decision to adopt a particular technology. However the empirical results 
are insufficient to verify this selection of elements. Further research, focused on testing the causality of 
the first order elements on a customer‘s decision to adopt a technology, is required to determine the 
validity of the selection of first-order elements. The recent cases described in this dissertation would lend 
itself for such research. 
 
In constructing the integrative framework, an approach was taken whereby the elements were organized 
based on their influence on a consumer‘s decision. There are, however, also other approaches to 
constructing a framework. A particularly elegant alternative approach is the one taken by Gallagher and 
West613, which use a model depicting increasing returns as a positive feedback loop as basis and extend 
this (shown by Figure 13). By focusing on a key mechanism that often determines the outcome of a 
technology competition, the resulting framework can be both accessible and comprehensive at the same 
time. Figure 84 shows how the elements identified in my research would fit in a framework with the same 
approach. Further research is required to compare the approaches and understand if one renders more 
insight than the other. 
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Figure 84: Extended technology adoption model incorporating positive feedback 
 
As Chapter 6 and 7 show, the constructs and variables captured in the integrative framework are not 
exhaustive. The integrative framework itself merely provides a high level abstraction of the constructs and 
variables. Each inter-element relationship is based on several academic papers that have studied it in more 
detail. In addition, the body of literature researching these relationships is expanding, of which Chapter 6 
is an example. In this dissertation, I synthesized the relationships between elements which have been 
identified in the body of literature, but did not summarize the findings themselves regarding each 
relationship. Research on this has been limited, with exceptions being Srinivasan et al.614 and Van de Kaa 
et al.615 This area could benefit from additional research efforts. 
 
Phases and milestones in the emergence of a de-facto standard 
Regarding the phases in the process of the emergence of a de-facto standard, Subsection 8.1.4. shows that 
the phases and milestones are well suited for cases where a de-facto standard emerges, however in 
technology competitions which do not result in a de-facto standard it becomes difficult to identify the 
milestones in the later stages of the competition. In order to test and improve the robustness of the 
phases and milestones, future research could test these on more technology competitions that did not 
result in a de-facto standard. Additionally, the current phases and milestones have only been applied on 
cases in the consumer electronics industry. The robustness of the phases could be further tested by 
applying it to cases from other industries. 
 
Applying the framework to technology competitions 
Although the goal for this thesis was to provide a framework that could be used to support strategic 
decision making, this framework has only been applied at the end of the technology competition. At this 
point the outcome was known, and the researcher had the possibility to overlook the whole technology 
competition and reconstruct the events. The main test for the framework, however, would be during a 
technology competition; would a technology sponsor, during a technology competition, with the 
information available at that time, be able to use the framework to enhance their insight in the technology 
competition and support strategic decision making to shape the odds. Such research would require a 
longitudinal, action research approach. 
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The integrative framework as it is presented in this dissertation is complex, and can be difficult to use for 
executive teams engaged in strategic decision making. It requires further research to find out if and how 
the framework can be simplified into something that is more accessible. 
 
The cases that were selected were all related to the consumer electronics industry. The robustness of the 
framework should be further tested by applying it to cases from other industries. 
 
As noted in Subsection 8.1.5, the idea of scoring the elements was a valuable addition to the framework. 
However, the scoring was done in hindsight, based on in-depth knowledge from both competing 
technologies. In order to learn more about the added value of assigning scores to the elements, future 
research should look into applying scores at ongoing technology competitions. The scoring could only be 
applied to two of the three case studies. The two cases that allowed for scoring were technology 
competitions whereby there were two main rivals that competed over multiple phases, whereas the case 
that did not allow for scoring was a technology competition whereby one technology faced different rivals 
over time. This raises the thought that there might be two distinct types of competitions; one with two 
main rivals, and one whereby a technology faces multiple rivals over time.  Future in-depth case studies 
can be used to further substantiate if there are indeed two types of technology competitions, or perhaps 
even more. 
 
The common dynamics during the emergence of a de-facto standard, as presented in Section 8.2, are 
mainly based on the insights from three in-depth case studies. While this is sufficient basis for an 
emergent theory, further in-depth case studies are required to test if the ‗common dynamics‘ hold for a 
wider variety of technology competitions. 
 
While Figure 79 and Figure 80 constitute the main integrative framework, the insights in Subsection 8.1.3. 
suggest there could be an alternate version of Figure 79 which takes into account that tipping can occur 
on both the customer and complementor network. Figure 85 shows how the integrative framework could 
be modified to emphasize the cluster of elements influencing the organizational community of supporters. 
Not all relationships could be captured in the graphical representation. From Appendix 4 we can see that 
in total 16 elements were found to influence the organizational community of supporters (this is excluding 
the two third order elements which also influence the organizational community); technological 
superiority, entry timing, appropriability, government intervention and industry regulation, marketing and 
pre-announcements, installed base, reputation and credibility, strategic partnerships, level of competition, 
level of collaborative development, market and industry characteristics, firm size, powerful rival 
technology sponsors, type of technological innovation, availability of imitators, and pre-empting scarce 
assets. At this point, Figure 85 should be considered as an alternate version of the integrative framework, 
of which the merits and demerits versus Figure 79 require further research. 
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Figure 85: Alternate integrative framework that accounts for tipping in the networks of customers and technology supporters 
 
As noted in Subsection 8.1.5., the integrative framework lacks a ‗market forces‘ perspective, which 
requires a higher level view of the industry dynamics. The body of management literature provides several 
frameworks that are used to study industry dynamics. Considering the available frameworks, I believe one 
of the classics, Porter‘s five forces framework616 (Figure 86), could serve as basis for an applicable 
framework. 
 
 
Figure 86: Porter‟s five-forces framework 
 
Figure 87 provides a suggestion for a slightly modified version of Porter‘s five forces framework, which 
can be used to monitor market forces in conjunction with the integrative framework. The modifications 
include the replacement of ‗threat of new entrants‘ by ‗embeddedness of existing de-facto standard‘, and 
the bargaining power of customer and complementors has been swopped to reflect Figure 85. As a result, 
this framework reflects the forces regarding the incumbent de-facto standard, technological substitutes, 
and the networks on both sides of a platform; the customers and complementors. To some extent, one 
can regard Figure 87 as an abstract (higher level) version of Figure 85, with the inclusion of the forces 
regarding the existing de-facto standard and the technological substitutes. Further research is required to 
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understand if this framework can be used, and if it indeed provides valuable ‗higher level‘ market force 
insights regarding e.g. the incumbent de-facto standard and threats from substitute technologies. 
 
 
Figure 87: Framework for monitoring market forces 
9.3.2. Methodological limitations 
The methodology and research approach were also marked by some limitations, which will be discussed 
in this section. As in the previous section, the limitations will be addressed per research question. 
 
Elements to incorporate in the framework 
The overview of elements was derived from the existing body of literature on de-facto standards. There 
are three methodological limitations regarding the overview of elements. Firstly, the overview was 
generated through content analysis of the existing body of academic literature. Content analysis is an 
inherently a subjective research method. To provide an example; although my content analysis resulted in 
36 elements that influence the emergence of a de-facto standard, Van de Kaa et al.617 found 29 elements 
during their content analysis, and of these we have 19 elements in common. This means that 10 elements 
of Van de Kaa et al. were not included in my content analysis, and 17 of my elements were not identified 
in their content analysis. This can be attributed to combining several elements (i.e. the elements ‗current 
installed base‘ and ‗previous installed base‘ of Van de Kaa et al. is represented in my results as ‗installed 
base‘) or by omitting elements that I deemed to be a moot point for the emergence of de-facto standards 
(e.g. the elements ‗commitment‘ or ‗antitrust laws‘ of Van de Kaa et al.). Secondly, the content analysis 
was applied on a limited set of sources. In my research, I reviewed 47 sources, whereas for example Van 
de Kaa et al. reviewed 127 sources, and Narayanan and Chen618 reviewed 89 sources. Thirdly, the content 
analysis was performed by a single researcher (albeit with ad-post review by the supervisor), which makes 
the content analysis subjective. Additional measures could have been taken to compensate for the 
subjectivity of the content analysis, for example by involving academic peers to review the overview of 
elements and provide feedback. 
 
A drawback of the inductive coding method is that the research findings result from multiple 
interpretations made from the raw data by the researchers who code the data. Therefore, inevitably, the 
findings are shaped by the assumptions and experiences of the researchers conducting the research and 
carrying out the data analyses. Different researchers are likely to produce findings which are not identical 
and which have non-overlapping components. A range of techniques can be utilized to assess the 
trustworthiness of the findings. I opted to assess the trustworthiness by triangulation within the project as 
part of the second stage of my research (the case studies). To be more specific, for each case the 
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applicable elements were identified and incorporated into a case report. These case reports were checked 
by the respondents, 35 in total. Many of these respondents can be considered corporate experts in 
standardization. In addition, two case reports (high definition optical discs and MP3) were used for 
academic papers that were checked by co-authors and anonymous reviewers. These can be considered 
academic experts in standardization. As noted in Subsection 8.1.1., the case studies confirmed most of the 
elements that were identified in the content analysis of the academic literature. Hence, the confirmation of 
the corporate and academic experts can be regarded as validation of the identified elements. 
 
Integration of the elements in the framework 
After an overview was created of elements that influence a customers‘ decision to adopt a technology, 
these were differentiated based on their direct or indirect influence on the customers‘ decision. This 
differentiation was done based on a content analysis of the academic literature, but this differentiation was 
not tested on actual customers. Conjoint analysis should have been performed to better understand the 
trade-offs that are made by customers when adopting a technology, in order to verify the selection of first 
order elements. This matter requires further research. However, those who would undertake this research 
will have to take into account in their research approach that there are many attributes (40 elements) 
which can provide the issue of information overload. In addition, as de-facto standards are typically global 
phenomena, one would need to account for national or regional differences in customer trade-offs. 
 
Phases and milestones in the emergence of a de-facto standard 
In this research, the phases and milestones as proposed by Suarez619 were adopted as a starting point. I did 
not perform a comparative study with phases and milestones as proposed by other authors (i.e. the three 
phases proposed by Utterback and Abernathy620, or the two phases proposed by Tushman and 
Anderson621). Considering that the phases and milestones by Suarez build on the works of Utterback and 
Abernathy, and Tushman and Anderson, I believe the phases and milestones proposed by these others 
could be equally applicable. However, as the phases and milestones of Suarez provide more detail, they 
allow for a more thorough insight in the emergence of a de-facto standard. 
 
Applying the framework to technology competitions 
Another limitation of this study was its exploratory nature. As such, I performed in-depth case studies. In 
my efforts to generalize findings from the cases through a cross-case analysis, analytic generalization was 
applied. This method has several limitations: 
- The results from this approach need to be considered as ‗working hypotheses‘ (analytic 
generalizations requires carefully constructed arguments which must be resistant to logical 
challenge). Confidence in such hypothesizes can build as new studies continue to produce findings 
in support of the hypotheses. 
- The generalization of these results is limited to cases of which the context has a good fit with the 
context of the cases studied in this dissertation (Guba, 1981). In accordance with Lincoln and 
Guba,622 sufficient descriptive information has been provided regarding each case to allow other 
persons wanting to transfer the findings to assess the degree of similarity between the contexts. 
 
Future research should validate the findings with large-scale empirical research. 
 
As noted in Subsection 8.1.5, the idea of scoring the elements was a valuable addition to the framework. 
However, the scoring was done by the researcher, which makes the scores themselves very subjective. 
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Future research could investigate if scoring by multiple parties renders more accurate insights in the 
dynamics of the emergence of a de-facto standard. 
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Appendix 1: Description of  elements influencing the odds of  technology 
selection (in alphabetical order) 
 
1. Absorptive capacity 
Absorptive capacity reflects the firm‘s ability to recognize the value of new information, to assimilate it, 
and to apply it to commercial ends.623 Low investment in learning can lead to failure in anticipating shifts 
in customer requirements and makes companies less able to respond to technological change and 
emerging opportunities.624 
 
2. Adapters and gateways 
Technical interconnection of incompatible technological systems can be realized by developing adapters 
that enable the conversion from one side to the other, also known as gateway technologies (David et al.625, 
Katz and Shapiro626, Baake and Boom627). As such, gateway technologies may provide compatibility 
without constraining variety or innovation.628 Gateway technologies can be developed to facilitate 
conversion in one or two directions. Even though a gateway technology that works in two directions can 
be perceived as ‗neutral‘, it can tip the balance of market competition decisively in favor of on one of the 
technological systems. A gateway technology may provide the user of a certain network access to an 
alternative network. In the case of video game consoles, the company Coleco marketed an adapter that 
allowed its game console to play the broad range of video games developed for a competing game 
console.629 Adapters and gateways can be hardware (e.g. the rotary converter in electricity supply 
networks)630 or software (an emulator)631. However, gateway technologies can be expensive and/or 
inefficient (David et al.632; Farrell and Saloner633). 
 
3. Appropriability 
Appropriability refers to the ability of a technology sponsor to protect its innovation from imitation by 
competitors634 and capture the profits generated by it.635 Appropriability is dependent on solid intellectual 
property rights (patents, copyrights or trademarks), a secure research, development and manufacturing 
environment, and the efficacy of legal mechanisms to enforce the property rights. Different business 
environments have different degrees of appropriability, which have strong implications for the technology 
competition. According to Srinivasan et al.636, appropriability for a product category may be represented 
along a continuum extending from a tight (closed) regime where firms are able to appropriate most or all 
innovation rents, to a weak (or open) regime where firms are able to appropriate little or no rents. A tight 
appropriability regime will favour firms with superior technology, because it allows them erect barriers to 
imitation.637 High barriers to imitation may also provide a firm with a period of time free from 
competition, in which it can build an installed base sufficient to jump start an increasing returns 
mechanism.638 However, it is often difficult to erect high barriers to imitation. Enforcement using legal 
instruments such as patents and/or copyrights takes a long and costly process with an uncertain outcome. 
Hill639 mentions a large sample study of patent protection cases that found that 60% of patented 
innovations were invented around within four years. 
 
4. Availability of complementary goods 
Complementary goods are products or services that increase the utility of a technology, and are generally 
dubbed ‗software‘.640 Examples include pre-recorded DVDs for DVD players, and charging stations for 
electric vehicles. Especially platform technologies are hardly useful or desirable without an associated set 
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of complementary goods.641 Goods are complementary to a technology when they adhere to a common 
compatibility standard. Adhering to a common compatibility standard enables independent development 
of myriad complementary goods, and allows complementary assets to be employed on a wide range of 
platform implementations. Given adequate resources, firms may choose to vertically integrate 
downstream from their platform and provide their own complements. Even if firms produce their own 
complements, they often enable other companies to provide complementary goods, often unique 
innovations that the platform sponsor did not anticipate. Two types of complementary goods can be 
defined: the goods that are essential for a technology to function/become commercially feasible (such as a 
computer and an operating system) and the goods that add functionality to the technology (such as 
software programs for the operating system of a computer). These technologies need not be separate, but 
can be a sub-technology of the core technology (for example when Matsushita developed the 8mm video 
camera it also needed to develop the recording heads), as such core technology and sub-technology need 
to be developed in parallel.642 According to Arthur643 these technological products exist within local 
groupings of products that support and enhance them, and as such form mini-ecologies. The effect of this 
interdependence is that the success of a technology also depends on the availability of complementary 
goods and attracting companies to develop these. Suppliers of complementary goods will want to supply 
to a large market, so their supply decisions are affected by their expectations about the future size of a 
network.644 The possibilities a consumer has with a platform depend for a large part on the amount of 
available complementary goods, to realize a larger installed base than a competing technology it is thus 
important to influence the supply of complements.645 When consumers use products which have many 
complementary products it becomes difficult for them to switch to another technology because of the 
incompatibility of the complementary goods with the other technology.646 
 
5. Availability of products 
The availability of products can be defined as the extent to which products based on a particular 
technology are available to the customer. Prospective customers have to see the product (either tangibly 
or in catalogs or websites), in order to purchase it.647 The market for potential de-facto standards is often 
a ‗mass‘ market of global nature. Such markets are often serviced by large companies that market their 
products under one or several brands, and have access to efficient mass production capacity and broad 
distribution channels.648 When a technology sponsor sets out to establish an organizational community of 
supporters, this can be regarded as a race for distribution rights. The more ‗shelf space‘ is filled by 
products based on a technology, the more a customer perceives the technology as successful. 
 
6. Availability of imitators 
Technology supporters may face companies imitating the new technology or its complementary products 
(Besen and Farrell649; Wade650). The effects of second sources entering an industry are twofold. They 
increase competition in the industry, and are likely to reduce the market share of the original technology 
sponsor. But in a technology competition, attracting imitators increases the organizational community of 
supporters, the amount of products and complementary goods in the market. Technology sponsors may 
be able to ward off imitators when it has strong intellectual property rights and the industry has a strong 
appropriability regime.  
 
7. Backward compatibility 
A technology is backwards compatible when it is designed to be interoperable with, or accommodate 
products from, the previous technology generation. This often requires a product based on the new 
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Figure 88: Relationship between entry timing and technological lock-out (Source: 
Schilling, 1998) 
technology to be compliant with compatibility standards from the previous technology generation. In the 
case of platforms, this may hold for the platform itself or for the complementary goods. In the case of an 
optical disc format, a new generation of the technology may feature a new player that can play discs from 
the previous generation or it may feature a new disc that can be used in the player of the previous 
generation (hybrid disc). Backward compatibility lowers switching cost, and facilitates the migration of a 
technology‘s installed base to the next generation technology.651 
 
8. Chance 
According to Arthur652, in technological trajectories with (strong) network externalities many outcomes 
are possible; insignificant circumstances (small random events) such as unexpected successes in the 
performance of prototypes, whims of early developers, and political circumstances, become magnified by 
positive feedback to ‗tip‘ the system into the actual outcome selected (Arthur653; Besen and Farrell654). 
These random events resemble ‗chance‘ and ‗luck‘, and can tip a market very rapidly.  
 
9. Entry timing, window of opportunity and first-mover advantage 
Entry timing refers to the point in time when the first product based on a particular technology enters the 
market. For the timing of entry to the industry Suarez655 and Schilling656 state that an early market entry 
has several important effects in a technology battle; it helps to build a larger installed base (because an 
early entrant has more time to promote, deploy, and improve its technology) and creates reputation 
effects. Early entry in systematic R&D activities creates important learning effects and provides more time 
to experiment with different technological alternatives (McGrath et al.657; Suarez658). The earlier in the 
evolution of a technology the firm enters, the more easily it is able to garner influence over distributors, 
suppliers and customers.659 Early entry does, however, lock firms into particular technological trajectories 
that are potentially not consistent with the resulting dominant design. And while it pays to hit the market 
first, the initial lead can easily be taken by a competitor if the installed base is not built fast enough660 or if 
it does not have control over the required complementary assets.661 A later entrant can also capitalize on 
the research and development of the first mover, fine tune the product to customer needs as the market 
becomes more certain and avoid mistakes made by the first mover.662 Anderson and Tushman663 even 
state that first versions of a new technology do not become industry standards because they do not adhere 
to a broad set of customer needs, since 
customer needs are in an early industry 
stage unknown. 
 
According to Schilling664 there is a U-
shaped relationship between entry 
timing and technological lock-out (the 
technology trajectory sponsored by the 
company does not become the 
dominant design), graphically 
represented by Figure 88. The U-
shaped model of Schilling gives rise to 
the belief that there is a window of 
opportunity665 during which it is 
optimal to enter the market. This 
window of opportunity implies that 
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there is a specific time frame during which a firm should enter the industry. Schilling states that in very 
early market stages a technology may be underdeveloped, its fit with customer needs is unknown, 
necessary complementary goods and services may not be developed yet. As such the chances are low that 
the technology introduced in a very early market becomes the dominant design. Over time, knowledge of 
the technology and customer expectations will improve, thus increasing the likelihood that technologies 
will possess a set of attributes meeting customer demand. If the technology proves to be valuable, over 
time competitors will also enter the market. If competing technological designs enter too late, another 
design might have become so entrenched that the new designs have little chance of capturing market 
share. The deflection point and strength of the U-shaped relationship is moderated by the intensity of the 
industry‘s network effects, barriers to competitive entry and the margin of improvement the new 
technology offers over previous technologies competing for the same market. 
 
10. Firm’s complementary assets 
A firm‘s complementary assets are particular capabilities or resources which, in addition to the 
technological knowledge, support the commercial success of a technology (for example manufacturing 
facilities, distribution channels, marketing, etc.). This relates to the extent to which a firm is vertically or 
horizontally integrated. Complementary assets are often required for bringing an innovation to the market 
and can be used to overtake the head start of a competitor. Possessing the required complementary assets 
is a reason why imitators sometimes outperform the original innovators. In general, a better set of 
complementary assets will cause a higher likelihood of emerging as de-facto standard, other things being 
equal.666 The most valuable company assets are specialized and co-specialized assets. Specialized assets are 
unique elements accessible to the firm. To the extent that the assets (tacit or in tacit) are scarce or 
available only to the firm (such as a specific location) competitors will not be able to duplicate the firm‘s 
offering without the asset. Co-specialized assets are assets a firm possesses for other productive purposes, 
and which competitors therefore simply do not possess, but which can be deployed to enhance the 
product offering.667 Integrating or developing these assets is expensive. Contracting relationships with 
firms that own these assets provides relatively cheap access, but may not be possible due to scarcity of the 
asset.668  
 
11. Firm size 
Financial resources, number of industries and geographical markets in which the technology sponsor has 
a presence and its market share in these. Technology sponsors with substantial financial resources can 
apply these to rapidly create an installed base through penetration pricing and extensive marketing.669 
Large firms often have access to relevant specialized and co-specialized assets required to support for a 
technology (Teece670; Suarez and Utterback671). If the technology sponsor has experience in adjacent 
markets, it may be able to easily target the new market with its existing knowledge and skill base, or 
existing technology portfolio (Schilling672; Gallagher and Park673). A technology sponsor with an existing 
business in an adjacent market may be able to leverage its existing customer base and complementary 
assets such as distribution networks.674 
 
12. Government intervention and industry regulation 
There are four relevant aspects of government intervention: government may act as an early adopter of a 
particular technology, provide subsidies to promote adoption or erect trade barriers, subject a technology 
sponsor to antitrust scrutiny, or mandate the use of a particular technology. In high tech industries, it is 
not uncommon that a branch of government (military, space or public health department) acts as an early 
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adopter. Government purchases of a technology in the early stages may, however, tilt the balance in its 
favour and enhance the odds to become the de-facto standard.675 An often mentioned example concerns 
the role of the US Navy in early nuclear reactor construction contracts, which favoured the early 
development of light-water reactors).676 Military and space programmes may also operate as a focussing 
mechanism during a particular technological trajectory, while at the same time providing financial support 
to R&D and guaranteeing public procurement.677 Klepper and Simons678 note that in the television 
receiver industry, the Japanese government managed to limit foreign competition by placing tariffs and 
restrictions on foreign direct investment. In addition, they subsidized R&D and exports, and provided 
preferential access to capital. Rosenbloom and Cusumano679 note that the Japanese Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) provided subsidies to firms willing to develop a domestic version 
of a videotape recorder. An example of the third aspect can be found in the video-game console market; 
Gallagher and Park680 found that around 1991 Nintendo removed the prohibition on licensees making 
their games available to competing game consoles because they were under threat of antitrust 
investigation. Lastly, sometimes a government will intervene directly to mandate the use of a particular 
technology.681 This has often been the case for the utilities such as the telecommunications and television 
industries.682 In these cases the consumer welfare benefits of having compatibility in technology have 
warranted government regulation. 
 
13. Hetero- or homogeneity of customer needs 
Markets differ on the hetero- or homogeneity of customer needs. According to McGrath et al.683, markets 
can be composed of unevenly concentrated groups of customers that have different preferences regarding 
a product category. Markets with homogenic customer needs are prone to ‗tipping‘ under network 
externalities, whereas markets with heterogenic customer needs are more likely to sustain multiple 
technologies.684 The extent to which a technology may envelop groups of customers in a heterogenic 
market is dependent on its level of superiority. In many cases a new technology initially meets the specific 
requirements of a niche market, which allows it to build-up an initial installed base.685 Through subsequent 
returns to adoption, a technological development will enhance its performance, and enable it to address 
an increasing amount of customer groups until it reaches its mass market potential. 
 
14. Increasing returns to adoption 
An important effect to obtain and retain technological superiority are the increasing returns to adoption 
or ‗learning curve effects‘ (Schilling686; Abernathy and Clark687; Besen and Farrell688; Suarez and 
Utterback689). Complex technologies often exhibit increasing returns to adoption in that the more they are 
adopted, the more they are improved.690 This is also called ‗learning by using‘. Revenues generated by the 
technology adoption can be used to further develop and refine it. As the technology is adopted, greater 
knowledge and understanding of the technology accrues as a by-product, which may enable 
improvements in the technology and in applications of the technology. Increasing returns to adoption will 
also enable better understanding of what customers want. 
 
15. Installed base 
Installed base is a multifaceted term, of which the applicable definition is case-dependent. It can be 
defined as the number of users applying a technology at a certain moment in time,691 the number of users 
applying products of a particular firm, or the number of products in use. A larger installed base is 
associated with higher rates of adoption of a technology, and as such heightens the chance that customers 
will choose the technology.692 Because the installed base becomes locked into the technology, it is difficult 
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for the technology to be displaced by a superior and cheaper alternative. The size of the installed base is in 
industries with network effects also directly related to the benefits a consumer derives from using the 
technology.693 For these reasons it is important for a firm to quickly build an installed base in industries 
with strong network effects. If an established company sponsors a new technology, it can offer the 
technology to its existing installed base in order to realize fast market adoption.694 
 
16. Killer application 
Market adoption of a new technology can be accelerated by a ‗killer application‘.695 A killer application is 
an application of the technology that possesses a set of attributes meeting customer demands. Killer 
applications can refer to the product in which the technology is implemented (e.g. a PDA; Schilling696), a 
service enabled by the technology (e.g. electric lighting; David and Bunn697) or complementary goods (e.g. 
popular games for video game consoles; Gallagher and Park698; Schilling699).  
 
17. Level of collaborative development  
Extent to which a technology sponsor engages into a collaboration with its competitors to develop a 
shared technology. Such cooperation can take place in an industry alliance, or under the auspices of a 
standard development organization such as IEEE. Collaborative development allows merging technology 
features, spreading development cost, ensures adequate manufacturing capacity and distribution, and 
typically lowers the number of competing technologies.700 Hill701 notes that collaborative development 
may be able to produce a superior technology by combining the best aspects of several independent 
technology streams. The level of collaborative development also refers to the timing of a technology 
sponsor to engage into a collaboration with competitors; shared development can start at any moment 
during the technological development process. 
 
Van den Ende et al.,702 show that when a technology sponsor involves other parties in the development of 
a technology and its extensions, this enhances the amount of support and ensures that the technology 
incorporates features which are important to the different types of parties in the industry. While the 
development of technologies can be open or closed, it rarely occurs fully open or fully closed.703 It is a 
trade-off between letting other companies participate in refining the technology vs. risk of losing grip over 
direction of technological developments and sharing potential license revenues (Cusumano et al.704; 
Shapiro and Varian705; Lee et al.706). Technologies that result from a collaborative process often have a 
longer time-to-market. Following collaborative development, the technology sponsors may opt to further 
extend the amount of supporters building an organizational community by licensing the technology to 
competitors and/or complementors. 
 
18. Level of competition 
The level of competition in a technology competition is based on the number of incompatible 
technological alternatives that are competing in the market for adoption and the strength (financially and 
in terms of market share) of their supporters. Competition between incompatible technologies in markets 
governed by strong network effects are not just a matter of better products or lower costs, small 
differences can be magnified into a substantial lead,  resulting in a de-facto standard.707 Technology 
competitions may delay market growth by causing market confusion which encourages buyers to wait for 
the outcome. Companies can choose to compete for the market with several incompatible technologies, 
or to compete within the market and agree to make their products compatible and subsequently compete 
in different dimensions such as price, service, and product features. 
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19. Market and industry characteristics 
This element refers to the structure and dynamics of the market and technological field.708 Every market 
has specific dynamics (e.g. excess inertia or insufficient friction, market size and growth), rules of 
engagement and information sharing practices which cut across organizations and can be described as an 
industry‘s value system. A company can make use of this value system, or review the various market 
segments for its technology and introduce it in a market with favourable dynamics, to affect the 
technology competition. Smit and Pistorius709 indicated a certain conservatism in the mining industry that 
caused resistance to technological change. Overcoming this conservatism and building the necessary 
confidence in a new technology took considerable time. 
 
20. Marketing and pre-announcements  
This element refers to creating market awareness regarding the availability of a technology, informing the 
customer of its strengths,710 and influencing customer and industry perception regarding its potential 
success.711 As incumbents will try to knock down the viability of new technologies that emerge, those very 
entrants will strive to establish credibility. Arthur712 refers to the management of expectations as 
psychological positioning; in industries with network effects rivals will back off in a market if they believe 
it will be locked in by someone else (since appearances may count as much as reality does if the installed 
base can only be imperfectly observed). Psychological positioning can take place through 
preannouncements, threatened alliances, parades of announced products (vapourware), etc. According to 
Shapiro and Varian713 the most direct way to manage expectations is by assembling allies and making 
grand claims about the technology‘s current or future popularity. This discourages competitors from 
taking on a potentially dominant rival. Not all companies like to manage expectations through means such 
as vapourware and prefer a stick-to-the-facts approach.714  
 
21. Network effects 
Network effects (i.e. increasing returns, network externalities, bandwagon effects) in markets are a result 
of consumption complementarities whereby the utility of a technology to a customer increases with the 
number of customers that use the technology.715 We distinguish two types of network effects; direct and 
indirect network effects. Direct network effects arise from the mere fact that when the nth customer joins 
a network, a network connection is created for all existing customers. As such the network becomes more 
valuable (the utility that a user derives depends upon the number of users) to a user the more users 
become connected.716 Indirect network effects arise as a result of increased demand for complementary 
products or services (such as specialized training, etc.). The platform with the largest installed base attracts 
the largest supply of complementary products, which, in turn, further increases the platforms popularity 
with customers and this its attractiveness to providers of complementary products.717 These positive (self-
reinforcing) feedback loops will result in a virtuous cycle that will inevitably ―tip‖ a platform competition 
in favour of the platform that has the leading installed base. However, the process of increasing returns 
needs to be jump-started in order to create momentum behind a technology. There are several company 
strategies for jump starting718 or igniting719 the increasing returns process: early entry, technological 
superiority and penetration pricing have positive effects on building an installed base. The effect of a 
firm‘s strategic manoeuvring is enhanced by network effects, this makes strategic manoeuvring a powerful 
force driving the emergence of a de-facto standard. While some argue that strong network effects result in 
strong selection pressures to choose a dominant design (Besen and Farrell720; Schilling721; Shaprio and 
Varian722), others (Srinivasan723) show that a dominant design is more likely to arise under weak network 
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effects. Shankar and Bayus724 show that network effects are a function of network size (size of installed 
customer base) and network strength (marginal impact of a unit increase in network size on customer 
demand).  A firm with a smaller customer network, but a higher network strength than the firm with the 
larger customer network is able to overtake the sales of a firm with a larger network size because of higher 
customer loyalty. 
 
22. Organizational community of supporters 
In order to best a competitor in terms of availability of products and complementary goods, a technology 
sponsor can build a network of competitors and/or complementors that support its technology (i.e. 
creating an organizational community that has some degree of hardware and/or software compatibility725). 
A prime example is the case of the video recorders, whereby JVC enabled its VHS technology to win 
from the competing Betamax technology by being very successful in building an ecosystem of 
competitors and complementors that supported VHS.726 Determinants of the ecosystem are the amount 
of parties, diversity, and market shares. According to Arthur727 companies building ‗webs‘ (alliances of 
companies organized around a mini-ecology) to amplify positive feedback to the base technology. The 
density of the network (the amount of possible links within the networks) and the strength of 
relationships between actors in the network influence the performance of the actors in the network. The 
strength of the relationships depends on the type of relationship between the actors. This can reach from 
a simple arms-length licensing contract to a joint venture in which the companies that have contributed 
technology take a share in the joint venture (this aspect is highlighted separately in ‗level of collaborative 
development‘). Larger groups often suffer from problems related to control and coordination. Van de 
Kaa et al.728 state that these ecosystems are often organized in a core-periphery structure. The core can 
consist of a single sponsor with key complementors or an alliance of sponsors. 
 
The ecosystem of supporters can be built through licensing and OEM agreements. Hill729 identifies two 
licensing strategies; passive multiple licensing (which involves licensing to all comers and letting the 
licensees build the market for the technology) and aggressive multiple licensing (which involves licensing 
to as many firms as possible while remaining the dominant supplier of the technology). It is also possible 
to keep the core technology proprietary and make the knowledge of the interfaces of the technology 
public, this allows complementors (even rivals) to participate in developing the technology, but under 
own terms determined by the technology owner.730 Licensing facilitates wide distribution and may co-opt 
competitors.731 The resulting momentum will create a disincentive for competitors to invest in the 
development of their own technology. Success in persuading other enterprises to enter into licensing 
agreements sends a positive signal to the suppliers of complementary products, which are more likely to 
invest in the development of complementary products if a technology has gained substantial momentum. 
A liberal licensing strategy comes at the price of increased competition of licensees which make 
improvements on the technology and a certain loss of control over the technology‘s path of development, 
and may result in prices being bid down below the rate that would prevail in a monopoly situation. 
 
In addition, OEM agreements can be useful when a brand owner is interested to offer a product under its 
brand, but is not willing to invest in technology-specific manufacturing facilities until the market has 
obtained sufficient volume. In order to accommodate these licensees, a technology sponsor (which needs 
to invest in a manufacturing facility anyways), could offer to manufacture products on OEM basis for its 
licensees. In order to effectively build the ecosystem of supporters, a technology sponsor needs to 
255_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
239 
 
discover which requirements it has to fulfil in order to obtain support, and make a trade-off to what 
extent it is willing to accommodate licensee needs and requirements. 
 
23. Powerful rival technology sponsors 
Competing technology sponsors that have the resources required either to imitate a technology, even in 
the face of high barriers to imitation, or to develop their own, possibly superior, technology.732 In 
addition, these competitors may have a substantial installed based (and thereby market share) which could 
be leveraged towards the competing technology. The existence of Powerful rivals places more urgency on 
rapidly building an installed base, thereby increasing the attractiveness of licensing arrangements and 
entering into strategic alliances. Technology sponsors faced with powerful rivals may be well advised to 
persuade them into a strategic alliance or collaborative development. A powerful rival may also help to 
build an organizational community of supporters; in the case of the Java programming environment, the 
threat of Microsoft entering the market with its Blackbird technology caused many smaller parties to 
support Sun Microsystems‘ Java technology.733 
 
24. Pre-empting scarce assets 
By anticipating on the path of technological development, companies can preserve future rights to scarce 
assets (e.g. materials, specific distribution channels or complementary products and intellectual 
property).734 This can be done by pre-emptively contracting or integrating co-evolutionary partners, and 
will enable the company to have access to crucial resources once these are needed. For example, in the 
video game console industry, the companies that were first to market were also the first to obtain 
exclusive rights to games based on popular arcade games (e.g. Space Invaders) and their characters such as 
Donkey Kong.735 
 
25. Pricing 
Pricing is a key variable in the demand of a product, but it has particular relevance in the emergence of 
de-facto standards. Early aggressive pricing lowers switching cost and leads to a larger installed base, 
which in turn makes it more likely that a firm‘s technology will become dominant.736 Penetration pricing 
often requires a dedicated technology sponsor with significant financial means, because the company 
must be able to bear substantial short-run losses in pursuit of longer run gains from economies of scale, 
learning effects, and establishing the technology as a standard. There are three ways to recoup the 
investments on penetration pricing: 
- Once sufficient volume has been built up, substantial unit cost reductions may be forthcoming 
from learning effects and scale economies, which lead to significant profit margins.737 
- Provide a discount to the first-movers in order to jump-start increasing returns, and remove the 
discount when the increasing returns mechanism kicks in. 
- In the case of platform technologies a firm may apply penetration pricing on the platform (for 
example a game console) and charge high margins on the complementary assets (video games).738 
 
26. Product proliferation 
Product proliferation involves serving as many niches in the market as feasible by customizing the 
product offering to appeal to different users.739 This maximizes the potential size of the market, and the 
rate of growth of the installed base. By designing a product or technology in such a way that it can easily 
be adapted to appeal to different users, the rate of installed base growth is optimized. Some indicators of 
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Figure 89: Type of technological changes (Source: Abernathy et. al, 
1985) 
product proliferation are a large number of new product introductions, wide product variety and 
extensive product lines.740 
 
27. Rate and type of technological change 
The rate of technological change is defined as the 
speed of introduction of subsequent innovations, 
i.e. the pace of technological change in the 
industry. The type of technological changes 
influences the pace of obsolescence. The rate of 
change and possibility of obsolescence affects the 
willingness of suppliers and buyers to invest in a 
technology and influences the desirability of 
committing to a specific technology. Henderson 
and Clark741 constructed a framework for defining 
the type of technological changes (see Figure 89). 
This model bears similarities to the model of 
Abernathy and Clark742 displayed earlier, however the model of Henderson and Clark focuses on 
innovation on product level, while Abernathy and Clark focus on innovation on industry level. In this 
model incremental innovation refines and extends an established design. Improvement occurs in 
individual components, but the underlying core design concepts, and the links between them, remain the 
same. Modular innovation is characterized by changes in the relationships between the core concepts of a 
technology. Radical innovation establishes a new set of core concepts embodied in components that are 
linked together in a new architecture (a substitute technology). Architectural innovation is defined as the 
reconfiguration of an established system to link together existing components in a new way. It creates 
new interactions and new linkages with (other) components, however the core design concept behind 
each component and the associated scientific and engineering knowledge remain the same.  
 
28. Reputation and credibility 
A firm‘s reputation is based on the public evaluation of a firm relative to other firms.743 A good reputation 
and credibility have a positive influence on the establishment of a de-facto standard, especially in network 
markets where expectations are important.744 Previous victories and a recognized name give customers 
some certainty that they are investing in a technology that has a good possibility of winning the 
competition. Consumers‘ knowing that a firm will act to preserve its reputation will raise consumer 
expectations about the future network size.745 This is one of the reasons smaller companies are often eager 
to form an alliance with established companies.746 
 
29. Strategic partnerships 
A technology sponsor may establish a contractual relationship with providers of complementary goods 
and distributors to more rapidly deploy the technology,747 or gain access to new technologies.748 The 
sponsor may be able to negotiate joint promotion of the new technology with other (complementary) 
goods or a strategic bundling relationship. A well known example is provided in the case of the 
microcomputer industry, whereby IBM chose to sell its first Personal Computer in a bundle with 
Microsoft‘s PC-DOS operating system. This facilitated a timely market introduction of IBM‘s Personal 
Computer and led to a large installed base of consumers using Microsoft‘s DOS.749 A strategic partnership 
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can bring the required mass production skills, financial resources, broad distribution networks and added 
credibility,750 especially if the sponsor is relatively unknown and the partner is established and reputable.751 
 
30. Switching and homing cost 
Switching costs are the costs that customers incur to move from one technology to another,752 including 
the cost of specialized or co-specialized complementary goods. Switching costs affect a firm‘s ability to 
attract customers and build or retain its installed base.753 As customers invest in technology specific 
training and complementary assets they become locked in a technology and the switching costs increase. 
The higher the switching costs, the more difficult it is for a firm to steal customers away from rivals and 
the more ―loyal‖ is its own customer base. Homing costs include all the expenses incurred by technology 
users.754 When homing costs are low, customers can easily choose to adopt multiple technologies. 
 
31. Technological breakthroughs in subsystems 
When a new technology is shown to be feasible in the form of a prototype, it is often not yet 
commercially feasible because some of its components or subsystems are not ready for (mass) production. 
Advances and breakthroughs in these subsystems can enable the technology to move from prototype to 
commercially feasible product. In the case of the video game console the creation of large-scale integrated 
circuits (transistors and microprocessors) enabled console systems to have sufficient processing speed at 
an acceptable price.755  Other examples include Sony‘s electronic correction system in the CD-player 
architecture, high energy density batteries in PDA‘s and cell phones, microprocessors for personal 
computers. 
 
32. Technological knowledge and skill base 
The ability of a firm to enter a new market and develop a superior technology is dependent on its 
technological knowledge and skill base.756 For example, Sony‘s know-how for magnetic recording 
equipment enabled it to replicate a videotape recorder in three months and use this as the basis to develop 
its Betamax technology.757 When a firm invests in the development of a new technology (or purchases 
access to this knowledge) it expands its existing knowledge and skill base. What the firm can hope to do 
technologically in the future is often narrowly constrained by what it has been capable of doing in the 
past.  
 
33. Technological performance trajectories 
The impact of certain kinds of technological innovations on a given industry can be explained by the 
concept of technological performance trajectories.758 Bower and Christensen759 state that disruptive 
innovations are often not superior to existing technologies (the reason the mainframe-computer market is 
shrinking is not that personal computers outperform mainframes), but can create other important 
attributes that enable the whole technological architecture to change and open up new markets (which 
value these different attributes). Once disruptive technologies or technological architectures become 
established in their new (niche) markets, sustaining radical and incremental innovations can raise the 
architecture‘s performance along steep trajectories (as Bower and Christensen found in the disk-drive 
industry), so that the performance from the architecture soon satisfies the needs of customers in 
established (mass) markets. In effect, a technology which is confined to a particular niche market today, 
may very well migrate to mass markets tomorrow. When facing a technological performance trajectory, it 
is important for the current and future installed base that the product road map offers a smooth migration 
path to the ever improving technology.760 
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34. Technological superiority 
A technology is superior when it has features that allow it to outperform competing alternatives.761 These 
features comprise of the pure effect of technology (e.g. picture quality of video storage media), and 
differentiating features (e.g. the amount of video that can be recorded on a video tape). These 
differentiating features may enable a technology to better ‗fit‘ in the context in which it will be used.762 
The technological features can be myriad, and their relative importance in a technology competition 
depends on the preferences of the major customer segments. If we take audio storage, these features can 
encompass the level of audio playback quality, portability (e.g. size and shock resistance), amount of 
storage capacity, ease of navigating between audio files/tracks, etc. Other things being equal, the better a 
technology performs with respect to competing technologies, the higher the likelihood of adoption. While 
it pays to have a superb technology, this does not guarantee success.763 Even more so, the technology that 
is superior often does not become the industry standard.764 Grindley765 emphasizes the importance of 
developing an ‗adequate‘ technology aimed at ‗satisfying‘ users rather than optimal performance. Suarez766 
states that while technological superiority does not always play a significant role in platform competitions, 
it is in general reasonable to expect that technological superiority will play a greater role when there are 
large performance differences between a technology and its competing alternatives. According to 
Schilling767 and Smit and Pistorius,768 a large performance difference is often a prerequisite to overthrow 
the entrenched de-facto standard and fend off substitutes. Arthur769 specifically claims that the new 
technology should be ‗two to three times better in some dimension - price, speed, convenience‘. 
 
In the case of compatibility standards, the extent to which a technical specification (and compliance 
certification) ensures interoperability is part of its technological superiority, and affects the extent to 
which a sponsor will be able to harness the benefits of network effects. 
 
35. Type of technological innovation 
In accordance with the framework of Henderson and Clark770, a technology sponsor can develop a 
technology based on an incremental innovation, modular innovation, architectural innovation, or a radical 
innovation. This type of technological innovation impact the superiority of the technology, its backward 
compatibility, appropriability, ability to engage in collaborative development, and ability to build-up an 
organizational community to support the technology. 
 
A radical innovation typically offers better technical performance than an incremental innovation. 
However, an incremental innovation is inherently more likely to be backward compatible than a radical 
innovation.771 Regarding the appropriability, a radical innovation often provides possibilities to create 
intellectual property rights. This enables a technology sponsor to erect barriers to imitation. Fourthly, if a 
technology sponsor wants to engage in collaborative technology development, it needs to find a 
competitor that has a similar perspective on the required innovation (if the perspectives are opposing, the 
lack of a shared view will hamper the collaboration). Lastly, when a technology sponsor develops an 
architectural or radical innovation, it will find it harder to attract industry incumbents in an organizational 
community of supporters, because such firms are generally not inclined to support a technology that 
requires a different skill set or complementary assets. 
 
36. Unclear assessment criteria 
In the early stages of a new industry, or with the introduction of a radical new technology, customers 
often face ambiguity regarding the features that they value and require in a new technology. This is cause 
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by unawareness of the capabilities of the new technology or a need to explore its functionalities.772 In the 
stage when customer requirements are fluid, it is difficult to implement the technology in such a way that 
it meets customer requirements and gains traction in the market. This is an important determinant for a 
firm‘s entry timing in the market, and can be resolved through increasing returns to adoption. 
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Summary 
 
The emergence of a technology towards de-facto standard is a complicated, dynamic process whereby often 
many companies are involved. De-facto standards are established by market selection. However, the time 
required to move from research and development to becoming the de-facto standard can easily span more 
than ten years, challenged by changing customer preferences and a changing industry. 
 
Currently, research in the field of technology- and innovation-management has identified many elements that 
influence the process of de-facto standard emergence. Whereas some academics have generated 
comprehensive overviews of these elements, others have proposed simplified models, composed of several 
elements, aimed at clarifying how these interact and influence the success of a technology. The main 
shortcomings are 1) that elements itself do not provide insights in the dynamics of de-facto standard 
emergence, and 2) the simplified models (although they have merit) address only a part of the total picture 
and are therefore incomplete. 
 
This dissertation proposes an integrative framework and corresponding methodology for understanding the 
process by which a technology becomes the de-facto standard. This framework can be used to gain better 
insight how strategic decision making can shape the odds of a technology emerging as the de-facto standard. 
It thereby advances the ‗strategic-choice view‘ that has been advocated by institutional economists and 
focuses on strategic behaviours of firms to establish their technology as the de-facto standard. 
 
The framework was developed by creating a concept from a directed content analysis of the existing body of 
scientific literature. This integrated insights from different streams of literature. The concept was tested and 
improved through a multiple case study approach on technology competitions. The following technology 
competitions were studied: Blu-ray versus HD-DVD (high definition optical discs), MP3 (music storage and 
distribution), and Super Audio CD versus DVD-Audio (high definition audio discs). 
 
This research resulted in the following main findings: 
- Every technology that emerges as de-facto standard displays a unique path. This provides support to 
the notion that all technology competitions are unique, and therefore require a framework approach 
to support strategic decision making. 
- The results confirm that companies can shape the odds of their technology emerging as de-facto 
standard through strategic decision making, however the outcome does not solely rely on strategic 
decision making. 
- The emergence of a de-facto standard can be influenced by 34 unique elements (e.g. market 
mechanisms, models for creating a technology bandwagon, elements for shaping the odds of 
technology selection). Of these elements, 17 were found to be subject to strategic decision making. 
Companies can utilize these to shape the odds of their technology emerging as the de-facto standard. 
- The 34 elements can be divided into nine groups by first allocating them to three types of categories 
(i.e. firm-, technology-, and market/industry related), and subsequently segmenting them into those 
with a first, second and third order influence on a customer‘s decision to adopt a technology. These 
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nine groups form the basis for the integrative framework. Of the 34 elements, 12 were found to be 
firm-related, seven were technology-related, five were market/industry related, and 10 could be 
allocated to multiple categories. In terms of influence on a customer‘s decision to adopt a technology, 
16 elements have a first-order, 14 a second-order, three a third-order influence. One, the element of 
chance, could be attributed to all categories and levels, and was therefore excluded from the 
framework. 
- Many elements influence each other. In total 132 inter-element relationships were identified. 
- The emergence of a de-facto standard can be divided into six phases: R&D build-up, Preparing for 
market entry, Creating the market, Gaining critical mass, Winning the mass market, and Post 
dominance. My research confirms that each technology competition progresses through these phases. 
- When testing the integrative framework on several case studies, this provided a more comprehensive 
insight in technology competitions and the emergence of de-facto standards, leading to a better 
understanding of the dynamics and the differences / commonalities between technology 
competitions. In addition, it allowed better insight in the strategic approaches of the rival technology 
sponsors during the emergence of the de-facto standard. Lastly, the framework enabled an analysis on 
how, in hindsight, the losing side could have shaped odds of its technology to emerge as the de-facto 
standard 
- Out of the comprehensive number of elements that were found to influence each of the technology 
competitions, it was possible to identify a small subset of ‗key elements‘ that proved decisive in the 
process. These decisive elements, and their number, differ per case. 
 
The research led to the following main contributions: 
- The primary contribution is the integrative framework that can be used to support strategic decision 
making to shape the odds of a technology emerging as the de-facto standard. Its contribution is 
twofold: 
o Firstly the composition of the framework: the framework is comprised of 33 elements 
influencing the emergence of a de-facto standard, scoring options, phases and milestones in 
the emergence of a de-facto standard, and dynamics which are typical for each of the phases. 
Although the framework draws upon many findings from the existing body of academic 
literature, the novelty lies in the way these are combined. This enabled new insights in 
accordance with the findings described above. 
o Secondly the approach: the research in this dissertation confirmed that the emergence of 
every de-facto standard displays a unique ‗path‘, therefore the integrative framework is 
designed to cater to the variety and dynamics of technology competitions. It does so by 
combining the concept of phases with a ‗menu‘ of elements. Rather than providing a ‗recipe 
for success‘, the integrative framework supports the strategic decision maker through a series 
of questions. 
- Sixth phase in the process of de-facto standard emergence. Suarez1 claimed that de-facto standards 
emerge through five phases. This hypothesis is tested in my case studies, and these indeed support the 
                                                          
1 Suarez, F.F., Battles for technological dominance: an integrative framework, Research Policy, 33 (2), 2004, pp.271-286 
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five phases, but also that there is a sixth phase, Winning the Mass Market, that was previously not 
identified. 
- Common set of dynamics that govern technology competitions. By studying patterns between the 
case studies, the main attention points per phase were identified, providing guidance on the subset of 
elements that are especially relevant for each phase of the emergence of a de-facto standard. 
- Possibility of two-sided tipping. Academic literature has shown that de-facto standards emerge as a 
customer driven process, but the case of Blu-ray versus HD-DVD showed that a de-facto standard 
can also emerge through selection by manufacturers of complementary goods. In other words, 
‗tipping‘ caused through network effects does not only occur in the customer network, but also in the 
complementor network. Therefore, two-sided tipping is possible. 
- In my research, 34 unique elements were identified, thereby extending the current state-of-the-art by 
5 elements. Of these elements, three were newly found during the case studies, i.e. subsidizing 
providers of complementary goods, history of the industry, and accessibility of intellectual property 
rights. 
- Comprehensive overview of inter-element relationships, and a first glance on how they develop 
during the emergence of a de-facto standard. The research in this dissertation identified 132 inter-
element relationships, of which 114 from the body of literature and 18 from the case studies. This 
represents the first time that inter-element relationships have been thoroughly mapped. It adds to the 
field of the ‗strategic choice view‘ by providing a better understanding how various elements influence 
each other, and provides insight how the status of an element can be altered. In addition, the results 
show that inter-element relationships are dynamic: throughout the emergence of a de-facto standard 
the relationship between two elements may be intermittent, and the nature of the relationship (i.e. 
strong or weak influence, positive or negative effect) can change over time. 
- Integral view of the concepts ‗compatibility standard‘, ‗dominant design‘, and ‗platform‘. The 
phenomenon of de-facto standards is multi-faceted, whereby the concepts of ‗compatibility standard‘, 
‗dominant design‘ and ‗platform‘ highlight these different facets. The overlap and boundaries between 
the concepts is illustrated through 15 examples of de-facto standards.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Een technologie welke de positie van marktstandaard verovert legt een pad af dat gepaard gaat met 
complexiteit en dynamiek. Dit wordt mede ingegeven doordat vaak meerdere bedrijven hierbij betrokken zijn. 
Marktstandaarden komen tot stand door marktselectie, oftewel de voorkeur van de klant. Het proces om de 
positie van marktstandaard te veroveren neemt vaak lang in beslag, vanaf de initiële onderzoeksfase kan dit 
gemakkelijk meer dan tien jaar zijn. Gedurende deze tijd moeten bedrijven rekening houden met 
ontwikkelingen in klantvoorkeuren en wijzigingen in de industrie. 
 
In het academische veld van Technologie- en Innovatiemanagement is te zien dat academici vele factoren 
hebben geïdentificeerd welke de totstandkoming van een marktstandaard beïnvloeden. Sommigen hebben 
deze factoren samengevoegd tot complete overzichten, terwijl anderen een selectie van factoren in een 
versimpeld model hebben gevat. Dit alles om een beter inzicht te verkrijgen hoe het kan dat de ene 
technologie wel door de massamarkt wordt geaccepteerd, terwijl de andere faalt of slechts door een select 
aantal klanten wordt geaccepteerd. De belangrijkste tekortkomingen van de voorgaande studies zijn enerzijds 
dat de factoren op zichzelf niet in staat zijn om inzicht te geven in de dynamiek van een technologiestrijd, en 
anderzijds dat de versimpelde modellen een incompleet beeld geven. 
 
In dit proefschrift wordt inzicht gegeven hoe een technologie zich kan ontwikkelen tot marktstandaard. Dit 
gebeurt aan de hand van een raamwerk en een bijbehorende methodiek voor toepassing ervan. Door middel 
van het raamwerk kan beter inzicht worden verkregen hoe bedrijven strategische keuzes kunnen inzetten om 
de kans te vergroten dat hun technologie de positie van marktstandaard veroverd. Hierdoor kunnen de 
grenzen van het ‗strategische-keuze‘-veld worden verlegd. Dit veld wordt aangehangen door institutionele 
economen, en richt zich op het vraagstuk hoe bedrijven door strategisch manoeuvreren hun technologie tot 
marktstandaard kunnen promoveren. 
 
Het raamwerk is tot stand gekomen door eerst, middels een studie van de academische literatuur, een concept 
te ontwikkelen. In dit concept zijn inzichten van verschillende stromen uit de academische literatuur met 
elkaar verenigd. Vervolgens is dit concept getoetst en verbeterd door het toe te passen op een aantal gevallen 
waarin technologieën in onderlinge concurrentie strijden om de voorkeur van de klant. De volgende gevallen 
zijn bestudeerd: Blu-ray versus HD-DVD in de markt voor videodragers en -spelers, MP3 in de markt voor 
muziekopslag en -distributie, en Super Audio CD tegen DVD-Audio in de markt voor muziekdragers en -
spelers. 
 
Het onderzoek heeft tot de volgende bevindingen geleid: 
- Elke technologie welke de positie van marktstandaard verovert legt een uniek traject af. Deze 
bevinding ondersteunt de aanname dat niet een model, maar een raamwerk gebruikt moet worden om 
strategische keuzes te kunnen ondersteunen. 
- De resultaten van het onderzoek bevestigen dat bedrijven door middel van strategische keuzes de 
kans kunnen vergroten dat hun technologie de positie van marktstandaard verovert, maar laten ook 
zien dat de uitkomst niet enkel door strategische keuzes bepaald wordt. 
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- In totaal zijn 34 individuele factoren gevonden welke de totstandkoming van een marktstandaard 
beïnvloeden. 17 van deze factoren zijn onderhevig aan strategische keuzes. 
- De 34 factoren kunnen onderverdeeld worden in negen groepen, namelijk als factoren die toebedeeld 
kunnen worden aan eigenschappen van de firma, de technologie, en de markt/industrie, en die 
anderzijds een eerste-, tweede- of derde-orde-invloed op klantbeslissingen hebben. Deze negen 
groepen vormden de basis voor het verdere raamwerk. Van de 34 factoren zijn er 12 gerelateerd aan 
eigenschappen van de firma, zeven aan eigenschappen van de technologie, vijf aan eigenschappen van 
de markt/industrie, en tien factoren konden aan meerdere categorieën worden gerelateerd. In termen 
van klantbeïnvloeding, bleken 16 factoren een eerste-orde-invloed te hebben, 14 een tweede-orde-, en 
drie een derde-orde-invloed. Eén factor, namelijk de factor ‗toeval‘, bleek op alle categorieën en ordes 
van toepassing. Zodoende is deze factor niet opgenomen in het raamwerk. 
- Veel factoren beïnvloeden elkaar onderling. In totaal zijn 132 relaties tussen de factoren gevonden. 
- Technologieën welke de positie van markt-standaard veroveren gaan door een proces bestaande uit 
zes fases: technologie-ontwikkeling, voorbereiding op marktintroductie, creëren van de initiële markt, 
versnellen van de marktadoptie, overtuigen van de massa, en tot slot de fase na totstandkoming van 
de marktstandaard. Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift bevestigt dat elke technologiecompetitie deze 
fases doorloopt. 
- Tijdens het testen van het raamwerk bleek dat deze het mogelijk maakt om een fijnmazig beeld te 
verkrijgen van technologiecompetitie uit het verleden. Deze fijnmazigheid bleek noodzakelijk om de 
dynamiek van de technologiecompetities te begrijpen, en daarmee te kunnen verklaren waarom de ene 
technologie wel succesvol was terwijl de andere heeft gefaald. Bovendien heeft het raamwerk 
geholpen om de verschillen en overeenkomsten tussen de bestudeerde gevallen te identificeren. 
Daarnaast bleek dat het mogelijk was om de strategieën van de concurrerende partijen te achterhalen. 
Dit heeft ons een beter beeld gegeven van de strategische mogelijkheden, en hoe deze zich gedurende 
de technologiecompetitie kunnen ontwikkelen. Vanwege het holistische beeld dat dankzij het 
raamwerk verkregen werd, was het mogelijk om achteraf te analyseren welke opties de verliezer 
mogelijkerwijs had om zijn situatie te verbeteren, en op welk moment deze opties ingezet konden 
worden. 
- In elk van de bestudeerde gevallen werd een groot aantal factoren geïdentificeerd welke de 
totstandkoming van een marktstandaard beïnvloeden, maar het opmerkelijke was dat het telkens 
mogelijk was om achteraf enkele factoren aan te wijzen welke hierin doorslaggevend waren. Deze 
doorslaggevende factoren, en hun aantal, bleken echter per geval verschillend. 
 
Daarnaast heeft het onderzoek tot de volgende bijdragen aan het academische veld geleverd: 
- Het raamwerk is de voornaamste bijdrage aan het academisch veld, aangezien dit gebruikt kan worden 
om beter inzicht te geven hoe bedrijven strategische keuzes kunnen inzetten om de kans te vergroten 
dat hun technologie de positie van marktstandaard veroverd. De bijdrage van het raamwerk is 
tweeërlei: 
o Compositie van het raamwerk: het raamwerk is opgebouwd uit 34 factoren die invloed 
hebben op de totstandkoming van een marktstandaard, zes fases en bijbehorende mijlpalen, 
en een indicatie van de zaken die per fase van belang zijn. Hoewel een groot deel van de 
280_Erim_Uil_bw stand.job
 
264 
 
componenten individueel al in de literatuur te vinden is, zit de noviteit in de combinatie van al 
deze componenten en de wijze waarop deze gecombineerd zijn. Dit maakte de hierboven 
beschreven nieuwe bevindingen mogelijk. 
o De aanpak: de resultaten uit het onderzoek hebben bevestigd dat elke technologie welke de 
marktstandaard wordt een uniek traject doorloopt, zodoende is het raamwerk zodanig flexibel 
ontwikkeld dat het recht doet aan de grote variëteit en het dynamische proces waaraan 
technologiecompetities onderhevig zijn. Dit wordt gedaan door de gebruiker de juiste vragen 
op het juiste moment voor te leggen, in plaats van een ―succesformule‖ te presenteren zoals 
academici in het verleden dikwijls hebben gedaan 
- De identificatie van een additionele fase in de totstandkoming van een markt-standaard. In 2004 
stelde Suarez2 dat er vijf fases onderscheiden kunnen worden in de totstandkoming van een 
marktstandaard. Het onderzoek bevestigt deze vijf fases, maar heeft daarnaast een nieuwe fase 
gevonden: overtuigen van de massa. 
- Generieke vraagstukken in de fases van de technologie competitie. Na afloop van de drie bestudeerde 
technologiecompetities zijn de bevindingen naast elkaar gelegd en geanalyseerd. Hierbij zijn patronen 
gevonden die erop wijzen dat elke fase een aantal onderliggende vraagstukken kent. Deze dienen 
correct geadresseerd te worden wil een bedrijf de kans vergroten dat zijn technologie de 
marktstandaard wordt. Dit resulteerde in een overzicht van de voornaamste aandachtspunten per 
fase, en de daaraan gekoppelde factoren in het raamwerk. 
- Niet alleen de klant, maar ook de industrie kan de uitkomst van een technologiecompetitie bepalen. 
De industrie kan de uitkomst van de technologiecompetitie bepalen doordat zo veel bedrijven zich 
achter een technologie scharen dat de hele markt overgaat. De literatuur over de 
technologiecompetities die in dit proefschrift centraal staan gaat ervan uit dat de uitkomst bepaald 
wordt door de klant, bijvoorbeeld de consument. Deze maakt een keuze op basis van bepaalde 
voorkeuren, waarbij de technologie welke het meest gekozen wordt als winnaar uit de strijd komt. In 
de markt voor consumentenelektronica was het inderdaad typisch de consument die de keuze maakte 
voor de ene technologie of de andere. Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift laat echter zien dat de keus 
niet alleen bij de klant ligt, maar dat het aantal bedrijven dat zich achter een technologie schaart ook 
de doorslag kan geven. 
- Zoals eerder genoemd zijn 34 individuele factoren gevonden die de totstandkoming van een 
marktstandaard beïnvloeden. Hiermee wordt het tot nu toe meest complete overzicht met vijf 
factoren overschreden. Drie van deze elementen zijn geïdentificeerd tijdens het empirische deel van 
het onderzoek, en daardoor nieuw:  (1) subsidiëren van partijen die aanpalende producten en diensten 
leveren, (2) geschiedenis van de industrie (bijvoorbeeld ‗oud zeer‘ tussen bedrijven), en (3) 
toegankelijkheid van intellectueeleigendomsrechten.  
- Inventarisatie van relaties tussen factoren en een eerste beeld hoe deze zich gedurende de 
technologiecompetitie ontwikkelen. Veel voorgaande studies hebben zich gericht op het nauwkeurig 
vaststellen van een relatie tussen twee, of een paar, factoren. In dit proefschrift is deze schat aan 
inzichten bij elkaar gebracht, en gecomplementeerd met de inzichten uit de technologiecompetities 
die in het kader van dit proefschrift bestudeerd zijn. Dit resulteerde in een inventarisatie van 132 
                                                          
2 Suarez, F.F., Battles for technological dominance: an integrative framework, Research Policy, 33 (2), 2004, pp.271-286 
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relaties, waarvan 114 afkomstig uit de literatuur en 18 uit de bestudeerde technologiecompetities. 
Door deze inventarisatie is een beter beeld verkregen hoe de 34 factoren op elkaar inspelen, en aan 
welke knoppen bedrijven kunnen draaien om een bepaalde factor te beïnvloeden. Daarnaast hebben 
de resultaten aangetoond dat de relaties tussen de factoren niet statisch zijn, maar zich gedurende de 
technologiecompetitie ontwikkelen. Zo kunnen twee factoren elkaar in de ene fase beïnvloeden, en in 
de volgende fase niet meer. Daarnaast kan de invloed sterker of zwakker worden, of zelfs omslaan 
van een positief naar een negatief effect. 
- Integratie van de begrippen ‗compatibiliteitsstandaard‘, ‗dominant ontwerp‘, en ‗platform‘ die in de 
academische literatuur elk verwijzen naar het begrip ‗markt-standaard‘. Deze drie begrippen zijn 
echter wezenlijk verschillend, wat het lastig maakt om inzichten vanuit de hieraan gerelateerde 
gebieden met elkaar te verenigen. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat het concept ‗marktstandaard‘ meerdere 
facetten heeft, en de genoemde begrippen belichten elk een ander facet. Dit is gedaan door de 
overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen de drie begrippen te illustreren aan de hand van 15 
voorbeelden van marktstandaarden.  
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)THE EMERGENCE OF DE-FACTO STANDARDS
Increasingly, companies compete on technologies that bring together groups of users in
two-sided networks. Examples include smartphones and on-line search engines. Industries
governed by such platform technologies commonly show one emerging as the de-facto
standard. This is because these industries are prone to network externalities (i.e. when the
benefit that can be derived from a technology increases exponentially with the number of
users). Competitions for the de-facto standard are high-stakes games. These ‘winner-take-
all’ markets demonstrate very different competitive dynamics than markets in which many
competitors can coexist relatively peacefully, as they often have a single tipping point
which shifts market adoption to one particular technology. The academic field lacks a robust
clarification on how firms can shape the odds of their technology emerging as the de-facto
standard.
This study develops an integrative framework and corresponding methodology for
under standing the process by which a technology becomes the de-facto standard. By apply -
ing the framework to several technology competitions, insight is provided in how firm-,
technology- and market-related elements influence technology competitions. Results indi -
cate that the emergence of every de-facto standard displays a unique path. This path can
be divided into six phases, and can be influenced by 34 unique elements, of which 17 are
subject to strategic decision making. Patterns between technology competitions indicate a
common set of focal points per phase.
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zoek school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus
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Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research under taken by
ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm
relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
ad vanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research pro -
grammes. From a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity is
united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
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